Marine Corps amphibious doctrine faced trial by fire during Battle for Tarawa

28 Nov 2002 | Lance Cpl. Virgil P. Richardson Marine Corps Training and Education Command

At 2:15 a.m. on Nov. 20, Navy ships serving as Marine transports received orders to ?general quarters,? sending hundreds of Marines to their berthing areas. Although general quarters is a time most servicemen use to rest, last minute landing preparations were made and last rites were issued by chaplains. Instead of sleeping soundly, ships full of ?green? Marines lay awake in preparation for the impending attack on the island of Tarawa, a gruesome three-day battle that would both test and validate the necessity of the Marine Corps in amphibious combat situations.

The Marines had developed an amphibious doctrine that made them unique from all other Armed Forces. After Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, had signed the Manual for Landing Operations, much training had been invested to perfect the tactics, which were to that point relatively unknown. While many doubted the validity of the amphibious doctrine, the ?island hopping? campaign would prove its worth, one way or another.

The Marines had long since been regarded as America?s elite fighting force in ?every climb and place.?  That would need to prove true at Tarawa if the island was to be taken. Capturing the island and the airstrip it contained would virtually guarantee the success of the ?island hopping? campaign. In the moments before the pre-invasion bombardment began, the naval commander, Rear Adm. Howard F. Klingman, announced to the landing parties, ?Gentlemen, we will not neutralize Betio. We will not destroy it. We will obliterate it!?

At 5:05 a.m., the first wave of amtracks and Higgins boats moved in on the lagoon side of Betio. The formation was jolted to a stop 500 yards out by a reef, which the amtracks could climb over only with great difficulty. Simultaneously, a hail of Japanese fire opened up from the island, incinerating the lodged and incoming boats as well as mowing down the Marines wading ashore. Marines were forced to abandon their boats and swim ashore due to unexpectedly shallow waters. Few of the first wave survived. A few got through, and with the help of four successive waves, the Marines established a beachhead up to a four-foot sea wall. By nightfall, the Marines were pinned down on a stretch of beach 100 yards long and 20 feet inland. Rather than being obliterated, the Japanese Marines had barely been scratched by the naval and air bombardment. While a brief respite between bombardment and the landings had occurred, the Japanese had rushed to their gun posts and had delivered devastating fire. Because their communication lines had been cut, none of them knew what was going on. Therefore, according to the Bushido Code, each isolated soldier or group of soldiers was obliged to either fight to the death or commit suicide unless ordered otherwise. Consequently, Japanese resistance was fanatical. Some Japanese swam out to disabled amtracks that night and poured fire onto the Marines from the rear, silenced only at great cost to the Marines by destroying their own vehicle. A lone Japanese seaplane-turned-bomber easily inflicted casualties on the concentrated beachhead. In all, the first day on Betio had been very costly for the Marines: amtracks and Higgins boats littered the lagoon, wounded Marines lay everywhere, and dead bodies and parts of bodies were everywhere: out of 5,000 men, 1,500 were dead or wounded.

The U.S. commanders made three planning assumptions about Tarawa that also proved detrimental to the assault. One was that there was adequate communication for the mission, a key element in the amphibious doctrine. This turned out to be untrue. The other two assumptions the commanders made were that there would be sufficient water over Betio?s reef to permit Higgins boats to reach the shore and that preliminary bombardment by naval guns and aircraft would destroy the fortifications on the island.

These also proved wrong.

The early hours of day two brought much of the same. Only 450 of the 800 Marines who attempted to come ashore were successful. Even with these reserves, the exhausted Marines who had landed the night before regrouped and moved inland across the airstrip.

Finally, a high tide flooded the lagoon, allowing boats to pass over the reef and land directly on the beach. At noon, the tide rolled in, and so did Higgins boats filled with badly needed supplies. Morale restored, a new brotherhood developed in the ranks. Failure was no longer an option.

By dusk, the 6th Marines, after having secured the nearby island of Makin, paddled over the reef in rubber boats and landed on the western beach. There, they met up with Major Ryan?s ravaged western lagoon assault battalion. Reinforced, and having gained crucial ground, the second day came to an end. Marine Col. Michael Shoup radioed the daily situation report back to the command ships: ?Casualties: many. Percentage dead: unknown. Combat efficiency: we are winning.? Meanwhile, Admiral Shibasaki was sending his last radio message to Tokyo: ?Our weapons have been destroyed. From now on everyone is attempting a final charge. May Japan exist for 10,000 years!?

On the third day, all three battalions moved inland, with the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines sweeping up the southern shore of Betio. With infantry and flamethrower support, tanks blew apart the remaining fortifications in the central and western part of the island.

Taking out pillboxes, machine gun nests and snipers took up much of the third day. By nightfall, the Marines held western and central Betio. At twilight, Shibasaki?s troops made one final courageous suicide charge. They rushed the 6th Marines in almost overpowering numbers. The Marines began to break. In the crucial moments of the engagement, the command aboard the awaiting Naval vessel received a desperate request for reinforcement, saying, ?We are killing them as fast as they come at us, but we can?t hold much longer; we need reinforcements.? The commanders replied, ?We haven?t got them to send you. You?ve got to hold.? In the face of heavy losses, the 6th Marines wavered, but didn?t break. When dawn appeared, the Marines still held their positions.

After three days of intense fighting against all odds, the Marines had taken Tarawa. While any number of events could have changed the outcome of the gory battle, the Marines had endured when most men would not have.

Luck also played a part in the American success. A Japanese attack would have wiped the Marines off the island, as they were cut off from one another, and dangerously low on supplies. While circumstances were kind to the Marines, their determination ultimately won the battle.

Courage on Betio was so commonplace that many fantastic acts of heroism and self-sacrifice went unnoticed in the general sharing of danger. Marines routinely assaulted dug-in, elevated pillboxes at the cost of their safety or lives. Marines who would not have their deeds recorded, or recognized by earning a medal went about the deadly business of survival and winning a battle. Here and there small groups of Marines, most led by brave privates, took tiny patches of ground. The extraordinary requirement to wade across 700 yards of coral reef sharp enough to cut through combat boots, totally exposed to withering machine gun fire and accurately registered artillery salvos, was faced by almost every single Marine in the Division. That simple act required bravery and fortitude to succeed.

Tarawa did turn out to be a ?productive proving ground? for the amphibious doctrine. In fact, every subsequent move in the drive across the central pacific during the island hopping campaign was to be made with the mistakes of Tarawa in mind. The lessons learned and adjustments made to the doctrine helped take the Marshalls twice as fast with half the casualties. The practical lessons of amphibious warfare [at Tarawa] provided for adjustments and improvements in all six parts of the doctrine. What must be recognized and remembered about Tarawa was that it was the individual Marine, his courage, bravery and training which bought the victory and time for adjustment which sold the doctrine. The doctrine may have been sound, and the correct method may have been used to seize an enemy base, island or hostile shore, but it was in disarray and failing on Tarawa. It took the Marines to catch and save it from failure; Marines who relied on traditional bedrock foundations of the Corps. Edwin Hoyt put it best when he said, ?without the heroism of the Marines at Tarawa, the entire course of the Central Pacific might have changed.? Tarawa should not stand as the proof of amphibious doctrine alone, but as the symbol of raw courage and Marine tradition.

Marine Corps Training and Education Command