

Joint Publication 3-57



Civil-Military Operations



08 July 2008



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning and conduct of civil-military operations (CMO) by joint forces, the use of civil affairs forces, the conduct of civil affairs operations, and the coordination with other capabilities contributing to the execution of CMO to achieve unified action.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S. Goldfein', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

STEPHEN M. GOLDFEIN
Major General, USAF
Vice Director, Joint Staff

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION (JP) 3-57
DATED 8 FEBRUARY 2001**

- **Consolidates JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, and JP 3-57 formerly titled *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations***
- **Emphasizes that civil-military operations (CMO) are an inherent responsibility of command and facilitate accomplishment of the commander's mission**
- **Amplifies the use of CMO as a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with "asymmetric" and "irregular" threats in the 21st century**
- **Addresses provincial reconstruction teams**
- **Enhances the discussion of CMO objectives**
- **Discusses the relationship between CMO and civil affairs operations**
- **Addresses how CMO support operations and activities as they relate to the phasing model (i.e., Shape, Deter, Seize Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, Enable Civil Authorities)**
- **Relates Chapter III "Planning," to the planning process as addressed in JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, and provides an Appendix B "Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations"**
- **Provides an in-depth discussion of the relationship between CMO and the interagency, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector**
- **Updates Appendix A "Service Capabilities"**
- **Provides definitions for civil affairs operations, indigenous populations and institutions, private sector, and provincial reconstruction team**
- **Modifies the definition of civil-military operations center**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Describes Civil-Military Operations across the Range of Military Operations and the Levels of War**
- **Discusses the Objectives of Civil-Military Operations**
- **Discusses the Role of Civil-Military Operations within the Phases of a Joint Campaign**
- **Describes the Relationships Between Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations**
- **Describes Commander Responsibilities for Civil-Military Operations**
- **Discusses the Organizations Providing Civil-Military Operations Capabilities**
- **Describes Civil-Military Operations Strategic and Operational Planning Considerations**
- **Discusses Civil-Military Operations Coordination Requirements and Organizations**

Civil-Military Operations Overview

Civil-Military Operations (CMO). The activities of a commander that establish collaborative relationships among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations are nested in support of the overall U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local,

At the strategic, operational and tactical levels and across the full range of military operations, civil-military operations (CMO) are a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with “asymmetric” and “irregular” threats. Potential challenges include ethnic and religious conflict, cultural and socioeconomic differences, terrorism and insurgencies, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime, incidental and deliberate population migration, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, and sharpening competition/exploitation of dwindling natural resources. Opportunities, conversely, include the integration and comprehensive use of intergovernmental, regional, national, and local governmental and nongovernmental and private sector

regional, or national government.

organizations, which have proliferated in number, variety, and capability. Recent policy initiatives, national security, military strategies, and military doctrine demonstrate a growing appreciation of the need to leverage more nonmilitary instruments of national power, reposed in the interagency process and the private sector, entailing a more holistic, and balanced strategy.

CMO are holistic, cumulative, integrative, and synergistic, working in the seams of power and gaps in organizations, phases, and processes. CMO need to take into consideration the culture of the indigenous population. CMO are about engaging the population and building relationships. CMO are inherently joint, interagency, and multinational. At all levels, CMO use political bargaining, collaboration, consensus, and relationship-building to create conditions for success.

At all levels, CMO use political bargaining, collaboration, consensus, and relationship-building to create conditions for success.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) integrate civil affairs (CA) forces with other military forces (maneuver, health service, military police [MP]/security forces, engineering, transportation, and special operations forces [SOF]), security forces (e.g., national, border, and local police), other government agencies (OGAs), indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), host nations (HNs), foreign nations (FNs), and the private sector to provide the capabilities needed for successful CMO.

Liaison

Liaison ensures mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.

Effective CMO require extensive liaison and coordination between U.S., multinational, and indigenous security forces and engaged OGAs as well as NGOs, IGOs, IPI, or the private sector. Liaison is the contact by which communications can be maintained between organizations and agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.

Unity of Effort

One of the most difficult problems for the JFC in CMO is coordinating the activities of the military units with multiple civilian organizations having their own

purpose and goals. The JFC must ensure that CMO are not only coordinated at the operational level, but also at the country and theater strategic levels.

