



USMC Civil Affairs Course Student Study Guide



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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Training and Education Command
Marine Corps Civil Military Operations School
Civil Affairs MOS Course
1019 Elliot Rd C466
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5001

STUDENT OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/15/2012

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

(1) Without the aid of a reference, identify who is responsible for Civil Military Operations by selecting the correct answer from a given list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify the five core tasks of Civil Affairs By selecting the correct answer from a given list of possible answers.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, define Civil Military Operations by selecting the correct answer from a given list of possible answers.

(4) Without the aid of a reference, define Civil Affairs by selecting the correct answer from a given list of possible answers.

(5) Without the aid of a reference, identify the table of organization for Civil Affairs teams by selecting the correct answer from a given list of possible answers.

1. BACKGROUND

a. **Complex Environment.** The modern complex operating environment means that the Marine Corps must plan and conduct operations using a combination of lethal and non-lethal operations - especially when conducting Stability Operations (STAB-OPS) and Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN). Instead of focusing on the force-on-force aspect of operations, units have been compelled by circumstances to adopt non-lethal means of combating the enemy, by focusing on influencing the human terrain.


To support this effort, the Marine Corps is employing Civil Affairs (CA) forces as the primary Subject Matter Experts (SME) to advise and/or execute Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Civil Military Operations (CMO).

b. **What CMO is Not.** CMO is not Civil Affairs, Information Ops, just for counter-insurgencies, administration, about making people feel good, or just for artillerymen.

c. **Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs.** We should begin with a quick examination of two terms: Civil-Military

Operations and Civil Affairs. They are often used interchangeably when discussing CMO; but they are not interchangeable. CMO are the *what*; the things you do operationally. They are the activities of a commander, not just things that CA Marines do. CMO is a command responsibility (cannot be delegated), and is ultimately the responsibility of the MAGTF commander. CA Marines are the *who* of CMO; they are the individuals/units specifically organized, tasked, and trained to conduct CMO. They are not the only ones who can conduct CMO, anyone can; however CA Marines are specifically trained and hold the MOS of 0530/0531 to conduct CMO. They are the commander's CMO SMEs. Keep in mind that CMO tasks in a given AO will usually far exceed the ability of available CA assets. CA Marines will assist in the planning and execution of CMO, but the majority of the effort will/may be conducted by other MAGTF forces.

The five CMO core tasks (FHA, CIM, SCA, NA, PRC) are represented by the pillars below.



(1) Civil-Military Operations (CMO). The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate

and achieve operational U.S. objectives (JP 3-57 Joint CMO July 2008).

(2) Civil Affairs (CA). Designated active and reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil military operations.

(a) CA is a term that only describes designated personnel and distinct units.

(b) CA Marines are the SMEs in the planning, coordination, and execution of CMO; however, the majority of the execution is conducted by the various elements of the MAGTF.

d. CMO and CA in the Spectrum of Conflict. CMO are conducted across the full spectrum of military operations, from peacetime engagement through major combat operations. When conducting CMO, commanders may employ a number of military capabilities and engage many different indigenous populations and institutions (IPI) to include intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and/or other host nation organizations. The Army and Marine Corps CA forces are among the capabilities available to the commander. CA forces support the commander during CMO in a variety of ways. It is instructive to briefly review the history of how the U.S. Armed Forces in general and the Marine Corps specifically have developed and employed CA forces and how they conduct CMO.

e. Marine Corps CMO History. The Marine Corps has been engaged in CMO activities since its inception. In the 20th & 21st Centuries, the Marine Corps has performed extensive CMO during many different campaigns all over the world. For example, the Marine Corps was involved in military interventions in several of the Caribbean and Latin-American nations as early as before World War I. The Marine Corps protected American citizens and business interests by intervening in the Dominican Republic (1916-1924), Haiti (1915-1934), and Nicaragua (1912-1933).

In addition to providing stability and security during these 'Small Wars,' Marines developed CA doctrine as they built roads and schools, taught local citizens how to become civil servants, and raised the overall standard of living for these countries. During World War II, 18 Marine Corps Staff CA Officers performed military government functions in the wake of fighting in Guam, Okinawa, and in postwar Japan; they performed similar functions

during the Korean War. The *Small Wars Manual* (1940) highlights civil military operations conducted pre-WWII.

The Vietnam War saw the development of the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) concept; the Corps' first attempt to create an active duty CA operational capability. From 1965 to 1971, the purpose was to organize and support individual Vietnamese villages throughout the northern I Corps area of South Vietnam. In addition there were large-scale pacification projects being conducted by larger units and their staffs. The Marine Corps also conducted comprehensive CMO, using both CA units and combat units, in Panama, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and in the Horn of Africa.

f. **Marine Corps CA Forces.** The first substantial active duty CA capability in the Marine Corps was the CAPs. In 1966, the first Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG) was activated on the east coast as part of Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES). This was followed by the activation of the 3rd CAG in 1985. During the Cold War, these units were deemed to be sufficient to handle most of the CMO requirements, as well as Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief operations that frequently occurred throughout the world.

In 2001, when the Corps, as well as the rest of the U.S. Armed Forces, found itself facing a series of challenges (Afghanistan, Iraq) that strained the reserve forces' CA capacity. In 2004 this led to the creation of the first provisional CAG, the 5th, formed from MARFORRES units. A 6th CAG was created shortly after the 5th CAG. Though both have been disbanded, they were able to relieve the pressure that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) had placed on the 3d and 4th CAGs. The 3rd and 4th CAGs deployed 3 times each from 2003-2007.

Sensing the challenges the Corps was facing in the GWOT, particularly in the CMO arena, the Commandant ordered the establishment of 173 active duty Marine CA billets. The active duty Marines would be distributed throughout the Corps and assigned to staffs at the MEF, MARDIV, RCT, and MEU level beginning in FY 08.

Additionally, the Commandant directed through ALMAR 061/05 in 2005 that each artillery regiment would be assigned a secondary CMO Mission. The assignment of this secondary CMO mission created a misperception that Artillery forces had been assigned a mission of providing provisional Civil Affairs Groups. 5/10

served as the 'CMO Force' in support of II MEF (FWD) in 2007. Although 5/10, 2/11 and 2/10 are all differently designated, they all performed essentially as Provisional CAG's.

2. CMO AND THE MAGTF

a. **Support.** CA forces provide the MAGTF commander with expertise on the civil component of the operational environment. The commander uses CA capabilities to analyze and influence the human terrain through specific processes and dedicated resources and personnel. As part of the commander's CMO, CA forces conduct activities nested within the overall mission and intent. CA forces ensure the legitimacy and credibility of the mission by providing advice on how to best meet the moral and legal obligations to the people affected by military operations. The key to understanding the role of CA is recognizing the importance of leveraging each relationship between the command and every individual, group, and organization in the operational environment to achieve a desired effect.

In simpler terms, the wartime mission of CA forces is to assist the commander in keeping the civilians out of the way on the battlefield and to help gain the support of the civilian populace to reduce interference with military operations. In peacetime, Marine Corps CA forces engage in humanitarian and relief operations as well as conduct various surveys and assessments for non-U.S. militaries and governments.

b. **Tasks.** The Activities of the Marine Corps CA Force are governed by the Marine Corps Task (MCT) list. The two primary tasks are Conduct CMO and Conduct CA operations (CAO). Typically, Marines do not conduct CAO as this is more accurately a reference to the functional specialties found in the Army CA force (i.e. a medical or veterinary doctor, lawyer, etc.). As a CA Marine you are considered a generalist whereas CA Soldiers are more specialized according to their functional areas.

c. **Planning.** CMO are an inherent command responsibility. CMO are integral to every operation; they are performed throughout the spectrum of operations, from Phase 0 (shape) through Phase 5 (transition). CMO should be coordinated with the interagency, IGOs and NGOs where applicable and the host nation government. All elements of the MAGTF can perform CMO. CMO are essential when utilizing Logical Lines of Operation (LOOs). Failure to consider the civil dimension when planning combat operations will often prevent smooth transition to phases 4 (stabilize) and 5.

3. STAFF AND RELATED CAPABILITIES

a. Staff Integration. It is imperative to integrate a CA representative with the MAGTF staff. It is now common to have a C9 or G9 assigned to the commander's staff. At the regimental level, the CA Detachment officer-in-charge may determine that a distinct CMO cell is the most efficient means to support the MAGTF staff planning and integration. To further support operations, a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) may be established to coordinate actions with host nation officials, NGOs and IGOs operating within the area of operations.

b. CMO and Intelligence. Marines must remember that CA forces are not intelligence operatives and must not be perceived as such by the local population. Should this happen, they may find themselves compromised and unable to function effectively. However, CA Marines should remember the following:

(1) CA Dets and Teams must share information and atmospherics about the civil dimension of the AO with the supported G-2 / S-2.

(2) The G-2 / S-2 may provide intelligence on enemy forces and capabilities to the supporting CA element in order to enhance their situational awareness and their understanding of the human terrain in the area of operations.

(3) Only by working together and sharing information can a common relevant operating picture of the area of operations be developed, especially in COIN operations.

The CA Group S-2 normally directs and supervises the unit intelligence collection effort and incorporates the information gained into the available data base. Once in the data base it can be easily accessed by other intelligence specialists in the MAGTF.

c. CMO and Information Operations. During the planning process, every CA mission must be analyzed to consider the possible impact it will have on Information Operations (IO) being conducted in the AO. Every CA mission has an IO impact; all words and deeds will be measured and evaluated by the local population.

Ideally, CMO should reinforce IO being conducted by the MAGTF or at the very least should not contradict it. CA Marines are well positioned to assess the effectiveness of IO campaigns; they

have frequent interactions with the local population. The CA Marines should share information with the supported units' staff IO officer and keep the IO officer informed of the team's mission in order to reinforce IO themes, assess the impact of IO, and to help fine-tune future IO campaigns.

Regarding IO, all members of the MAGTF team should speak with one voice. It is important to coordinate your activities with everyone who has a stake in IO. The stakeholders include but are not limited to the MAGTF Staff, CAGs, Public Affairs, and planners.

d. **CMO, PAO and IO**. All three entities must work together to get the most out of each and every activity. Normally, the IO officer convenes an IO targeting board or cell that meets every day. The Marine Corps is currently studying the recommendation that IO personnel be assigned down to the infantry company level, since it is at the tactical level where much of the relevant IO battle is fought and won.

4. **ORGANIZATION**

a. **Civil Affairs Group (CAG)**. The CAG is authorized to have 156 personnel. The 156 Marines and Sailors consist of 54 comprise the HQ and Staff, 2 in the public health sections, and 4 detachments of 25. This is the normal peacetime organizational structure based on the Aug 2008 Table of Organization and Equipment. The CAG has a Staff and HQ element, a public health element, and four identical CA Detachments, each with three Civil Affairs Teams.

b. **CAG Table of Organization (T/O) for Major Combat Operations**. When activated, a CAG provides CA support to a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The CAG is organized with a group headquarters and four CA detachments. The group headquarters is organized into a command section and staff sections, along with communications, motor transport, and public health sections. The group headquarters provides the nucleus of CA staff support to the MEF command element, and command and control of subordinate CA elements. In garrison, the CAG headquarters is responsible for training and equipping subordinate elements, preparing them for deployment, and coordinating their support to the operating forces. CAGs are multipurpose units, equipped with a variety of skills, expertise, and experience. When activated, the CAG enhances the ability of the MAGTF to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO. Elements of the CAG will form the nucleus of a MEF G9.

c. **CMO Planners per 202k**

(1) Regiments

(a) 1 Major and 1 GySgt per Regiment

(2) MEUs

(a) 1 Major and 1 GySgt per MEU

(3) MEFs

(a) 2 LtCols and 1 GySgt per MEF

(b) III MEF has only 1 LtCol Assigned

d. **CA Support to MAGTF.** The CAG will typically be mobilized to support the MEF. The CAG HQ section will augment the existing MEF CMO planners to establish the core of the MEF G-9 (CMO staff section); the detachments will be placed in a direct support or attached support relationship to subordinate Infantry Regiments as required.

e. **The CA Team.** A CA team supports the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or major subordinate element of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), such as an infantry battalion. A CA team helps the MAGTF plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO. The best supporting relationship for a CA team is attached. The CA team provides a tactical CA augmentation to the existing T/O MEU CMO planners (one 0530 Maj and one 0531 GySgt). Like CA Dets, CA Teams can be task organized and provide more security elements, interpreters, etc. Current T/O for Active Component CA Teams is 7 CA personnel, while Reserve Component CA Teams have 5 personnel.

5. **OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

a. **Other DoD and USG Capabilities.** Due to limited resources and manpower, it is beneficial to assess other elements of the joint force as well as the U.S. interagency community, multinational partners and NGO / IGOs.

b. **U.S. Army Civil Affairs.** May 2006, U.S. Army transferred operational command and control of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command from U.S. Army Special Operations Command to the U.S. Army Reserve Command.

- (1) 18% (800) in Active Component
 - (a) 95th Civilian Affairs Brigade (Airborne)
- (2) 82% (3,550) in Reserve Component
 - (a) 4 Civil Affairs Commands

c. **U.S./Allied Government Agencies.** Often will be seen as members of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) or the U.S. mission (embassy) in the host nation.

- (1) UK runs Helmand PRT
- (2) United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
- (3) Department of Agriculture
- (4) Department of State
- (5) Justice Department
- (6) UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office
- (7) UK DFID

d. **Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs).** IGOs may not have the same mission or objectives as the DoD. They are bureaucratic in nature and are not under U.S. control.

e. **Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).** NGOs are transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (UNESCO). They may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief).

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STUDENT OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION TO USMC SMALL WARS

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 04/25/2014

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

(1) Without the aid of a reference, define "irregular warfare" by selecting the correct answer from a given list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify five irregular warfare activities by selecting the correct answer from a given list of possible answers.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, define stability operations by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(4) Without the aid of a reference, identify the five stability functions by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(5) Without the aid of a reference, define Counterinsurgency (COIN) by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(6) Without the aid of a reference, identify how counterinsurgency relates to civil-military operations by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(7) Without the aid of a reference, identify what civil-military considerations are important in a COIN environment by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(8) Without the aid of a reference, define three COIN approaches by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

1. **IRREGULAR WARFARE**. Irregular warfare is defined as, "A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)." (JP 1-02)

a. **Irregular Warfare Problem**. The Joint Irregular Warfare Operating Concept describes the irregular warfare problem as: "Adaptive adversaries such as terrorists, insurgents, and criminal networks as well as states will increasingly resort to irregular forms of warfare as effective ways to challenge conventional military powers. Advances in technology and other trends in the environment will render such irregular threats

ever more lethal, capable of producing widespread chaos, and otherwise difficult to counter. These threats are enmeshed in the population and increasingly empowered by astute use of communications, cyberspace, and technology, such that their impact extends regionally and globally. Many of these conflicts are essentially contests for influence and legitimacy over relevant populations."

b. **Five Principal Activities.** There are five activities or operations that are undertaken in sequence, in parallel, or in blended form in a coherent campaign to address irregular threats: counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (StabOps). In addition to these five principal activities, there are related activities including strategic communications, information operations of all kinds to include military information support operations, civil-military operations, and support to law enforcement, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations to counter irregular threats.

2. **SMALL WARS.** Small wars may be defined, "as applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation." (Small Wars Manual)

a. **Small Wars History.** The Marine Corps' role in small wars is not new. During the early years of the 20th century, the Corps was widely viewed as the nation's overseas police and response force. This was a natural adjunct to expeditionary operations and using the mobility of the Navy to provide timely intervention in foreign affairs on behalf of American interests.

b. **The Small Wars Manual.** As a result of the experiences of a series of guerrilla wars and military interventions in Central America and the Caribbean from the late 1890s through the early 1930s - the Banana Wars - the Marine Corps began to systematically analyze the character and requirements of operations short of major war - "small wars." Between 1921 and 1935 a series of official reports and professional articles were written to capture and share the operational experiences gained in these interventions. The results of these efforts were encapsulated in the manual, *Small Wars Operations* in 1935. For the 1940 revision, it was renamed the *Small Wars Manual*.

c. **Small Wars Relevance.** The Small Wars Manual remains relevant today as the foundation of much of the current irregular warfare, StabOps and COIN thinking and doctrine. The Small Wars Manual emphasizes that interorganizational coordination is indispensable to all small wars operations, that every intervention is unique - both in terms of the circumstances of its inception, as well as the nature of U.S. interests prompting intervention and that diplomatic and military actions should complement each other, forming part of a coherent, harmonized regional strategy that promotes U.S. interests.

3. **STABILITY OPERATIONS.** "Stability operations are various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief." (JP 3-07)

a. **DoD Instruction 3000.05.** The Secretary of Defense signed Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3000.05 on 11 Sep 09. It provides the military force with definitive guidance to conduct stability operations and requires military services to "be prepared to conduct [stability operations] with the proficiency equivalent to combat operations."

b. **Elements of a Stable State.** Human security, economic and infrastructure development, governance and rule of law are elements of a stable state. While these elements can be analyzed individually, it is better to view them as a whole system. The stability of the state depends upon how well these elements are performed, the manner in which they interact, and the commitment of key members of that society in maintaining or promoting a standard acceptable to the populace.

c. **Integrated Approach.** The 'whole of government' approach integrates collaborative efforts of the interagency to achieve unity of effort towards a shared goal. The Department of State (DoS) is charged with responsibility for leading a whole-of-government approach to stabilization that includes the array of U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies, including DoD and component services and agencies. Within this broad approach, the primary military contribution to stabilization is to protect and defend the population, facilitating the personal security of the people and thus, creating a platform for political, economic, and human security.

d. **U.S. Institute of Peace Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction**. The accomplishment of stability requires unity of effort as civilian organizations have separate and distinct chains of command. The principles highlight complexities associated with conducting interagency and coalition operations and are found in the U.S. Institute of Peace *Guiding Principles of Stabilization and Reconstruction*:

(1) Host Nation [HN] Ownership and Capacity. The affected country must drive its own development needs and priorities even if transitional authority is in the hands of outsiders.

(2) Political Primacy. A political settlement is the cornerstone of a sustainable peace. Every decision and every action has an impact on the possibility of forging political agreement.

(3) Legitimacy. Legitimacy has three facets: the degree to which the HN population accepts the mission and its mandate or the government and its actions; the degree the government is accountable to its people; and the degree regional neighbors and the broader international community accepts the mission and the HN government.

(4) Unity of Effort. Unity of effort begins with a shared understanding of the environment. It refers to cooperation toward common objectives over the short and long term, even when the participants come from different organizations with diverse operating cultures.

(5) Security. Security is a cross-cutting prerequisite for peace. The lack of security is what prompts stabilization efforts. Security creates the enabling environment for development.

(6) Conflict Transformation. Conflict transformation guides the strategy to transform resolution of conflict from violent to peaceful means. It requires reducing drivers of conflict and strengthening resiliencies across political, security, rule of law, economic, and social spheres, while building HN capacity to manage political and economic competition through peaceful means.

(7) Regional Engagement. Regional engagement entails encouraging the HN, its neighboring countries, and other key

States in the region to partner in promoting both the HN's and the region's security and economic and political development. It has three components: comprehensive regional diplomacy, a shared regional vision, and cooperation.

e. **Range of Military Operations**. The term 'Range of Military Operations' (ROMO) applies to the joint force. The foundations for MAGTF operations conducted outside the United States and its territories are reflected across the ROMO: continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.

f. **Joint Campaign Phases**. Although joint force commanders determine the number and actual phases, use of the operational phasing model provides a flexible model to arrange smaller, related operations. Major operations and campaigns are generally arranged in six phases: Shape, Deter, Seize Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, and Enable Civil Authority.

g. **Joint Campaign Construct**. Military operations are the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. These combinations are manifested in operations designed to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative using the mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities. Offensive and defensive tasks focus on the lethal effects of combat power; stability tasks emphasize non-lethal effects.

4. **FUNCTIONS**. Stability operations function as a framework; they are a tool to help visualize the conduct of an operation, sequence necessary activities within an operation, and develop appropriate priorities for those activities and resource allocation. Individually, the functions encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that constitute stability activities in a functional sector. The stability functions are:

- Security
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Economic Stabilization & Infrastructure
- Rule of Law
- Governance & Participation

a. **Security Function**. Security activities seek to protect and control civil populations, property and territory. They may

be performed as part of a military occupation during or after combat, to help defeat an insurgency or in response to a humanitarian disaster. They seek ultimately to reassure rather than compel. Security activities conclude successfully when civil violence is reduced to a level manageable by HN law enforcement authorities.

(1) Security Responses. A safe and secure environment is one in which the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent, or large-scale violence. Such an environment is characterized by an end to large-scale fighting; an adequate level of public order; the subordination of accountable security forces to legitimate state authority; the protection of key individuals, communities, sites, and infrastructure; and the freedom for people and goods to move about the country and across borders without fear of undue harm to life and limb.

b. Humanitarian Assistance Function. Includes programs conducted to meet basic human needs to ensure the social well-being of the population. Social well-being is characterized by access to and delivery of basic needs and services (water, food, shelter, sanitation and health services), provision of education, return or voluntary resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict and restoration of a social fabric and community life.

c. Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure Function. Includes programs conducted to ensure an economy in which people can pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a predictable system of economic governance bound by law. A sustainable economy is characterized by market-based macroeconomic stability, control over the illicit (black market) economy and economic-based threats to the peace, development of a market economy, and employment generation.

d. Rule of Law Function. Refers to programs conducted to ensure all individuals and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are held accountable to the law, which is supreme. The rule of law in a country is characterized by just legal frameworks, public order, accountability to the law, access to justice, and a culture of lawfulness. Rule of law requires laws that are publicly disseminated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles.

e. **Governance & Participation Function.** Governance and participation refers to programs conducted to help the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state. Stable governance is characterized by a government that provides essential services and serves as a responsible steward of public resources; government officials who are held accountable through political and legal processes; and a population that can participate in governance through civil society organizations, an independent media, and political parties. Stable governance is the mechanism through which basic human needs of the population are largely met, respect for minority rights is assured, conflicts are managed peacefully through inclusive political processes, and competition for power occurs nonviolently.

5. **INSURGENCY.** The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24)

a. **Insurgency Paradigm.** COIN is an extremely complex form of warfare. At its core, COIN is a struggle for the population's support. The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to success. Gaining and maintaining that support is a formidable challenge.

b. **Insurgents.** Political power is the central issue in insurgencies; insurgents aim to get the people to accept their governance or authority as legitimate. Insurgents use all available tools: political, informational (religious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs), military, and economic.

c. **Elements of an Insurgency.** The proportion of each element relative to the larger movement depends on the strategic approach the insurgency adopts. A conspiratorial approach does not pay much attention to combatants or a mass base. Military-focused insurgencies downplay the importance of a political cadre and emphasize military action to generate popular support. The "people's war" approach is the most complex: if the state presence has been eliminated, the elements exist openly; if the state remains a continuous or occasional presence, the elements maintain a clandestine existence.

d. **Motives.** Primary motivations are old/new grievances, greed, or ideology. The motivations drive the type of approach insurgents will use. Approaches include:

(1) The conspiratorial approach (Russian Revolution)

(2) A Military-focused approach ("Foco" insurgency waged by Che Guevara in Bolivia)

(3) An urban approach (used by the IRA in Ireland, and Northern Ireland)

(4) The protracted popular war approach (China)

(5) Identity or ethnic focused insurgency (Mau Mau in Kenya, Taliban in Afghanistan, Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka)

e. **Dynamics of an Insurgency.** Many insurgencies utilize combinations of several different dynamics. The interplay of these dynamics influences an insurgency's approach and organization. Effective counterinsurgents identify the organizational pattern these dynamics form and determine if it changes. For example, insurgents operating in an urban environment usually form small, cohesive, secretive organizations. In contrast, insurgents following a military-focused strategy often operate in a rural environment and exploit international support to a greater extent. A change in location or the amount of external support might lead insurgents to adjust their approach and organization.

f. **Mobilization.** The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy. Insurgents and counterinsurgents seek to mobilize popular support for their cause. Both try to sustain that struggle while discouraging support for their adversaries. Regardless of approach, an insurgency will not be ultimately successful without support of the indigenous population.

g. **Phases of an Insurgency.** Insurgencies are dynamic but often occur in three distinct, separate phases. While not all insurgencies experience such phased development and progression, examples based on Mao Zedong's theory of protracted war are numerous:

(1) **Strategic Defensive** - Latent and Incipient (Preliminary Phase). Government is stronger and insurgents must concentrate on survival and building support.

(2) **Strategic Stalemate** - Guerilla War (Equilibrium Phase). Opposing forces roughly about equal and guerilla warfare becomes most important activity.

(3) Strategic Counteroffensive - War of Movement (Final Phase). Insurgency is stronger than government.

6. **COUNTERINSURGENCY**. Insurgency and COIN are included within the broad irregular warfare category. COIN involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the armed forces cannot succeed in COIN alone - it is a whole of government effort!

a. **Definition**. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes (JP 1-02). COIN consists of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. This is a good starting point; but it does not properly highlight a key paradox. Insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that have been called revolutionary war or internal war; however, they are distinctly different types of operations.

b. **Statistics**. The purpose of America's armed forces is to fight and win the Nation's wars. Throughout history the armed forces have been called on to perform many tasks beyond pure combat. This has been particularly true during the conduct of COIN operations. COIN requires forces to be ready both to fight and to build, depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors. To illustrate this point, Dr. David Kilcullen has posed that:

(1) 83% of wars since 1815 have been irregular wars (17% have been state vs state)

(2) 14 years to defeat insurgents once an insurgency develops (RAND)

(3) Successful COIN 15-20 years

(4) Unsuccessful COIN 9-15 years

c. **Conduct COIN**. CMO are central to conducting COIN activities. Effective CMO requires close cooperation with national, international, and local interagency partners. These partners are not under military control so unity of action and unity of effort is paramount. The military's role is to provide protection, identify needs, facilitate CMO, and use improvements

in social conditions as leverage to build networks and mobilize the population to resist insurgents.

d. **Understand the Operational Environment.** Successful COIN depends on a thorough understanding of the society and culture within which it is conducted. Marines must possess the following within the area of operation's cultural context:

(1) Possess a clear appreciation of the essential nature and nuances of the conflict.

(2) Understand motives, strengths, and weaknesses of the insurgents.

(3) Possess knowledge of all key actors and their role in the area of operations.

e. **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).** Evaluating an insurgency is difficult. Insurgent organizational structures are functionally based and continually adaptive. Attempts to apply traditional order of battle factors and templates can produce oversimplified, misleading conclusions. Applying a civil lens to traditional IPB processes helps to inform the commander as to the true nature of the environment.

f. **Civil Preparation of the Battlespace (CPB) in COIN.** CPB involves developing an understanding of the environment through the lens of the population and is critical to the success of operations. It includes rigorous analysis, with emphasis on the following:

- (1) Political Structures
- (2) Cultural Topography
- (3) Key Infrastructure
- (4) Lines of Communications
- (5) Weather and Terrain

g. **Civil Considerations.** Through civil reconnaissance and using the tenets of Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, Time available (METT-T) you are only able to form a partial understanding of the operational environment. Adding the C - Civil considerations - will expose other factors to include:

- (1) Organization of key groups in the society
- (2) Relationships and tensions among groups
- (3) Ideologies and narratives/mythologies

- (4) Values of groups, interests, and motivations
- (5) Means by which groups communicate
- (6) The society's leadership system

h. **Operational Variables.** The operating environment typically refers to the physical or tangible characteristics of the local area. The CPB process uses civil considerations in the form of ASCOPE-PMESII [ASCOPE (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events) and PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure)] and cultural context to help identify this information. For example, CPB does not simply generate a list of facts about the operating environment; it is supposed to reveal relevant factors about the local population and the relationship to the Marine mission. An example would be to not only identify that the local government is dominated by one tribal group, but also that inequity undermines the legitimacy and support for the government among other tribes.

i. **ASCOPE / PMESII Crosswalk.** Technique that fuses cultural considerations and operational variables to create the most comprehensive Common Operational Picture (COP) possible.

7. **COIN PRINCIPLES.** COIN operations are complicated; even when the principles are followed success is not guaranteed. This paradox is present in all forms of warfare but is most obvious in COIN. However, understanding the principles helps illuminate the challenges inherent in defeating an insurgency.

a. **Legitimacy.** It is important to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. This may be achieved by balancing the application of both military and non-military means. All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Those considered legitimate rule primarily with the consent of the people. Governments described as illegitimate tend to rely on coercion - citizens obey out of fear. Legitimacy makes it easier for a state to carry out its key functions. There are six indicators of legitimacy: security for the populace, leader selections are frequent and consider fair, participation in the political process exists, corruption is at an acceptable level, political, economic and social development is acceptable and a high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.

b. **Unity of Effort.** Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of COIN operations. This is typically achieved by working through non-military agency liaisons.

c. **Political Factors.** The political and military aspects of insurgencies are so bound together, that they are considered inseparable. Military actions executed without properly assessing their political effects, at best will result in reduced effectiveness and at worst are counterproductive. Most insurgencies require a political solution.

d. **Understand the Operational Environment.** See above.

e. **Intelligence Drives Operations.** Effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force.

f. **Isolate Insurgents from their Cause and Support.** A method to cut off support is to redress the social, political and economic grievances that fuel the insurgency. As the HN government increases its legitimacy, the populace will begin to actively participate in government.

g. **Security.** The cornerstone of any COIN effort is to establish security for the civilian populace. Permanent reforms cannot be achieved without a secure environment. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they lose public support. Using a legal system established in line with local culture and practices to deal with such criminals enhances the HN government's legitimacy.

h. **Long-Term Commitment.** COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources. The populace may prefer the HN government to the insurgents; however, people do not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the counterinsurgents have the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. U.S. support can be crucial to building public faith in that government's viability.

8. **COIN IMPERATIVES.** Recent COIN experiences have identified an important set of imperatives to promote success.

a. **Manage Information and Expectations.** Skillful counterinsurgents manage information and expectations. The HN government and the counterinsurgents build support by creating and maintaining a realistic set of expectations among the populace. Actions should match the commitments or promises. IO can be a resource when managing information and expectations.

b. **Appropriate Level of Force.** Counterinsurgents should calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who employs it for any operation.

c. **Learn and Adapt.** Skillful counterinsurgents will adapt at least as fast as insurgents. Every unit should be able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. An effective system should be developed to circulate best practices throughout the command.

d. **Empower the Lowest Levels.** Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding.

e. **Support the Host Nation.** U.S. forces committed to a COIN effort are there to assist a HN government. The long-term goal is to leave a government in a position to stand by itself.

9. **APPROACHES TO COIN OPERATIONS.** There are many approaches to achieving success in a COIN effort; and the components of each are not mutually exclusive. The approaches listed may be modified or combined, depending on the environment and available resources. The following three approaches have been proven effective: clear-hold-build, combined action and limited support.

a. **Clear-Hold-Build.** COIN efforts should begin by controlling key areas. Security and influence then spread out from secured areas. This approach aims to develop a long-term, effective HN government framework and presence that secures the people and facilitates meeting their basic needs. Success reinforces the HN government's legitimacy.

b. **Combined Action.** Combined action involves joining a U.S. rifle squad or platoon with a HN platoon or company, respectively. Commanders use this approach to hold and build while providing a persistent counterinsurgent presence among the populace. Combined action units are not designed for offensive operations; they rely on more robust combat units to perform this task. A combined action program can work only in areas with limited insurgent activity. Combined action is most effective after an area has been cleared of armed insurgents.

c. **COIN with Limited Support.** Not all COIN efforts require large combat formations. In many cases, U.S. support is limited, focused on missions like advising security forces and

providing fire support or sustainment. The longstanding U.S. support to the Philippines is an example of such limited support. The limited support approach focuses on building HN capability and capacity. Under this approach, HN security forces are expected to conduct combat operations, including any clearing and holding missions.

10. **HISTORICALLY SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES**. In the past success has been achieved by doing the following:

- Maintain a constant, forward presence with the population
- Acquire and disseminate accurate and timely intelligence
- Avoid overreaction to insurgent activity; for example, limit civilian casualties
- Ensure the population has a basic level of essential services
- Emphasize countermeasures against IEDs/mines and booby traps
- Control access to weapons, uniforms, and other supplies that the insurgents may use
- Protect industry and public services from attack and sabotage
- Demonstrate support for the government and population in the local area

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Training and Education Command
Marine Corps Civil Military Operations School
Civil Affairs MOS Course
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STUDENT OUTLINE

CIVIL AFFAIRS METHODOLOGY

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/15/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

(1) Without the aid of a reference, identify the six steps of the CA Methodology, from a list of possible answers with 100% accuracy.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, define METT-TC, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers with 100% accuracy.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, define ASCOPE, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers with 100% accuracy.

1. CA METHODOLOGY

a. **Background.** Marines are very familiar with the lethal aspect of operations. When applying lethal force, MAGTF planners employ a process known as targeting methodology. Targeting methodology involves identifying a target, deciding which means to use to engage that target, the actual engagement of the target, the assessment that follows to determine whether the desired effect was achieved, re-engagement of the target if necessary, and then the transition from that target to the next.

Targeting is the process the maneuver commander uses to focus the fire support, intelligence, and command and control warfighting functions to achieve his intent. The process is continuous and is used to translate the commander's intent into a plan. The targeting process uses a methodology called D3A (DECIDE-DETECT-DELIVER-ASSESS). The elements of D3A enables the commander to determine what to attack with fire support systems and how to acquire those targets; when those targets are found determine how to attack them in a way that disrupts, delays or limits the enemy's ability to respond.

Similarly, CA forces use a process called the CA methodology. This process is specifically designed to achieve effects within the civil dimension that aid the maneuver commander in achieving his objectives.

b. **Need.** The need for Civil Affairs forces to develop their own targeting methodology has been apparent for a number of years. From the tactical level all the way up to the strategic level, the cumulative effect of CMO can have strategic

consequences. This requires a level of analysis that enables the CMO planner to see through the fog of war and determine what is actually occurring on the ground in regards to the civilian population. In the past, CA forces and CMO planners were improperly employed or excluded from the planning process.

Failure to use CA assets in the analysis of political, economic, and social bases of instability may result in inadequate responses to the root causes of the instability. The result could be the initiation or continuation of conflict.

c. **CA Marines and CMO Planners.** CA Marines, including CMO planners, must see the area of operations differently. They must look at the AO the way Marines usually do and be attuned to aspects of the civil dimension as well.

The way CA Marines do this is by applying the CA Methodology. It is similar to the methodology the S-2 uses to develop the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). In this regard, CA Marines can use CA Methodology as a lens, which will allow them to focus primarily on understanding the civil terrain and how it will affect the mission. CA methodology helps focus CA Marines (teams/planners) as they plan to conduct CMO.

2. **ASSESS, DECIDE, DEVELOP & DETECT, DELIVER, EVALUATE, TRANSITION (AD3ET).** The CA methodology consists of 6 steps and in general follows the 4 steps of targeting methodology. The Assess and Transition steps have been added to emphasize their importance to the success of CMO. CA methodology is recommended for use by MAGTF CMO planners. It does not replace the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP), but serves as a planning framework to envision a CMO from start to finish, with particular emphasis on the assessment portion of the process.

a. **Assess.** This is where the CMO planner determines the situation, the conditions, and what assets are available. This step normally begins with the receipt of the mission and initiation of mission analysis. The CMO planner will review mission-related material: OPLANs, INTSUMs, FRAGOs. Once he understands how CMO fits into the overall plan, the CA Marine collects CMO-related information about the civil environment. This includes information about IGOs/NGOs, indigenous population and institution (IPI), and our interagency partners. The CMO Planner then conducts a Civil Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (CIPB) using METT-TC/ASCOPE as a guide.

(1) Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops & Support Available, Time, Civil Considerations (METT-TC). METT-T works well when you are planning offensive or defensive operations; however it is insufficient when planning CMO. To properly assess the civil dimension, the "C" in METT-TC has been added, which is further rounded out by assessing the civil terrain using the term ASCOPE.

(2) "C". The "C" in METT-TC stands for Civil Considerations. From now on, as CMO Planners, you will need to factor this in whenever you are planning CMO or working as a member of a MAGTF staff or an operational planning team (OPT). METT-TC enables leaders to synthesize operational level information with local knowledge relevant to their missions and tasks in a specified AO. Tactical and operational leaders can then anticipate the consequences of their operations before and during execution. Failure to adequately consider the impact of the civil dimension during planning can have dire consequences during the operations. The civil considerations that you have to factor in are covered by the acronym ASCOPE.

(3) ASCOPE. The six elements are Civil Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events.

(a) Areas. Address terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. The analysis shows how key civilian areas affect the missions of respective forces and how military operations affect these areas. Factors to consider include political boundaries, locations of government centers, by-type enclaves, special regions (for example, mining or agricultural), trade routes, and possible settlement sites.

(b) Structures. These include traditional high-payoff targets such as critical infrastructure, protected cultural sites, and facilities with relevance to the civilian population (i.e., schools, hospitals, detention facilities, etc.). The analysis is a comparison of how a structure's location, functions, and capabilities can support operations as compared to costs and consequences of such use.

(c) Capabilities. Refers to those means a civil society uses to save, sustain, or enhance life. Capabilities can also refer to the ability of local authorities to provide key functions and services.

(d) Organizations. Marines must consider all nonmilitary groups or institutions in the AO. These may be

indigenous, come from a third country or be U.S. agencies. They influence and interact with the populace, U.S. forces, and each other. Current activities, capabilities, and limitations of local organizations are vital to building situational awareness.

(e) People. This is a general term describing all nonmilitary personnel that military forces encounter in the AO. This includes those personnel outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the mission. Identify the key actors and the formal and informal processes used to influence people. In addition, consider how historical, cultural, and social factors can shape public perceptions beliefs, goals, and expectations.

(f) Events. These actions may be routine, cyclical, planned, or can be spontaneous activities that significantly affect organizations, people, and military operations, such as seasons (i.e. harvest, hunting), festivals, holidays, funerals, political rallies, and agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles and paydays. Other events, such as disasters and those precipitated by military forces, stress and affect the attitudes and activities of the populace. Record and template events and analyze them for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

(4) PMESII. The acronym PMESII stands for: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information. This analytical tool is paired with ASCOPE to form the ASCOPE/PMESII crosswalk. This pairing will assist the CMO planner in conducting the assessment phase of the CA methodology. You may also see a version of this as PMESII-PT. The PT stands for: Physical Environment and Time.

(5) District Stability Framework (DSF). To increase the effectiveness of stability operations, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has created the District Stability Framework (DSF). DSF was designed to assist commanders and their staffs to identify the root causes of instability, develop activities to diminish or mitigate them, and evaluate the effectiveness of the activities in fostering stability. DSF provides assessment reports that are fed into a central database that allows the CMO planner to determine underlying causes in a region that may have fostered instability. The Tactical Conflict Survey (TCS) of DSF includes the following four questions:

(a) Has the number of people in the village changed in the last year?

(b) What is the most important problem facing the village/town/district?

(c) Who do you believe can solve your problems?

(d) What should be done first to help the village/town/district?

The final product of the ASSESS Phase of CA Methodology is the initial CMO Estimate. This product allows CA Marines to participate in the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPPE).

b. **Decide**. Step 2 of the CA Methodology is the Decide step, where you determine what the desired end state is and what are the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), and Measures of Performance (MOP) of your CMO plan. When completed, this step will result in the identification of the WHO, does WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, WHY and HOW through Course of Action (COA) development.

(1) The Courses of Action (COA). Should ensure that the efforts of CA units and other available assets are directed towards the needs and requirements identified during the assess phase. The CMO planner should do his best to ensure that these efforts are focused on the MAGTF's operational objectives and most of all, support the Commander's intent.

(2) Planning Products. Some of the planning products of the DECIDE Phase of the CA Methodology include an updated CMO estimate. Other products include the commander's concept for CMO (if appropriate), CA priorities (such as for each of the Lines of Operation/Lines of Effort), the CMO support plan (Annex G) as well as any Measures of Performance (MOPs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) that result from this step.

c. **Develop/Detect**. During this step, the CMO Planner asks the questions, what is the civil situation in the area of operations, what are the relationships/human networks and what are the civil conditions. This begins the execution phase of the CMO Plan. CA forces do not follow their own agenda within the MAGTF's area of operations, but rather enter the AO in order to establish relationships and build rapport with a variety of host nation government officials and representatives.

By collecting civil information (an ongoing task) the CA Marine continues to build the civil component of the Common Operational Picture (COP). Some examples of activities during this phase include expanding or finalizing CMOC operations, facilitating interagency cooperation, conducting civil engagements, supporting or carrying out information operations (IO), and identifying key leaders to engage.

Additional CMO planning products of this phase include continuous CMO assessments, revised / updated CMO supporting plans / annexes, formalized CMOC terms of reference (particularly when other interagency representatives are operating in the AO), and the drafting and issuing of fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) that are relevant to CMO.

Throughout the CA methodology, information gathering is a continuous / cyclical process. During the Develop and Detect phase, initial assessments feed into deliberate assessments, which in turn may drive the generation of surveys to determine underlying causes of instability. Products of this continuing information gathering may be daily/weekly/monthly sitreps. Deliberate assessments can be used to confirm or deny initial reports.

d. **Deliver**. During this step, CA forces may carry out the execution of large-scale, pre-planned CMO core tasks or support the MAGTF's engagement plan with appropriate means (project funding, carrying out key leader engagements). Properly executed CMO may mitigate or reduce the need for contingency / crisis action operations.

CMO carried out during this phase may include the planning and execution of various CMO Projects / Programs (could be funded through OHDACA), interagency coordination, support of RCTs and maneuver battalions, support to local governments, and civil engagements.

e. **Evaluate**. The evaluation phase helps the planner to validate the MAGTF operation from a CMO perspective and determine whether MOEs and MOPs have been met.

The Evaluate step is the most crucial phase of the CA Methodology process. It is used to determine if adjustments to the plan or operations are needed, or whether a new plan or operations are required. The evaluate phase will determine if the MAGTF needs to mitigate unforeseen or unintended

consequences, and whether the MAGTF has reached a decision point for termination or transition of operations.

The products of this phase include CMO briefings and reports, after-action reviews (AARs), additional project nominations, any new mission requirements (FRAGOs), and a transition plan / timeline.

f. **Transition**. The last step in the CA Methodology is the transition phase. During this step, CMO Planners prepare to terminate or transition civil-military tasks to host nation authorities, IGOs, NGOs, follow-on CA units, other military units (non-CA), and interagency partners.

Transition requires a vast amount of pre-coordination. All parties should conduct concurrent planning.

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STUDENT OUTLINE

INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 8/19/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE

(1) Given a mission, commander's intent and access to appropriate civilian representatives, coordinate with interagency partners, NGOs, IGOs, and the private sector, in order to achieve unity of effort.

b. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

(1) Without the aid of a reference, define the interagency by choosing from a given list of possible options.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify the responsibilities of the U.S. Ambassador by choosing from a given list of possible options.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify the purpose of Provincial Reconstruction Teams by choosing from a given list of possible options.

(4) Without the aid of a reference, define Intergovernmental Organizations by choosing from a given list of possible options.

(5) Without the aid of a reference, identify the mechanism that creates an Intergovernmental Organization by choosing from a given list of possible options.

(6) Without the aid of a reference, define Non-Governmental Organizations by choosing from a given list of possible options.

(7) Without the aid of a reference, identify relationships of IGOs and NGOs with U.S. forces by choosing from a given list of possible options.

1. **THE INTERAGENCY.** United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense (JP 1-02).

a. Common Partners for DoD Include:

(1) U.S. Department of State (DoS)

(2) U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

(3) U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ)

(a) FBI

(b) DEA

(4) U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

b. **Interagency Coordination.** Within the context of the Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 1-02).

(1) **Challenges.** Internal interagency bureaucracy often inhibits the integration of multiple partners. Each individual agency has its own core values and agenda, and this can make coordination very difficult at times. While we in the military have a very clear chain of command and effective decision making process, civilian agencies often do not, and will frequently arrive at decisions by consensus. Oftentimes contentious issues will be compartmented or put aside for further consultation deferring important decision points. Each agency may have different requirements and methods of doing business. Understand that the people within each agency may view the situation differently than a Marine.

c. **Diplomacy, Development, and Defense.** Not everyone in the USG looks at the world in the same manner. The DoD, DoS and USAID all *divide* the world up differently and, therefore, have different priorities. This is not necessarily a bad thing as it allows for different perspectives and viewpoints which may in fact help eliminate potential gaps in our understanding of the world. The different combatant commands do not line up exactly with how the DoS and USAID divide the world geographically.

d. **Relationship at the National Level.** Relationships at the national level remain complex as different agencies vie for funding from congress. Presidential Policy Directive-1 (PPD-1) should clarify relationships between the different government organizations for policy formulation at the national level.

e. **Relationships on the Ground.** Depending on the situation, there could be hundreds of civilian organizations already operating in the area. Interagency coordination provides a conduit to many of these organizations, and assists the DoD in utilizing complementary capabilities, hopefully

avoiding duplication of effort in the process. The DoD has a clearly defined chain of command; that same clarity may not be presented when dealing with a myriad of organizations on the ground.

2. **DOD GUIDANCE**. DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, addresses the DoD role in support of reconstruction and stabilization as a core U.S. military mission. It has a priority comparable to combat operations, and mandates integrated civilian and military efforts and close work with the interagency, foreign partners, international organizations, and the private sector.

a. **Stability Operations**. Military and civilian activities conducted to establish or maintain order in foreign states and regions and to advance U.S. interests and values. Immediate goals include providing security, restoring essential services, and meeting humanitarian needs.

b. **Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations JP 3-08**. Interagency, intergovernmental organization, and nongovernmental organization coordination during joint operations, describes the operating environments, core competencies and organizational structures of various civilian organizations to facilitate interagency partnerships.

3. **PRIMARY INTERAGENCY CONTACTS**

a. **Department of State (DoS)**. Interaction with members of the DoS primarily takes place at U.S. Embassies or while training and working with the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO). The DoS establishes Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and/or district support teams.

(1) **The Ambassador**. Also known as the Chief of Mission, the Ambassador is the senior U.S. official, military or civilian, at the embassy. The Ambassador provides overall direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. Government activities and personnel in a host country.

(2) **The U.S. Country Team**. Country Teams in embassies are made up of key figures from the DoS and other agencies who work under the direction of the ambassador and meet regularly to share information and coordinate their actions. This practice has been followed since May 29, 1961, when President John F. Kennedy wrote to all U.S. chiefs of mission saying, "You are in

charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission and I shall expect you to supervise all of its operations. The Mission includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, but also the representatives of all other United States agencies which have programs or activities in [your country]."

Depending on embassy size and the nature of U.S. interests in a country, each country team may be configured differently. Some may include more than 40 agencies. In addition to DoS section chiefs and the head of the local USAID mission, the following are some agencies most frequently represented on a mission's country team.

b. **U.S. Agency for International Development.** The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is an independent agency of the U.S. Government that works closely with the State Department and receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. It promotes long-term and equitable economic growth and advances U.S. foreign policy objectives through programs in the fields of developmental economic growth, agriculture and trade, global health, democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance.

USAID operates programs in nearly 100 countries divided into five geographic regions: Europe and Eurasia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the Near East. From its headquarters in Washington, D.C., USAID works with more than 3,500 American companies and over 300 U.S.-based Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). USAID also partners closely with indigenous organizations, universities, international agencies, other U.S. agencies, and other governments. USAID coordinates with other government agencies primarily through their bureaus of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) and Office of Civilian Military Cooperation (CMC).

Under DCHA, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the lead federal agency for international humanitarian assistance. Their charter is to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the economic and social impact of disasters. When a disaster strikes, DCHA may deploy a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to assist the U.S. Ambassador in the stricken country and coordinate the U.S. government's relief response. OFDA has liaison officers at SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, PACOM, UN-NYC and UN-Geneva.

c. **Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)**. The PRT is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in an area with unstable or limited security. It leverages all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to improve stability. The PRT is an integral part of the U.S. Government's long-term strategy to transition the functions of security, governance, and economics to the host nation. The PRT serves as a force-multiplier for both the local commander and the U.S. Government development agencies.

4. **INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**. International organizations may be classified as intergovernmental organizations or nongovernmental organizations.

a. **Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)**. An intergovernmental organization is a permanent organization with voluntary membership of eligible parties, with a basic instrument stating goals, structure, and methods of operation, and a permanent secretariat.

IGOs are established by a treaty between two or more states and usually, in order to safeguard state sovereignty, operate at the level of consent, recommendation, and cooperation rather than through compulsion or enforcement. The United Nations and economic and social council commissions and specialized agencies are IGOs.

(1) **United Nations**. The United Nations was established in 1945. There are six principal organizations that comprise the UN. They are:

(a) **Secretariat**. Body of international civil servants headed by the Secretary General.

(b) **Trusteeship Council**. Safeguards the rights of non-self governing peoples that are placed under the trusteeship of the UN.

(c) **Security Council**. Provides a mechanism to aid in maintaining international peace and security whereby enforcement would depend upon the power of the large states. There are ten seats on the security council with five permanent members; The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France.

(d) International Court of Justice (ICJ). The headquarters of the ICJ is located in The Hague in the Netherlands. The ICJ is composed of fifteen judges elected by concurrent vote of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(e) General Assembly. Serves as an arena for general debate for the UN and as the only existing approximation of a world forum.

(f) Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The mission of ECOSOC is to promote the welfare of all peoples everywhere. Some examples include:

- UN Commission for Social Development
- UNHCR United Nations Human Rights Council
- UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
- World Health Organization (WHO)
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- International Monetary Fund (IMF)
- World Food Programme (WFP)

(2) Regional Intergovernmental Organizations. Geographical IGOs are found all over the world. Membership is characterized by geographical boundaries. They are established to foster cooperation, economic development, and/or collective defense/security.

(a) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Formed in 1967, this regional IGO is an economic organization of ten countries in Southeast Asia. Membership includes: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Its goals are economic growth, social progress, cultural development, regional peace and stability, and to provide opportunities for member countries to discuss differences peacefully.

(b) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A military alliance based on collective defense whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. As a result of 9/11, "the first time in NATO's fifty-two-year history, the members of the alliance voted to invoke Article 5 of the charter: An attack on one is an attack on all" George W. Bush.

(c) European Union (EU). The Maastricht Treaty established the EU in 1993 and is comprised of 27 member states. The EU has developed a single market and a single currency (except for Great Britain). EU has provided for the freedom of movement of people, goods, and services. The EU has limited external relations and defense policies.

(d) African Union (AU). Established in 2002, the AU is a union of 54 African states. The only African state not in the AU is Morocco.

(e) Arab League. Formed in 1945, the League of Arab States as it is officially titled, is comprised of Arab states in North and Northeast Africa, and Southwest Asia (Middle East). The Arab League currently has 22 members and the main goal is to "draw closer the relations between member States and coordinate collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries."

(3) International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC is a private humanitarian institution based in Geneva, Switzerland. The ICRC is an IGO because states are signatories to the Geneva Conventions and have given the ICRC a mandate to protect the victims of international and internal armed conflicts. Victims include: war wounded, prisoners, refugees, civilians, and other noncombatants. They remain neutral during conflicts. They were operating in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime.

b. Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). Non-governmental organizations have been created in almost every conceivable field of human concern, from religion to transport and from art to science. NGOs do not operate in a vacuum, sealed off from each other or from governments and intergovernmental organizations. They usually play an important role interacting with governments, IGOs, and other NGOs as elements in transnational action networks concerned with various policy and issue areas.

Since the end of the Cold War, most significant NGO activity has concentrated in the three broad areas of the environment, human rights, and humanitarian affairs.

NGOs are legally constituted organizations that operate independently from any government. The term is used to refer to organizations that do not form part of the government and are

not conventional for-profit businesses. NGOs that are funded by governments maintain their non-governmental and 'neutral' status by excluding government representatives from membership in the organization.

(1) Characteristics. NGOs are founded, developed, and managed by civilians. NGO personnel can be highly professional and skilled, trained or educated in disaster management, public health, logistics, technology, water sanitation, communications, medicine, geology, sociology, and psychology. Some may have acquired their skills through on-the-job training. Staff cadre are of different backgrounds, training, nationalities, and cultures. Most NGOs attempt to use all local staff to build capacity and have large human resource databases that keep emergency personnel and cadres of career aid workers on call.

(2) Social Aims. Most NGOs pursue a social aim related to the goals of the UN. There are approximately 40,000 NGOs that operate internationally. Most NGOs maintain a consultative status with the UN through ECOSOC on the following subjects:

- International relief and development
- Democracy promotion and electoral support, human rights and good governance
- Conflict mitigation, management, and resolution
- Civil society support and community-based service
- Education, medical, and state service replacement

(3) Funding. Major sources of NGO funding are membership dues, the sale of goods and services, grants from international institutions, governments, and private donations. Government funding of NGOs is controversial since they are supposed to be neutral without the influence or pressure from governments that provide funding.

(4) NGO Examples

(a) Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE). CARE is a broad-spectrum relief, humanitarian, and development NGO, fighting global poverty.

(b) International Medical Corps (IMC). Dedicated to saving lives and relieving suffering through health care training and relief and development programs.

(c) Medicins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders). Best known for projects in war-torn regions and developing countries facing endemic diseases.

(d) Amnesty International. Stated mission is "to conduct research and generate action to prevent and end grave abuses of human rights, and to demand justice for those whose rights have been violated."

(e) Human Rights Watch. Conducts research and advocacy on human rights.

(f) Greenpeace. Focuses its work on world-wide issues such as global warming, deforestation, overfishing, commercial whaling and anti-nuclear issues.

(g) Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). The world's largest non-governmental development organization and is the largest NGO by number of staff (120,000 employees). In Afghanistan their major programs include microfinance, health, education, National Solidarity and Capacity Development.

5. IGO/NGO COORDINATION

a. Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). Physical or virtual meeting places of stakeholders that serve as the primary collaboration interface for the joint force among indigenous populations and institutions, IGOs, NGOs, multinational military forces, the private sector, and other governmental agencies.

b. Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC). A center that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operation.

c. USAID. In many cases, NGOs will allow USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to serve as the broker for humanitarian coordination between the U.S. military and the NGO community.

d. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). Created by the UN to respond to complex emergencies and natural disasters and serves as the UN

focal point on major disasters, and coordination of humanitarian response.

e. **Considerations**. There are many considerations when working with IGOs and NGOs.

- Who and where are they in your AO?
- What are their objectives and their mandate?
- How do they view your mission?
- How can you help them?
- What resources do they have?
- Can you find common ground?
- Can you develop coordination mechanisms?
- Do they want to work with you?

f. **Security Clearances**. Often at times security clearances with regards to classified material can be problematic. Many members of NGOs do not hold a security clearance. If at all possible all coordination meetings should be held at the unclassified level.

g. **Challenges to Coordination**

(1) **Communication**. NGOs do not have the same communications equipment as the military. Most often they use local means of communications such as cell phones and may not follow U.S. military operational security (OPSEC) protocols. Other militaries might also have equipment that is not compatible with U.S. communication equipment.

(2) **Who is in Charge?** The military has a top down chain of command. It is typical that there is no formal chain of command in a NGO; many decisions are made by consensus.

(3) **Change of Personnel**. NGOs, IGOs and partner militaries might have different lengths of deployments.

h. **NGO Perceptions of the Military**. Although not always extremely apparent, some (but not all) NGO personnel have a range of feelings about the military: disdain, nervousness (around weapons), ignorance, previous bad experiences, or philosophical opposition. Some common misperceptions by NGOs may include:

(1) Militaries are designed for fighting or defending, not for implementing humanitarian assistance operations.

(2) Primary military motives are anti-humanitarian and political.

(3) Military personnel have no humanitarian training and little ability to understand the needs of the displaced.

(4) Militaries pay too much attention to force protection and self-preservation to make them truly humanitarian agents.

(5) Militaries have rigid and inflexible management structures that make coordinating with other organizations and responding to highly dynamic humanitarian conditions difficult.

It is important to realize that such sentiments can be found in various NGO personnel.

7. 2004 TSUNAMI EXAMPLE

a. USPACOM. USPACOM provided assistance to the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and other affected nations to mitigate the effects of the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean. U.S. military operations were in support of the USG lead agency (USAID), which coordinated with international organizations, non-governmental organizations and partner nations. This was a truly interagency and multilateral effort.

b. Participating Nation Military Operations. During peak operations, 21 participating nations provided the following military assets to relief efforts in Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand: 102 ships, 104 helicopters, 92 fixed wing aircraft.

Countries within the PACOM AOR responded to disaster consistent with PACOM's theatre security cooperation plan (TSCP) objectives and expectations. Treaty Allies and select others made immediate military responses and nearly spontaneously aligned efforts with U.S. efforts.

(1) Relationships established in Multinational Planning and Augmentation Team (MPAT) facilitated military to military and, in some cases, military to NGO coordination through MPAT trained National Liaison Officer (LNOs).

Some highlights included: first deployment of Indian liaison officers in support of a multinational operation, first deployment of the Bangladesh Navy, first operational use of

Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) LCACs in support of international disaster relief efforts.

c. **Civilian Relief Agencies**. U.S. Military efforts were conducted in coordination and in support of numerous relief organizations. Over 200 NGOs were involved in the relief efforts.

d. **Regional Coordination Centers**. OFDA/USAID was the lead U.S. Agency for relief operations. The agency stood up five coordination centers to support relief operations.

(1) Additionally, the United Nations stood up four onsite Operations Coordination Centers. The U.S. Military combined support groups were based at these coordination centers.

(2) Representatives from the UN and OFDA were assigned to the USPACOM headquarters to further enhance the coordination between the U.S. military forces and the civilian agencies.

(3) U.S. Military relief efforts were designed to facilitate a transition of operations to the OFDA and the UN.

8. **INTERAGENCY TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES**. There are multiple opportunities to train with IA partners:

- JHOC (USAID)
- PRT Classes (DoS FSI-Foreign Service Institute)
- Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) Courses
- Seminars (Nat. Def. Uni., Naval Postgrad School, etc.)
- Title 10 exercises (Cobra Gold, Tandem Thrust, etc.)

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Training and Education Command
Marine Corps Civil Military Operations School
Civil Affairs MOS Course
1019 Elliot Rd C466
Quantico, Virginia 22134

STUDENT OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 12/03/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given a mission, commander's intent and mission analysis, manage civil information, ensuring the timely availability of civil information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination to support the visualization and understanding of the civil environment for the commander's decision making process.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of references, identify the capabilities of the Civil Information Grid (CIG) by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of references, identify the six-step CIM process by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(3) With the aid of a reference, gather civil information on the assigned area from all available sources, to provide the commander with a clear image of the civil dimension of the common operating picture.

(4) Without the aid of a reference, define Information Management (IM) by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(5) Without the aid of a reference, identify the activities in the information process by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(6) Without the aid of a reference, identify the characteristics of quality information by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(7) Without the aid of a reference, identify the four classes of information within the information hierarchy by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(8) Without the aid of a reference, identify the information management annex in an operations order by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

1. **CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (CIM)**. Civil information is information developed from data about civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events that can be

fused or processed to increase situational awareness for the interagency, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO), and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).

CIM is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other USG/DoD agencies, and international organizations and NGOs to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of both the raw and analyzed civil information to military and non-military partners throughout the area of operations.

a. **The Civil Information Grid (CIG)**. The CIG provides the capability to coordinate, collaborate, and communicate. This grid provides a common shared collaborative information environment between the MAGTF headquarters, CMO staff, and civil partners or stakeholders.

b. **Civil Information Management Core Task**. (CIM) is a core Civil Affairs task and also one of five CA-related Marine Corps Tasks. CIM helps to enable the other four core tasks by providing a methodology for collecting, organizing, collating, processing and retrieving data in an organized manner that helps build the MAGTF Commander's common operating picture, regardless of whether the MAGTF is involved in the conduct of FHA, SCA, NA, or PRC missions. There are many contributors to building the civil component of the COP, including CMO planners at all levels with the MAGTF, liaison officers, interagency & host nation partners, CA teams and detachments.

c. **Goal of Civil Information Management**. The goal of CIM is to create a collaborative information environment that consists of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructure, and processes to create and share the data, information, and knowledge needed to plan, execute, and assess CMO. It will enable CA Marines to make more informed recommendations to the supported commander. CIM enhances CA capabilities for the explicit purpose of information and knowledge collaboration which enhances unity of effort. CIM seeks to provide the right information to the right people at the right time in an understandable and actionable format or display. The effective management of civil information benefits the supported commander.

(1) Anticipating and satisfying civil information needs for the supported commander are tasks for CA/CMO planners. In

order to support the commander's intent, CA/CMO planners can perform the following:

- Conduct civil reconnaissance to find, analyze, and report civil information.
- Coordinate with non-CA assets to achieve a coherent reconnaissance and execution plan.
- Synchronize the collection and consolidation of civil information.
- Develop the civil components of the Common Tactical Picture (CTP) and Common Operational Picture (COP).
- Conduct interagency, Indigenous Populations & Institutions (IPI), IGO and NGO coordination.
- Develop protocols for the storage, maintenance, access, and referral of civil information.

d. **Intent of Civil Information Management.** The intent of CIM is to provide the Commander with a clear view and understanding of the civil dimension and its impact upon operations. CIM should contribute to the MAGTF Commander's COP. It is preferable to keep the vast majority of this type of information unclassified and easily shared with other USG partners. Though this may be challenging to do in practice on account of classification guidelines; CA Marines should strive to make this information as accessible and as transparent as possible.

e. **Civil Information Management Roles.** Groups of individuals accomplish the CIM process through collaboration within and outside the MAGTF. There are three roles required to execute this process: unit support, coordinators and stakeholders.

(1) The supported unit is any other supported unit that uses and manages civil information during the course of their duties, including maneuver unit staffs, CMO staff (G9), force enablers (civil affairs teams, military police, surgeons, chaplains, legal officers, engineers, etc.) and other elements. This process provides considerations, procedures, and best practices for the staff of the supported unit to integrate civil information into the planning and execution process.

(2) Civil information management coordinators facilitate the movement of civil information and act as the liaison for staff and managers of civil information. This requires executing content management functions in conjunction with the civil information management process to ensure civil information is *visible, accessible, and understandable* between echelons and different Areas of Operation (AO). These tasks are performed by U.S. Army (USA) CIM cells, U.S. Navy (USN) CIM coordinators, and U.S. Marines (USMC) who are tasked and organized to conduct CIM, and all other service members tasked to perform equivalent responsibilities.

(3) Stakeholders are any group of individuals who have legitimate interest in, knowledge of, can affect, or are affected by USG operations in the civil environment. They can be military and non-military entities with information, information requirements or interest in the operating environment, and include, but are not limited to:

- Higher, adjacent, subordinate units
- Other U.S. Government agencies (the interagency)
- Host Nation (HN) military and civilian agencies
- Partnering nation military and civilian agencies
- IGOs/NGOs, Indigenous Populations & Institutions (IPI), private sector entities such as business, education, and medical conglomerates

NOTE: Currently the Marine Corps has no organic CIM coordinators resident within active or reserve component CA units. They typically task-organize a CMO cell, located within the operations section (S-3 or G3/G9) that includes MOS 0530 CA Officers and 0531 CA Noncommissioned Officers (NCO).

f. **CIM: a Six-step Process.** The six-step process consists of Planning, Collection, Consolidation, Analysis, Production and Sharing.

(1) Planning. Staffs have specific procedures for managing information about friendly and enemy forces. CIM must develop a situation-specific architecture that links civil considerations of the tactical conditions to strategic objectives. Planning provides structure to measure

effectiveness and performance, based on effects. The planning step is modeled on the principles of targeting, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), and operational planning. It relies on civil information architecture for identifying centers of gravity, strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats in the civil environment. This step in the process identifies and prioritizes information requirements to satisfy information gaps.

(2) Collection. Complete, accurate, and timely collection of operationally relevant civil data is necessary for a reliable representation of the civil components of the operating environment. The ability to visualize this dimension of the operating environment is critical to the commander's planning process. We collect relevant civil data in three ways: Information Search, Civil Reconnaissance and Civil Engagements.

(a) Information Search. Collecting data and information from the internet, printed media, and other civilian or military sources. This is viewed as indirect collection. Information search might use open source research (data mining).

(b) Civil Reconnaissance. A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the operational environment. It should be coordinated with the combatant command's intelligence operations center to ensure integration and de-confliction with the intelligence collection plan. CA or other assets (e.g., engineer, medical, MP/security forces, HN or FN organizations, unmanned aircraft systems, interagency partners, or intelligence systems) can conduct civil reconnaissance. It is related to and often performed in conjunction with infrastructure reconnaissance (assessment and survey). The focus of collection for civil reconnaissance in the MAGTF's operational area is the daily interaction between civilians and U.S. forces. This results in capturing contacts and data points. CA/CMO planners in coordination with the CMOC integrate civil reconnaissance into the overall supported commander's plans and orders, enhancing COP development.

(c) Civil Engagements. Actively engaging individuals in dialogue or cultural exchange. Examples are key leader engagement, mass engagement, and surveys of the people and organizations in the operating environment. Collection must be executed for a purpose, with direction, and have the necessary authority. Source reliability and data credibility must be validated to avoid misrepresenting conditions. This

category also includes project management, which is a special environment where collection is conducted and affords opportunities to influence the operating environment.

Remember and apply the following principles (PACCT) when collecting civil data and reporting in your sitreps:

Collect Civil Data for a **P URPOSE**
Collect **A CCURATE** civil data
Collect **C OMPLETE** civil data
Don't over- **C LASSIFY** civil data
Report civil data in a **T IMELY** manner

(3) Consolidation. The purpose of consolidation is to organize and filter civil data into civil information. It provides decision-quality information to support command and control. During consolidation raw data is progressively transformed into the more useful state of information. Consolidation is accomplished by collating and processing data into concise groups of relevant information in formats that are *visible, accessible, and understandable*.

(4) Analysis. Analysis is the fourth step in the civil information management process and provides the *so what* to data that has been consolidated and transformed into information. It provides significance, scope and meaning to consolidated information, converting it into useable understanding.

Analysis is the sifting of the information for patterns and indicators of past behaviors or ideas that might have some predictive value and application. It can only be conducted with processed information and is executed to generate conclusions for use as the basis of products to satisfy requirements. Analysis is used to understand key aspects of the operating environment, enable planning, execution and assessment of operations. Understanding provides the basis for decision making.

(a) Analytical Approach(es). Different analytical approaches are required for many reasons beginning with the needs of the decision maker and the type of available data. The following types of analysis, though developed for other information requirements, are used to support specific civil information requirements.

1 Assess MOEs and MOPs. Assessing outcomes is required to understand if operations are advancing conditions

toward the mission success criteria identified for Lines of Operation (LOOs).

2 Geospatial Analysis. Geospatial analysis forms the foundation upon which all other information on the operating environment is layered to form the COP. Geospatial engineer units provide strategic, operational and tactical terrain analysis, terrain visualization, digital terrain products, nonstandard or updated map products, and baseline survey data.

3 Stakeholder Analysis. Looks at those partners or potential partners operating in and among the civil populace in the AO to predict whether they might support or block USG objectives with regard to civil populace. This analysis may be conducted at all levels.

4 Systems Analysis. Graphically depicts relationships among a set of entities.

5 Time-series Analysis. Identifies patterns and changes in data over time. It is valuable to CMO as most effects in the civil components of the operating environment take weeks or months to become observable.

6 Pattern Analysis. The process of deducing the principles of procedures that IPIs employ by carefully observing and evaluating patterns in their activities.

(5) Production. The end state is to deliver products that accurately and completely present the civil components of the operating environment, and enables the MAGTF to make sense of the environment. These formats come in a variety of digital and non-digital media. Production considerations:

- Who is the intended audience?
- What is the intended purpose of the product?
- When is the product needed?

(6) Sharing (Dissemination). Sharing is the delivery or exchange of information between users in a usable form for application to appropriate missions, tasks, and functions.

Sharing is a vital part of the civil information management process. The collected civil data and derived information is

useless unless it gets to the people that need it in a timely, accurate, and complete manner. The capability to share information also permits a more efficient use of resources (personnel, time, funding), prevents duplication of effort, and improves overall situational awareness of the AO. However, sharing is also one of the most difficult civil information management steps; it requires considerable direct interaction and communication with people, both internal and external to the organization.

g. **SWEAT-MSO, ASCOPE, PMESII and DSF**. Civil information managed through this six-step process is developed from data with relation to several mnemonics: SWEAT-MSO, ASCOPE, PMESII and DSF.

2. **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (IM)**. IM is the sum of all activities involved in capturing, storing, retrieving, representing, transferring, mining, displaying, protecting, and managing the quality. IM promotes an understanding of the battlespace, which enables commanders to better formulate and analyze courses of action, make decisions, execute those decisions with adjustments to plans, and understand the results from previous decisions.

a. IM focuses on providing quality information to support decision making. IM addresses information as a commodity rather than a technology and is performed at all command levels, regardless of the extent of automation. The goal of IM is to provide a timely flow of quality information, enabling the commander to anticipate and understand the consequences of changing conditions.