Civil-Military Operations and Levels of War

CMO can assist the geographic combatant commander (GCC) in conducting strategic planning by linking his theater security cooperation plan regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives.

Strategic. At the strategic level, CMO focus is on larger and long-term global or regional issues such as reconstruction, economic development, and stability. CMO can assist the geographic combatant commander (GCC) in conducting strategic planning by linking his theater security cooperation plan (SCP) regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives.

Operational. At the operational level, CMO focus on immediate or near-term issues such as health service infrastructure; movement, feeding, and sheltering of dislocated civilians (DCs); police and security programs; building FN government legitimacy; synchronization of CMO support to tactical commanders; and the coordination, synchronization, and, where possible, integration of interagency, IGO, and NGO activities with military operations.

Tactical. Tactical-level CMO include support of stakeholders at local levels, and promoting the legitimacy and effectiveness of U.S. presence and operations among locals, while minimizing friction between the military and the civilian organizations in the field. These may include local security operations, processing and movement of DCs, project management and project nomination, civil reconnaissance, and basic health service support (HSS).

Integrating CMO into Plans and Orders

Integration of CMO into the combatant commander's (CCDR's) plans and orders ensures all government activities are considered and coordinated, and that strategic, operational, and tactical level CMO are

Integration of CMO into the combatant commander's (CCDR's) plans and orders ensures all government activities are considered and coordinated, and that strategic, operational, and tactical level CMO are conducted to achieve the maximum effect. During complex contingency operations, the interagency community develops and promulgates a United States Government (USG) strategic plan for reconstruction,

conducted to achieve the maximum effect.

stabilization, or conflict transformation in compliance with national security Presidential directive (NSPD)-44. For the NSPD-44 planning process, Department of Defense (DOD) participants are the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. CCDR or subordinate JFC participation will coordinate on the strategic plan for reconstruction, stabilization or conflict transformation in conjunction with the Joint Staff. The primary mechanism for coordinating CMO within an echelon and between echelons is Annex G “Civil-Military Operations” to operation plans and orders. Since CMO involve the activities of a number of staff sections and subordinate units, it is necessary to have a single document to identify, consolidate, deconflict, and synergize the activities of the various sections and units (e.g., engineers, health service, and transportation).

Escalation Indicators

Unforeseen changes or shifts in effort may arise from a failure to anticipate changes in the military or political situation as well as unexpected changes in the environment such as the occurrence of a natural or man-made disaster. Possible indicators to monitor include, but are not limited to: political activities and movements; food or water shortages; outbreaks of disease; military setbacks; natural disasters; crop failures; fuel shortages; onset of seasonal changes (e.g., winter may exacerbate fuel and food shortages); police force and corrections system deterioration; judicial system shortcomings; insurgent attacks; sharp rise in crime; terrorist bombing; disruption of public utilities; and, economic strife due to socioeconomic imbalance.

Objectives of Civil-Military Operations

The purpose of CMO is to facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives, through the integration of civil and military actions.

CMO are a range of possible activities that are considered based on the desired level of civilian support, availability of resources, and inadvertent interference by the local population. The purpose of CMO is to facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives, through the integration of civil and military actions while conducting support to civil administration (SCA),

populace and resources control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance (NA), and civil information management (CIM).

Support to Civil Administration. SCA helps continue or stabilize management by a governing body of a FN's civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. SCA consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports U.S. and multinational objectives.

Populace and Resources Control. PRC assists HN governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. PRC measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation success.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA is defined as programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA.

Nation Assistance. NA is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the U.S. and that nation. NA programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, and humanitarian and civic assistance.

Civil Information Management. Civil information is information developed from data about civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events that can be fused or processed to increase

interagency, IGO, and NGO situational awareness. It is a CA planning consideration. CIM is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and fused with the supported JFC, higher headquarters, DOD and joint intelligence organizations, other USG and DOD agencies, interagency partners, NGOs, and the private sector to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners.

Civil-Military Operations in Joint Operations

CMO can be broadly separated into support to military operations and support to civil actions.