3. **THE INFORMATION PROCESS AND ACTIVITIES**. Personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures are essential to the commander in exercising command and control (C2). C2 supports the commander in three main areas: achieving situational awareness, making decisions, and communicating information to execute and implement decisions. Effective IM is critical to all three areas. IM is cyclical in nature and has four basic steps.

a. **Processes**. There are four basic steps in the processes: identify information requirements, collect and process information, build a common operational picture and develop understanding.

(1) Identify Information Requirements. IM begins with identifying and/or updating information requirements. Information requirements are the criteria that must be known about the battlespace to enable mission accomplishment. Information needed to perform applicable staff functions are referred to as Information Requirements (IR). Those that support the commander's decisions during the execution of battle command are referred to as Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). IRs and CCIRs focus information collection allowing for the processing of large amounts of relevant information.

(2) Collect and Process Information. The process continues with data collecting and processing to fulfill information requirements. Staff sections collect information to satisfy the requirements associated with their IRs; CCIRs are disseminated to elements that can develop information applicable to the unit mission.

(3) Build a Common Operational Picture (COP). Information that is accurate, timely, usable, complete, precise, and reliable, is used to build a COP. As defined in JP 1-02, a COP is a single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A COP facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. While the COP is intended to support the unit mission, staff elements may develop information displays specifically designed to support their operations. The key consideration for information displays is that they are organized and easily understood to enable rapid decision making.

(4) Develop Understanding. Awareness is provided by information but understanding is the result of applying judgment to that information. Understanding equates to knowing what is happening and why. It allows the consequences of friendly and enemy actions to be anticipated and enables the correct decisions to be made. Collaboration facilitates situational awareness and understanding and leads to informed decisions. With decisions made, subordinates are directed to take action with their forces. Executing these actions results in the need to adjust information requirements based on the situation.

b. Activities. IM includes seven basic activities: collecting, processing, storing, protecting, displaying, disseminating, and disposing of information. These activities occur continuously throughout all phases of all operations and enable understanding and decision making.

(1) Collecting. Obtaining information in any manner, including sensing, direct observation, liaison with official agencies, or soliciting from official, unofficial, or public sources from the information environment.

(2) Processing. Refining information from raw data to actionable knowledge. Processing consists of filtering, fusing, formatting, compiling, cataloging, organizing, collating, correlating, plotting, translating, categorizing, arranging, analyzing and/or evaluating. It also refers to the application of judgment in developing understanding. The primary purpose of processing is to add meaning to the identified and isolated information.

(3) Storing. The retention of information in any form for orderly, timely retrieval, and documentation until needed. In the world of the digital battlefield, storage often equates to database management. Common access databases provide resources for supporting widely disparate and distributed information needs and building effective COPs. They provide bridges, allowing different systems with different purposes to share information and interoperate effectively. Multiple applications will use the same data simultaneously for different purposes to support multiple decisions across the battlespace.

(4) Protecting. Measures taken to ensure the availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation of information and information systems. These methods protect critical information systems from corruption, intrusion, and destruction, while safeguarding the commander's mission.

(5) Displaying. Representing information in a usable, easily understood audio or visual form tailored to the needs of the user. The display conveys the COP for decision making and exercising C2 functions. Historically, the display of information has taken the form of formatted charts, written reports, verbal narrative reports, and graphic map displays. Information display technology includes interactive imagery continuously updated in real or near real time and accessible from remote locations. To convey information effectively, displays must:

- Use symbols, graphics, and terminology consistent with joint standards.
- Be clear, understandable, and intuitive.

- Consist of accurate, reliable, timely, and relevant information.

- Change promptly and easily with updates.
- Be interoperable among service components and outside agency elements.

(6) Disseminating. Communication of information from one person, place, or thing to another in a useable form by any means to improve understanding or to initiate or govern action.

(7) Disposing. Actions taken on inactive records. These include destruction and archiving of information. It may include a transfer to a staging area or records center or a transfer from one organization to another.




Figure I-2. Information Management Cycle

4. PURPOSES OF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT. IM provides commanders relevant information for making informed, timely decisions. More specific purposes of IM include the following:

- Facilitate situational understanding, common operational picture, decision making, transfer and availability of expertise and experience to promote a smooth transition to follow-on units.

- b. Enhance organizational learning.
- c. Enhance collaboration among personnel at different places.
- d. Increase the timeliness of information and knowledge transfer between units and individuals.
- e. Provide reachback capability to schools, centers of excellence, and other resources.
- f. Help leaders and Marines become more agile and adaptive during operations.
- g. Influence doctrine development.

5. **INFORMATION CHARACTERISTICS**

a. **Quality**. Quality information adds value to the decision-making process. In the face of uncertainty, it is important to consider information quality characteristics.

ACCURACY	Information that conveys the true situation
RELEVANCE	Information that applies to the mission, task, or situation at hand
TIMELINESS	Information that is available in time to make decisions
USABILITY	Information that is in common, easily understood format and displays
COMPLETENESS	All necessary information required by the decision maker
BREVITY	Information that has only the level of detail required
SECURITY	Information that has been afforded adequate protection where required

b. **Information Hierarchy**. There are four classes of information within the information hierarchy: raw data, processed data, knowledge, and understanding. The essence of the hierarchy is as information moves thru the hierarchy, it increases in quality thereby becoming more valuable to the decision maker in achieving situational awareness. The goal of information management is to facilitate the development of quality information throughout the hierarchy.

(1) **Raw Data**. Facts and pieces of information that serve as building blocks of processed information.

(2) Processed Data. Comes from organizing, correlating, comparing, processing, and filtering raw data.

(3) Knowledge. The result of analyzing, integrating and interpreting processed data. Knowledge is a representation of what is happening.

(4) Understanding. The highest level of information awareness; why things are happening.

6. DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PLAN

a. Roles and Responsibilities. The unit Information Management Officer (IMO) may be a special staff officer operating under the staff cognizance of the Chief of Staff (CoS) or executive officer. Each principal staff section, including the G-9 or CMO cell, should also assign an IMO to conduct internal staff information management functions. The unit IMO is responsible for establishing the policy and procedures for information management within the command. The duties and responsibilities of the IMO include:

- Coordinates information management efforts throughout the organization
 - Coordinates the CCIR process
 - Develops and implements, in close coordination with the CoS and other staff principals and subordinate units' IMO, effective information dissemination techniques
 - Develops training programs on information management procedures
 - Coordinates with the unit security manager and the G-6/S-6 for the development and implementation of Information Security (INFOSEC) procedures
 - Coordinates with the G-6/S-6 on local area network/wide area network (LAN/WAN) management and networking issues
 - Develops and publishes the information management plan
- b. The Information Management Plan (Annex U). Describes the processes by which information will be created, processed, maintained, displayed, and disseminated within the organization.

Normally, the information management plan will consist of a set of SOPs that are updated to fit the circumstances of a particular exercise or operation and promulgated as Annex U to the OPLAN or OPORD.

(1) The unit IMO, with the guidance of the CoS or executive officer and in coordination with the IMOs of each staff section and subordinate units, develops the plan. Each staff section identifies its information requirements, including the nomination of CCIRs. These requirements must then be integrated and prioritized into overall unit information requirements, and the information management procedures must be developed to satisfy them. The information management plan must be closely coordinated with the G-6/S-6 to ensure adequate support. The information management plan should include procedures for the following:

(a) Identifying, developing, and prioritizing information requirements, including nominating, approving, collecting, reporting, maintaining, and disseminating CCIRs.

(b) Maintaining and displaying the COP. Guidance should include the level of detail displayed; assignment of responsibility for the quality and integrity of the database; and assignment of responsibility for maintaining the status of friendly and enemy units. Each staff section will be assigned responsibility for providing status information for their functional areas.

(c) Designating information exchange standards (symbolology, report/message formats, and data elements).

(d) Effective dissemination of routine and time sensitive information (manual and automated procedures).

(e) Information reporting, including the originator, the recipients, reporting frequency, the method of transmission, and report formats.

(f) Configuration, maintenance, access, use, synchronization, and integration of systems and databases supporting command and control.

(g) Staff briefing schedules.

(h) Security and integrity of information.

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Training Command
Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School
Civil Affairs MOS Course
3200 Louis Road C478
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5001

STUDENT OUTLINE

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 05/15/2014

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given a mission and commander's intent support a Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) operation, to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or endemic conditions that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

- (1) Without the aid of a reference, define Foreign Humanitarian assistance (FHA).
- (2) Without the aid of a reference, identify the categories of disasters, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.
- (3) Without the aid of a reference, identify the types of operational environments by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.
- (4) Without the aid of a reference, identify various types of FHA Operations, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.
- (5) Without the aid of a reference, identify related operations that may be conducted with FHA operations by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.
- (6) With the aid of references, conduct assessments, to identify the scope of the disaster, in accordance with USAID's *Field Operations Guide* (FOG).
- (7) Without the aid of a reference, identify legal sources of funding, required to conduct an effective FHA operation, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.
- (8) Without the aid of a reference, identify elements of a successful transition/termination of FHA/FDR operations to other organizations by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

Overview: Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) activities conducted by U.S. Armed Forces range from steady-state program activities supporting geographic combatant commanders (GCC) security cooperation and related programs to conducting limited contingency operations in support of another United States Government (USG) department or agency. FHA activities include foreign disaster relief (FDR) and other activities that directly address a humanitarian need. FHA operations can be supported by other activities conducted by U.S. military forces or they may be conducted concurrently with other types of related operations and activities such as dislocated civilian support, security operations, and foreign consequence management (FCM). FHA operations (including FDR operations) are normally conducted in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Department of State (DOS).

1. **FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (FHA)**. FHA is defined as Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.

FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The FHA provided by the DoD is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the Host Nation (HN) that has primary responsibility for providing the assistance; and may support other USG departments or agencies. Although U.S. military forces are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct military operations that defend and protect U.S national interests, their inherent, unique capabilities may be used to conduct FHA activities.

a. **Categories of Disasters**. Before responding to a request for FHA, MAGTF planners, working closely with a CMO planner must understand the operational environment. Important elements of the operational environment to consider when executing a FHA mission include the type of disaster involved, underlying causes, the security environment and the system of international relief already at work in the affected nation. There are three categories of disasters, **slow onset, rapid onset, and complex onset**.

(1) Slow Onset. These emergencies are characterized by the gradual decay of order over relatively long periods of time.

They might be caused by events such as crop failures due to drought, the spread of agricultural diseases, or a deteriorating social or political situation that leads to conflict.

(2) Rapid Onset. These emergencies are usually the result of sudden, natural events such as hurricanes, typhoons, floods, tsunamis, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions. They may also be caused by accidental or human related catastrophes such as civil conflict, acts of terrorism, sabotage, or industrial accidents.

(3) Complex Onset. The United Nations (UN) defines a complex emergency as a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country program already in place.

(a) United States Agency for International Development (USAID) defines a complex emergency as a natural or manmade disaster with economic, social, and political dimensions. It is a profound social crisis in which a large number of people die and suffer from war, disease, hunger, and displacement owing to manmade or natural disasters, while others may benefit from it. Common characteristics of a complex emergency include the following:

1 Number of civilian casualties and populations besieged or displaced.

2 Serious political or conflict-related impediments to delivery of assistance.

3 Inability of people to pursue normal social, political, or economic activities.

4 High security risks for relief workers. This includes all parties concerned: Host nation (HN) workers, NGOs, IGOs, and DoD assets committed to relief efforts.

5 International and cross-border operations affected by political differences.

2. **MAGTF SUPPORT TO FHA**. FHA support is planned and executed by MAGTFs at all levels (MEU, MEB, MEF, SPMAGTF). Regardless of peacetime or war, CA Marines will participate in FHA related activities throughout a range of military operations. Several key ways in which the MAGTF supports FHA include providing

security, conducting assessments, transport of material and people, construction of dislocated civilian (DC) camps, providing food and medical care and the construction of basic sanitation facilities.

Recent Examples of USMC Support to FHA operations:

- Philippine Mudslides: 2006/ 31st MEU
- Bangladesh Typhoons: 2007/ 22d MEU
- Philippines: Tropical Storm Ketsana: 2009/ 31st MEU
- Haiti Earthquake: 2010 Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE/ 22d & 24th MEU
- Pakistan Flooding: 2010/ 15th and 26th MEU
- Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami/Nuclear Reactor Disaster: "Operation Tomodachi": 2011: III MEF
- Typhoon Yolanda: "Operation Damayan" 2013/ III MEF

3. **FHA OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS**. When abroad, CA Marines must recognize three broad categories of operational environments in which FHA will take place.

a. Permissive. Host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist FHA operations. A permissive environment is usually associated with pure relief efforts following a natural disaster. Little or no resistance to military forces is expected.

b. Uncertain. Host government forces, whether opposed or receptive to operations, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population within the intended area of operations. Some resistance to military forces should be expected.

c. Hostile. Hostile forces have control, intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to operations. Strong resistance to military forces is to be expected; forces conducting FHA must be prepared to engage a full range of force protection contingencies.

4. **FHA ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.** FHA programs are normally the responsibility of the Host Nation's (HN) civil authorities. In many instances, countries that were already on the verge of collapse (fragile states) suffer massive damage through either man-made or natural events. This added burden may result in the host nation's inability to deal effectively with the crisis. As a CA Marine, you must be able to work with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and members of other U.S. Government agencies (the interagency). The aim of the *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief - Oslo Guidelines* - is to establish the basic framework for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defense assets in international disaster relief operations. The *Oslo Guidelines* provide that foreign military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only when the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset, therefore, must be unique in capability and availability. Military assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged "humanitarian gap" between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. At the onset, any use of military assets should be limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel. For the purpose of the *Oslo Guidelines*, humanitarian assistance (HA) can be divided into three categories based on the degree of contact with the affected population. These categories are important because they help define which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with international military resources. The three categories are:

a. **Direct Assistance.** The face to face distribution of goods and services

b. **Indirect Assistance.** This involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel and other activities that are at least one step removed from the population

c. **Infrastructure Support.** This involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management, and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily

visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population


Where practicable, the military role should focus on providing indirect assistance and infrastructure support while minimizing direct assistance.

(1) USG (non-DoD) Role in FDR. The USG response to man-made or natural disasters will be coordinated through USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). OFDA's mandate is to "Save lives, alleviate suffering, and reduce the economic impact of disasters." If a foreign disaster is large enough in scope for a MAGTF to be committed (most often a MEU due to their forward presence), it is probable that OFDA will have teams on the ground in the affected area. These teams, known as Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs), can provide the MAGTF with the first real intelligence as to what is taking place in the disaster's wake. OFDA has stocks of goods staged at three locations throughout the world (Miami, Pisa Italy, and Dubai). The DART answers to the U.S. Ambassador and will assist the Embassy in prioritizing needs, recommending response actions, and serving as the liaison between the affected country, other organizations (IGOs/NGOs), and the DoD. When present in an affected country, the ambassador or Chief of Mission and the Department of State (DoS) are in charge of the overall USG response (to include DoD). The employment of multiple USG assets, to include DoD, is known as the whole of government approach.

(2) Roles of Other Organizations in FDR During FDR operations, the MAGTF will find itself increasingly operating with, or through, other organizations such as IGOs and NGOs. Most likely, Marines will encounter members of the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The United Nations will have the overall international lead for Foreign Disaster Response (FDR) operations. Much like a DART from USAID, the UN will also have teams on the ground known as UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams.

OCHA will establish a UN Joint Coordination Center (UNJCC) and/or a UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) to aid and assist the multitude of IGOs/NGOs and the militaries of those nations that offer to participate in the response. Since much of what the MAGTF has to offer during FDR operations involves logistical support, it is imperative that CMO Planners seek out the logistics planners affiliated with the UN agencies involved.

Examples of Humanitarian Assistance Stakeholders



* Present in the Middle East

Legend

EU	European Union	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
IOM	International Organization for Migration	USG	United States Government
NGO	nongovernmental organization	WFP	World Food Program
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	WHO	World Health Organization
UNHCR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees		

Figure II-1. Examples of Humanitarian Assistance Stakeholders

5. Unified Action

Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental, nongovernmental, and international entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation towards common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. Unity of effort in an operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose. During FHA operations unity of command may not be possible but the requirements for unity of effort becomes paramount.

Because DOD will normally be in a supporting role during FHA contingency operations the Joint Force Commander (JFC) may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies. Obstacles to unified action include differing objectives and modes of operation, competing missions, inadequate structure and procedures, incompatible communications, overly restrictive security classifications, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations. DOD forces will work with actors outside the USG to include the HN, IGOs, NGOs and the private sector. The tenets of multinational unity of effort (i.e., respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination) applied during a FHA mission cannot guarantee success; however, ignoring them may lead to mission failure.

6. Types of FHA PROGRAMS

a. **Disaster Relief Missions** Disaster relief missions are provided for under Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.46 *Foreign Disaster Relief*. These missions include prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of disaster victims. Distribution of relief supplies has traditionally been the domain of NGOs and IGOs because of their charters, expertise, and experience. However, if the relief community is overwhelmed, or if the security situation precludes it, U.S. military forces may be tasked to distribute these supplies. Potential relief roles for the U.S. forces include immediate response to prevent loss of life and destruction of property, construction of basic sanitation facilities and shelters, and provision of food and medical care. The DOD normally supports the efforts of the HN, USAID, NGOs and IGOs during FDR operations.

b. **Technical Assistance and Support Functions**

Technical assistance and support functions are short-term tasks that generally include communication restoration, relief supply management, and provision of emergency medical care, humanitarian demining, and high-priority relief supply delivery. Based upon the GCCs guidance, the FHA force commander should establish policy regarding technical advice and assistance to the affected country, United Nations (UN), NGOs, and IGOs as soon as possible.


c. **Foreign Consequence Management Operations** Foreign Consequence Management (FCM) is defined as the assistance provided by the United States Government to a host nation to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives attack or event and restore essential government services. Primary responsibility for FCM rests with the HN , unless otherwise stipulated under relevant international agreements or arrangements.

Civil Affairs roles in FCM include:

- Assisting with the restoration of essential HN government services
- Assisting with the protection of HN public health and safety
- Assisting with the provision of emergency relief to HN government, businesses, and individuals
- Identifying and assessing the threat posed by hazardous materials
- Provide consultation to HN decision makers

7. **Related Operations**

Although FHA operations may be executed simultaneously with other types of operations (Stability operations, Nation Assistance, Peace operations, and Non-Combatant Evacuation operations) each type has unique characteristics. Military commanders must be cautious not to commit their forces to projects and tasks that go beyond the FHA mission. Military commanders conducting FHA simultaneously with these other types of operations must develop end state, transition, and termination objectives, as well as measures of effectiveness (MOEs) complementary to simultaneous military operations. With the exception of Peace Operations, all other related operations will have their own, separate, period of instruction.



a. **Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)**. HCA is assistance to the local populace provided in conjunction with authorized military operations. This assistance is specifically authorized by Section 401, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 401). *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations*, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions must promote the security interests of both the United States and the host country and specific operational readiness skills of the members of the U.S. Armed Forces who participate in the activities. Military assistance is limited to:

- Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction and repair of basic sanitation facilities.
- Detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war, including activities relating to the

furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war.

It is important to understand the differences among HCA and FHA. FHA focuses on the use of DOD support as necessary to alleviate urgent needs in a host nation caused by some type of disaster or catastrophe through FDR. By contrast, HCA programs are typically preplanned military exercises designed to assist the host nation. HCA is conducted for the primary purpose of training U.S. forces. Incidental to this purpose are the benefits received by the civilian population.

To avoid possible overlap or duplication and ensure sustainability, HCA projects must be coordinated through the country team (especially the USAID representative at the embassy) and the host nation. For example, school construction should not be undertaken if there is not a sustainable plan by partners to provide teachers, administration, salaries, equipment, and books.

General Rules for the conduct of HCA

- Programs must benefit a wide spectrum of the country in which the activity occurs.
- Programs/Projects are self-sustaining or supportable by the HN once the Marines have departed.
- Assistance is not offered to individuals or groups of individuals engaged in military or paramilitary activities.

8. FHA PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

a. **Supporting the MAGTF Commander.** In order to fully support the MAGTF Commander, CA Marines must be prepared to conduct a number of tasks that will allow the commander and his staff the ability to plan and conduct reactive or proactive FHA operations. These tasks will include:

- (1) Assessments that determine the scope of the problem.
- (2) Data collection (via civil reconnaissance).

(3) Close liaison with the interagency, NGOs, IGOs and host nation civil authorities. This provides the commander with knowledge of organizations on the scene, what capabilities they provide, and recommendations to achieve a unity of effort.

(4) Determine appropriate sources of funding.

b. Assessments. One of the primary tasks a CA Marine will undertake during FHA operations is to provide assessments to the commander.. Through the use of checklists or templates the CA Marine can provide input on several key areas of concern to the commander and his planning staff. When conducting your assessments, coordinate with additional resources already present (i.e. USAID, NGOs, IGOs and other interagency partners to determine the full scope of the problem). Assessments provide the commander with a snapshot that allows for the creation of measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP). As a CA Marine, it is vital to understand that not all concerned parties agree on terms or definitions. For our purposes, we will be utilizing OFDA's *Field Operations Guide, Version 4.0 (2005)*. The FOG standards align closely with those utilized by the United Nations and The Sphere Project. As a result, you will gain an understanding of common terms and standards utilized across the vast majority of the relief community to include most NGOs.

c. Assessment Recommendations

- Recommendations made by assessment teams should not have a detrimental effect on the long-term recovery efforts of an affected country.
- Recovery (after a disaster) depends on restoring the affected population's own capacity to meet their basic needs.
- Assessments are only a "snapshot in time"
- Over time, information changes
- Without a point of reference, most assessment data is of little value.
- Distinguish between emergency and chronic needs. Emergency needs are those resulting from the event (i.e. the disaster) whereas chronic needs are those that existed *prior to the onset of the disaster*.
- Try to learn about pre-disaster norms in the AO
- Learn the capabilities and capacities of interagency partners, the HN, and IGOs/NGOs
- Try to "plug in" to existing disaster relief mechanisms. Remember, many or all of the supported organizations are

likely to have been on the ground before a disaster/crisis had occurred.

d. Needs, Logistical, and Infrastructure Considerations.

The *Field Operations Guide* (FOG) supplied by USAID/OFDA provides the CA Marine with an excellent guide as to what needs, logistical, and infrastructure criteria a CA Marine must consider during a FDR mission. The FOG mentions the following broad categories of information to gather for specific sectors:

- (1) Victims/Displaced Population Profile
 - (a) General Characteristics
 - (b) Capacities
 - (c) Displaced Populations
 - (d) Physical Assets
- (2) Food
 - (a) Baseline Data
 - (b) Effect of the event on food
 - (c) Food availability
 - (d) Distribution systems
 - (e) Social and market impact of food aid
- (3) Nutrition
 - (a) Nutritional status
 - (b) Public health related risk of malnutrition
 - (c) Care-related risk of malnutrition
 - (d) Food access-related to malnutrition
 - (e) Nutrition interventions
- (4) Health
 - (a) Health and demographic information
 - (b) HIV/AIDS
 - (c) Health system capabilities
 - (d) Local health programs
 - (e) Health information/Surveillance systems
 - (f) Cultural and social health factors
 - (g) Environmental health factors
- (5) Water
 - (a) Displaced population situation
 - (b) Water system disruption
- (6) Sanitation
 - (a) Displaced population situation
 - (b) Non-displaced population situation

- (7) Shelter and settlements
 - (a) Establishing context
 - (b) Identifying impacts, resources, and opportunities

- (8) Agriculture and livestock
 - (a) Baseline data
 - (b) Effect of the event on agriculture
 - (c) Effect of the event on livestock
 - (d) Agricultural production capabilities
 - (e) Other

- (9) Search and rescue

- (10) Logistics
 - (a) Airports
 - (b) Civil Aviation
 - (c) Alternative aircraft
 - (d) Seaports
 - (e) Transfer points
 - (f) Trucking
 - (g) Railroads
 - (h) Warehousing

- (11) Infrastructure
 - (a) Communications
 - (b) Electric power
 - (c) Community water supply and wastewater treatment/disposal
 - (d) Hydraulic structures (Dams, levees, irrigation canals, hydropower facilities)
 - (e) Roads and bridges

This list is by no means all inclusive. Each event will introduce unique circumstances that will challenge the relief community (to include DoD personnel) in the conduct of assessments.

9. **LEGAL AUTHORITIES**. Every FHA operation is unique. Because FHA can be conducted as either a part of a larger operation or as the sole mission, CA Marines must be familiar with how to utilize or apply these resources to support the commanders CMO objectives.

Funding for FHA may originate from within the DOD, DOS, or other governmental organizations (OGAs) as appropriated by Congress

Sections of Title 10, United States Code (USC) provide the authority for commanders to conduct humanitarian operations. However, foreign aid and Security Assistance programs are the primary responsibility of the DOS (Title 22, USC). The President may direct DOD through the Secretary of Defense to respond to man-made or natural disasters with concurrence of the Department of State.

a. Key Provisions of Title 10, USC Regarding FHA Authorities and Funding

(1) Section 166a, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 166a) *Combatant Commands: Funding through the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, is the Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) may provide funds to the commander of a combatant command, upon request of the commander, or with respect to a geographic area or areas not within the AOR of a commander of a combatant command. This section provides combatant commanders a great deal of legal flexibility to conduct activities that include:

- Contingencies
- Joint exercises
- HCA to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance
- Joint warfighting capabilities
- Selected operations

(2) Section 401, Title 10 (10 USC 401). Section 401 establishes Humanitarian and Civic Assistance activities (HCA). This section provides specific authority to use operations and maintenance funds (O&M) to conduct HCA during overseas exercises directed or coordinated through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. HCA programs are administered by the Geographic Combatant Commanders. The goal of the program is to promote regional security objectives by providing basic HCA. Deploying units usually use generic Operations & Maintenance Funds which pay for day-to-day expenses related to training, exercises, and other missions. Funds appropriated for O&M may be obligated for HCA only for incidental costs of carrying out such assistance. This is also known as "Minimal HCA".

(3) Section 402, Title 10 (10 USC 402). Known as **The Denton Amendment**, this section is the only legal means for U.S. military aircraft and ocean going vessels to transport private cargo (usually from NGOs) at no cost to the provider of the humanitarian supplies. It authorizes DoD to provide transportation throughout the world, as space is available.

(4) **Section 407, Title 10 (10 USC 407)**. Section 407 Provides funding for Humanitarian Mine Action. Mine risk education, demining training, victim assistance, and assistance to host nation (HN) mine action center development are tenets of this authorization. In addition to work within the HN, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) funds the Humanitarian Demining Training Center in Ft. Leonard Wood, MO.

(5) **Section 2557, Title 10 (10 USC 2557)**. Makes available excess *non-lethal* DoD property to foreign recipients. The property must be transferred to the Department of State (DoS) for distribution within the country in need. Items such as heavy equipment, ambulances, fire trucks, school furniture, medical equipment, tools, generators and engineering supplies are examples of non-lethal property.

(6) **Section 2561, Title 10 (10 USC 2561)**. Section 2561 authorizes use of funds for transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide. The statute does not define "other" humanitarian purposes worldwide. This allows the DOD to carry out broader, more extensive HA projects.

(7) **Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) Funds**. In an attempt to bring order to the scattered sources of funding for military humanitarian programs, Congress established OHDACA to appropriate funds into one account. OHDACA funds are used for all DoD FHA and mine awareness activities that fall under sections 2561 and 401. While the law specifically lists HCA and disaster relief (section 401) activities as appropriate uses for the fund, OHDACA funds are mostly used to pay for Section 2561 activities. OHDACA funds are managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).

10. **TRANSITION**. CMO tasks can be transitioned to follow-on agencies such as CA units, other military units, HN assets, UN organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and other civilian agencies. This

step is the CA forces' direct contribution to a sustainable solution. The elements of a successful transition must be DURABLE and SUSTAINABLE. For each task and/or project a transition of authority or relief-in-place should take place with the follow-on forces or organizations to promote a successful transition.

Termination of FHA operations must be considered at the outset of planning and should be coordinated with the HN, UN, other IGOs, NGOs, and the interagency. Bear in mind that the end-state envisioned by the military commander may differ from the end-state envisioned by the other participants. Because FHA is largely a civilian endeavor, with the military in a supporting role, the termination of U.S. or multi-national military FHA operations will not necessarily coincide with the termination of international relief efforts. Normally, military forces operate in the initial stages of disaster relief to fill immediate gaps in assistance; military objectives will be to enable civilian control of disaster relief efforts (HN, international, interagency).

The transition of humanitarian efforts to HN authorities will not occur by default. Planning of FHA must involve extensive international and interagency coordination from the very beginning in order to ensure a successful transition. The goal is to transition ownership thus allowing for the timely redeployment of the joint force (of which you will play a vital role). Measures of effectiveness (MOEs), definition of end-state, transition, and termination planning should all reflect this goal. Finally, the proper use of CIM, i.e. tracking Key Leader Engagement (KLE), accounting of funds, updating of project status, and lists of trustworthy contractors will prove invaluable in completing a transition. Through CIM, you will provide the follow on organization with the context and reference materials they will need to continue working towards the agreed upon end-state.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Training and Education Command
Marine Corps Civil Military Operations School
Civil Affairs MOS Course
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STUDENT OUTLINE

NATION ASSISTANCE

CIVIL AFFAIRS MOS COURSE

REVISED 11/21/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given a supported commander's planning guidance, mission and intent and with the aid of references, support Civil Military Operations conducting Nation Assistance.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, define Nation Assistance by selecting the correct answer from a given list of possibilities.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify the roles/responsibilities of the U.S. Ambassador in Nation Assistance by selecting the correct answer from a given list of possibilities.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify Nation Assistance Programs by selecting the correct answer from a given list of possibilities.

1. **NATION ASSISTANCE (NA)**. Civil and/or military assistance (**other than FHA**) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between the U.S. and that nation. NA operations support a HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions.

Nation Assistance is one of the five CA core tasks. CA core tasks are those primary tasks that CA Marines are fully capable of planning, supporting, and executing in support of the MAGTF.

a. All NA activities are normally coordinated with the U.S. ambassador through the country team. NA programs often include but are not limited to:

(1) Security Assistance (SA)

(2) Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

(3) Title 10, U.S. Code (DOD) programs, such as military civic action (MCA), humanitarian civic action (HCA), and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by federal agencies or international organizations.

b. NA activities are normally nested within a geographic combatant commander's (GCC) theater security cooperation plan. Each Marine Force Component (i.e. MARFORSOUTH, MARFORAF, MARFORPAC, etc.) establishes a multi-year campaign plan that identifies which nations are priorities.

(1) Security Cooperation (SC). All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multi-national operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

(2) Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSC). A multi-year campaign plan developed by regionally focused Marine Force Components that integrate all aspects of the interagency in the execution of USMC activities within a nation. These are developed on a multi-year basis to provide a broad framework for funding authorities, but are refined for specific nation assistance activities as execution of those activities draws near. A MARFOR may have more than 50 nations within its AOR. They prioritize key nations; it is the responsibility of the Civil Affairs Marine to conduct detailed coordination with interagency representatives within that nation.

2. NATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. The U.S Ambassador is ultimately responsible for all NA activities within the host nation to include:

a. Security Assistance (SA). Security Assistance is a broad program aimed at enhancing regional security in areas around the world facing both internal and external threats. While SA is under the supervision of the Department of State, the DoD administers the military portions of the program under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. SA programs are carried out under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or related appropriation acts and statutory authorities by which the United States provides defense articles and services. These include:

- (1) Foreign Military Sales
- (2) Foreign Military Construction Sales
- (3) The Military Assistance Program (MAP)

(4) International Military Education and Training (IMET) program

b. **Foreign Internal Defense (FID)**. FID is an umbrella concept that covers a broad range of activities. Its primary intent is always to help the legitimate host government address internal threats and their underlying causes. Commensurate with U.S. policy goals, the focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the HN program of internal defense and development (IDAD). FID is not restricted to times of conflict. It also can take place in the form of training exercises and other activities that show U.S. resolve to and for the region.

c. **Military Civic Action (MCA)**. MCA activity consists of employing U.S. military forces in a military-to-military role of advising or training foreign military forces in MCA projects in overseas areas. These projects are arranged by international agreement between the HN and the USG. Marines do not commonly participate in MCA. The intent of MCA is to legitimize the HN government in the population's perception.

Projects include:

- Education
- Training
- Public Works
- Agriculture
- Transportation
- Communications
- Health
- Other projects that contribute to economic and social development of the area

d. **Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)**. Build or repair basic roads, schools, public buildings, well drilling and basic sanitation upgrades. The programs are provided in conjunction with military operations AND must provide a training benefit to U.S. forces. Assistance cannot be provided to military or paramilitary organizations. The intent of HCA is to enhance the image of the HN military and provide training to U.S. Forces.

(1) HCA can be used for basic medical, dental, surgical, and veterinary care (MEDCAP, DENTCAP, VETCAP)

(2) Authority: 10 U.S.C. §§ 401

(3) Funding: HCA activities are funded by Service Operations & Maintenance (O&M) funds

3. **USMC SUPPORT TO NATION ASSISTANCE**. Marines support Nation Assistance mostly through the MarFors located around the globe in support of Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). MarFors work directly with Marine Forces CONUS, host nation forces, and Security Cooperation offices to plan, coordinate, and execute the variety of NA projects that occur.

a. **CA Support to the MAGTF During NA**. CA Marines are valuable to their commanders during NA activities as they help shape, plan, coordinate, and execute projects or operations to positively affect the civilian populace of the AO in which they are operating. CA Marines can advise their commanders on NA project selection, validation, execution, and can act as quality control during and after the project is complete. CA Marines must never pass up the opportunity to teach basic CMO concepts to both Marines (non-CA) and host nation forces. CA Marines will provide valuable expertise regarding the coordination of these activities with parties having a vested interest (interagency, IGOs/NGOs, IPI, etc.).

b. **CA Support of SA**. During SA activities, the CA Marine plays a large part in assisting the planners and commander on what effects their operations may have on the civilian populace. CA Marines can also be extremely valuable in acting as a conduit between both U.S. and foreign civilians when planning and executing humanitarian and civic assistance projects. Again, CA Marines can teach basic CMO classes to both Marines who plan SA activities and host nation military forces that participate in them.

c. **CA Support of FID**. CA may support other military forces and nonmilitary agencies through direct or indirect support of FID; but they must coordinate with the HN and GCC. When assigned to a training team or on a staff that is in a position to do so, CA Marines may give CMO planning input on development plans.

d. **CA Support of MCA**. In MCA programs, U.S. personnel are limited to training and advising the HN military on planning and executing projects useful to the local population. CA Marines can provide expertise in areas such as assessments, CIM, KLEs, etc. This will enable the HN military to conduct CMO.

e. **CA Support to HCA.** Generally Marines incorporate HCA into every major exercise abroad. For HCA, we have no organic assets (medical, dental, veterinary). We often rely on the U.S. Navy or Army National Guard to assist. CA Marines can be extremely helpful in the planning and execution of HCA by conducting area studies, civil reconnaissance, assessments, project management, etc.

4. **FUNDING AUTHORITIES.** There are various funding sources for Nation Assistance projects. They fall under either Title 22 (U.S. State Dept), Title 10 (Armed Forces) of the U.S. Code, or The National Defense Authorization Act.

a. **Title 22 Programs**

(1) **International Military Education and Training (IMET).** This is a program through which the United States pays for the training or education of foreign military and a limited number of civilian personnel. IMET grants are given to foreign governments. The foreign government then chooses the courses their personnel will attend.

(2) **Foreign Military Financing (FMF).** The program consists of congressionally appropriated grants and loans which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training.

(3) **Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).** GPOI is designed to meet the world's growing need for well-trained peace operations forces. GPOI is primarily a training program, with infantry or infantry-like battalions as the primary training audience.

b. **Title 10 Programs**

(1) **Combatant Commanders' Initiative Fund (CCIF).** The CCIF is designed specifically to enhance the GCC's warfighting capabilities and to be administered by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The fund is a means of handling unforeseen requirements that could not be addressed in the normal budget process.

(2) **HCA.** Section 401 of Title 10 authorizes components to conduct HCA projects while on operational deployments. These are Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. Projects are carried out by, and must provide training to the U.S. military;

however, the beneficiaries must be the host nation civilian population.

(3) Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA). OHDACA appropriation funds DoD activities in Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency Response and Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), formerly referred to as Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDO).

(4) Humanitarian Assistance (HA). Section 2561 of Title 10 provides authority for use of Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) funds to carry out HA projects that are not in conjunction with military exercises.

(5) Exercise Related Construction (ERC). Is used for unspecified minor military construction (MILCON) to build or improve semi-permanent facilities. ERC has permanent U.S. presence that supports CJCS-directed exercises conducted by OCONUS.

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STUDENT OUTLINE

SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/19/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given a mission, commander's intent and problem framing analysis, provide Support to Civil Administration (SCA), in order to reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports U.S. and multinational objectives.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, define Support to Civil Administration by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible options.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify what provides parameters for Support to Civil Administration in friendly territory from a list of possible options.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify who provides parameters for Support to Civil Administration in occupied territory from a list of possible options.

(4) Without the aid of a reference, identify essential services, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible options.

1. **SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION (SCA)**. SCA are military operations that help to stabilize or continue the operations of a governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population (FM 3-05.40).

a. **SCA is a CA Core Tasks**. SCA is part of the core CA mission, which utilizes the whole of government approach to achieve its objectives. CA Marines will coordinate with members of the interagency, NGOs, IGOs, and most importantly the host nation.

(1) Three of the five Civil Affairs Core Tasks are supporting tasks to SCA operations:

- (a) Population and Resources Control (PRC)
- (b) Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)
- (c) Nation Assistance (NA)

(2) Civil Information Management (CIM) is performed continuously throughout SCA and is essential for transition.

b. **MAGTF and SCA.** MAGTF support to civil administration helps to build progress toward achieving or restoring effective, legitimate governance in the wake of conflict or disaster. SCA focuses on restoring public administration and resuming public services while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system of political governance. These efforts to reestablish local civil services with similar, related actions will establish a safe, secure environment.

c. **Support.** The support provided by the MAGTF helps to shape the environment for extended unified action by other partners. These efforts *may* enable the host nation (or occupied foreign nation) to develop an open political process, a free press, a functioning civil society, and legitimate legal and constitutional frameworks. They are however not a guarantee of success. Malign actors and various cultural and environmental factors may disrupt any progress you have made. SCA works best when it is integrated into a whole of government approach.

2. **SCA OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS.** There are two operational environments in which to conduct SCA. The first is Civil Administration in friendly territory (one that we are allied with or have signed a mutual security cooperation agreement). The second is Civil Administration in an occupied territory or country, such as during the course of a war where U.S. or coalition forces have taken control of a formerly hostile area or enemy territory. Depending on the nature of the relationship between U.S. forces and those in the AO, the way the U.S. approaches SCA may differ substantially.

a. **Friendly Territory.** CA Support of SCA in a friendly nation may include a Geographic Combat Command's (e.g., CENTCOM, PACOM, etc.) support to governments of friendly territories during peacetime, disasters, or war. This may include advising friendly authorities and performing specific functions within the parameters of the authority and liability established by international treaties and agreements. The host nation's people and government must be willing to accept support, and SCA must compliment the experience and expectations of the supported HN agencies. A good idea would be for U.S. Government agencies to contact NGOs and encourage them to participate in the operation. Some examples of this include advising/assisting Iraqi & Afghan Governments in order to develop their governing capacity (also known as *capacity building*).

b. **Occupied Territory.** In the case of CA Support to Civil Administration in occupied territory, the establishment of parameters for the temporary government (military or civilian-led), will be directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). This government will exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the populace of a territory which U.S. forces have taken from an enemy by force of arms until an indigenous civil government can be established. The goal is not to maintain control of the civil government as long as possible, but to establish a legitimate HN government to which we will transfer full authority. Examples include Japan and Germany post-WWII, support to UN in Kosovo, Post-OIF Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

(1) **Military Government.** The form of administration by which an occupying power exercises governmental authority over occupied territory. The necessity for such government arises from the failure or inability of the legitimate government to exercise its functions on account of the military occupation, or the undesirability of allowing it to do so. The occupying power usually issues an edict or proclamation declaring that the country is under formal occupation and that military authorities will take necessary action required by international law to insure the safety and security of the population.

(a) **Military Governor.** The military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from the commander's government or superior.

(b) **Military Government Ordinance.** An enactment on the authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control.

3. **USMC CIVIL AFFAIRS SCA CAPABILITIES.** CA forces support the MAGTF Commander and his operations with respect to the continuity of government in a Foreign Nation (FN) and/or Host Nation (HN) with planning expertise, embedded advisors/mentors, facilitators, and Liaison Officers. CMO support to SCA should occur across the spectrum of conflict and during each phase of a campaign. During wartime support occurs primarily during Phases IV-V of major combat operations or throughout COIN or stability operations.

4. **CA SUPPORTING TASKS.** Generally, CA Marines perform the following CMO tasks in support of SCA:

a. Identify, validate, or evaluate FN/HN infrastructure (essential services) through assessments and civil reconnaissance using the acronym SWEAT-MSO.

- (1) Sewer
- (2) Water
- (3) Electricity
- (4) Academics
- (5) Trash
- (6) Medical
- (7) Safety
- (8) Other considerations

b. Understand the needs of the Indigenous Populations and Institutions (IPI) in terms of the Logical Lines of Operation (LOOs)/Lines of Effort or the Army's six CA functional specialties.

c. Monitor and anticipate future requirements of the LOOs or functional specialties.

d. Build capacity with HN government officials.

e. Perform liaison functions between military and civilian agencies.

f. Coordinate and synchronize collaborative interagency or multinational support to civil administration operations.

g. Participate in the execution of selected support to civil administration operations, as needed or directed.

h. Perform quality control assessments of support to civil administration operations and costs.

i. Assist in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of support to civil administration operations (negotiation and mediation).

j. Coordinate and synchronize transition of support to civil administration operations from the MAGTF to the indigenous government, international community or interagency partners.

5. **LINES OF OPERATION (LOO)**. A LOO will link multiple tasks and missions to focus efforts toward establishing the conditions defined by the desired end-state. LOOs are essential in stability operations, where physical, positional references to

an enemy or adversary are less relevant. Understanding relationships of the LOOs are essential in helping commanders visualize how the MAGTF can best support civil authorities with available assets.

CMO planners and CA forces are often the most appropriate individuals and/or organizations within the MAGTF for conducting planning and coordinating along these LOOs: Rule of Law, essential services, governance, economic and infrastructure development.

6. **MAGTF CMO SCA CAPABILITY**

a. The conduct of SCA requires a high degree of knowledge of how civilian systems function plus the skills needed to carry them out. These are called functional specialty skills. The MAGTF often lacks practical experience in these areas; therefore, MARFORRES may search worldwide for individuals that possess these skills. Marine CAGs have only a *limited* functional specialty capability in the following areas: Rule of Law (led by Judge Advocate assigned to each CAG) and Public Health & Welfare (led by USN Preventive Medicine Officer).

b. MAGTFs can train to carry out certain functional specialty related tasks; but it is best to request outside experts. These functional specialty skills reside in the Joint CA community, or in the interagency community (DoS, USAID, USDA, DoJ, etc.).

7. **ARMY CA FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTIES.** A significant capability of the Joint CA force is the functional specialty expertise found in the U.S. Army CA force. U.S. Army Reserve CA functional specialists are categorized within six functional areas: Governance, Rule of Law, Economic Stability, Infrastructure, Public Health and Welfare, and Public Education and Information. The USMC has limited capability in Rule of Law and Health and Welfare.

a. There are 14 subsets associated with the six broader functional areas.

- (1) Governance
 - Public Administration
 - Cultural Relations
 - Civilian Supply

- (2) Rule of Law
 - International Law
 - Public Safety

- (3) Economic Stability
 - Economic Development
 - Food and Agriculture

- (4) Infrastructure
 - Public Works and Utilities
 - Public Transportation
 - Public Communications

- (5) Public Health and Welfare
 - Environmental Management
 - Public Health

- (6) Public Education and Information
 - Public Education
 - Civil Information

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STUDENT OUTLINE

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

Civil Affairs MOS Course

08/21/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given a mission, PRC plan, and commander's intent, support Populace and Resources Control (PRC) operations, in order to minimize civilian interference with military operations and to ensure the commander meets the moral and legal obligations to the civilian populace.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, identify who has the primary responsibility for implementing Populace and Resources Control measures by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify populace control measures, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify resource control measures, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(4) Without the aid of a reference, identify the related capabilities that Marines can leverage to implement PRC measures by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(5) Without the aid of a reference, identify the five powers over property, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

1. **POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL**. Control measures that assist Host Nation (HN) governments or de-facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. Populace and resources control measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation success.

These controls are primarily the responsibility of the indigenous civil government. PRC measures are executed as an integral part of military operations across the full spectrum of operations.

a. **Populace Control**. Provides for the security of the populace, mobilization of human resources, and denial of

personnel available to the enemy, detection, and reduction of the effectiveness of enemy agents. Types of populace control measures:

- Curfews
- Movement restrictions
- Travel permits
- Registration cards
- Relocation of population
- Biometrics

b. **Operations**. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and Dislocated Civilian (DC) Operations are sub-sets of PRC.

A NEO is an authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the Department of State (DoS), Department of Defense (DoD), or other appropriate authority.

NEO, similar to DC operations, requires extensive planning and coordination among various military and non-military organizations to include the U.S. Embassy.

The goal of DC operations is to minimize civilian interference on the battlefield and to protect civilians from military operations. DC operations are conducted and managed from the CMO cell/CMOC.

c. **Resources Control**. Regulates the movement or consumption of material resources, mobilizes material resources, and denies material to the enemy. Types of resource control measures:

- Licensing
- Regulations or guidelines
- Checkpoints (roadblocks)
- Ration controls

- Amnesty programs
- Inspection of facilities

2. RELATED CAPABILITIES

a. Military Information Support Operations (MISO). MISO usually develops and disseminates information products to inform the populace on PRC measures and to counter insurgent propaganda.

b. Military Police (MP). MPs (of any DoD component) can be utilized for a number of functions related to PRC operations.

c. Civilian Police. The functions of the host nation's local police should be to control and protect the people, maintain confidence, respect, provide law and order, and collect information from the local populace.

d. Paramilitary. The paramilitary, irregulars, or auxiliary forces within a host nation are called upon to augment/support the local police and extend the regular military forces.

e. HN Military Forces. The host nation's military forces should only be used when civil police and paramilitary units cannot cope with the insurgent or other subversive activities.

3. PRC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS. When planning PRC operations, you must analyze certain factors prior to the actual implementation of any control measure. The following is a list of basic planning considerations used for PRC.

a. The Nature of the Target Area. What are the various social, political, and geographic aspects of the target area that will guide, limit, or influence the planning and implementation of PRC (PMESII/ASCOPE)?

b. Atmospherics. What is the attitude of the target populace? Will the PRC measures planned or used adversely affect their perceptions? How will MISO programs mitigate any undesired effects?

c. The Effect on Other Operations. Will the PRC operation conflict or assist other operations being carried out at the same time?

d. **Time/Forces Available.** How much time is needed to carry out the PRC operation versus how much time is actually available? What are the resources and availability of related capabilities?

e. **The Legal Aspect of PRC Operations.** All PRC measures must have a firm legal basis established by the host nation's government. These measures must be in compliance with The Hague, and Geneva Conventions, and other national and international laws governing the area of operations.

4. **CA ROLE IN PRC.** Your role as a CA Marine will be to:

- Identify or evaluate existing host-nation PRC measures.
- Recommend ways the command could implement selected PRC measures.
- Coordinate with MISO to publicize the control measures among indigenous populations and institutions.
- Assess the effectiveness of the PRC measures.
- Assist in the arbitration (negotiation and mediation) of problems arising from the implementation of PRC measures.
- Coordinate directly with IGOs and NGOs operating within the AO regarding PRC programs.
 - o Determine the scope and capabilities (resources and personnel) of their programs.
 - o Identify any shortfalls of their programs.

5. **FIVE POWERS OVER PROPERTY.** The powers that the military commander may exercise over property in enemy territory may be broadly classified as destruction, confiscation, seizure, requisition, and control, also known as the five powers over property.

a. **Destruction.** Destruction is the partial or total damage of property. If destruction is necessary during combat operations, then no payment is required.

b. **Confiscation.** Confiscation is the taking of enemy public movable property without obligation to compensate the

state to which it belongs. Private property taken on the field of battle that is used by the troops to further the fighting is also subject to confiscation on the theory that it has forfeited its right to be treated as private property. Otherwise, the confiscation of public movable property is generally limited to the property with direct or indirect military use.

c. **Seizure**. Seizure is the taking of certain types of enemy private movable property for use by the capturing state. Title does not pass to the occupying power. Payment or compensation is normally made at the time a peace treaty is signed or when hostilities end.

d. **Requisition**. A requisition is the act of taking private enemy movable or immovable property for the needs of the forces of occupation. It differs from seizure in three basic respects. First, the items taken may be used only in the occupied territory; second, private immovable as well as private movable property may be seized; and third, the owners are to be compensated as soon as possible.

e. **Control**. Property within occupied territory may be controlled by the occupant to the degree necessary to prevent its use by (or for the benefit of) hostile forces. As a general principle of international law, the occupying commander is required to maintain public order. Included within this general mandate is the requirement for the occupying force to take control of and protect abandoned property, to safeguard banks, and prevent looting and black market activities.

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STUDENT OUTLINE

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/21/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given a mission and commander's intent, support Dislocated Civilian (DC) operations, in order to minimize civilian interference with military operations and to ensure the commander meets the moral and legal obligations to the civilian populace.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, define dislocated civilian operations, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify categories of dislocated civilians, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify responsibilities of the theater commander when conducting dislocated civilian operations, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(4) With the aid of references, establish the layout of a DC camp, in order to accommodate a given number of dislocated civilians in accordance with the USAID *Field Operations Guide* (FOG).

1. **DISLOCATED CIVILIAN (DC) OPERATIONS**. DC operations are a sub-category of Populace and Resources Control. The goals of DC operations are to minimize civilian interference with military operations and to protect civilians from combat operations. DC operations may occur across the spectrum of combat and during all phases of a campaign, as well as during stability operations. DC operations may also be required during FHA, SCA or NA missions.

a. **Statistics**. Ever since we have had war or natural disasters, there have been civilians who have been forced to leave their homes to seek safety or have been driven out by occupying forces. During the past decade, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons in countries such as Sudan, Chad, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, has skyrocketed, reaching a peak of nearly 35 million people in 2006. As the Marine Corps continues to conduct contingency operations, Marines can expect to encounter large and growing numbers of dislocated civilians. Large groups of dislocated

civilians can negatively impact operations by their mere presence. During stability operations, DCs may be the focus or center of gravity for MAGTF operations.

CA Marines must anticipate that at some point during operations, the civilian population may flee their homes. This has an unintended effect, making operations more challenging and complex. In order to better prepare the MAGTF for their possible impact, the CA Marine and CMO Planner can take a number of prudent planning measures that will help the MAGTF minimize their impact and assist the Commander to meet his moral and legal obligations to the civilian population.

b. **USMC Experience.** Over the past 65 years the Marine Corps has conducted numerous DC operations. During WWII, the Marine Corps had to deal with large numbers of friendly DCs in Guam and the enemy civilian population in Okinawa. During the Korean War, Marines had to confront large numbers of DCs on limited road networks as well as having to accommodate 98,000 refugees during the evacuation of Hungnam after the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir. During the Vietnam War, Marines had to conduct limited DC operations during the battle for Hue City as well as during the Rural Pacification Program, when large numbers of the rural population were forcibly relocated from their villages to *Fortified Hamlets*.

During the invasion of Panama in 1989, Marines had to fight in and amongst densely populated areas. The damage to civil infrastructure drove large numbers of people from their homes. This forced the MAGTF to deal with thousands of homeless people until camps could be set up or until they could be relocated elsewhere. During Operation Desert Storm, Marines confronted large numbers of Kuwaiti citizens trying to return to their homes. The Marines also dealt with third country nationals who had been released from Iraqi detention facilities. Marines were engaged during Operation GITMO (the Haitian Relief Op) in 1991-92; they had to provide security for Army CA forces that operated several large DC Camps on McCalla Airfield.

During the initial stages of the Peacekeeping Operation in Kosovo in 1999, the 26th MEU engaged with large numbers of Albanian DCs returning to their homes. This complicated road movement and threatened to deny commanders freedom of movement. Furthermore, Marine Forces planned to deal with extremely large numbers of DCs during the initial stages of OIF (the march to Baghdad), which fortunately never materialized. Marines also established a large DC camp during Operation Phantom Fury to

retake Fallujah in 2004; though it turned out that it was not needed due to the unique circumstances that existed at the time. However, in the future Marines can count on large numbers of civilians living in possible AOs. The CMO planners on the staffs of MAGTFs will be responsible for developing a plan to deal with DCs, should the need arise.

2. **CATEGORIES OF DISLOCATED CIVILIANS.** Civilians are divided into two categories and then further divided into eight sub-categories.

a. **Two Categories.** Civilians are broken down into two distinct categories: those who remain in place in their homes or municipalities, and those who flee and are dislocated due to a number of factors. Those who remain behind must still be factored into planning if the MAGTF controls the ground. In this case a PRC plan needs to be developed. For those who become dislocated, MAGTF CMO Planners must develop a plan that will implement a series of control measures to prevent them from adversely impacting MAGTF operations.

b. **Eight Sub-categories.** The term Dislocated Civilians (DCs) is considered a generic term to describe civilians on the battlefield who are no longer in their homes. For greater understanding, this term is further divided into eight categories, each of which has a different status under international law. They include:

- Displaced persons
- Refugees
- Evacuees
- Stateless persons
- War victims
- Internally displaced persons
- Returnees
- Re-settlers

3. **PLANNING DISLOCATED CIVILIAN OPERATIONS.** In order to plan a Dislocated Civilian Operation it is important to understand the command's responsibilities, requirements, planning factors and methods used to mitigate the impact on those civilians affected.

a. **Responsibilities.** Each and every level of command from Bn to MEF has a different level of responsibility to the planning, movement and care of DCs. The theater commander (e.g., CENTCOM, MNF, USFOR-A, etc.) provides directives on the

care, control, and disposition of DCs. It is up to the CMO Planner on the MAGTF staff to get copies of these directives and incorporate them into any DC operations planning. The supporting CA detachments and teams attached to RCTs and battalions will be responsible for planning DC operations at their levels; depending on the situation and METT-TC, they may have to implement certain aspects of the plan themselves.

b. **Requirements.** At a minimum, DC plans are required to state the authorized extent of migration and evacuation, to establish a means to provide a minimum standard of care and a means to determine status and disposition of DCs. The DC Plan should also designate or delegate responsibilities within the MAGTF (i.e., who does what). DC operations also include the planning and management of DC routes, assembly areas, and camps in support of the efforts of the HN and IGOs/NGOs. They also include Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) support to the affected populace. The Provost Marshal is a key component to the successful planning and execution of DC operations. His office should be involved early in the planning process. A DC operations plan is usually an appendix to CMO Supporting Plan (Annex G) in the Operations Order.

c. **Movement Planning Factors.** DC movement planning factors include the following: distance factors, rate factors and time factors. Distance factors include Dislocated Civilian Road Space (DCRS), DC column gap, DC traffic density, length of DC column, and the road gap.

d. **Mitigate the Impact.** Methods to mitigate the impact of DCs include minimizing dislocations, bypassing or ignoring DCs (in which case the commander assumes risk), controlling DC movement using various techniques or any combination of the above.

Preventing or minimizing dislocations involves executing PRC control measures such as imposing a stay-put policy, establishing curfews and conducting controlled evacuations. Each of these measures requires detailed assessment planning, coordination and support of Host Nation civil authorities (if available) and any NGOs/IGOs operating in the area.

(1) **Stay-Put Policy.** A stay-put policy is, essentially, an order to citizens to stay within the confines of their homes, communities, or other defined boundaries. Successful execution of a stay-put policy requires that the citizens be provided with sufficient necessities of life (food,

water, shelter, security, and health care). The stay-put policy minimizes civilian interference with military operations and just as importantly, minimizes civil collateral damage. HN authorities should enforce a stay-put policy whenever possible. When enforced by military forces, the policy requires an agreement among participating nations and the appropriate military command.

(2) Curfews. Curfews and other movement restrictions discourage unauthorized civilians from moving during certain times or into certain areas. These restrictions should be codified in a policy that is legal, practical, enforceable, and well publicized. Exceptions to the policy may be granted using a strict identification or pass system. In addition, restrictions should be enforced by a system of measures, including patrols, checkpoints, and roadblocks, or any combination thereof.


(3) Controlled Evacuations. Controlled evacuations are a way of minimizing the chaos that exists when civilians will not or should not stay in place. Forced dislocations may be appropriate to protect civilians from combat operations and impending natural events, such as hurricanes or volcanic eruption. They also may be appropriate to support military operations. The removal of civilians from port areas or areas adjacent to main supply routes may be necessary to promote the efficiency of logistics operations and minimize the possibility of sabotage. The CA unit supporting the element of the MAGTF tasked with this responsibility should form a DC planning team and incorporate these factors into planning.

(4) Movement Control Procedures. The three movement control procedures are: blocking, clearing and collecting. Blocking prevents movement to certain areas; clearing removes the population from specified areas; and, collecting assembles DCs in a designated area for possible movement to another location.


(5) DC Overlay. A graphic representation of your supporting plan for DC operations that may serve as an addition to your CMO supporting plan to the MAGTF operations order. Key elements of the overlay should include but are not limited to:

- (a) Selection of routes
- (b) Control and assembly points
- (c) Emergency rest areas

(d) DC collection point



(6) DC Collection Point. The illustration below shows a typical DC collection point. CA Marines set up collection points to group civilians for ease of transport, to protect them from the effects of combat, and to provide for the immediate needs of the DCs.



(7) Evacuation Planning. Currently, U.S. policy dictates only a division-level commander or higher can order an evacuation. When the commander decides to evacuate a community, CMO planners must make detailed plans to prevent uncontrolled groups from disrupting the movement of military units and supplies. Considerations in mass evacuation planning include: transportation, security, documentation, briefing the evacuees, provision of rations, minimum healthcare (life, limb, eye sight) and provisions for returning them to their homes.

(8) Disadvantages. Evacuation should be considered as a last resort. Evacuation removes civilians from areas where

they can maintain themselves. It also provides material for enemy information operations and may arouse resentment among the evacuees. In addition, evacuation complicates control of the population, creates difficulty maintaining security among the civilian population and requires resources and time. It may also lead to epidemic conditions should sanitation break down in DC camps or holding areas.

4. **PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR DC CAMPS.** In planning DC camps, the primary factor should be transition planning for the care and transfer of responsibility of the DC population to a controlling agency (ideally the host nation). Controlling agencies normally care for the basic needs of DCs (i.e., food, water, shelter, sanitation, and security). Controlling agencies also must be prepared to prevent the outbreak of disease among DCs. This last point is important for the health of the populace and military forces. HN personnel usually administer and operate the camps; however, CA units or other elements of the MAGTF may be called upon to provide technical advice, support, and assistance as needed.

a. **Camp Location/Construction.** The most manageable number of people in a camp is 5,000 or less. The location of the camp is extremely important. Engineer support and military construction materials may be necessary when camps are in areas where local facilities are unavailable (i.e., hotels, schools, theaters). CA Marines must avoid sites near vital communication centers, large military installations, or other potential military targets. The location of the camp also depends on the availability of food, water, power, and waste disposal. Additional considerations include the susceptibility of the area to natural or man-made disasters.

b. **DC Camp Layout.** The physical layout of the camp is important. The main principle is to subdivide the camp into sections or separate compounds to ease administration and camp tension. Each section can serve as an administrative sub-unit for transacting camp business. The major sections normally include camp HQ, hospital, mess, and sleeping areas. The sleeping areas must be further subdivided into separate areas for unaccompanied children, unattached females, families, and unattached males. CA Marines must also consider cultural and religious practices and make every effort to keep families together. Tribal considerations also should be addressed during the design.

A possible DC Camp Assessment Checklist which will assist you with designing a camp may include the following:

- (1) Victims/Population Profile - how many?
- (2) Food - how much is required?
- (3) Nutrition - what kind of food is needed?
- (4) Health - do I need to plan for medical assistance?
- (5) Water - how much is needed? Do we treat it?
- (6) Sanitation - do we need to build toilets?
- (7) Shelter and Settlements - do we build tent cities?
- (8) Agriculture and Livestock - vaccinations?
- (9) Search and Rescue - do we need to plan?

c. **DC Camp Administration.** Because of the large numbers of DCs for whom control and care must be provided, using HN civilians as cadre for the camp administration is preferred. DCs should become involved in the administration of the camp. If possible, CA Marines organize and train the cadre before the camp opens. Camp rules of conduct must be published and enforced. Camp rules should be brief and kept to a minimum. Camp administrators, not CA Marines, are the single point of contact, coordinating all internal camp matters and external matters with organizations or agencies.

d. **Screening of Camp Residents.** Screening is necessary to prevent infiltration of camps by insurgents, enemy agents, or escaping members of the hostile armed forces. Although intelligence or other types of units may screen DCs at first, friendly and reliable local civilians under the supervision of CA Marines can perform this function. The screening process also identifies skilled technicians and professional specialists to help in camp administration (i.e., doctors, dentists, veterinarians, carpenters, and cooks). The CMO Planner may also consider using badges and biometrics to facilitate screening and control of the camp.

e. **Medical Care and Sanitation.** Enforcement and education measures are necessary to ensure that the camp population complies with basic sanitation measures. There are many humanitarian aid organizations (NGO and IGO) that specialize in providing medical care, such as the International Medical Corps and Doctors without Borders.

f. **Security**. Sources for security officers include local police forces, HN paramilitary or military forces, and U.S. military forces. Another potential source may be the camp population itself. Police personnel within the population could supplement security teams or constitute a special camp police force, if necessary. Internal and external patrols are necessary; however, security for a DC facility should not give the impression that the facility is a prison.

g. **Civil Supply**. HN supplies must be used first.

h. **Information Dissemination**. Communications may be in the form of notices on bulletin boards, posters, public address systems, loudspeakers, camp meetings and assemblies, or a camp radio station.

i. **Liaison Requirements**. By leveraging other partners in the AO, the CMO planner and the DC Camp staff should strive to curb or eliminate the use of MAGTF vehicles, supplies and equipment.

j. **Disposition of DCs**. The final step in DC operations involves the ultimate disposition of DCs. This consideration must occur early in the planning phase. The most desired disposition is to return them to their homes. Allowing DCs to return to their homes as quickly as tactical considerations permit lessens the burden for support on the military and the civilian economy. It also decreases the danger of diseases common among people in confined areas. Guidance on the disposition of DCs must come from higher authority, under coordination with U.S. forces, host nation authorities, and international agencies.

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STUDENT OUTLINE

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/15/2012

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given a mission and commander's intent, support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), so that the Embassy's Emergency Action Plan (EAP) and the MAGTF plan for the NEO are supportive, coordinated, and fully integrated.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, identify roles and responsibilities of the Department of State when conducting a NEO, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify the primary DoD organization that will conduct NEO, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify roles and responsibilities of the Department of Health & Human Services when conducting a NEO by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

1. **NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION (NEO)**. Operations directed by the Department of State (DoS) or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense (DoD), whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens as designated by the Department of State.

2. **THE CIVIL AFFAIRS ROLE IN NEO**. By the nature of their mission, CA forces may assist in planning and coordinating a NEO. Military support to a NEO involves contact with civilians (foreign nationals and U.S. citizens). Activities that support NEO include, but are not limited to:

- Conducts an initial civil-military operations (CMO) assessment of the operational area.
- Advises the commander on how to minimize population interference with evacuation operations.
- Maintains close liaison with embassy officials to ensure effective interagency coordination and delineation of CA responsibilities and activities.

- Assists the MAGTF in accomplishing its mission by obtaining civil or indigenous support for the NEO.
- Assists DoS in the identification of U.S. citizens and others to be evacuated.
- Communicate with potential evacuees via the "Warden System." The Warden System is a notification system used to communicate to the U.S. population through the wardens using telephones, faxes, emails, and direct personal contact. A warden coordinator prepares lists of wardens and other contacts to cover areas of assigned responsibilities. During the evacuation, each warden receives and distributes messages, keeping individuals informed about the evacuation, and other relevant information.
- Assists embassy personnel in receiving, screening, processing, and debriefing evacuees.

3. U.S. AGENCIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Department of State (DoS). The Chief of Mission (COM), normally the U.S. Ambassador or other principal DoS officer-in-charge, has the primary responsibility for conducting an evacuation.

All U.S. Embassies and consulates are required to maintain an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for their area of responsibility. The COM is responsible for preparing and maintaining the EAP to include the potential use of military forces. The EAP consists of evacuation sites, number of evacuees (total and by area), assembly areas, command posts, and the roles of key personnel. However, the GCC, or supporting military commander is responsible for the actual planning and implementation of the military's role in the operation. For the GCC, the EAP should be reviewed not as an OPLAN for the execution of a NEO but more as a reference document to support the formulation of an OPLAN.

The Embassy is responsible for:

- (1) Evacuating U.S. citizens abroad.
- (2) Maintaining an EAP.
- (3) Determining the eligibility of those to be evacuated.

b. **Department of Defense (DoD)**. The Department of Defense is responsible for providing U.S. military forces and equipment to conduct a NEO. Due to their forward deployed status, the MEU will normally conduct a NEO. Military assistance is provided in a variety of circumstances not just when requirements exceed the capability of the diplomatic mission. When the Secretary of State requests military assistance from DoD, approval and the military response are directed by the President or SecDef through CJCS; the appropriate GCC will initiate military operations. When hostilities or disturbances occur with complete surprise or appear imminent, the ambassador may invoke such elements of the EAP as the situation warrants, including requesting assistance of the appropriate military commander, while simultaneously informing DoS.

The senior Department of State official in country remains in charge of the evacuation. It should be noted that NEO plans consider host nation assets as the primary source of security, transportation, and temporary facilities. When host nation assets are inadequate or unavailable the DoD assets are used to fill the shortfall.

c. **Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)**. The DHHS is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for the reception of all evacuees in the United States. DHHS personnel meet and assist evacuees at the U.S. port of entry. Their plans rely on state and local governments to carry out the operational responsibilities of repatriation.

d. **United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)**. Through its mobility components, USTRANSCOM can leverage its ability to obtain commercial lift by using existing service contracts. At a minimum, the strategic lift requirements for evacuation of noncombatants should be coordinated with USTRANSCOM.

4. **REAL-WORLD EVACUATIONS**

- 1950 South Korea (Hungnam Harbor)
- 1965 Dominican Republic
- 1975 Vietnam and Cambodia
- 1981 Liberia

- 1991 Philippines, Somalia, Haiti and Zaire
- 1992 Sierre Leone
- 1994 Rwanda
- 1996 Liberia
- 1997 Albania, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Cambodia
- 1998 Kenya, Tanzania, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau
- 2002 Sierra Leone
- 2003 Turkey
- 2004 Bahrain
- 2006 Lebanon

5. **OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS**. There are three environments in a NEO: Permissive, Uncertain and Hostile.

a. **Permissive Environment**. In a permissive environment, there is no apparent physical threat to evacuees; the political environment is stable.

The host government is either in support of, or will not oppose the orderly departure of evacuees. If military assistance is required, it is generally limited to support and security functions such as additional transportation assets or military police for security functions.

This type of operating environment often occurs in connection with serious natural or man-made disasters.

(1) An example of this type of an environment occurred in 1991 with Operation Fiery Vigil, where military personnel and their dependents were evacuated from Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station in the Philippines because of the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. While not popular with the local population, this evacuation was unopposed and took place in a permissive environment.

b. **Uncertain.** In an uncertain environment, the degree of danger is not known. The host government may or may not be in control, but cannot ensure the safety of U.S. citizens.

Possible opposition may come from the host nation government, an opposition force, outside force, or all three. Due to the uncertainty, the military commander may elect to reinforce the evacuation force with additional security.

(1) An example of this type of environment occurred in 1991 with Operation Eastern Exit. In this operation, U.S. citizens were evacuated from Somalia because the civil war had escalated to the point that the collapsing Somali government could no longer guarantee their safety.

c. **Hostile.** In a hostile environment the host government or other forces are expected to oppose evacuation and U.S. military assistance. Forced entry by U.S. military into the AO may be required to secure some evacuees and follow-on combat operations may be required.

In this environment, the focus may shift from evacuation to retrograde combat operations. Because all commanders must be prepared to deal with large numbers of displaced civilians and noncombatants, the presence of civil affairs assets is critical.

(1) An example of this type of environment occurred in 1975 with the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, Vietnam. A similar example would be Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, in which medical students were evacuated from the island of Grenada.

6. **PHASES OF A NEO.** There are three phases of notification in a NEO: Travel Warning, Drawdown and Evacuation.

a. **Travel Warning.** The first phase of evacuation is the travel warning. The travel warning is used to discourage additional travel into a potentially hazardous location and encourage early departure. This advisory may cover an entire country or just a particular region. The travel advisory may be short-term such as in anticipation of a particular event, like an election, or a precursor to a more serious long-term situation.

b. **Drawdown.** A drawdown is used by the embassy to begin reducing staff for government agencies to essential personnel only. The embassy is required to prepare lists of personnel to

remain in an emergency situation. The list of personnel will include those needed to manage an eventual evacuation of U.S. citizens. The basic options for the drawdown are authorized and ordered departure.

(1) Authorized Departure. The authorized departure must be requested, by the Ambassador, from the DoS. The authorized departure encourages departure of additional nonessential staff, dependents, and U.S. citizens. Employees and their family members who wish to leave the post must obtain approval from the Ambassador. Non-select U.S. citizens will be encouraged and assisted to depart but will not be reimbursed by the USG for their travel. Authorized noncombatants are those who may be ordered to depart by the ordering authority, such as the COM.

(2) Ordered Departure. Mandatory departure of staff ordered (skeleton embassy staff remains). A chartered or military transport may be required.

c. Evacuation. There are four phases for an evacuation: Stand Fast, Leave Commercial, Evacuation and Embassy Closing.

(1) Stand Fast. A stand fast advisory may be issued at any time during an authorized or ordered departure phase. This will occur if the situation deteriorates to the point that it is deemed too hazardous for U.S. citizens to move about the country. The stand fast advisory encourages U.S. citizens to stay in their homes or other safe places and wait for further instructions. At this point, the Ambassador may consider requesting military assistance.

(2) Leave Commercial. The leave commercial advisory is issued because of the gravity of the situation. Nonessential U.S. citizens may be told to leave by commercial transportation as soon as possible. It is assumed commercial transportation will be available and adequate. When this advisory is issued other actions may take place. The Embassy's internal security force may be reinforced by additional Marine Corps and/or DoS security personnel, or a joint task force (JTF) may be assembled to assist in the evacuation.

(3) Evacuation. The actual evacuation advisory is issued when the political or security environment is believed to have deteriorated to the point that the safety of U.S. citizens is threatened. With DoS approval, the Ambassador orders the departure of the personnel listed in the Report of Potential

Evacuees, keeping only essential country team members. The embassy would assemble, document, and begin assisting in the movement of U.S. citizens and third and host country nationals to designated assembly areas. Depending on the situation, a mix of commercial, charter, private or military transportation might be necessary.

(4) Embassy Closing. The final element of an evacuation is the closing of the embassy. With the embassy closing, the situation has deteriorated to the point that the U.S. flag is taken down and all the remaining U.S. citizens and embassy employees are evacuated. This does not include private U.S. citizens and their dependents that desire to remain in country. Military assistance might not be required until this phase of evacuation.

7. **PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**. Because DoD assets may be tasked to support the DoS through all phases of a NEO, it is important that they coordinate with the embassy staff. CMO planners should play a major role in the planning process, starting with the preparation or review of existing evacuation plans and continuing through execution. CA Marines can enhance the military efforts in support of a NEO. NEOs (like DC operations) are a subset of Populace and Resources Control (PRC).

a. **Factors to Consider in Contingency Plans**

(1) Political impact of conducting a NEO

(a) A political last step. It sends a signal to the world that the United States has lost faith in the ability of the foreign government to protect U.S. personnel.

(2) Potential Rules of Engagement

(3) Accurate and timely intelligence

(4) Designation and number of evacuees

(5) Presence of dissidents

(6) Political and military situation (types of environment)

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STUDENT OUTLINE

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/22/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, define Defense Support to Civil Authorities by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible options.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify emergency support functions, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible options.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify the types of military response to DSCA from a list of possible options.

(4) Without the aid of a reference, identify direct assistance activities to civil law enforcement agencies from a list of possible options.

1. **NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS DOCTRINE**. In March 2011, The President of the United States signed Presidential Policy Directive 8, to strengthen "the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters."

In support of this directive, the Department of Homeland Security, primarily through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), maintains national doctrine for all aspects of *incident management*, defined as a national comprehensive approach to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

Incident management includes measures and activities performed at the local, state, and national levels and includes both crisis and consequence management activities (JP 3-28). U.S. armed forces operate as part of a larger national effort characterized as *unified action*; the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). Commanders must integrate their actions and operations within this larger framework, collaborating with entities outside their direct control. Nowhere is this truer than in incident management, in

which U.S. armed forces conduct unified land operations to integrate fully with national preparedness efforts.

2. **DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)**. Support provided by U.S. Federal Military Forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD component assets, and National Guard Forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events (DoDD 3025.18).

a. **Declarations and Authorizations**

- The President can declare a national emergency through National Emergencies Act.
- The President can declare major disaster through the Stafford Act.
- The Secretary of Department of Health & Human Services can declare a public health emergency.

b. **National Response Framework (NRF)**. The NRF is a guide to how the nation responds to all hazards. NRF is built upon a scalable, flexible and adaptable coordinating structure to align key roles and responsibilities across all levels of government.

(1) **National Incident Management System (NIMS)**. NIMS provides the template for incident management regardless of size, scope or cause of the incident.

(2) **Emergency Support Functions**. Following a catastrophic event, segments of state, tribal, and local governments as well as non-government organizations (NGOs) and the private sector may be severely compromised. The government should be prepared to fill potential gaps to ensure continuity of government, public and private sector operations. There are 15 Emergency Support Functions:

- Transportation
- Communications
- Public Works & Engineering
- Firefighting

- Emergency Management
- Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services
- Logistics Management and Resource Support
- Public Health & Medical Services
- Search & Rescue
- Oil & HAZMAT
- Agriculture & Natural Resources
- Energy
- Public Safety & Security
- Long-Term Community Recovery
- External Affairs

3. **INCIDENT RESPONSE PROCESS.** A typical incident response begins with first responders at the local level. Occasionally, local emergency managers must request assistance from regional and/or state response organizations, including the National Guard. If the response is escalated to the federal level, including a Presidential-declared major disaster or emergency declaration, DoD forces may be sent to the site to support civilian efforts. The DoD's primary mission is homeland defense; however, the DoD may contribute to DSCA. Civil support:

- a. Begins at the local level with first responders.
- b. Assistance may be needed from regional and/or state response organizations.
- c. If escalated to federal level, DoD forces may support civilian efforts.

4. **TYPES of MILITARY RESPONSE.** The military may respond by Immediate Response, Mutual Aid Assistance Agreement or by Emergency Authority.

- a. **Immediate Response.** DoD response at the municipal, county, or tribal level is provided under Immediate Response Authority (IRA). When time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, then local military commanders or responsible officials of other DoD components may, in imminently serious conditions and upon request from local authorities, provide support to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage.

b. **Mutual Aid Assistance Agreements.** Mutual aid assistance agreements exist between emergency responders and the military to provide assistance across jurisdictional boundaries. Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) establish and arrange mutual aid assistance agreements.

c. **Emergency Authority.** In extraordinary emergency circumstances, where authorization by the President is impossible, and duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation, the involved federal military commanders are granted emergency authority.

5. **TIERED RESPONSE.** Incident management, including DSCA, is based on the principal of a tiered response. Response and support begin at the lowest level of government and escalate based on requirements. Each level of government maintains enough capability to carry out its responsibilities. Each has some reserve capability to address out-of-the-ordinary situations that occur within its jurisdiction. When a situation exceeds the capacity of any level of government, it calls upon the next higher level of government for support. The key players in this tiered response are local, tribal, state, territorial, and federal governments. At all levels, non-governmental organizations and the private sector work closely with government agencies in response to an incident. Although tiered in principle, actual incident response may be so compressed that all levels of government respond simultaneously depending on agreements set in place prior to an incident.

6. **SUPPORTING CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.** When requested, federal forces may provide support to federal, state, tribal and local law enforcement. The requested support must be consistent with the limits Congress place on the military support through the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) and other laws. Types of support include: reacting to civil disturbances, conducting border security, counter drug missions and antiterrorism operations.

a. **The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).** The Posse Comitatus Act restricts the use of federal military forces in conducting direct civilian law enforcement activities, except as expressly authorized in the Constitution or by an Act of Congress. This does not apply to National Guard Forces operating in state active duty status or Title 32 USC.

7. **DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.**

DoDD 5525.5 DoD *Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement*

Officials provides guidance on the type of assistance DoD can provide to local authorities. They include:

- Investigations and other actions related to the enforcement of UCMJ.
- Investigations and other actions related to the commander's inherent authority to maintain law and order on a military installation.
- Protection of classified military information or equipment.
- Protection of DoD personnel, DoD equipment and official guests of DoD.


a. **Other Domestic Activities and Special Events**

- Training
- Expert advice
- Equipment
- Use of DoD personnel to operate or maintain equipment
- Border security and immigration enforcement support
- Counterterrorism operations
- Counterdrug support operations
- Explosive ordnance disposal

b. **Request for Assistance (RFA)**. DoD uses the following criteria to evaluate supportability:

- Legality (compliance with laws)
- Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DoD forces)
- Risk (safety of DoD forces)
- Cost (who pays, effect on DoD budget)
- Appropriateness (mission in the interest of the DoD to conduct)
- Readiness (impact on DoD's primary national defense mission)

In order to determine if the DoD should be involved, follow the Request for Assistance as it moves from the requestor through the process.



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STUDENT OUTLINE

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 8/23/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES

(1) Given a mission and commander's intent, manage a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) with the Country Team, the Host Nation, IGOs, NGOs, and IPIs to meet the commander's intent (0530).

(2) Given a mission, commander's intent, and a CMOC, operate a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) with the Country Team, the Host Nation, IGOs, NGOs, and IPIs to meet the commander's intent (0531).

b. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

(1) Without the aid of a reference, identify the definition of a CMOC by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify the primary functions in a CMOC by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify possible locations of a CMOC by selecting the most appropriate site in accordance with the operational environment.

(4) Given a CMOC, conduct CMOC operations with the Country Team, the Host Nation, IGOs, NGOs, and IPIs to meet the commander's intent by initiating communication, recording, and disseminating information.

(5) Given a scenario, and applicable orders and directives, conduct a solatia/claims payment.

1. **CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER (CMOC)**. An organization normally comprised of civil affairs Marines, established by the Commanding Officer to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the U.S., with IPIs, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the commander.

a. **Functions of the CMOC**. The CMOC must be organized to promote the information exchange between participating civilian

or HN agencies and organizations, including those that otherwise will not have a mechanism for coordination and cooperation. Primary functions of the CMOC include but are not limited to:

(1) Providing interagency partners, IGOs, and NGOs with a single accessible point of contact for the coordination of CMO.

(2) Facilitating collaborative civil military efforts with joint and coalition forces and UN, HN, and other non-military agencies.

(3) Assist in the transfer of authority and/or transition of operations from the MAGTF to DoS, UN, NATO, HN, or other non-military control.

(4) Act as a clearinghouse for all civilian support requests, from the MAGTF and other U.S. military forces. The CMO staff element attempts to meet civilian requirements with civilian capabilities via coordination at the CMOC before passing validated support requests to the MAGTF.

(5) Provide agency POCs, agency capability lists, daily information summaries, population density, demographic, and DC overlays which might be posted on a public information board.

The proper application of CIM in a cooperative environment is paramount to ensure the success and harmony (unity of effort) of an operation. Information sharing with the organizations listed above can be challenging at times; if at all possible try to keep your information unclassified.

2. **CMOC OPERATIONS**. Support the commander by providing a forum in which CA Marines and civilian planners analyze the civilian component of an AO. Also, CA Marines can conduct initial CMO estimates and analyze CA tasks. The CMOC is task organized. It should always attempt to have military and civilian components on staff which will allow you to maximize the efforts of each entity involved; this ensures greater unity of effort.

3. **PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**. Personnel and location must be considered when planning a CMOC.

a. **Personnel**. CMOC personnel may include related capabilities. Be prepared to use the following assets:

(1) PAO

- (2) SJA
- (3) MISO
- (4) Engineers

b. **Locations**. Since external organizations, such as NGOs/IGOs and the HN, cannot be compelled to use the CMOC, it must be seen as something that serves a useful purpose to them in order to encourage their participation. The CMOC must be easily accessible and may be placed beyond perimeter security. However if the security situation dictates, the CMOC may be inside the perimeter.

Inside the Wire - Pros: security is high while operating within the security perimeter of the supported military headquarters. Proximity to HHQ means support is optimum, and logistical resources are readily available. Cons: NGOs and IGOs may be hesitant to conduct business with the CMOC due to its location being inside a military facility. Locals may believe presence is more of a military operation versus Civil-Military Operations (CMO).

Outside the Wire - Pros: closer to the community that you are working with, increases convenience and participation of NGOs and civilians, reduces some of the fear by having fewer military troops. Cons: this means operating outside of the security perimeter of the supported military HQ.


Mobile CMOC - Provides the ability to conduct rapid assessments. A mobile CMOC allows flexibility to confirm or deny information first hand by providing immediate action or response. Mobile CMOCs can be utilized during all phases of operations.

Supported units should supply vehicles with trailers to transport CMOC personnel and their necessary equipment.

The CMOC must have the ability to communicate with units via secure and unsecure means. It might also be valuable to communicate through commercial means as many IGOs, NGOs, and HN personnel communicate commercially.

4. **LAYOUT**. While there is no set floor plan for a CMOC, its layout can be limited by its surroundings. Marines must plan for areas where civilians and other agencies can work at the CMOC (phones/email access, etc.) while maintaining a restricted or classified area.

Sample CMOC Layout:



5. **BIOMETRIC COLLECTIONS**. Fingerprints, iris scans, and facial identification photographs are commonly referred to as biometrics. To help identify local or third country nationals during operations, civil affairs Marines enroll volunteers into the Biometric Automated Toolset (BATs). Biometrics tools can be incorporated into the entry control plan of the CMOC.

Collecting biometric data on visitors is a crucial part of the voluntary biometric enrollment programs. BATs or other biometric devices are useful to civil affairs personnel to identify claimants, vet contractors, record payments, or identify frauds. If authorized, BATs can be used to create ID cards for key leaders, contractors, or other local or third country nationals.

6. **THE FOREIGN CLAIMS ACT (10 U.S.C. § 2734-2736)**. A U.S. federal law enacted January 2, 1942. This law provides compensation to inhabitants of foreign countries for personal injury, death, or property damage caused by noncombat activities of U.S. military personnel overseas. The Foreign Claims Act applies to all damages (except battle damage) caused by U.S. Forces abroad.

a. **Foreign Claims Commission**. The Foreign Claims Commission is an officer or officers appointed to address claims up to \$20,000 by a commanding officer defined as:

The Judge Advocate General of the Navy; the Officer in Charge of the United States Sending State Office for Italy; Chiefs of Naval Missions (including chiefs of the naval section of military missions); Chiefs of Military Assistance Advisory Groups (including chiefs of the naval section of such groups); and naval attaches.

b. **Adjudicating Authority**. The composition of the Foreign Claims Commission determines the dollar amount for which that commission may adjudicate:

(1) One Officer:	\$ 5,000
(2) One Officer (JAG):	\$10,000
(3) Three Officers:	\$10,000
(4) Three Officers (including one JAG):	\$20,000

c. **Claims Process**. Civil Affairs Marines will typically serve as the primary point of contact between the local population and the Foreign Claims Commission. Marines may also be designated as paying agents. Civil Affairs Marines must be familiar with the claims process and be prepared to support the Foreign Claims Commission by documenting incidents and preparing claims paperwork.

(1) A local national presents a claim and a SF-95 is prepared.

(2) The claim is investigated (witness statements, photographs, location of damages, etc.).

(3) The Foreign Claims Commission approves, denies, or forwards the claim to a higher adjudicating authority.

(4) The claimant is notified of the outcome and if the claim is approved a settlement agreement is prepared.

(5) If you are responsible for disbursing funds or serving on the Foreign Claims Commission prepare voucher SF-44

(a) Accounting Data. Foreign claims are paid from a centrally managed budget with a fund citation from the NAVCOMPT Manual, Vol. II, para 023304. The document number that must appear on every foreign claim voucher is: N00013\$\$MDA1001 (\$\$ equals the last two digits of the fiscal year when the deposit is actually made).

(b) The Line of Accounting (LOA). The LOA that must appear on every Voucher is: AA 17+1804.12TL 420 00013 H 068892 2D +##### 00013+A1001X (+ is the last digit of the fiscal year when the deposit is actually made, and ##### is the five digit Unit Identification Code (UIC) of the command making the deposit).

(c) Document Handling. The command adjudicating the foreign claim is responsible for immediately mailing a legible copy of every voucher to: The Office of the Judge Advocate General (Code 64), 1322 Patterson Ave SE, Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066.

d. References. The document that provides guidelines for the formation of Foreign Claims Commissions and claims processing is JAGINST 5800.7D, Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN).

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

File Reference: _____

I, _____ [claimant], hereby agree to accept the sum of _____ [amount] (\$ [or equivalent] _____) in full satisfaction and final settlement of any and all claims which I have—individually, on behalf of the next of kin of _____ [injured party], and on behalf of the estate of _____ [injured party]—or may have against the United States, its officers, agents and employees, for property damage, personal injury, wrongful death, [whichever applicable] and associated losses arising from _____ [brief details of incident], and for any and all damages, injuries and losses proximate and consequent thereto.

In consideration hereof, I hereby release and forever discharge the United States, its officers, agents and employees, from all liability, claims and demands of whatsoever nature arising from the said incident.

It is understood that the amount tendered is accepted in full satisfaction and final settlement and that the award is made pursuant to the Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734, which provides for the administrative settlement of disputed claims against the United States arising from its activities, and is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of, but as a release of, the United States, its officers, agents and employees.

DATE

Claimant

WITNESSES:

Name

Address

Name

Address

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Marine Corps Civil Military Operations School
Civil Affairs MOS Course
1019 Elliot Rd C466
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5001

STUDENT OUTLINE

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS REPORTS

CIVIL AFFAIRS COURSE

REVISED 08/21/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

(1) Without the aid of a reference, identify the purpose of a sitrep, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify the five 'C's of a sitrep, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers

(3) With the aid of reference and a template, create a sitrep, in order to reflect the current civil dimension.

1. SITUATION REPORT (SITREP). Used to provide timely and accurate information on critical situations and military operations. Some situations by their very nature are complex. Your goal is to take those complex issues and distill them into a logical format that can be readily understood.

a. The Five Cs of Sitreps. When writing a situation report, remember the 5 'C's of good reporting:

- **Clear** - The input must be clear to the reader. Avoid the use of acronyms and abbreviations. Use plain language.
- **Concise** - The input must be concise.
- **Complete** - The input must be complete and not lead to open-ended questions. It is very important that you paint an accurate picture of what has taken place.
- **Current** - The input must contain current information that covers the reporting period.
- **Critical** - The input must deal with critical events and activities.

2. REPORTS. A sitrep can be a CMO Spot Report, Daily Report or a Weekly Report.

a. CMO Spot Report. A spot report is used to present timely information as it is collected that will impact the situation. This report does not have a specific format, but there are different types of spot reports used by maneuver units governed by doctrine and unit SOP. The type of information will

dictate the type of report. All spot reports will answer the basic who, what, when, where, why, questions and should include a report on actions taken. Upon completion, you will distribute this information through the chain of command via the unit SOP.

b. **Daily Reports**. The daily sitrep is a document used to keep higher and adjacent headquarters informed of the status of personnel and equipment. It provides a summary of significant operational events that occurred during the reporting period. It is also an important tool for the commander to highlight concerns that may impact the operational capability of the unit.

c. **Weekly Reports**. Weekly reports contain a summary of activity for all CA elements, current and completed projects, summary of meetings that have occurred, all assessments that have been conducted in the AO, key leader engagements, any significant events that have occurred that may impact your area of operation, and administrative/logistical support needed to accomplish the mission.

3. **USES OF INFORMATION**. There are two basic uses of information. The first is to help create situational awareness, which provides commanders information to make decisions. The second is to direct and coordinate actions in the execution of a decision. The information CA Marines provide can affect the way the battlefield is viewed and wars are fought.

a. **Staff Integration**. It is important to integrate with other staff functions as information can flow between intelligence, operations, logistics and CMO. At every level there is a requirement to do analysis. Careful analysis of the common operating picture may be beneficial in guiding the commander's priorities.

4. **BEST PRACTICES**

- It may be useful to include a project status tracker in your sitrep.
- Sitreps are important and can be time consuming when factoring in your unit's battle rhythm. Be sure to allow time to complete them in the required time.
- Avoid too many NSTR entries - Nothing Significant to Report.

- Provide enough information to avoid having too many RFIs sent to you. If you have been receiving RFIs, it is a good indicator that you are not providing enough details and follow-on actions.
- Track other CA team's sitreps, they may provide useful information that you can apply to your AO.
- Any CA team member should have access to and be able to create the sitrep.

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Civil Affairs MOS Course
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STUDENT OUTLINE

MILITARY BRIEFING

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/21/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given presentation requirements, conduct briefs so that all questions are fully answered for the audience.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, identify types of military briefings by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify steps in the military briefing process by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(3) Given a presentation template, deliver a military briefing in a time limit of 5 minutes using 7 slides.

1. **INTRODUCTION**. As a CA Marine, you will be called upon occasionally to deliver briefings regarding your various activities. Being able to describe your activities in clear, concise terms is an important skill that all CA Marines, regardless of rank, must master.

Military briefs are a specialized type of military speech. The purpose of a military briefing is to present information to commanders, staff, and other designated audiences. The information presented in military briefings can be a general overview or be very specialized, depending on the type of briefing and mission requirements.

2. **TYPES OF MILITARY BRIEFINGS**. There are four basic types of military briefings: Information, Decision, Mission, and Staff. Regardless of the type of brief, all share three general purposes: to inform, to persuade, and to direct.

a. **The Information Briefing**. The information briefing is designed to inform the listener. It deals primarily with facts and does not include conclusions or recommendations. It is used to present high priority information requiring immediate attention. The information may be complex, involving complicated plans, systems, statistics, or charts. The information may also be controversial requiring elaboration and explanation. Situation briefings that cover the tactical situation over a period of time usually fall into this category.

b. **The Decision Briefing.** The decision briefing is designed to obtain an answer or a decision. In higher HQ, it is used for most matters requiring command decisions on tactical matters. The decision brief contains elements of an information brief. The information presented is of a broader, more comprehensive nature.

c. **The Mission Briefing.** The mission briefing is used most often during actual operations. The mission brief is very closely related to the information brief in that it imparts information. The mission brief also gives special instructions, and instills an appreciation for the mission at hand. The most common example of a mission brief that you are likely to encounter would be a convoy brief. During a mission brief, oral or written orders may be passed, existing orders/procedures will be addressed, and new requirements will be noted.

d. **The Staff Briefing.** The staff briefing is utilized to secure a unified effort on behalf of the commander's staff. It may involve the exchange of information (i.e. between the S3 and the S4), the announcement of decisions, the issuance of directives, or the presentation of guidance. The staff briefing is widely used at every level of command. In garrison, the staff briefing is usually a regularly scheduled event. While in combat or when deployed, it will be held as often as necessary. The staff briefing is the briefing that may contain elements of the other three types of briefings (Information, Decision, and Mission).

3. **STEPS IN THE BRIEFING PROCESS.** Like many other tasks we perform as Marines, the briefing process has steps that must be followed in order to achieve success. The briefing process contains four steps: Plan, Prepare, Execute, and Assess.

a. **Plan.** When planning your briefing, ensure that you, the briefer, understand the purpose of the briefing and know what you want to accomplish. The time allocated for the briefing dictates the style, and preparation effort required. Keep in mind the three general purposes: inform, persuade and direct. During the planning phase, you will need to research the topic.

(1) **Research Your Topic.** Research is vital in order to provide the audience with information that is well documented and verifiable. Open source research will play a role so be sure to properly document all of your sources. The audience affects the level of classification, scope, and depth of information that you may be allowed to discuss. Be mindful of

the audience (i.e. avoid the use of military jargon or language that may be confusing). As a CA Marine, you may be required to brief members of the interagency, IGOs and NGOs. Many of our interagency partners are not familiar with military jargon or acronyms. If you use acronyms, spell them out the first time you use them so that the audience has a reference point. While the internet is an extremely valuable tool for conducting research, do not forget to utilize the base library, higher HQ assets, or personal contacts that may be deployed. During your research, begin to formulate your presentation into a logical sequence of events (a rudimentary outline) that can be modified as time/necessity permit.

b. **Prepare**. During the preparation phase, refine your rudimentary outline into major and minor points. In addition, begin choosing your visual aids (maps, overlays, charts, etc.). The form(s) of media you decide to utilize in your briefing should adhere to the following six (6) criteria:

(1) **Necessary**. Use only the media needed to enhance or support the brief. Too many or unnecessary media can be distracting.

(2) **Appropriate**. Media must be relevant to the brief and the target audience.

(3) **Simple**. Each medium or visual used should convey only one thought, idea concept, or topic.

(4) **Accurate**. All media must be accurate in content, grammar, spelling, and format.

(5) **Portable/Durable**. The media should be as easy as possible to use, move, store, and maintain.

(6) **Attractive/Neat**. Professional, neat, and appealing media enhances the credibility of the briefer and the presentation. If utilizing PowerPoint be sure to stick to a consistent format throughout the entire slide show.

A crucial task in the prepare phase is the delivery of a practice briefing. Rehearsal is absolutely critical to success. If possible, attempt to deliver the practice brief in the same location in which the actual brief will take place. This provides you not only with a familiarization of the area but also allows you to run a check on any computers or electronic devices you may choose to utilize. Ideally, if the opportunity presents itself, try and record your rehearsal brief on video

and/or audio. At the very least, have colleagues sit in on the rehearsal and offer constructive criticism.

Once feedback has been received, revise your brief. If you have the opportunity to videotape or record your presentation (or simply receive feedback from a colleague) take the time to address the following potential problem areas:

- Nervousness
- Eye contact
- Hands (nervous movements)
- Bearing
- Timing
- Rate
- Emphasis on the major points (or was this lacking?)
- Microphone vs. no microphone
- Omissions (Did you actually cover all of the material in your outline?)

c. **Execute**. Once you have revised your brief and updated your presentation (if necessary) you will be ready to deliver the final product. Remember, a successful briefing depends on how it is presented. Maintain a relaxed, military bearing, use deliberate gestures and movements and avoid distracting mannerisms. The effective briefer's delivery is characterized by conciseness, objectivity, and accuracy.

Know when your briefing occurs in the context of a larger meeting. Depending on the type of briefing, you may be one of many briefers that have only a short time to deliver their presentation. Arrive early and set up the briefing area as appropriate. Be prepared to provide handouts to the audience if necessary. Because you are likely to be one of a string of briefers, brevity precludes a lengthy introduction or summary. Use logic when arriving at conclusions and recommendations. It is likely, although not entirely certain, that interruptions and questions will occur. Plan accordingly and be ready to answer questions regarding your subject matter.

d. **Assess**. Much like the revisions you enacted following your rehearsal (prior to the actual briefing), you need to request feedback on your briefing. If questions posed by the commander or the general audience went unanswered, be sure to follow through and respond to the interested party. If your status as a briefer will be an ongoing task, revise your briefing as necessary.

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Civil Affairs MOS Course
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STUDENT OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL CULTURE

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/20/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given an operating environment, apply operational culture, to support the commander's intent.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, identify the five cultural dimensions by selecting the correct answer from a given list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify the significance of cultural second and third order effects by selecting the correct answer from a given list of possible answers.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify cultural aspects a CMO planner must consider by selecting the correct answer from a given list of possible answers.

1. **OPERATIONAL CULTURE**

a. **The Effect of Culture in Operations**. As recent military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed, today's conflicts require not only the understanding of the physical environment but also an understanding of the population and the cultural or human environment. Culture shapes our world view or perception of events; it is composed of a pattern of relationships and structures and is varied and dynamic. It is not a check-in-the-box factor that can be reduced to a map and predicted with scientific certainty; it is complex. Culture should be understood and included in operational planning, training and execution. This is called operational culture.

b. **Engaging Locals**. For the Marine, Operational Culture is not simply a thing or feature outside of the battlespace. Rather, it is a continual process of individual and collective learning about contemporary and future operations. A Marine who recognizes the nature and significance of operational culture, and engages in continuous operational culture learning, embraces the identity of a culture operator.

c. **ASCOPE**. We have numerous tools to help understand and frame the battlespace. Civil Affairs (CA) Marines often use the ASCOPE analysis to understand the civil dimension of the battlespace. Using ASCOPE, CA Marines analyze how **Areas**,

Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events may impact or be impacted by military operations. While useful, it only provides the surface details. When we overlay an operational culture analysis utilizing the environment, the economy, social organization, political structures and belief systems we are able to derive a much deeper understanding of the operational environment.

2. **THE FIVE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS.** There are five cultural dimensions: culture and the environment, culture and local economies, social organization and power, political structures and leadership and cultural belief systems. While the military has developed many models of culture, most models are not based on scientific research. The five dimensions of culture is not a list of different cultural facts someone thinks are important. They are founded on 150 years of studies of other cultures. The studies teach us that all people, regardless of their culture, share certain ways of organizing and interacting with each other based on five different dimensions.

Therefore, the five dimensions can be applied to any culture. When applied, Marine Corps planners have a tool that does not have to be created each time a mission is assigned. With this tool, you are able to think about aspects of a particular culture which most affect planning and execution. Without such a framework, cultural information can be left out or labeled inappropriately.

The five dimensions are intrinsically connected; each affects the other. Marines must understand the connections between the five dimensions and how their actions will result in second and third order effects. This illustrates the consequences of each action.

a. **Culture and the Environment.** In preparing an operational plan that includes cultural factors, Marines need to understand the close relationship between a local community and its environment.

(1) How do people in the culture use the environment? All cultures have developed a unique interdependent relationship with their physical environment. Operationally relevant features of the physical environment that must be considered are:

- Water
- Land

- Food
- Materials for Shelter
- Fuel/Power
- Climate and Seasons
- Transportation & Communications

b. **Culture and Local Economies**. There are numerous economic exchanges that never use money. Moreover, much of human economic interaction is not regulated, taxed, or measured by national governments. For the Marine working in a foreign AO, understanding and working with these other forms of economic exchange may be critical to success in local operations.

(1) How do people in the culture obtain and distribute goods and services? All cultures have a specific system for obtaining, producing and distributing the items that people need or want to survive in their society (food, water, cars, houses etc.). This system (which does not necessarily require money or banks) is called the economy of a culture. Two aspects to consider are the economic exchange systems and the formal and informal economies that the culture uses.

c. **Social Organization and Power**. Every cultural group organizes the relationships among people. The way of organizing relationships defines the kinds of interactions people can have with each other. The resulting pattern of relationships can be described in terms of a structure. This structure places boundaries on people's behaviors, and limits access to certain people. This structure also connects individuals and groups, and defines the kinds of interactions they can have. This is the social structure of a culture.

(1) All cultures assign people different roles, status and power within the group. The way that people organize themselves and distribute power and status is called their social structure. While there are many possible ways to categorize people, most societies around the world differentiate people on the basis of the following characteristics:

- Gender
- Age
- Class
- Ethnicity / Race
- Religious Membership
- Kinship / Tribal Affiliation
- Socially Valued Skills

d. **Political Structures and Leadership.** We have seen that economic and social structures shape the distribution of power and authority in a group. The map of that power and authority reveals a group's political structure, expressed in political mechanisms and relationships. We define political structure as the way that power and leadership are apportioned to people, and exercised according to the social structure of the society.

(1) How do people in the culture determine authority and leadership? All cultures have a system that determines who leads the group and makes decisions about its welfare. How a group is ruled (and it may not be by a specific person or set of people) is referred to as the political structure of a culture.

- Formal versus Informal Leadership
- Non-hierarchical forms of leadership

e. **Cultural Belief Systems.** All cultural groups have a shared set of beliefs that unite individual members. A belief is a certainty, learned through inherited group experiences and practices about the substance and meaning of phenomena and human activity. Beliefs influence the way people perceive their world, resulting in a specific world view that structures and affects the way people in the group interact with each other. While it is easily accepted that a group's beliefs cause behavior, the reverse is also true; behavior causes group beliefs.

(1) All cultures have a shared set of beliefs and symbols that unite the group.

- Beliefs are based on more than religion. Some examples include:
 - Ideologies (Communism, slavery)
 - History and Stories
 - Education
 - Family and Tradition
 - Religious Beliefs
 - Formal and Informal Religious Systems

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STUDENT OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL AFFAIRS AREA STUDY & ASSESSMENTS

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/22/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES

(1) Given a mission and commander's intent, conduct an area assessment, in order to confirm, correct, refute, or add to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment.

(2) Given a prescribed area and unit SOP, develop an area study, so that baseline information is established relating to the civil components of the assigned area.

b. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

(1) Without the aid of a reference, define civil affairs area study, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) With the aid of a reference, prepare an area study, in accordance with format outlined in FM3-05.40.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, define civil reconnaissance by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(4) Without the aid of a reference, identify a preliminary assessment by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(5) Without the aid of a reference, identify a deliberate assessment by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(6) Without the aid of a reference, identify an initial assessment by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(7) Without the aid of a reference, identify rapid assessment by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

1. **CA AREA STUDY.** A prescribed collection of specific information pertaining to a given area developed from sources available. It is developed before the receipt of mission in an area or country where missions are possible. It is most commonly used as a planning guide for preparation prior to

deployment. The CA area study enables CA Marines to make assumptions of possible needs in the designated area. The area study is a snapshot in time. Conditions are constantly changing and the information may become dated quickly.

The area study is a process common to all CA Marines. CA Marines obtain, analyze, and record information. The study is updated as required through area assessments. An area study has no single format. The information acquired through the area study supports the area assessment. An area assessment begins with receipt of the mission. CA area assessments that support other forces should supplement not repeat information in the basic area study. When a CA area study is prepared separately, the 'General' section is used as a basic document.

a. **Usage.** The CA area study is the initial planning tool based on the commander's intent. CMO planners prepare their initial CMO estimates from the CA area study.

b. **Mission Preparation.** The area study can be a beneficial tool in mission preparation. Some imperatives are:

- Understand the operational environment
- Recognize the economic, social and political implications
- Facilitate interagency and other organizations' activities
- Consider secondary and tertiary effects
- Develop multiple courses of actions
- Identify HN capacity (infrastructure)

c. **Consequences to Civilian Populace.** The area study provides a base of information to CMO planners and allows the prediction of effects and consequences to the civilian populace due to military decisions and actions. These consequences may have an impact on the following aspects of the civil dimension:

- **Political** - A multitude of interrelated issues, positions, and interests associated with the agendas of various groups or individuals.

- **Economic** - This pertains to local economic activities, as well as the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) and international relief organizations (IROs).
- **Psychological** - This refers to the mental impact on the civilian populace as well as their attitudes and beliefs.
- **Environmental** - Military operations impact the civilian environment in various ways.
- **Legal** - This refers to the HN judicial system as well as international law (the Geneva-Hague Conventions) to safeguard noncombatant life and property.

d. **Assess Civil Considerations.** Civil considerations also affect larger long-term diplomatic, economic, and informational issues. Discounting these issues can tax military or government resources and can hinder the transition of operations to follow-on elements. If the military mission is to support civil authorities, civil considerations define the mission. Civil considerations can be identified through an ASCOPE/PMESII analysis.

e. **CA Area Study Format.** There is no single format for an area study. Individual commands will set their policy or guidance. You may use the format in the FM 3-05.40 (Civil Affairs Operations) appendix D as a guide. The CA Area Study is usually divided into two major sections:

(1) Section 1. The 'General' section discusses:

- Geography
- History
- People
- U.S. interest
- FN support

The general section, when done separately may be used as a basic, stand-alone document.

(2) Section 2. Closely mirrors the six Functional Specialty Areas that Army CA units practice: Governance, Rule of Law, Economic Stability, Infrastructure, Public Health and Welfare, Public Education and Information. Although CA Marines are generalists, the Army's area study format (based on the six

Functional Specialty Areas) is a useful tool to serve as a general guideline.

2. **RESEARCH**. Area Study information can be obtained from various sources. The most difficult part of collecting information from outside of the area is finding current, relevant, and reliable information.

a. **Open Source Information**. Is obtained from resources that can be accessed by the general public. The internet has become the main tool for open source research.

b. **Restricted Source Information**. Is obtained from resources that are not accessible to the general public. Normally a security clearance is required along with a need to know.

c. **Internet**. Use caution when using websites that are not considered scholarly. Wikipedia is not scholarly.

d. **Other Sources of Information**. Human sources (personal contact) can provide information that can be used (telephone conversations or emails). If you are relieving another unit, use transition materials/workbooks/AARs to obtain information.

3. **CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE (CR)**. CR can be conducted by CA Marines or by other elements of the MAGTF as required. Civil Reconnaissance is targeted, planned, and coordinated observations and evaluations that focus on the civil aspects of the environment. CR focuses specifically on the civil component through the ASCOPE analysis. CR assists CMO planners and CA Marines in completing detailed planning for CMO to be conducted.

b. **Area Assessment**. Is the commander's prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment.

(1) CMO planners integrate CR into the overall supported commander's OPLAN. CR complements the efforts of other MAGTF staff sections, enhancing the development of the Common Operational Picture (COP).

c. **Civil Reconnaissance Checklist**. The following are examples of how ASCOPE can be used to develop questions that may

assist CA Marines in planning and conducting civil reconnaissance:

(1) Who are the civilians we might encounter in our area of operations? How are they organized? What are the tribal lines? What are the ethnic lines?

(2) Where, why, and when might we encounter them?

(3) What activities are civilians engaged in that might affect MAGTF operations?

(4) Are they supporting the police and other indigenous security forces?

(5) How might MAGTF operations affect civilian activities (economic, social, political, etc.)?

While assessing the impact of MAGTF operations, the CA Marine should consider the following:

(6) Health and Nutrition

(7) Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academics, Trash, Medical, Safety, and Others (SWEAT-MSO)

(8) Availability of Food

(9) Shelter/Living Areas

(10) Logistics/Movement of Goods and Services

(11) Infrastructure

g. **Civil Information Management (CIM)**. CIM resources must be used in the conduct of civil reconnaissance. CIM has the capability to geo-reference and interface pertinent civil and threat data to assist in developing the civil inputs to the common operation picture (COP). CIM may provide trends in the civil dimension. The MAGTF commander and other staff elements may not be aware of which could adversely impact MAGTF operations.

4. **AREA ASSESSMENTS**. There is no doctrinal format for conducting a CA Area Assessment; it usually follows the format of the CA Area Study. Each commander has to decide for

themselves what should be included and what conclusions may be drawn from the information collected.

a. **Preliminary Assessment**. Is conducted upon receipt of mission. It is the first step of mission analysis (METT-TC) and feeds into the Civil Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (CIPB). The Preliminary Assessment is characterized by an analysis of all information known about the area or situation. Much of this information may be old, secondhand, or incomplete. This requires planners to make assumptions until information shortfalls can be answered through a more detailed and deliberate assessment made upon entry into the AO.

Objectives of the Preliminary Assessment are:

- (1) Analyze known information about the situation or conditions in the AO
- (2) Relate U.S. policy, goals, and objectives to the current situation
- (3) Determine the best use of assigned assets to meet the known challenges of the assigned mission

b. **Deliberate Assessment**. Is conducted upon entry into the AO continuously, throughout an operation, and as directed for special or emergency cases. The deliberate assessment is characterized by firsthand observation, interviews and surveys. Deliberate assessments also use other tools to make knowledgeable decisions.

Objectives of the Deliberate Assessment are:

- To validate the preliminary assessment
- To finalize or modify operations planned prior to deployment into the AO

There are two types of deliberate assessments, the initial and rapid assessments.

(1) **Initial Assessment**. An initial assessment is conducted upon entry into the designated AO. The objectives or focus of the initial assessment should be broad yet manageable; for example, assess general conditions of the AO in the areas of public health, public safety, public works and utilities, civil information, and emergency services.

During the initial assessment, the CA team takes a cursory look at the conditions of the area as directed by the mission statement. Using the principles of METT-TC for analyzing a situation, the CA team visits locations that will most likely provide the information it has been directed to find. Sources of pertinent information include municipal government and public safety offices, hospitals, medical clinics, feed centers, and HN, UN, and NGO relief sites.

(2) Rapid Assessment. A rapid assessment should determine current conditions, capabilities, or attitudes of a specific village, facility, or population group. The objectives or focus for the rapid assessment should be well defined. Rapid assessments are normally tasked during the 'decide' step (AD3ET) to appropriate elements. The elements will then be in a position to satisfy information shortfalls. Rapid Assessments can also be used for emergencies, single issues, or special situations. Format example for a rapid assessment:

- (a) General
 - (1) Village Name, Grid, Sector, Language
- (b) Population
 - (1) Total Population, Families, Male, Female, Children
 - (2) Refugees, Refugee Origin, Abroad
- (c) Emergency Services
 - (1) Police, Fire & Rescue, Militia
- (d) Key Persons
 - (1) Mayor (key political official), Police Chief, Military Commander, etc.
- (e) Economics
 - (1) Unemployed, Self-Employed (Nature of Self-Employment)
 - (2) Employed, Nature of Employment, agriculture, Industry

(f) Lines of Communication/Utilities

(1) Communications, Water Supply, Electrical Supply, Road System, Rail System, Medical Facilities, Education Facilities

5. **PLANNING**. Assessments are an important aspect to future planning endeavors.

a. **The CMO Estimate**. This estimate provides a timely examination of factors that support decision making and can affect mission accomplishment. Depending on the level of command and the time available, the estimates could be a formal, detailed written document or an informal verbal briefing.

It is both a process and a product. The process calls for a disciplined approach to collecting and processing information (i.e., CIM), and recording the results. Automated tools such as databases give the CMO planner the flexibility and responsiveness needed to tailor the estimate to meet a variety of requirements. The CMO estimate is a living document that is continuously refined, as additional information becomes available. A current estimate allows the CMO planner to quickly provide accurate information to meet planning requirements as they change. The coordinating staff and each staff principle develop facts, assessments, and information that relate to their functional field.

b. **Running Estimate**. A staff estimate that is continuously updated based on new information, as the operation proceeds. Once the MAGTF commander decides on a course of action (COA), staff estimates transition to a running estimate that supports decision making during the execution phase.

AREA STUDY EXAMPLE FM 3-05.40

I. GENERAL.

A. Geography.

1. Location and size.
 - a. Location in relation to neighboring countries.
 - b. Total land area (square miles or kilometers [size in relation to a U.S. state]).
2. Physical features.
 - a. Waterways and ports.
 - b. Topography.
 - c. Natural resources.
 - d. Road and rail nets.
3. Climate.
 - a. Seasonal abnormalities, temperature, atmospheric pressure, humidity, rainfall, and prevailing winds.
 - b. Characteristics and statistics.
4. Political geography.
 - a. Politically organized areas and regions.
 - b. Effectiveness of administration of political areas in relation to geographic boundaries.
 - c. Cities and towns.
 - d. Boundaries
 - e. Sources of raw material.
 - f. Principles or traditions that command loyal support.
 - g. State of industrial development.

B. History.

1. Brief history of—
 - a. The development of the area.
 - b. Influence exerted by major powers in development.
 - c. Divisions or partitions resulting from wars and treaties.
 - d. Major geographic or political factors to the current status of the area.
 - e. Present form of government and previous forms of government.
 - f. Extent of political control over other areas.
 - g. Degree of control over the population exercised by government.
 - h. Susceptibility of existing government toward major powers.
 - i. Political organization of the area.
2. Brief coverage of each—
 - a. International treaty to which subject area or country is signatory.
 - b. Status of forces agreement.
 - c. Summary pronouncement of national policy pertinent to the subject area or country.

C. People.

1. Population.
 - a. Numbers.

- b. Distribution and density.
- c. Birth and death rates.
- d. Biographical sketches of prominent personalities.
 - (1) Name.
 - (2) Address.
 - (3) Business, profession, or occupation.
 - (4) Political affiliation.
 - (5) Education.
 - (6) Religion.

2. Culture and social structure.

a. Culture.

- (1) History, government, and geography as they affect the cultural makeup of the people.
 - (a) Events and facts considered most important.
 - (b) Traditionally conducted activities, beliefs, or situations.
- (2) Heroes and leaders of groups, with reasons for special esteem.
- (3) Ethnic groups (racial, tribal, or religious) and population distribution (rural or urban with ratios of age, sex, and imported or exported labor forces).
- (4) Majority or minority groups (unique challenges or conditions).
- (5) Moral codes.
- (6) Attitudes toward age, sex, race.
- (7) Influences on personality development.
- (8) Individuality.
- (9) Privacy.
- (10) Nature of the people's perceptions.
- (11) Clothing.
- (12) Fatalism or self-determination.
- (13) Values in economic philosophy (cooperation, competition, respect for personal and private property).

b. Social structure.

- (1) Status of male and female, by age.
- (2) Humor, entertainment.
- (3) Community participation.
- (4) Exchange of gifts.
- (5) Public displays of emotion.
- (6) Lines of authority.
- (7) Cooperation versus competition, including economics.
- (8) The family.
 - (a) Roles and status of family members.
 - (b) Nuclear or extended.
 - (c) Authority, obedience, place, and expectations of members.
 - (d) Place in society.
 - (e) Inheritance customs.
 - (f) Entrance rites and rituals.
 - (g) Markers of social change, adulthood, special activities.
- (9) Dating and marriage.
 - (a) Age standards.
 - (b) Influence of family and peers.

- (c) Common dating practices, courtship activities.
 - (d) Chaperones, group dating.
 - (e) Engagement customs.
 - (f) Divorce, separation, aloneness.
 - (g) Sexual mores.
- (10) Greetings.
- (a) Conversation and gestures on meeting.
 - (b) Distinctive approaches for greetings.
 - (c) Compliments given or received.
 - (d) Space and time (standing, sitting, distance between people).
 - (e) Farewell and leave-taking.
 - (f) Use of first name versus titles.
 - (g) Favorite, familiar, or pleasing phrases.
- (11) Visiting practices.
- (a) Conversations. 1 Topics.
 - 2 Appropriate part of visit.
 - 3 Attitude, rate, pitch, and tone.
 - (b) Gifts.
 - (c) Compliments on possessions, family, and children.
 - (d) Parties and other social events.
 - (e) Business discussions.
 - (f) Mannerisms, gestures, posture, eye contact, and facial expressions.
- (12) Eating practices.
- (a) Table manners (before, during, and after the meal).
 - (b) Average diet, meal size, and scheduling.
 - (c) Specific foods reserved for special occasions or rituals.
 - (d) Forbidden foods.
 - (e) Social and other occasions.
 - (f) Unique problems and challenges.
- (13) Work and recreation.
- (a) Age, sex, status, and hierarchy.
 - (b) Schedules.
 - (c) Obligations, successes, or failures.
 - (d) Business codes.
 - (e) Bribes.
 - (f) Family, cultural, and social recreation, vacation, and sports.
 - (g) Individual recreation (age and sex exclusions and variations).
 - (h) Distinctive arts and sciences.
 - (i) Well-known artists, athletes, and others.

c. Dos and don'ts (Item or area that could embarrass or hurt the commander's mission if handled improperly. Include a quick reference for the commander and a starting point for briefing troops. This section may include items previously mentioned).

3. Languages.
 - a. Map showing distribution.
 - b. Minority groups.
 - c. Standardization of languages.
4. Religion.
 - a. Religious sects (number, key leaders, and geographic locations).
 - b. Funeral and burial practices.
 - c. Religious problems.
 - d. Eating and dietary habits.
 - e. Sexual mores, including interrelations and intermarriages with alien personnel.
 - f. Written and unwritten laws of conduct and human behavior.
- D. U.S. Interests.
 1. U.S. military units and teams in the area and their activities.
 2. U.S. Government organizations in the area and their interests.
 3. U.S. civilian organizations and interests in the area.
 4. Legal agreements and treaties.
 5. Trade and commercial interests.
- E. FN Support.
 1. C2.
 - a. Space and facilities at echelons above corps.
 - b. C2 of other functional areas.
 - c. Area security.
 - d. Dislocated civilians.
 - e. Battlefield circulation control communications.
 - (1) Use of communications systems.
 - (2) Repair of communications systems.
 - (3) Cable construction and repair.
 2. Combat service support.
 - a. Use of FN transportation and distribution systems, including highways, railways, waterways, ports (public and private).
 - b. Use of FN buildings.
 - c. Civilian services (laundry, bath, bakery, food, water).
 - d. Depot operations and depot maintenance.
 - e. Material-handling equipment.
 - f. Labor.
 - (1) Skilled.
 - (2) Manual.
 - (3) Agricultural.
 - (4) Male or female.
 - (5) Draft exemption for U.S. employees.
 - (6) Third country (labor necessity, availability, and quantity).
 - (7) Screened by intelligence.
 - (8) Linguists and interpreters.
 - (9) Salary (standard wages).
 - (10) Workday.
 3. Mobility and Survivability.
 - a. Repair of railroads, highways, and pipelines.
 - b. Obstacle construction.

- c. Contract guard services.
 - d. Decontamination.
 - e. Port facilities and repair.
 - f. Barrier and construction materials.
4. Medical.
- a. Hospitals (facilities and beds).
 - b. Medical evacuation.
 - c. Medical supplies and equipment.
5. FN POC for U.S. forces and procedures.
6. Impact of U.S. presence on the FN economy.

II. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.

A. General System of Public Administration.

- 1. Political traditions.
- 2. Political stability.
- 3. Standards and effectiveness.
- 4. Constitutional system.
- 5. Civil rights and practices.
- 6. Political factions, movements, and dynamics.

B. Structure of National Government.

- 1. Executive branch.
 - a. Organization.
 - b. Powers.
 - c. Policies.
 - d. Administration.
- 2. Legislative branch.
 - a. Organization.
 - b. Powers.
 - c. Composition of membership.
 - d. Pressure groups.
- 3. Judicial branch.
 - a. Organization.
 - b. Powers.
- 4. Methods of selection of key officials.
- 5. Biographical sketches of key officials.
 - a. Name.
 - b. Address.
 - c. Position in government.
 - d. Political affiliation.
 - e. Education.
 - f. Religion.
 - g. Former business, profession, or occupation.
 - h. Attitude toward the United States.

- 6. Potential officials and biographical sketches.

C. Structure of Government at Other Levels.

- 1. Province or state.
- 2. District.

3. City.
4. Relations with national government.
5. Biographical sketches of key officials, potential officials, and other influential persons.
 - a. Name.
 - b. Address.
 - c. Position.
 - d. Political affiliation.
 - e. Education.
 - f. Religion.
 - g. Former business, profession, or occupation.
 - h. Attitude toward the United States.

D. Armed Forces.

1. Historical background.
2. Organization, size, and mission.
 - a. Defense establishment.
 - b. Army.
 - c. Navy.
 - d. Air Force.
 - e. Paramilitary forces.
 - f. Political control and effectiveness.
3. General military policy.
4. International treaties.
5. Foreign influence.
6. Military establishment and the national economy.
 - a. Defense budget.
 - b. Percentage of total budget.
 - c. Military pay.
7. Quality and source of manpower.
 - a. Key officers and qualifications.
 - b. Recruitment.
 - c. Conscription.
 - d. Reserves.
 - e. Training.
 - f. Mobilization plans.
8. Logistics.
9. Weapons and equipment.
10. Ranks, uniforms, and insignia.
11. Loyalty and morale factors.
12. Military justice.

E. Political Parties.

1. Strength and capabilities.
2. Organization.
3. Policies and objectives.
4. Biographical sketches of leaders.
5. Training.
6. Role in international communist movement.
7. Relation to domestic government.
8. Internal party politics.

F. International Affairs.

1. Agencies.
2. Foreign relations.

3. Relations with intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

III. CULTURAL RELATIONS.

A. General conditions and problems.

B. Cultural Affairs.

1. Religions in the area.

- a. National.
- b. Organized.
- c. Unorganized (sects).
- d. Relations among religions and religious leaders, indigenous and missionary.

2. Clergy.

- a. Number, location, and education of clergymen.
- b. Influence of religious leaders.

3. Religious beliefs.

- a. Major tenets of each religion, including such concepts as—
 - (1) Faith.
 - (2) Impact of faith on life.
 - (3) Concept of the hereafter.
 - (4) Means of salvation.
 - (5) Rites of cleaning and purification.
 - (6) Impact of religions on value systems.
- b. Degree of religious conviction in lives of indigenous populace.

4. Worship.

- a. Forms and significance of worship of each religion.
- b. Places of worship.
- c. Frequency of worship.

5. Relationship between religion and motivation of indigenous people.

6. Relationship between religion and transcultural communication.

7. Socioeconomic influence of religion.

- a. Influence of religions on society.
- b. Economic influence of religions.
 - (1) Religious ownership of property and other possessions.
 - (2) Teachings of religions about private property.

8. Interrelation with government.

- a. Relationship of religious leaders and government officials.
- b. Role of religions and religious leaders in armed forces.
- c. Political influence of religious leaders.

9. Religious schools.

- a. Location, size, and attendance.
- b. Influence.
- c. Relationship to nonsecular schools.

C. Arts, Monuments, and Archives.

1. Description of conditions of the arts and monuments.

2. Advancements over the past 10 years.

3. Influence of outside countries.

4. Arts.

- a. Location, type, use, and significance of the fine arts.
- b. Population attitude toward art treasures.
- c. Government policies and agencies dealing with the arts.

- d. Agencies through which arts are performed.
 - (1) Private.
 - (2) Government.
- 5. Advancements in science.
- 6. Artists' organizations and government control.
- 7. Monuments.
 - a. Location of historic monuments and sites.
 - b. Present significance of historic monuments and sites.
- 8. Archives.
 - a. Location of archives.
 - b. Varieties of archives.
 - (1) Public archives.
 - (2) Semipublic archives.
 - (3) Ecclesiastical archives.
 - (4) Private or family archives.
 - c. Contents or category of archives.
 - (1) Historical.
 - (2) Current documents.

IV. CIVILIAN SUPPLY.

- A. General Conditions and Problems (Peculiarities of climate and geography that might influence civilian supply).
- B. Storage, Refrigeration, and Processing Facilities.
 - 1. Storage space, available and required.
 - a. Food.
 - b. Other supplies.
 - 2. Refrigeration, available and required.
 - a. Food.
 - b. Other supplies.
- C. Distribution Channels.
 - 1. Food.
 - 2. Clothing.
 - 3. Essential durables.
- D. Dietary and Clothing Requirements and Customs.
 - 1. Food.
 - a. Available.
 - b. Required.
 - 2. Clothing.
 - a. Available.
 - b. Required.
 - 3. Customs that might influence civilian supply.
- E. Production Excesses and Shortages.

V. LEGAL.

- A. System of Laws.
 - 1. Civil and criminal codes.
 - a. Origins.
 - b. Procedures.
 - c. Penalties.
 - 2. Political crimes.
- B. Administration of Justice.
 - 1. Historical development.
 - 2. Agencies (national and local).

3. Courts and tribunals (types of jurisdiction [including administrative tribunals]).
4. Judicial procedures.
5. Personnel.
 - a. Judiciary.
 - b. Prosecutors.
 - c. The Bar.
 - d. Legal training.
 - e. Political controls.

VI. PUBLIC SAFETY.

A. General Conditions and Problems (primary consideration in this area is whether the existing institutions [police, fire, and penal] may be used to carry out the combat commander's primary mission and to provide the day-to-day control and bodily protection of the local population).

B. Police System.

1. Organizations at all levels.
 - a. Types of police forces and criminal investigative agencies.
 - b. Organization.
 - c. Areas of responsibility and jurisdiction.
 - d. Chain of command.
 - e. Names and biographical sketches of key personnel.
 2. Equipment.
 - a. Arms and special equipment.
 - b. Modern crime-fighting equipment.
 - c. Traffic control equipment.
 - d. Riot control equipment.
 - e. Police communications.
 - f. Transportation.
 3. Personnel.
 - a. Strength.
 - b. Method of selection.
 - (1) Political, racial, and religious requirements.
 - (2) Reliability.
 - (3) Morale and state of training.
 - c. Promotion basis.
 4. Functions and authority.
 - a. Criminal action.
 - b. Civil ordinances.
 - c. Disorder and disaster control.
 5. Police regulations that differ from U.S. concept of law and order.
 - a. General.
 - b. Identification system.
 - c. Restrictions on travel, gatherings, and curfews.
 - d. Restrictions on ownership of firearms.
 6. Miscellaneous.
 - a. Other methods of enforcing law and order, such as the influence of religious leaders, family ties, and role of the military.
 - b. Psychological effect on the local population.
- C. Penal Institutions.
1. National and local.
 - a. Prisons and jails (number, location, and capacity).
 - b. Concentration camps and labor camps (number, location, and capacity).

2. Organization.
 3. Government agency exercising control.
 4. Inmate breakdown.
 - a. Political (reliability and future use in the U.S. cause).
 - b. Criminal.
 - c. Juvenile.
 - d. Sex.
 5. Adequacy (sanitary and health conditions).
 6. Treatment of prisoners.
 7. Probation.
 8. Parole.
- D. Fire Protection.
1. Organization (in general, the same as for the police).
 2. Equipment.
 - a. Type, location, and adequacy of existing equipment and facilities.
 - b. Adaptability of local military firefighting equipment.
 3. Personnel.
 - a. Strength and mode of selection.
 - b. Training status and efficiency.
 - c. Names and political reliability of key personnel.
 4. Miscellaneous.
 - a. Particular problems in certain areas, such as overcrowded cities, narrow streets, and local water pressure.
 - b. Possible use of equipment in controlling riots and other public disasters.

VII. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

- A. General Conditions and Problems.
- B. Public Finance.
 1. Organization.
 - a. National level.
 - b. Other levels.
 - c. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
 2. Policies.
 - a. Fiscal and economic policies.
 - b. Special conditions and policies.
 - c. Accounting systems used.
 3. Monetary System.
 - a. Currency.
 - b. Reserves or backing of currency.
 - c. Issuing authorities.
 - d. Stability of currency.
 - e. Controls.
 - f. Exchange rates.
 - g. Government authorities.
 - h. Other legal instruments of exchange.
 - i. Other means of exchange, such as the black market.
 4. Budgetary system and current budget.
 - a. Current budget.
 - b. Budgetary analysis.
 - c. Governing authorities and controls.
 - d. Analysis of budgetary procedures.

- e. Patterns of expenditure and distribution.
5. Sources of government income.
 - a. Analysis of taxation (amount of taxes collected, method of collection, and type of taxes).
 - b. Formulation of tax policies.
 - c. Investments.
 - d. Other sources of government income.
 6. Financial Institutions.
 - a. Banking institutions (facilities, location, capital, and credit policies).
 - b. Investment institutions.
 - (1) Stock institutions.
 - (2) Controlling authorities and control exercised.
 - (3) Miscellaneous investment companies.
 - c. Insurance companies (number, size, and location).
 - d. Specialized savings institutions.
 1. Foreign exchange (balance of trade, controls, and restrictions).
 2. Applicable laws and regulations.
- C. Economics and Commerce.
1. Description of economic system.
 - a. Private enterprise.
 - b. Public enterprise.
 - c. Biographical sketches of key officials and business leaders.
 2. National economic policy and controls.
 3. Goals and programs.
 - a. Short-range.
 - b. Intermediate-range.
 - c. Long-range.
 4. Summary of important trade agreements and extent of participation in world trade.
 5. Resources.
 - a. Natural.
 - b. Developed.
 - c. Human.
 - d. Self-sufficiency, dependency, substitution.
 6. Extent of development.
 - a. Capabilities of infrastructure.
 - b. Capabilities of industry and power.
 - c. Capabilities of agriculture.
 - d. Capabilities of service sector.
 7. Statistics.
 - a. Per capita (income, savings, consumer spending).
 - b. Aggregate (gross national product, national income).
 - c. Ratios (unemployment, productivity, occupations).
 - d. Validity of statistics (when compiled).
 8. Internal movement of goods.
 9. Exports and imports.
 - a. Type.
 - b. Quantity.

- c. Market.
- d. Influence.
- 10. Commerce.
 - a. Domestic trade.
 - (1) Wholesale and retail distribution system.
 - (2) Markets and fairs.
 - (3) Weights and measures standards.
 - (4) Cooperatives and public markets.
 - b. Foreign trade.
 - (1) Principal items of export and import.
 - (2) Tariff system, customs, duties.
 - (3) Trade agreements.
 - (4) Balance of payments.
- 11. Industries.
 - a. Location of main industrial centers.
 - b. Names of important companies.
 - c. Labor (skills and distribution).
 - d. Power sources and capacities.
 - e. Manufacturing industries.
 - f. Types (machinery, chemical, textile).
 - g. Locations (province, city).
 - h. Processing industries (types, locations, and capacities).
- 12. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
 - a. Government organization.
 - b. Trade associations and chambers of commerce.
 - c. Laws governing commerce and industry.
 - d. Subsidies and monopolies.
- 13. Price control and rationing.
 - a. Stabilization.
 - b. Variation of prices.
 - c. Control measures and techniques.
 - d. Commodities under price control.
 - e. Distribution.
 - (1) Essential commodities.
 - (2) Imports and exports.
 - (3) Ration controls.
 - (4) Production and distribution.
 - (5) Effect on demands.
 - (6) Types and status of markets.
 - f. Control systems.
 - (1) Price-control program.
 - (2) Rationing program.
 - (3) Raw materials.
 - (4) Financial.
 - g. Legislation.
 - (1) Price-control legislation and items subject to price control.
 - (2) Rationing legislation and items subject to rationing.
- D. Labor.

1. Organization.
 - a. National level.
 - b. Other levels.
 - c. Key personnel with biographical sketches.
2. Labor force.
 - a. Employment data and trends.
 - b. Available manpower and labor supply by special classes.
 - c. Ages and distribution.
 - d. Unemployment.
 - e. Labor productivity.
3. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
 - a. Government labor policy.
 - (1) Labor laws and working conditions.
 - (2) Role of government.
 - (3) Government job placement controls.
 - (4) Wages and other incentives.
 - b. Labor organizations.
 - (1) Organizations (type, size, location, leadership, and political influence).
 - (2) Membership.
 - (3) Relations with foreign or international labor organizations.
 - (4) Total potential labor force (type, distribution, mobility, and ages).
 - c. Social insurance.
 - d. Labor disputes, including mechanisms for settling.
4. Wages and standards, including hours and working conditions.

VIII. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE.

- A. General Conditions and Problems.
 1. Importance of agriculture in total economy.
 2. Extent of agricultural productivity and self-sufficiency.
 3. Principal problems.
 4. Attitude of farm population.
- B. Agricultural Geography.
 1. Locations of principal farm areas.
 2. Types of soil.
 3. Influence of climate and topography.
 4. Types of crops.
 5. Farm to market road net.
- C. Agricultural Products and Processing.
 1. Livestock and dairy products (types, amounts, methods of processing, refrigeration, warehousing).
 2. Crops (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage).
 3. Poultry (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage, refrigeration).
- D. Agricultural Practices.
 1. Extent of mechanization.
 2. Improvement programs.
 3. Conservation programs.
 4. Pest and disease control.

- E. Land-Holding System and Reform Programs.
- F. Fisheries.
 - 1. Commercial (number, companies, location, type of fish, type of crafts, fishing areas, methods of processing, storage, annual production).
 - 2. Private (policy, rules, regulations, type of fish, fishing areas).
 - 3. Restocking program.
 - 4. Problem areas.
- G. Forestry.
 - 1. Reforestation program.
 - 2. Importance of forestry to the country.
 - 3. Forestry services or administration.
 - 4. Hunting (controls, laws, regulations, and types of game).
 - 5. Products and their processing.
- H. Agencies, Institutions and Programs.
 - 1. Government.
 - 2. Private.
- I. Food Products.
 - 1. Type.
 - 2. Quantity.
 - 3. Processing.
 - 4. Location, size, ownership of warehouses.
 - 5. Types and quantity of food supplies stored.
- J. Applicable Laws and Regulations Governing Food and Agriculture.

IX. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT.

- A. General Conditions and Problems.
- B. Pollution Control and Environmental Management Organizations.
- C. Laws and Regulations.
- D. Sources of Pollution.
 - 1. Air.
 - 2. Water.
 - 3. Soil.
- E. Health Hazard.
 - 1. Immediate and present threats.
 - 2. Near-term.
 - 3. Mid-term.
 - 4. Long term.

X. PUBLIC HEALTH.

- A. Organization.
 - 1. National level.
 - 2. Other levels.
 - 3. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
- B. General Conditions and Problems.
- C. Agencies and Institutions.
 - 1. Hospitals.
 - a. Number.
 - b. Capacity (number of beds).
 - c. Location and condition of facilities.
 - 2. Other medical facilities.
 - a. Public.
 - b. Private.
- D. Medical Personnel.

1. Numbers (doctors and nurses).
 2. Location.
- E. Medical Equipment and Supplies.
1. Surgical and dental equipment.
 2. Testing equipment.
 3. Drugs.
 - a. Availability.
 - b. Shortages.
 4. Other supplies.
- F. Diseases.
1. Predominant types.
 2. Control programs.
- G. Environmental Sanitation.
1. Regulations governing food and drugs.
 2. Water control and supply.
 3. Disposal of sewage and waste.
- H. Public Welfare.
1. Organization.
 - a. National level.
 - b. Other levels.
 - c. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
 2. Major social problems.
 - a. Juvenile delinquency.
 - b. Alcohol and narcotics abuse.
 - c. Unemployment.
 - d. Poverty and dependency.
 3. Public assistance.
 - a. Basis upon which granted.
 - b. Types of relief and medical care provided.
 4. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
 - a. Social insurance.
 - b. Health insurance.
 - c. Accident insurance.
 - d. Old age, disability, and survivors' pensions.
 - e. Unemployment.
 - f. Family assistance.
 - g. Other.
 5. Welfare services (government and private).
 - a. Child welfare (adoption, maternal).
 - b. Emergency and war relief.
 - c. Relief and public assistance.
 - (1) For mentally and physically handicapped.
 - (2) For aged and indigent.
 6. Institutions.
 - a. Orphanages (number, location, and capacity).
 - b. Homes for the aged (number, locations, and capacity).
 - c. Physical therapy (number and location).
 7. Programs.
 - a. Recreational.
 - b. Vocational.
 - c. Health.
 - d. Child care.
 8. Welfare personnel.
 - a. Professional standards.
 - b. Volunteer assistance.

- c. Number available by type of organization.
- 9. Financial and legal.
 - a. Financial plan (how funds are obtained).
 - b. Laws and regulations.
 - c. Organizational structure.
- 10. Regulations governing public welfare.

XI. PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION.

- A. General Conditions and Problems.
- B. Rail Transport.
 - 1. Railroad by type, gauge, and miles or kilometers.
 - 2. Type, number, and condition of rolling stock.
 - 3. Location of switchyards.
 - 4. Major rail terminals (number, size, location, and condition).
- C. Vehicular Transportation.
 - 1. Road (type, condition, and miles or kilometers).
 - 2. Street systems and condition.
 - 3. Vehicles and public conveyances by type, number, and ownership.
- D. Water Transportation.
 - 1. Size, location, type, use, and ownership of all floating vessels.
 - 2. Location of all port facilities and services.
 - 3. Identification of sea routes.
 - 4. Location and use of inland waterways.
- E. Air Transportation.
 - 1. Location, size, and use of all airfields.
 - 2. Number, size, use, and ownership of all aircraft.
- F. Pipelines.
- G. Travel.
 - 1. Status of tourist travel.
 - 2. Restrictions.
 - 3. Regulations.
 - 4. Volume by geographic area of people leaving and entering.
 - 5. Items of general importance common to all transportation systems.
 - a. Ownership.
 - b. Regulatory agencies and licenses.
 - c. Financial structure.
 - d. Administration.
 - e. Operation and revenues.
 - f. Maintenance.
 - g. Trade associations.
 - h. Personnel and labor relations.
 - 6. Elements relative to each specific transport system in detail.
 - a. Location and mileage.
 - b. Condition.
 - c. Effect of seasonal variation.
 - d. Special traffic hazards and problems.

XII. PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES.

- A. General Conditions and Problems.
- B. Public Works.
 - 1. Public buildings, including hospitals (use, size, and location).
 - 2. Roads and streets.
 - 3. Bridges.
 - 4. Port facilities (harbors).
 - 5. Airports and railroad terminals.
 - 6. Mass housing.

7. Dams (flood control).

C. Public Utilities.

1. Power system, including nuclear reactors and power-generating plants and distribution systems.

2. Water system, including source dams, degree of pollution, filter plants, and ownership.

3. Gas works (size, location, source, and ownership).

4. Sewage-collection systems and disposal plants.

5. Radioactive waste, garbage, and refuse disposal.

6. Storm drainage systems.

7. Items of general importance to all public works and utilities.

a. Ownership.

b. Regulating and licensing agencies.

c. Financial structure.

d. Administration.

e. Operations and revenues.

f. Maintenance.

g. Trade associations.

h. Personnel and labor relations.

8. Elements relative to each specific public works or utility in detail.

a. Locations of plants, line systems, nets, and connecting grids.

b. Condition.

c. New construction requirements.

d. Available resources for construction.

e. Priority of usage.

XIII. PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS.

A. General Conditions and Problems.

B. Postal System.

1. Extent and frequency of service.

a. Metropolitan.

b. Rural.

2. Censorship.

3. Private carriers.

4. Parcel post service.

5. Other functions.

a. Postal savings.

b. Money order service.

c. Issuance of licenses.

d. Tax information service.

C. Telephone.

1. Exchanges and local service.

2. Long-line systems and connecting grids.

3. Priority usage.

4. Censorship.

5. Private systems.

6. International and intercontinental wire and submarine cables.

D. Telegraph.

1. Exchanges and local service.

2. Long-line systems and connecting grids.

3. Priority usage.

4. Censorship.

5. Private systems.

6. International and intercontinental wire and submarine cables.
- E. Radio and Television.
 1. Transmitting stations (number, type, and location).
 2. Channels, frequencies, and trunk lines.
 3. Hours of operation.
 4. Censorship.
 5. Propaganda usage.
 6. Foreign influence.
 7. Foreign broadcasts.
 8. Programming.
- F. Applicable Laws Governing Communications Systems.

XIV. PUBLIC EDUCATION.

- A. Organization.
 1. National level.
 2. Other levels (province, state, district).
 3. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
 4. Philosophy guiding the educational systems.
- B. General Conditions and Problems.
 1. General development of the area's educational system.
 2. Requirements placed upon individuals.
 3. Significant achievements in recent years.
 4. Educational level of population.
- C. Agencies, Institutions, and Programs.
 1. Government agencies and policies.
 2. Educational systems and facilities.
 - a. Administration and controls.
 - b. Preschool, kindergarten, and primary schools.
 - c. Secondary schools.
 - d. Vocational and special schools.
 - e. Higher education.
 - f. Teacher education.
 - g. Private schools.
 - h. Adult education.
 3. Evaluation of educational system.
 4. Private and public organizations.
 - a. Influence and pressure groups.
 - b. Youth organizations.
 - c. Religious groups.
- D. Influence of Politics on Education.

XV. CIVIL INFORMATION.

- A. General Conditions, Problems, and Stage of Development.
 1. Effect of geographic, social, economic, and political factors.
 2. Reading, listening, viewing habits.
 3. Rural-urban differences.
 4. Anticomunist appeal.
 5. International outlook.
 6. Techniques to measure impact.
- B. Newspapers, Periodicals, and Publishing Firms.
 1. Name.
 2. Location.

3. Ownership.
 4. Circulation.
 5. Publication.
 6. Language.
 7. Editorial policies (political persuasion).
 8. Procedures.
 9. Employees.
 10. Equipment.
 11. Sources of supply.
 12. Revenue.
- C. Miscellaneous Means of Communications.
1. Private printing facilities.
 2. Advertising agencies.
 3. Others.

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STUDENT OUTLINE

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

MARINE CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

Updated 08/26/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given a mission, project, funding source, and commander's intent, manage a project to deliver the effect specified by the commander.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, define project management, by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify the duties of project purchasing officers by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify the duties of pay agents by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(4) Without the aid of a reference, identify the duties of project managers by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(5) Without the aid of a reference, define appropriated funds by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(6) With the aid of a reference, propose a project in accordance with applicable orders and directives.

1. **PROJECT MANAGEMENT**. Project management is an important skill that CA Marines must understand. However, the CA Marine must not be relegated solely to project management functions. Most CMO does not require funding (i.e., KLE, Civil Reconnaissance, Assessments, Support to Civil Authorities, etc.). Funding projects enables you to leverage support for the MAGTF. As CA Marines engaged in stability operations, money becomes more than just currency, it is an asset that can influence the indigenous population at all levels (village, district, and provincial). With this in mind, your projects should focus on several key areas:

a. Legitimize the HN government and MAGTF in the eyes of the population

- b. Build capacity of HN, including local government
- c. Stimulate the local economy
- d. Improve the basic quality of life for the local population
- e. Shape the operational environment by creating conditions favorable to the MAGTF
- f. Repair battle damage
- g. Reinforce IO themes

2. **PROJECT PRINCIPLES**. When selecting proposed projects, you can improve their probability of success by applying the following general principles.

- a. **Ownership**. Locals must view development programs as their own.
- b. **Capacity Building**. Transfer all knowledge and skills so they obtain requisite abilities to deliver essential services to the population.
- c. **Sustainability**. Select projects that will have lasting effects.
- d. **Selectivity**. Allocate resources based on need and local commitment.
- e. **Assessment**. Design projects based on local conditions.
- f. **Results**. Achieve clearly defined, measureable, strategic objectives.
- g. **Partnership**. Collaborate with local HN authorities, IGO/NGO and interagency partners.
- h. **Flexibility**. Adjust to changing conditions to achieve maximum effectiveness.
- i. **Accountability**. Build transparency to guard against corruption.

3. **BILLETS**. CA Marines need to have a basic understanding of project management billets that they may be assigned.

a. **Project Purchasing Officer (PPO)**. The term *project purchasing officer* differentiates officers responsible for projects from those involved with projects funded by other O&M accounts. PPOs conduct operations following the same established policy and procedures as a Field Ordering Officer (FOO) and are prohibited from commingling appropriated funds. PPOs execute payments according to established procedures.

Duties of the PPO:

- Manages the budget of individual projects
- Manages individual project nominations
- Provides advice and oversight for all unit projects
- Maintains project files and required forms
- Is personally responsible for a legal aspects relevant to a project
- Obtains appropriate signature/approvals during the project approval process
- Ensures quality assurance measures are in place

b. **Pay Agent (PA)**. Serves as a direct representative of the servicing finance office's disbursing officer. PAs are appointed to perform specific disbursement duties (project payments and battle damage) and are trained by a comptroller. The limitations of an agent's authority are detailed in the appointment orders that assign the duty. The PPO cannot perform the duties of a PA; they have completely separate duties.

Duties of the PA:

- Ensure funds are paid according to contracted agreements
- Ensure funds are transported and safeguarded in accordance with theater policy

c. **Project Manager**. Is a position of general oversight for the commander. He or she ensures all projects are updated on a weekly basis in a project tracking database or record (OHASIS or CIDNE) to give his or her commander an accurate status of

current projects. Required tasks include but are not limited to:

- Manages the budget
- Project status
- Project start and completion dates
- Funds committed, obligated and disbursed
- Percentage of work complete
- Classification code (of authorized uses)
- Confirmation of (or any change to) original grid coordinates
- All performance metrics
- Final review of all projects and bulk draws
- Maintains master checkbook
- Monitor fund distribution to ensure subordinate units are funded adequately

4. **PROCESS AND TERMS OF FUNDING**

a. **Performance Metrics**. A snapshot of the immediate benefit, sustainability and durability of a project.

b. **Legal Review**. The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) will conduct a legal review to ensure the project meets the requirements of the FMR 7000.14-R and current MAGTF guidance.

c. **Purchase Request and Commitment (PR&C / Form DA 3953)**. A document used to request the commitment of funds prior to incurring an obligation. The funding data is a series of numbers and letters representing an account and subsequent amount for the committed funds.

d. **Funding**. PA takes the signed PR&C to the supporting Finance Office to receive a line of accounting (LOA), also called funding data, which allows the PA to draw funds from disbursing. The Disbursing Officer will issue a Statement of Agent Accountability (DD Form 1081) to the PA, after cash is

disbursed. This DoD form then holds the PA liable for the cash in his possession.

Appropriated Funds:

- **Commitment**. The act of certifying and recording, by an authorized official, a programmed expenditure of funds for the costs associated with the purchase or reimbursement of products and services. This is done through a Department of the Army (DA) 3953 Purchase Request & Commitment.
- **Obligation**. Acts that legally bind the United States Government (USG) to make payments. This is done when a contract is signed.
- **Disbursement**. The payment of funds to satisfy a legal obligation of the USG. This is done with an SF-44.

e. **Bid Solicitation**. It is standard practice to obtain a minimum of three bids. If only one bid can be solicited, a 'sole source' justification will be required.

f. **Making Payments**. Payments to the contractor should be made on a schedule as the project progresses (pay in increments). A payment schedule should be designated in the contract. PPO and PA have to witness payments made on the account.

g. **SF44**. The SF44 acts as a receipt when making payments and will be used when the PA reconciles the account with disbursing.

5. **ABUSE OF FUNDING**. After an IRS investigation, a U.S. Army officer was arrested and indicted with theft of government property, money laundering and structuring financial transactions. Between April 2007 and February 2009, while deployed to Iraq, this Army CPT stole in excess of \$690,000 in U.S. currency that was entrusted to him in his role as a Civil Affairs Officer in Muqadadiyah, Iraq.

6. **PROJECT COMPLETION**. Ideally projects are accepted by, and transitioned to HN authorities. Oftentimes ongoing projects (those not completed before a relief in place will occur) will be transitioned to follow on forces.

a. **Final Inspection.** All projects should have a final inspection with the following representatives:

- (1) Project Manager
- (2) PPO
- (3) Contractor
- (4) Host nation civil authority (if required)

b. **Final Payment.** If the project meets the specifications stated in the scope of work (SOW), then the final payment can be made to the contractor. If any conditions do not meet standards, the final payment cannot be made until the correction of any deficiencies has occurred.

c. **Documentation.** The proper management of paperwork is vital to completing and transitioning any project. Proper Civil Information Management (CIM) facilitates successful accountability of required documents. Each command may have local closeout memorandums. PPOs should retain copies of all documents, to include:

(1) DD1081 (Statement of Agent Officer's Account). The purpose of the DD form 1081 is to serve as a summary of cash transactions and receipt for cash and vouchers on hand between DOs and their agent officers (deputies, agents, cashiers, paying agents, and collection agents).

(2) SF44s (Purchase order-invoice-voucher). A receipt for cash. A completed SF 44 is equivalent to the monetary value of the cash it represents.

(3) SOW (Scope of Work). The SOW is a detailed narrative statement which provides prospective contractors the information required to prepare a competitive bid for the proposed project.

(4) DA3953 (Purchase Request & Commitment PR&C). A purchase is an acquisition of materials, supplies, services, or construction that is made using a contract between the U.S. and a private contractor. The purchase request, and commitment (PR&C) is one of the instruments that initiates the acquisition process. Purchases may be made for materials, supplies, services, and construction.

(5) Legal Review. Certifies that the request is legally sufficient.

(6) Copy of Contract(s). A contract is an agreement entered into voluntarily by two parties or more with the intention of creating a legal obligation.

(7) Other. Other pertinent documentation based on unit standard operating procedures.

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STUDENT OUTLINE

ARTS, MONUMENTS, AND ARCHIVES (AMA)

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/26/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

(1) Without the aid of a reference, select the correct definition for cultural property by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify the legal imperatives for the Armed Forces of the United States to protect cultural property by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify the roles that Civil Affairs Marines will undertake in the protection of AMA by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

1. **CULTURAL PROPERTY**. Cultural property is the tangible representation of significant human events, beliefs, and values. This definition is purposefully broad to allow for the full range of items which may be considered culturally significant.

a. **Identifying Cultural Property**. Cultural properties are often unique to each culture; however, they may fall into these typical categories

- Historic and ancient buildings and their ruins
- Works of art
- Archeological sites and artifacts
- Shipwrecks
- Museum and library collections
- Sacred places (sanctuaries, shrines, churches, mosques, temples, cemeteries, and pilgrimage routes)

b. **Cultural Property Markers**. Many cultural properties are not clearly marked. Local organizations such as historical preservation societies may mark historic buildings. The international community has agreed upon markers which indicate the cultural importance of a site. Two examples are:



HAGUE CONVENTION BLUE SHIELD



ROERICH PAX CULTURA

c. **Archives**. One must not only consider historical archives of cultural significance but civil and even private archives as well. Maintenance of administrative records such as, local government registrars, land deeds, police records, budget documents, and bank records, if lost, can destabilize an area.

2. **LEGAL IMPERATIVES**. Protection of cultural property is mandated by federal and international law.

a. **Roerich Pact**. The first attempt to preserve cultural sites and objects; recognized the neutrality of cultural properties. It was signed in 1936 by the United States.

b. **Geneva Convention Article 33**. Pillaging is prohibited.

c. **Geneva Convention Article 53**. Any destruction by the occupying power of real or personal property, belonging individually or collectively to private persons or to the state, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. In addition to being an ethical, tactical, and strategic concern, protecting cultural property is a legal obligation.

d. **Hague Convention and Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict**. In 2009, the United States ratified the 1954 Hague Convention. The articles of this convention are now U.S. Code. The convention mandates that belligerents make no use of cultural property that might expose it to damage or destruction, and direct no military force against it unless required by military necessity. It also forbids theft, pillaging, requisitioning, or even moving cultural property.

(1) Hague, Article 3. The high contracting parties undertake to prepare in time of peace for the safeguarding of cultural property situated within their own territory against the foreseeable effects of an armed conflict, by taking such measures as they consider appropriate.

(2) Hague, Article 7. The high contracting parties undertake to plan or establish in peacetime, within their armed forces, services or specialized personnel whose purpose will be to secure respect for cultural property and to cooperate with the civilian authorities responsible for safeguarding it.

e. **National Historic Preservation Act, Public Law 89-665. 16 U.S.C. 470**. Mandates the protection of cultural heritage during federal undertakings. Legally, military operations outside the continental United States are considered federal undertakings; this and other environmental and cultural protection acts apply to deployed military units.

3. **ROLES OF CIVIL AFFAIRS**

a. **Planning**. Through Area Study, Country Study and CIPB, identify cultural property locations and annotate them on maps and overlays (protected target list). Plan with supported units to protect the locations throughout the operation.

b. **Key Leader Engagement**. Make contact with local authorities (law enforcement, cultural ministries, museum officials, engineers, academics, elders, NGOs) as soon as possible. They may have expertise on the value and maintenance of the AMA sites.

c. **Documentation**. Accurate documentation is absolutely necessary. GPS the position. Take detailed pictures. Catalog points of contact, groups/individuals able to support your efforts, and as soon as possible.

d. **Imminent Destruction**. Take action without advice of preservation or conservation professionals only if the building or collection is in immediate danger of destruction or collapse. Do as little as possible and as much as necessary to stop active damage and avoid further damage.

e. **Protection**. Place cultural structures off-limits to military and civilian personnel, and post security around the area. Inform the chain of command of particularly valuable or sensitive material so it can be sealed or isolated.

4. **MILITARY NECESSITY.** In World War II, just before the invasion of Italy, in December 1943, General Eisenhower issued a general order to protect the country's cultural heritage, which said in part:

"If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our own men, then our men's lives count infinitely more and the buildings must go. But the choice is not always so clear-cut as that. In many cases the monuments can be spared without any detriment to operational needs. Nothing can stand against the argument of military necessity. That is an accepted principle. But the phrase 'military necessity' is sometimes used where it would be more truthful to speak of military convenience or even of personal convenience. I don't want it to cloak slackness or indifference."

Civil affairs played a role in protecting the arts, monuments and archives in World War II. Through General Eisenhower's order, the message to preserve cultural heritage was disseminated to all.

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STUDENT OUTLINE

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE MEDIA

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/23/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE.** Given a mission and commander's intent and a command message conduct a media interview in accordance with MCWP 3-33.3 Appendix C.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, identify the purpose of a command message by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify interview ground rules by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(3) Given a command message, provide an interview to the media by using correct media interview ground rules.

1. **MEDIA.** Marines must know the type of media (print or broadcast), the visibility of the media (local, national, international, American or foreign) and the style of the media (news, information or entertainment) covering the operation. It is the policy of the DoD to provide media timely access to military units in the AO without compromising OPSEC.

a. **Engaging the Media.** In today's media environment, there is a high probability that individual Marines regardless of rank will answer media questions. At all levels, Marines must be media savvy. Leaders must recognize the importance of public opinion and its potential impact on the morale, confidence, and effectiveness of Marines as well as the political will of our nation. Leaders must also know the impact of the media on national strategic, operational and tactical objectives.

Whether Marines speak to the media or not, the media will report a story. It is in our best interest to engage the media and convey a message that we craft rather than leaving it up to reporters to generate an image for the public. When dealing with reporters, always treat them with respect and professionalism. Never give them cause to view the military negatively.

b. **Military and the Media.** Military professionals and journalists often have different outlooks. Do not let this lead to misunderstandings. Most journalists are committed to fair and balanced coverage and are true professionals that research

prior to reporting any information. With the help of a Public Affairs Officer, establish ground rules for the interview and proceed as directed.

2. **PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

a. **Public Affairs Officer (PAO)**. The Public Affairs Officer is a Marine Officer who is trained specifically as a liaison between the command and the media. CA Marines must always work through the PAO and get approval from the chain of command before talking to the press.

PAOs provide advice, counsel, and support to the commander and his staff. They do this by:

(1) Continuously assessing the situation, developing solutions and monitoring effects of public affairs operations.

(2) Issuing credentials to identify staff reporters and photographers who prepare material for use in publications.

(3) Establishing command-wide SOPs and will exercise caution when issuing credentials to anyone outside the PA office.

Accreditation is a means of identifying correspondents with a legitimate need for gathering news about military affairs and fostering a professional relationship between the military and the media. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces, U.S. operations, and themselves.

(4) Developing the command message which includes key points that should be made to the media. Command messages are generated by the appropriate PAO for a particular activity.

b. **Public Affairs Guidance (PAG)**. When dealing with the media, you should receive Public Affairs Guidance. The PAG can be a part of an operation order as a Public Affairs Annex F or may be written for a particular event or activity, such as a training course, an operational mission, a joint exercise, or a particular crisis. It describes what you can and cannot talk about, media ground rules, and what your message should be to support the commander's guidance or national objectives.

Questions outside the scope of the PAG should be referred to the PAO identified in the PAG. The second item to look for in the PAG is the command message.

PAG provides mission specific guidance to support public discussion of the operation. It establishes the command's public affairs policies, identifies issues likely to be of interest, delineates the Marine Corps perspective, and recommends appropriate themes. It addresses the methods, timing, and authority for releasing information to news media representatives.

c. **Command Message**. A communicated message that supports your commander's intent and the principles of the organization he or she serves. The command message clearly conveys an official position to designated and concerned publics.

d. **Ground Rules**

(1) **Releasable and Non-releasable Information**. In an operational environment, releasable and non-releasable items of information are established by the commander with input from the Public Affairs Officer. You should review these subjects with the reporter before the interview. This includes but is not limited to releasing the names of casualties before the next of kin have been notified. You should seek to convince reporters that the acceptance of reasonable military ground rules are in the best interests of both parties.

When evaluating whether or not to proceed with an interview or media event, remember that the DoD principles of information are summarized as **maximum disclosure-minimum delay**. However, there are four limitations to the maximum disclosure. They are security, accuracy, appropriate, and policy.

- Security - will the information the media is looking for violate operational security (OPSEC).
- Accuracy - ensure the information you give them is accurate; do not speculate.
- Appropriate - is the information or pictures appropriate.
- Policy - is there a policy prohibiting you from giving out the information.

(2) Select the Interview Location. You must consider several factors when determining the best interview setting.

- Security considerations
- Physical location (sensitive or classified areas)
- Type of interview
- Noise (heavy equipment nearby)
- Special requirements or requests

(3) Personal Appearance. Your initial appearance will not only make an impression on the reporter but also the target audience. They will form an immediate impression of you based on your appearance, tone of voice, and bearing.

(4) Interview Best Practices

Before:

- Know the medium you will be working with (television, radio, print) and the specific requirements of each
- Consult with the PAO
- Practice answering questions with the PAO
- Be aware of breaking news stories
- Rehearse the command message

During:

- Relax, be yourself
- Tell the truth
- Explain as much as possible
- Avoid military jargon
- Answer directly and give the bottom line up front (amplify later)
- Correct the record- if the reporter makes an error or has incorrect information, correct him during the interview
- Listen carefully
- Maintain eye contact
- Be expressive and show interest
- Remember you are always on the record
- Be prepared to answer the five Ws and the H (who, what, when, where, why, and how)
- Be modest but confident - you are the expert, but do not be condescending
- Do not lose your temper, even when provoked

- Do not fidget
- Do not look around the room for the answer (it gives the impression of discomfort, bluffing, or desperation)
- Do not speculate or comment on matters beyond your cognizance or responsibility
- Restate the command message

After:

- Thank the reporter for the interview and the opportunity to communicate with the American public
- Clarify any points that were unclear
- Ensure all information is correct
- Take a copy of the interview transcript to the PAO for critique

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Training and Education Command
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Civil Affairs MOS Course
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STUDENT OUTLINE

CMO AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 8/22/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given a mission, and commander's intent coordinate with related capabilities to achieve integration of a variety of separate disciplines and functions pertaining to the civil dimension for the command.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, identify the definition of information operations by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify the three dimensions of the information environment by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify the two ways in which CMO complements information operations by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

1. **INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)**. Information operations is the integrated employment, during military operations, of Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs) in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.

2. **INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. This environment consists of three interrelated dimensions which continuously interact with individuals, organizations, and systems. These dimensions are the physical, informational, and cognitive.

a. **The Physical Dimension**. The physical dimension is composed of command and control (C2) systems, key decision makers, and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects. It is the dimension where physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. The physical dimension includes, but is not limited to, human beings, C2 facilities, newspapers, books, microwave towers, computer processing units, laptops, smart phones, tablet computers, or any other objects that are subject to empirical measurement. The physical dimension is not confined solely to military or even nation-based systems and processes; it is a

defused network connected across national, economic, and geographical boundaries.

b. **The Informational Dimension.** The informational dimension encompasses where and how information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected. It is the dimension where the C2 of military forces is exercised and where the commander's intent is conveyed. Actions in this dimension affect the content and flow of information.

c. **The Cognitive Dimension.** The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information. It refers to individuals or groups processing information, their perception, judgment, and decision making capabilities. These elements are influenced by many factors, to include individual and cultural beliefs, norms, vulnerabilities, motivations, emotions, experiences, morals, education, mental health, identities, and ideologies. Defining these influencing factors in a given environment is critical for understanding how to best influence the mind of the decision maker and create the desired effects. As such, this dimension constitutes the most important component of the information environment.

(1) The information environment is not an exclusively military one. In fact, the military applications of information are almost obscured in today's universal usage of the information spectrum by national, international, and non-state players.

(2) In an information environment, military conflicts consist of interactions between humans and technology. Success is measured by indications that the effects created are influencing the enemy, friendly, and/or neutral activities in the desired ways on the battlefield.

3. **INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES (IRCs).** IRCs are the tools, techniques, or activities that affect any of the three dimensions of the information environment. They affect the ability of the Target Audience (TA) to collect, process, or disseminate information before and after decisions are made. The TA is the individual or group selected for influence. The joint force (means) employs IRCs (ways) to affect the information provided to or disseminated from the TA in the physical and informational dimensions of the information environment to affect decision making. The change in the TA conditions, capabilities, situational awareness, and in some cases, the inability to make and share timely and informed

decisions, contributes to the desired end state. Actions or inactions in the physical dimension can be assessed for future operations. The employment of IRCs is complemented by a set of capabilities such as Operations Security (OPSEC), Information Assurance (IA), counter deception, physical security, Electronic Warfare (EW) support, and electronic protection. These capabilities are critical to enabling and protecting the JFC's C2 of forces.

a. **Examples of IRCs.** IO is not about ownership of individual capabilities but rather the use of those capabilities as force multipliers to create a desired effect. There are many military capabilities that contribute to IO and should be taken into consideration during the planning process.

(1) Operations Security (OPSEC). OPSEC is a standardized process designed to meet operational needs by mitigating risks associated with specific vulnerabilities in order to deny adversaries critical information and observable indicators. OPSEC identifies critical information and actions attendant to friendly military operations to deny observables to adversary intelligence systems. Once vulnerabilities are identified, other IRCs (e.g., military deception, cyberspace operations) can be used to satisfy OPSEC requirements. OPSEC practices must balance the responsibility to account to the American public with the need to protect critical information. The need to practice OPSEC should not be used as an excuse to deny noncritical information to the public.

(2) Military Deception (MILDEC). One of the oldest IRCs used to influence an adversary's perceptions is MILDEC. MILDEC can be characterized as actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers, creating conditions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. While MILDEC requires a thorough knowledge of an adversary or potential adversary's decision-making processes, it is important to remember that it is focused on desired behavior. It is not enough to simply mislead the adversary or potential adversary; MILDEC is designed to cause them to behave in a manner advantageous to the friendly mission, such as misallocation of resources, attacking at a time and place advantageous to friendly forces, or avoid taking action at all.

(3) Military Information Support Operations (MISO). MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of

foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. MISO focuses on the cognitive dimension of the information environment where its TA includes not just potential and actual adversaries, but also friendly and neutral populations. MISO are applicable to a wide range of military operations such as stability operations, security cooperation, maritime interdiction, noncombatant evacuation, foreign humanitarian operations, counterdrug, force protection, and counter-trafficking. Given the wide range of activities in which MISO are employed, the military information support representative within the IO cell should consistently interact with Public Affairs (PA), CMO, Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), and IO planners.

(a) Expeditionary MISO Team (EMT). An EMT generally consists of a MISO team chief (staff sergeant or sergeant), an assistant team chief (sergeant or corporal), and an additional Marine to serve as a gunner and to operate the speaker system. A team is equipped with a vehicle fitted with a loud speaker, and often works with a local interpreter.

(4) Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO). All information-related mission areas increasingly depend on the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS). JEMSO, consisting of EW and joint EMS management operations, enable EMS-dependent systems to function in their intended operational environment. EW is the mission area ultimately responsible for securing and maintaining freedom of action in the EMS for friendly forces while exploiting or denying it to adversaries. JEMSO therefore supports IO by enabling successful mission area operations.

(5) Cyberspace Operations (CO). Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. CO are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Cyberspace capabilities, when in support of IO, deny or manipulate adversary or potential adversary decision making, through targeting an information medium (such as a wireless access point in the physical dimension), the message itself (an encrypted message in the information dimension), or a cyber-persona (an online identity that facilitates communication, decision making, and the influencing of audiences in the cognitive dimension). When employed in support of IO, CO generally focuses on the integration of offensive and defensive

capabilities exercised in and through cyberspace, in concert with other IRCs, and coordination across multiple lines of operation and lines of effort.

(6) Information Assurance (IA). IA is necessary to gain and maintain information superiority. The JFC relies on IA to protect infrastructure to ensure its availability, to position information for influence, and for delivery of information to the adversary. Furthermore, IA and CO are interrelated and rely on each other to support IO.

(7) Public Affairs (PA). PA comprises public information, command information, and public engagement activities directed toward both the internal and external publics with interest in the DoD. External publics include allies, neutrals, adversaries, and potential adversaries. When addressing external publics, opportunities for overlap exist between PA and IO.

(8) Space Operations. Space capabilities are a significant force multiplier when integrated with joint operations. Space operations support IO through the space force enhancement functions of: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, missile warning, environmental monitoring, satellite communications, and space-based positioning, navigation, and timing. The IO cell is a key place for coordinating and deconflicting the space force enhancement functions with other IRCs.

(9) Intelligence. Intelligence is a vital military capability that supports IO. The utilization of Information Operations Intelligence Integration (IOII) greatly facilitates understanding the interrelationship between the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment. By providing population-centric socio-cultural intelligence and physical network lay downs, including the information transmitted via those networks, intelligence can greatly assist IRC planners and IO integrators in determining the proper effect to elicit the specific response desired. Intelligence is an integrated process, fusing collection, analysis, and dissemination to provide products that will expose a TA's potential capabilities or vulnerabilities. Intelligence uses a variety of technical and nontechnical tools to assess the information environment, thereby providing insight into a TA.

(10) Special Technical Operations (STO). IO needs to be deconflicted and synchronized with STO. Detailed information

related to STO and its contribution to IO can be obtained from the STO planners, usually at Service Component Headquarters. IO and STO are separate, but have potential crossover, and for this reason an STO planner is a valuable member of the IO cell.

(11) Key Leader Engagement (KLE). KLEs are deliberate, planned engagements between U.S. military leaders and the leaders of foreign audiences that have defined objectives, such as a change in policy or supporting the JFC's objectives. These engagements can be used to shape and influence foreign leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and may also be directed toward specific groups such as religious leaders, academic leaders, and tribal leaders (e.g., to solidify trust and confidence in U.S. forces).

(12) Civil Military Operations (CMO). The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives (JP 3-57 Joint CMO July 2008).

4. CMO INTEGRATION WITH IO. CMO can directly affect and be affected by IO. CMO activities establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to achieve U.S. objectives. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military operations. In CMO, personnel perform functions normally provided by the local, regional, or national government, placing them into direct contact with civilian populations. This level of interaction results in CMO having a significant effect on the perceptions of the local populace. Since this populace may include potential adversaries, their perceptions are of great interest to the IO community. For this reason, CMO representation in the IO cell can assist in identifying TAs, synchronizing communications media, assets, and messages, and providing news and information to the local population.

Although CMO and IO have much in common, they are distinct disciplines. The TA for much of IO is the adversary; however, the effects of IRCs often reach supporting friendly and neutral populations as well. In a similar vein, CMO seeks to affect friendly and neutral populations, although adversary and

potential adversary audiences may also be affected. This being the case, effective integration of CMO with other IRCs is important, and a CMO representative on the IO staff is critical. The regular presence of a CMO representative in the IO cell will greatly promote this level of coordination.

a. **Information Operations Working Group (IOWG)**. IOWG coordinates the information operations activities amongst the staff, and synchronizes activities and actions with higher headquarters. By including the IOWG into the battle rhythm, it by necessity will be deconflicted with other staff meetings and will facilitate attendance by Liaison Officers (LNOs) and other members of the staff to include the CMO staff element (G-9).

5. **HOW CMO COMPLEMENTS IO**. CMO can support IO objectives by influencing, developing, or controlling the indigenous population. CMO complements IO in numerous ways. The two primary means are support to military operations and support to civil authorities.

a. **Support to Military Operations**. CMO supports military operations by minimizing civilian interference with military operations, maximizing support for operations, and meeting the commander's legal and moral obligations to civilian populations.

Operationally, CMO supports national policy and implements U.S. national objectives by coordinating with, influencing, developing, or accessing indigenous populations.

Tactically, CMO works to secure local acceptance of and support for U.S. forces. It is important to IO; because, CMO involves interfacing with essential organizations and individuals in the AO and with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs).

b. **Support to Civil Authorities (SCA)**. CMO's support to civil authorities includes assistance with relief, dislocated civilian support and security. These activities may include such actions as:

(1) Coordinating the removal of civilians from the combat zone.

(2) Interfacing between U.S./multinational forces and host nation and other IGOs/NGOs.

(3) Exercising military control over an area, hostile government, or population.

6. **COORDINATION TASKS RELATING TO IO.** The G9 (CMO) provides coordination tasks that relate to IO. They include:

a. Recommend CMO-related information requirements and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) to the G-7 (IO).

b. Coordinate with the G-2 (Intelligence) on aspects of the enemy situation that may affect CMO.

c. Coordinate for tactical forces to perform CMO tasks through the G-3 (Ops).

d. Coordinate with the IO Officer and Public Affairs Officer (PAO) to ensure disseminated information is truthful and supports IO objectives and themes.

e. Coordinate with the PAO and MISO to leverage media assets in the AO (press releases/interviews).

CA Marines must not participate in military deception activities.

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STUDENT OUTLINE

NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/26/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given a mission, commander's intent, and Key Leader(s), conduct a negotiation or mediation in order for the commander to influence civilian leaders to achieve desired effects.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of references, identify the various styles of negotiation/mediation by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Given a scenario, prepare to conduct a negotiation in order to determine the strengths/weaknesses of your position.

(3) Given a scenario, execute a negotiation in order to achieve your desired outcome.

(4) Without the aid of references, identify the importance of culture when conducting negotiation/mediation by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(5) Without the aid of references, define BATNA by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

1. **NEGOTIATION**. There are numerous definitions of negotiation; in its simplest form negotiation is dialogue intended to resolve disputes.

a. **With Whom Will You Negotiate?** Everyone! Negotiation in its most simple form is an act that occurs daily!!

b. **Success**. We negotiate to win, but often you must consider a broadened concept of success. For example:

- Accepting a lesser agreement to build a relationship(s)
- Accepting the outcome to establish a process
- Agreeing not just to a settlement but binding compliance
- Not focusing on an immediate final objective, but working on incremental gains

- Ensuring that the agreement is durable enough to endure through the short term and over the long term
- Establishing trust

c. **Qualities of an Effective Negotiator.** There are numerous examples of a good negotiator. However, we need to clarify this somewhat and look to qualities of an effective negotiator. An important quality includes outstanding communication skills. This is not just speaking, but listening and comprehending. Other skills include poise under pressure, creative problem-solving skills, patience, respect and integrity. Remember, however, to act within your authorities; do not sign the government up for something outside your negotiating mandate.

d. **Techniques.** There are numerous techniques that facilitate success during negotiations. Preparation is very important. You will be completely ineffective without proper preparation. Also be prepared to explain and justify your proposals and positions.

While there are positive techniques, there are also negative techniques. Avoid anger as much as possible. While sometimes appropriate, anger generally creates walls that cannot be easily penetrated or broken down, ultimately frustrating your efforts. Similarly, avoid unprofessional behavior, condescending speech or actions and the appearance of unpreparedness.

e. **Common Mistakes.** Inexperienced negotiators often make some common mistakes. For example, premature judgment may lead to a hasty decision that may ultimately lead to disaster. Another example may be the *single answer* or *fixed pie* assumption. Traditional negotiating is sometimes called *win-lose* because of the assumption of a *fixed pie* (one person's gain results in another person's loss). This is only true if a single issue needs to be resolved, such as a price in a simple sales negotiation. Finally, and most importantly, is the negotiator's failure to understand the other party's interests.

f. **Challenges.** There are some other challenges you should be thinking about. Here are some that you should work to mitigate in your negotiation preparations:

- Different cultures, languages (including organizational) - they may complicate issues

- Limited resources (time, money, etc.) - it is critical to determine time constraints as negotiation may be time consuming
- Power disparities - you (or the other party) may or may not be empowered to make (or enforce) a binding decision or quite simply the other party has a stronger bargaining position
- Different goals, strategies
- Nested negotiations - you negotiate to start negotiating!
- Different assumptions, expectations, fundamental understandings (often implicit) about what negotiation is and how it should be done

2. **TRADITIONAL NEGOTIATION.** In traditional or competitive negotiation, the approach is to treat the process as a competition that is to be won or lost. It is important to realize that the basic assumption of traditional negotiation is that it is a 'zero sum game.' That is, the parties involved believe that there is a fixed amount to be gained which both parties desire, and if one party gains then the other party loses. In traditional negotiation, the relationship between the parties is unimportant. They do not care about one another or what the other thinks about them. Traditional or competitive strategies seek substantial gains that focus either on hard exchange or satisfactory compensation. The bottom line is you either get the deal you want or you don't!

a. **Elements of Preparation.** Successful negotiations require preparation. There are many issues to consider such as determining a timeline, the location or physical layout, etc. You may have nested negotiations that must be completed to help prepare for the main event! Marines can use planning tools such as the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) or simple techniques such as "BAMCIS" to prepare themselves for negotiation. While there is no perfect system of preparation, the following objectives are a useful start:

- Determine (mission) requirements
- Gather information
- Study sources of conflict - what's at issue
- Determine issues and priorities

- Determine interests (both parties)
- Develop courses of action or strategies
- Set realistic expectations
- Determine how the outcome will affect the battlespace
- Determine your *bottom line*
- Determine your *BATNA* and *reservation point* or *price*.

b. **Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)**. If you enter into negotiations you may be confronted with a situation where the other party has a stronger bargaining position. Earlier we described this as a power disparity. No method of negotiation can guarantee success if all the leverage lies on the other side. In response to power the most we can do is meet two objectives: first, protect against making an agreement you should reject and second, help make the most of the assets you do have so that any agreement you reach will satisfy your interests as best as possible. Therefore, a negotiator needs to determine his/her **Best Alternative To A Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)**. We can think of the BATNA as the course of action that will be taken by a party if the current negotiations fail and an agreement cannot be reached. The BATNA determines the point at which you seek a better alternative elsewhere. Therefore, your objective in negotiations is to accept terms that are superior to your BATNA and reject outcomes that are worse.

c. **When Negotiations Break Down**. Not all negotiations will be successful. While not necessarily losing, your efforts may result in a stalemate or negotiations may even break down. Before giving up you should consider a new strategy. The following are options to work a new strategy:

- Take a time out - Sometimes you just need to step away
- Attempt a sidebar - Discuss an issue outside of the negotiating room in an *off the record* environment
- Go to the balcony - Get above the fray and stop to think, look for opportunities and keep your eyes on the prize. Identify the stakeholders and listen to yourself to control reactions and emotions

- Step to their side - Put yourself in their shoes and listen more than you talk. Acknowledge their point to enable trust
- Reframe the issue - Try looking at the problem in a different way
- Change the subject - Don't focus on the negative. Look to capitalize on areas where you have agreement and focus on building trust
- Change the players - New faces, new attitudes may move negotiation along
- Build them a "golden bridge" - Build on their ideas and look to satisfy unmet needs where you can
- Bring in a mediator!

d. **Culture and Negotiation.** Understanding culture is a critical enabler in negotiations. While there are numerous studies available, let's confine ourselves to this simple explanation of what culture is:

- The way people in a social group view the world (world view):
 - The accepted and understood rules for the way people in the group interact and organize their relationships (social structure)
- Culture includes but is not limited to:
 - Beliefs, customs, religion, tribal organization, ethnicity, gender roles, ideas about law and justice, ways of making a living, food and other taboos

How does culture affect negotiation? Experience has demonstrated that culture can influence negotiations. Although ignoring culture's impact does not necessarily mean an attempt at reaching a collaborative agreement will fail, understanding its affects can greatly facilitate and enhance the process. The challenge is to understand if cultural differences could be a driving influence as you negotiate (and to what degree) and then developing a strategy that fits into the cultural context of the proceedings as perceived by all parties.

An important aspect in developing a cross-cultural negotiation strategy revolves around preparation. First, in addition to analyzing the current issue(s) that brought the parties to the table, it is advisable to study the other negotiator's culture and history. It is equally necessary that a negotiator be self-aware of his/her own cultural proclivities. This is important in order to gain insight into potential cultural similarities or differences that could come into play during the negotiations. Also, establishing a relationship or rapport with the other parties involved, preferably before the negotiations begin is *time well spent*. The intent would be to provide the negotiators with an opportunity to find a common basis on which to build a relationship - a bridging technique.

e. **Paradigms**. Broadly speaking paradigms are the way cultures and institutions see and evaluate things. Often how we perceive each other during negotiations may impact our approach. There are two essential paradigms of negotiation: traditional/position-based and interest-based negotiation. In position-based negotiations substance is important. Both parties focus in on the actual item being negotiated. In interest-based negotiations substance is still important, but interest-based negotiations also emphasize the importance of relationships where the intent is to reach a mutually acceptable outcome. If we can change or influence the paradigm we can change or influence the behavior toward an outcome that is mutually acceptable. This task becomes even more difficult when we view our environment through different cultural lenses.

f. **Cultural Differences**. There are three basic requirements for operating in uncertain cultural waters: tact, timing, technique. Being conscious of your approach will greatly facilitate a positive result. As an example, some cultures communicate directly, they *get to the point* while others communicate indirectly, with much more *small talk*. E.g., "How is your family? The weather is very nice..." an hour later, "shall we discuss security?" Be aware of your environment, understand the importance of *small talk* and act accordingly.

3. **ANALYZING CONFLICT**

a. **Sources of Conflict**. Earlier we described conflict as disagreement. Conflict management is the employment of strategies to correct these perceived differences in a positive manner. We often think of conflict as a negative force. Conflict has come to be viewed as either functional or dysfunctional. Whereas dysfunctional conflict is generally

viewed as destructive, functional conflict may actually encourage or motivate parties to achieve superior results - because of our differences, we communicate, we are challenged, and we are driven to find creative solutions to problems. Multiple factors from scarce resources to communication breakdown may create conflict.

b. **Conflict Reaction / Negotiation Styles.** People perceive and manage conflict in different ways. Understanding your strengths and weaknesses will help you prepare for negotiations.

c. **Mapping Negotiation Styles.** Each individual has different strengths and weaknesses and personality traits. There are various tools to understand these traits. Two common examples are: Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument. Thomas and Kilmann identified a conflict-handling grid comprised of five conflict management styles based on two dimensions: assertiveness and cooperativeness. Conflict situations are those in which the concerns of two people appear to be incompatible. In such situations, we can describe an individual's behavior along two basic dimensions: (1) assertiveness, the extent to which the person attempts to satisfy his own concerns, and (2) cooperativeness, the extent to which the person attempts to satisfy the other person's concerns. Any of the following five conflict resolution styles might be appropriate based on the circumstances of the situation and the personalities of the individuals involved.

d. **Five Negotiation Approaches.** These two basic dimensions of behavior - assertiveness and cooperativeness - define five different modes for responding to conflict situations.

(1) **Avoiding.** *Avoiding* is unassertive and uncooperative -- the person neither pursues his own concerns nor those of the other individual. Thus he does not deal with the conflict. Avoiding might take the form of diplomatically sidestepping an issue, postponing an issue until a better time, or simply withdrawing from a threatening situation.

(2) **Accommodating.** *Accommodating* is unassertive and cooperative -- the complete opposite of competing. When accommodating, the individual neglects his own concerns to satisfy the concerns of the other person; there is an element of self-sacrifice in this mode. Accommodating might take the form of selfless generosity or charity, obeying another person's order when you would prefer not to, or yielding to another's

point of view. This conflict resolution style is important for preserving future relations between the parties.

(3) Compromising. *Compromising* is moderate in both assertiveness and cooperativeness. The objective is to find some expedient, mutually acceptable solution that partially satisfies both parties. In some situations, compromising might mean splitting the difference between the two positions, exchanging concessions, or seeking a quick middle-ground solution. This behavior can be used when the goals of both sides are of equal importance, when both sides have equal power, or when it is necessary to find a temporary, timely solution. It should not be used when there is a complex problem requiring a problem-solving approach.

(4) Competing. *Competing* is assertive and uncooperative -- an individual pursues his own concerns at the other person's expense. This is a power-oriented mode in which you use whatever power seems appropriate to win your own position. This approach may be appropriate when quick, decisive action is needed, such as during emergencies.

(5) Collaborating. *Collaborating* is both assertive and cooperative -- the complete opposite of avoiding. Collaborating involves an attempt to work with others to find some solution that fully satisfies their concerns. It means digging into an issue to pinpoint the underlying needs and wants of the two parties. The collaboration style is appropriate when the concerns are complex and a creative or novel synthesis of ideas is required. The downside of this approach is that the process of collaborating mandates sincere effort by all parties involved and it may require a lot of time to reach a consensus.

4. **COMMUNICATION IN NEGOTIATION**. Communication varies according to the formality of the negotiation situation. As the rules and procedures of negotiation become increasingly detailed and specific, the impact of communication becomes less significant. However, when negotiating, both parties involved usually prefer to keep certain information private - each side wants to obtain some information and to conceal other information. Consider the following three levels of communication:

- Surface level - What they're actually saying
- Underlying level - What they're not saying, but withholding

- Subterfuge level - What they're saying, but not really meaning

a. **Two Central Components.** If you want to reach a mutually beneficial agreement, you must make sure your messages are heard and understood. Moreover, it's important that you don't get caught up in your own message at the expense of hearing and understanding what the other party needs in order to reach an agreement. Studying the implicit and explicit signals and communication the other negotiator employs also helps you in understanding the strategy they intend to pursue. Use the following tips for listening more effectively:

- Seek to understand the framework in which others see an issue - open your mind and be receptive to the other party's message
- Empathize - listen for feelings, as well as facts, and consider the other party's concerns
- Clarify - respond to the other party with questions that stimulate conversation and clarify your understanding of his or her message
- Paraphrase - rephrase and simplify to ensure understanding
- Ask good questions - take notes on the important points the other party makes, and keep these points in mind as you formulate your responses

b. **Understand Interests.** By focusing on interests, disputing parties can more easily fulfill the principle of *increasing the pie* - inventing options for mutual gain. This means negotiators should look for new solutions to the problem that will allow both sides to win, not just fight over the original positions which assume that for one side to win, the other side must lose.

c. **What is an Interest?** Negotiating about interests means negotiating about things that people really want and need, which is not necessarily what they say they want or need. Often, these are not the same.

d. **Types of Interest.** The basic problem in negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns and fears. We often assume that because the other side's positions are opposed to ours,

their interests must also be opposed. A closer examination of interests may find that we both want stability and security. Often interests can be summed up as basic necessities of life or survival. For the CA Marine operating in a complex world it may be as simple as the basic human needs of security, economic well-being, a sense of belonging, recognition and control over one's life. The bottom line is that we need to understand the substantive, psychological and procedural interests that are at stake.

e. **Test for Interests.** There are clear benefits for looking behind positions (wants) for interests (needs). If a position may seem concrete and explicit, the interests underlying those positions may in fact be unexpressed. To determine what these interests are requires asking why. Put yourself in their shoes - why are they taking this position? At the same time you should ask why not. Asking why they have not made the decision you expect may indicate what interests are standing in the way of progress. Another simple approach may be to remember that interests are rarely asked for, are typically non-negotiable, require no justification and cannot be challenged. Remember, look for the bedrock concerns that motivate all people. If you can accommodate those needs you'll likely reach your agreement.

f. **Interest Based Negotiating.** *Interest-based (or integrative) negotiation* is built upon the principle of meeting the needs of all the individuals or stakeholders. This frequently calls for creative thinking that goes beyond the poorly thought out compromise--such as those arrived at when there is a rush to solve before we have made an effort to comprehend. A deep understanding of the true and often multifaceted nature of the underlying challenge is required, if a long-term solution is sought. Many conflicts that on the surface seem to be purely about resources, often have significant components related to issues of participation, face saving, relationships, and identity. For interest-based negotiation to work, people have to be able to share their actual needs and fears with each other. If they remain closely guarded, how can these individual needs be met? Stakeholders, therefore, must be able to retain a sense of ownership over framing such needs and fears. All of this is not always possible or easy to accomplish. Interest-based negotiation, then, is contrasted against either competing (win/lose) or compromising approaches.

5. **MEDIATION**. A way of resolving disputes between two or more parties. The mediator assists the parties to negotiate their own settlement. As such, the mediator facilitates an agreement between the parties. The mediator is usually neutral, but that may not always be the case.

a. There is more than one right way to mediate. The approach depends on the mediator, the parties, the relationships, the issues, and *the cultural context*. Other factors such as time may determine a course of action. The mediator must evaluate how best to proceed and may need to change techniques or adjust strategy depending upon the proceedings.

b. Typically, the mediator is appointed or requested to intervene. As such the mediator may be unfamiliar with the current situation with respect to the context of the negotiations and what the main points of contention are. It is critical, therefore, that the mediator becomes familiar with all the issues. To accomplish this, the mediator must identify all the responsible parties involved, research the issues at hand and determine what interests are at stake. Additionally, the mediator must understand all applicable legal issues and implications of resolving the dispute.

c. A mediator may be empowered to dictate how the negotiations will proceed. The mediator may:

- Select a location for the negotiations
- Determine the layout of the facility or the seating arrangements for the participants
- Arrange for related logistics
- Perform or dictate other such tasks as may facilitate a successful negotiation

d. Civil Affairs (CA) Marines may be appointed as mediators to support mission requirements. While there may be numerous reasons as to why a mediator is required, CA Marines must remember that supporting the mission always has a place of primacy.

e. **Mediation Goals**. The primary goal is to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement or improve the chance of agreement. The mediator does this by managing conflict,

improving communication and/or relationships in order to prevent future conflict.

f. **Mediation Techniques**. While there is no one foolproof mediation technique, a simple and effective method involves researching the issues and asking questions. In doing so the mediator is able to:

- Listen to the dispute
- Frame and reframe the argument
- Identify issues and interests at stake
- Employ levers to support mediation (e.g. applicable law)
- Identify common ground
- Determine cultural implications
- Communicate impartially
- Express realistic optimism
- Determine appropriate cultural dispute resolution options
- Look at all solutions to include third party enforcement options

g. **Common Pitfalls**. Sometimes mediators may lose focus of what they are there to achieve. The following are some common pitfalls to be avoided:

- Missing areas of common ground
- Impatience
- Telling vs. Asking
- Developing solutions before exploring interests
- Ignoring or overriding instincts
- Failing to adjust strategy

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Training and Education Command
Marine Corps Civil Military Operations School
Civil Affairs MOS Course
1019 Elliot Rd C466
Quantico, Virginia 22134

STUDENT OUTLINE

KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENT

MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER AND ENLISTED COURSE

REVISED 08/23/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE**. Given a mission, commander's intent, and Key Leader(s), conduct a Key Leader Engagement in order for the commander to influence civilian leaders to achieve desired effects.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, identify the purpose of key leader engagements by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify products obtained from conducting a social network analysis of the human terrain by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify the seven steps in the key leader engagement cycle by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

1. **KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENT (KLE)**. A KLE is a method for building relationships with people and groups that have influence in your AO. KLEs may occur at all levels. Coalition forces best achieve KLE desired effects through deliberate and focused face-to-face meetings with local leaders. Effective KLE fosters and expands communications and cooperation between MAGTF and coalition forces with influential people within communities.

a. **Purpose**. KLEs are civil engagements which are defined as activities in which MAGTF forces identify, prioritize and interact with influential political, military, tribal, business and religious leaders. This is done for the purpose of convincing those key leaders to influence their constituencies in assisting the MAGTF in achieving its objectives. This may help bridge the gap between national and local governments.

2. **IDENTIFY INFLUENTIAL KEY LEADERS**. An area study will help you determine potential key leaders in the AO before you arrive. Keep in mind that key leaders may change over time (election cycle, assassinations, shifting loyalties, etc.). It is also important to identify who (which Marine) will be conducting the engagement. For example it is unlikely that a Lance Corporal will be conducting a KLE with a District Governor. In order to define the key leaders determine the following:

- Confirm/deny key leaders capabilities in relation to desired effects (is this the correct person to engage?)
- Ethnicity (language/dialect)
- Tribal background and perspective (tribal code)
- Religious background
- Political affiliation
- Associations
- Alliances (personal/tribal)
- Resources
- Social Network
- Discern key leader's agenda, motivation and interests

3. **TIME AND TERRITORY MANAGEMENT**. During the planning and conduct of KLE, practice sound time and territory management. Time is a valuable commodity. You cannot devote 100% of your attention to KLE; you have other duties and responsibilities (submitting reports, conducting debriefs, and force protection). Take the time and make the effort to map out your territory. Through an ASCOPE analysis, become familiar with key people, projects, and facilities in the AO.

b. **Territory Map**. Develop a map that delineates your area of responsibility. On the map identify ongoing and completed projects, key infrastructure and tribal and religious boundaries, etc.

4. **SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS**. Some products that may be obtained from network-analysis might include: a diagram of insurgent leadership relationships, a list of insurgent weaknesses, or an overlay that shows various nodes of an organization on a map. All of these products are very useful for directing or targeting the CMO effort. However, analysts must remember to always keep in mind the cultural environment and incorporate socio-cultural considerations into targeting recommendations.

a. **Interlinked Networks**. As the KLE program expands, you will uncover more pieces of the puzzle, such as tribal networks, criminal networks, political and business networks, and

insurgent networks. They may be inextricably linked to one another in ways that make the job more challenging. It may also provide some useful information to the S-2 about some of the key leaders.

5. **THE KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENT CYCLE.** The KLE cycle consists of seven steps: identify key leader or group, conduct Civil Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (CIPB) via ASCOPE, identify desired effects, prepare engagement plan(s), execute, debrief and report, and re-engage.

a. **Identify Key Leader (Step 1)**

- (1) Identify the person(s) or entity of influence
- (2) Determine the potential for long-term influence
- (3) Evaluate the key leader network

b. **CIPB (Step 2)**

- (1) Confirm/deny key leader's capability in relation to desired effects
- (2) Ethnicity (language/dialect)
- (3) Tribal background
- (4) Religious background
- (5) Discern key leader's agenda, motivations, and interests
- (6) Develop contingencies and counters to unfavorable responses

c. **Identify Desired Effects (Step 3)**

- (1) Identify what you want to achieve
- (2) Identify supporting objectives
- (3) Identify preliminary conditions required to achieve the desired effect(s)
- (4) Predetermine what can be offered in order to get desired effect

(5) Identify the probability of a favorable response to the request or desired effect

(6) Develop a Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)

Progress can be measured by using Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs). MOEs and MOPs are established in this step of the KLE cycle. Some examples include: level of local cooperation, establish host nation services, economic development, local participation in projects and security improvements.

d. **Prepare/Rehearse Engagement Plans (Step 4)**

(1) Discuss desired effect and common terms with cultural advisor and interpreter

(2) Identify roles: designate recorder, note taker, & photographer

(3) Determine who takes the lead

(4) Practice social nuances

(5) Attempt to learn at least a few words of the local dialect

(6) Get your story straight

(7) Be prepared to confront corrupt officials

e. **Execute (Step 5)**

(1) Follow meeting etiquette

(2) Practice mutual respect

(3) Be patient and listen

(4) Focus on the objectives

(5) Know when to speak

(6) Under promise - Over deliver

(7) Instill local ownership in solutions

(8) Conclude the meeting by clarifying / repeating agreements

f. **Debrief and Report (Step 6)**

(1) Conduct post-KLE debrief / AAR

(2) Submit post-KLE report IAW unit SOP

(3) Input relevant KL information into designated databases for future use

g. **Reengage (Step 7)**

(1) Sustain/maintain relationship

(2) Provide method for key leader to contact you between KLEs

(3) Make maximum use of available funds to meet commitments

(4) Review previous KLE reports and agreements before the next KLE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Training and Education Command
Marine Corps Civil Military Operations School
Civil Affairs MOS Course
1019 Elliot Rd C466
Quantico, Virginia 22134

STUDENT OUTLINE

UTILIZE AN INTERPRETER

Civil Affairs MOS Course

08/22/2013

APPROVED BY _____

DATE _____

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE.** Given a situation requiring an interpreter, communicate through an interpreter so that the audience understands the intent of the Marine without error.

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of a reference, identify selection criteria for an interpreter by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(2) Without the aid of a reference, identify the importance of using two interpreters by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(3) Without the aid of a reference, identify the categories of interpreters by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(4) Without the aid of a reference, identify rapport building techniques by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(5) Without the aid of a reference, identify communication techniques by selecting the correct answer from a list of possible answers.

(6) With the aid of a reference, given a scenario, command message, information requirements and a performance checklist, employ an interpreter so that the audience understands the intent of the Marine without error.

1. **SELECTION CRITERIA.** When operating abroad CA Marines will need interpreters to operate effectively. The CA team will not necessarily procure interpreters. Ideally the interpreter will be a U.S. citizen. Oftentimes these services are provided by contractors on behalf of the MAGTF.

a. **Select the Interpreter.** The following are criteria to consider when selecting an interpreter:

(1) **Native Speaker.** The interpreter should be a native speaker of the socially or geographically determined dialect. His speech, background, and mannerisms should be completely

acceptable to the target audience so that no attention is given to the way he talks, only to what he says.

(2) Social Status. In some situations and cultures, an interpreter may be limited in his effectiveness with a target audience if his social standing is considerably lower than that of the audience. This may include significant differences in military rank or membership in an ethnic or religious group. Accept local prejudices as a fact of life.

(3) English Fluency. An often overlooked consideration is how well the interpreter speaks English. As a rule, if the interpreter understands you and you understand him, his command of English should be satisfactory. Also, interpreting goes both ways. The interpreter must be able to convey the information expressed by the interviewee, or target audience.

(4) Intellect. Your interpreter should be quick, alert, and responsive to changing conditions and situations. He must be able to grasp complex concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence. Although education does not equate to intelligence, generally speaking the better educated the interpreter the better he will perform due to increased exposure to diverse concepts.

(5) Technical Ability. In certain situations you may need an interpreter with technical training or expertise.

(6) Reliability. If your interpreter is to be considered a member of the team, he needs to be as reliable as the Marines in the team (punctuality, work ethic, etc.).

(7) Loyalty. If the interpreter used is a local national, it is safe to assume that his first loyalty is to the host nation or subgroup, not the U.S. military. The security implications are clear. Be very cautious in how you explain concepts to give them a greater depth of understanding. Additionally, some interpreters, for political or personal reasons, may have ulterior motives or a hidden agenda when they apply for the interpreting job.

(8) Gender, Age, and Race. Similar to social status, other factors such as gender, age, and race may have an impact on how your interpreter is perceived and how effective he will be. These aspects will dependent on where you are conducting CMO.

(9) Compatibility. You and your interpreter will work as a team. Your target audience will be quick to recognize personality conflicts between you and your interpreter, which can undermine the effectiveness of the communication effort. If possible, when selecting an interpreter, look for compatible traits and strive for a harmonious working relationship to convey unity of effort.

b. Choose More Than One Interpreter. If several qualified interpreters are available, select at least two. This is of particular importance if the interpreter will be used during long conferences or courses of instruction. The exhausting nature of these tasks makes approximately four hours of active interpreting about the maximum for peak efficiency. Furthermore, one interpreter, however skilled, will seldom be enough when conducting structured lessons. Regardless of the mission, with two or more interpreters, one can provide quality control, assistance to the active interpreter, and observe sidebar conversations.

2. CATEGORIES OF INTERPRETERS. There are three categories of interpreters: Category I, II and III.

a. Category I. Category I interpreters are locally hired and require vetting. They do not have a security clearance. They are the most abundant resource pool; however, their skill level is limited. Category I interpreters should be used for basic interpretation for activities such as patrols and base entrance coverage.

b. Category II. Category II interpreters are U.S. citizens with a secret clearance. Often they possess good oral and written communication skills. They should be managed carefully due to limited availability.

c. Category III. Category III interpreters are U.S. citizens with a top secret clearance. They are a scarce commodity and often retained at division and higher levels of command. They have excellent oral and written communications skills.

3. BUILD RAPPORT. Mutual respect and understanding is essential to effective teamwork. Rapport must be established early in the relationship and maintained throughout the deployment. The difficulty of establishing rapport usually stems from cultural and professional differences.

a. Most foreigners are reasonably knowledgeable about the United States. You should obtain some basic facts about the host nation. The area study, along with your ASCOPE/PMESII analysis will assist you. Information can also be obtained through open source research.

b. Find out about your interpreter's background. Show a genuine concern for their family, aspirations, career, education, and so on. Many cultures place a greater emphasis on family over career than western cultures. Another area to focus on is cultural traditions. Though you should gain as much information on culture as possible prior to entering a country, your interpreter can be a valuable source to fill gaps. Showing interest is also a good way to build rapport.

c. Ensuring accountability and the safety of your interpreter is also a way to build rapport. If the nature of your mission requires you to wear Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), you should also provide PPE for your interpreter.

4. **TRAIN THE INTERPRETER.** As part of the initial training with the interpreter tactfully convey that the instructor, interviewer, or interrogator (you) must always direct the interview or lesson. Put the interpreter's role in proper perspective. Stress to them their importance as a vital communication link between you and the target audience. Appeal to the interpreter's professional pride by clearly describing how the quality and quantity of the information sent and received is directly dependent upon their interpreting skills. Also mention how they function solely as a conduit between you and the subject.

a. Be aware that some interpreters, because of cultural differences, may attempt to 'save face' by purposely concealing their lack of understanding. They may attempt to translate what they think you said or meant without asking for clarification. This can result in disinformation and confusion, and impact credibility. Let the interpreter know that when in doubt they should always ask for clarification. Create a safe environment for this as early in the relationship as possible.

b. Other points to cover while orienting and training the interpreter are:

(1) Importance of the training, interview, or interrogation

(2) Specific objectives of the training, interview or interrogation (if any)

(3) Outline of lesson or interview questions (if applicable)

(4) Background information on the interviewee, or target audience

(5) Briefing, training, or interview schedules (it may take two to three times as much time using an interpreter to convey the same information)

(6) Copy of the briefing, questions, or lesson plan (if applicable)

(7) Copies of handout material (if applicable)

(8) General background information on subject

(9) Glossary of terms (if applicable)

5. **CIVIL ENGAGEMENT PREPARATION**

a. Select an appropriate site for the interview. Arrange the physical setup of the meeting area. The physical setup of the area can be significant when conducting interviews with VIPs or individuals from different cultures.

b. Instruct the interpreter to mirror your tone of speech. Instruct the interpreter not to interject his questions or personality. Instruct the interpreter to inform you if he notices any inconsistencies or peculiarities from sources.

c. Only speak in short sentences to allow your interpreter to convey messages more efficiently. Speak directly to the individual or audience. The interpreter should watch you carefully and during the translation mimic your body language as well as interpret your verbal meaning. You should observe the interpreter closely to detect any inconsistencies between his manner and yours. Presenting one major thought in its entirety allows the interpreter to reconstruct it in his language.

d. Although your interpreter will be doing some editing as a function of the interpreting process, he must transmit the exact meaning without additions or deletions. As previously mentioned, insist that the interpreter always asks for

clarification, prior to interpreting, whenever not absolutely certain of your meaning. A good interpreter, especially if he is local, can be invaluable in translating subtleties and hidden meanings.

e. During an interview or lesson, if questions are asked, the interpreter should immediately relay them to you for an answer. The interpreter should never attempt to answer a question on his own. Additionally, neither of you should correct the other in front of an interviewee or class; settle all differences away from the subject or audience.

f. Just as establishing rapport with the interpreter is vitally important, establishing rapport with an interview subject or target audience is equally important.

6. COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES

a. An important first step in communicating in a foreign language is to polish your English language skills. This is true even if no attempt is made to learn the indigenous language. The clearer you speak in English, including diction, the easier it is for the interpreter to translate. Other factors to consider include avoiding the use of profanity, slang, colloquialisms, military jargon and acronyms. In addition, if a technical term or expression must be used be sure your interpreter conveys the proper meaning.

b. Never say more in one sentence than you can easily repeat word for word immediately after saying it.

c. Whenever possible, identify any cultural restrictions prior to interviewing, instructing, or conferring with particular foreign nationals. For instance, determine when it is proper to stand, sit, or cross ones legs.

d. Best Practices:

(1) Position the interpreter by your side (or even a step back). This will keep the subject or audience from shifting their attention, or fixating on the interpreter and not on you.

(2) Always look at and talk directly to the subject or audience. Guard against the tendency to talk to the interpreter.

(3) Speak slowly and clearly. Repeat as often as necessary.

(4) Do not address the subject or audience in the third person through the interpreter. Avoid saying "tell them I'm glad to be their friend," rather say, "I'm glad to be your friend." Ensure that the interpreter does this as well.

(5) Speak to the individual or group as if they understand English. Be enthusiastic and employ the gestures, movements, voice intonations and inflections that you would normally do before an English speaking group. Attitudes and meanings can be conveyed nonverbally. Encourage the interpreter to mimic your delivery.

(6) Avoid side comments to the interpreter that are not expected to be translated. This tends to create the wrong atmosphere for communication.

(7) While the interpreter is translating and the subject or audience is listening, you should avoid doing anything distracting.

(8) DO NOT permit interpreters to intimidate or berate the subject.

Section I.
Acronyms and Abbreviations

AC	Active Component
ACE	aviation combat element
AC/S	assistant chief of staff
ACT	Advanced Civilian Team
ALMAR	All Marines
AO	area of operations
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and event
BCT	brigade combat team
C-9	combined civil-military operations staff section
C-35	combined future operations staff section
CA	civil affairs
CAG	civil affairs group
CAO	civil affairs operations
CAT	civil affairs team
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CG	commanding general
CIDNE	Combined Information Data Network Exchange
CIM	civil information management
CIPB	civil intelligence preparation of the battlefield
CJ-3	combined joint staff for operations
CJ-5	combined joint staff for plans
CJ-9	combined joint staff for civil-military cooperation
CJTF	combined joint task force
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COIN	counterinsurgency
COM	chief of mission
CONOPS	concept of operations
COP	common operational picture
CR	civil reconnaissance
CRSG	Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
CTF-IL	Combined Task Force-Indolaysia
DC	dislocated civilian
DCAA	dislocated civilian assembly area
DCCP	dislocated civilian collection point

DCG	deputy commanding general
DOD	Department of Defense
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State
DR	disaster relief
FACT	field advanced civilian team
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FM	field manual
FMFRP	Fleet Marine Force reference publication
FNS	foreign nation support
FRAGO	fragmentary orders
FY	fiscal year
G-2	brigade or higher intelligence staff office
G-3	brigade or higher operations staff office
G-4	brigade or higher logistics staff office
G-5	brigade or higher civil affairs staff office
G-6	brigade or higher communications system staff office
G-9	brigade or higher civil-military operations staff office
GCE	ground combat element
HA	humanitarian assistance
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HHQ	higher headquarters
HQ	headquarters
HN	host nation
IGO	intergovernmental organizations
IO	information operations
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IPI	indigenous population and institutions
J-3	operations staff section
JP	joint publication
JTF	joint task force
JTF-PI	Joint Task Force-Philippines
LNO	liaison officer
LOO	line of operations

MAGTF
MARFORRES
MCDP
MCPP

Marine air-ground task force
United States Marine Corps Forces Reserve
Marine Corps doctrinal publication
Marine Corps planning process

MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MEB	Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
MEF (Fwd)	Marine expeditionary force (forward)
MET	mission essential tasks
METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
MLG	Marine logistics group
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
MOS	military occupational specialty
MSC	major subordinate command
NA	nation assistance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSC	National Security Council
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OGA	other government agency
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPT	operational planning team
PA	public affairs
PIR	priority intelligence requirements
POC	point of contact
PRC	populace and resources control
PRT	provincial reconstruction team
PSYOP	psychological operations

R&S	reconstruction and stabilization
RC	Reserve Component
RCT	regimental combat team
Rein	reinforced
RFI	request for information
RNI	Republic of Northern Indolaysia
ROC	rehearsal of concept
ROE	rules of engagement
S-2	battalion or regiment intelligence section
S-3	battalion or regiment operations section
S-9	battalion or regiment civil-military operations section
SCA	support to civil administration
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SITREP	situation report
SJA	staff judge advocate
SME	subject matter expert
SOP	standard operating procedure
TACON	tactical control
TCAPF	tactical conflict assessment and planning framework
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
Zulu	time indicator for Universal Time

Section II. Definitions

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA**. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs operations. Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Also called **CAO**. (JP 1-02)

civil information management. Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other US Government and Department of Defense agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also called **CIM**. (MCRP 5-12A)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operation may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called **CMO**. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations center. An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called **CMOC**. (JP 1-02)

civil support. Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (JP 1-02)

civil support operations. The overarching term for the Department of Defense's support to civilian authorities. Civil support operations are divided into three broad categories of domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other activities, based on the civil support definition. These categories, in many cases, can overlap or be in effect simultaneously, depending on the particular circumstances of the incident. (Excerpt from JP 3-28)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

dislocated civilian. A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called **DC**. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance. Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called **FHA**. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called **HN**. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically

authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401 and funded under separate authorities. Also called **HCA**. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also called **HA**. (JP 1-02)

indigenous populations and institutions. A generic term used to describe the civilian construct of an operational area to include its populations (legal citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians), governmental, tribal, commercial, and private organizations and entities. (JP 1-02)

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called **IO**. (JP 1-02)

interagency. United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02)

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called **IGO**. (JP 1-02)

internally displaced person. Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. (JP1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called **JTF**. (JP 1-02)

migrant. A person who (1) belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries, or (2) has fled his or her native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution. (JP 1-02)

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10, US Code programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or intergovernmental organizations. Also called **NA**. (JP 1-02)

natural disaster. An emergency situation posing significant danger to life and property that results from a natural cause. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called **NGO**. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON**. (JP 1-02)

populace and resources control. Control measures that assist host nation governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. Populace and resources control

measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation success. Also called **PRC**.

provincial reconstruction team. An interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services. Also called **PRT**. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. (JP 1-02)

solatium payment. A monetary compensation given to indigenous personnel to alleviate grief, suffering, and anxiety resulting from injuries and property or personal loss due directly or indirectly to US Government/military actions. A solatium payment is nominal in amount and is not an admission of liability by the US Government.

refugee. A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. (JP 1-02)

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. (JP 1-02)

support to civil administration. Actions that helps continue or stabilize management by a governing body of a foreign nation's civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Support to civil administration consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives. Also called **SCA**.

unity of effort. Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action. (JP 1-02)