CMO occur across the range of military operations and throughout the joint operational phases. CMO can be broadly separated into support to military operations and support to civil actions, though at times those become mixed depending upon the operational environment and the potential to expand from military to civil or civil to military support. CMO tasks vary with the joint operation phases.

More than minimizing civilian interference, CMO help hasten an end to hostilities and attempt to limit collateral damage on indigenous populations and institutions from offensive, defensive, or stability operations.

Phase 0 -- Shape. CMO typically support many elements of the combatant commanders' (CCDRs) SCPs. At the strategic and operational levels, especially during the implementation of the CCDR's SCP, the timely application of CMO can mitigate the need for other military operations in response to a crisis.

Phase I -- Deter. CMO should be integrated with flexible deterrent options to generate maximum strategic or operational effect through synergizing softer, more influential civil and harder, more coercive military power.

Phase II -- Seize Initiative. During this phase, initiatives to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action through CMO are continuous while the JFC seeks to degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity.

Phase III -- Dominate. More than minimizing civilian interference, CMO help hasten an end to

hostilities and attempt to limit collateral damage on IPI from offensive, defensive, or stability operations.

Phase IV -- Stabilize. This phase typically is characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. As this occurs, CMO facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration of public services as fighting subsides and emphasis shifts from relief to reconstruction.

Phase V -- Enable Civil Authority. CA provide expertise in civil-sector functions normally the responsibility of civilian authorities and implement U.S. policy to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civil-sector functions.

Civil-Military Operations within Various Types of Military Operations

Counterinsurgency Operations. CMO support to counterinsurgency operations involve decisive and timely employment of military capabilities to perform traditionally nonmilitary activities that assist the HN or FN in depriving insurgents of their greatest weapon — dissatisfaction of the populace.

Security Assistance. CMO support to security assistance can include training foreign military forces in CMO and civil-military relations.

Peace Operations. CMO foster a cooperative relationship between the military forces, civilian organizations participating in the operation, and the governments and populations in the operational area.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. A CA officer could advise the advance party officer in charge on how to minimize population interference with evacuation operations, maintain close liaison with embassy officials to ensure effective interagency coordination and delineation of CA responsibilities and activities, and assist the joint force in accomplishing its mission by assisting embassy personnel in receiving, screening, processing, and debriefing evacuees.

Stability Operations. Initially, CMO will be conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish civil

law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. U.S. military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility.

Relationships Between Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations

There are six broad categories of civil affairs (CA) functional specialty areas — rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information.

The relationship between CMO and civil affairs operations (CAO) is best considered within the broad context of unified action that involves the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Commanders, in carrying out their CMO responsibilities are assisted by CA. There are six broad categories of CA functional specialty areas — rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information.

The GCC and subordinate commanders normally establish a distinct, full-time CMO staff element comprised of CA personnel to centralize the direction and oversight of planning, coordination, implementation, and conduct of CMO. While CA forces are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to support CMO, other joint force enablers performing CMO include SOF, psychological operations (PSYOP), legal support, PA, engineer, transportation, HSS, MP, security forces, and maneuver units.

Civil-Military Operations Responsibilities

CMO are conducted to synergize civil and military instruments of power, minimize civil-military friction and threats from the civil component, maximize support for operations, and meet the commander's legal obligations and moral responsibilities to the civilian

CMO are an inherent command responsibility. They encompass the activities JFCs take to establish and maintain relations with civil authorities, the general population, and other organizations. JFCs plan and conduct CMO to facilitate military operations in support of political-military objectives derived from national strategic objectives. An integral part of this is maintaining military-to-civil relations as well as emphasizing open and productive communications among OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and selected elements of the private sector. CMO are conducted to synergize

populations within the operational area.

civil and military instruments of power, minimize civil-military friction and threats from the civil component, maximize support for operations, and meet the commander's legal obligations and moral responsibilities to the civilian populations within the operational area.

Geographic Combatant Commanders. The GCCs provide regional coordination and direction to their subordinate commanders for the integration of CAO/CMO into military plans and operations. They support the goals and programs of other U.S. Government departments and agencies related to CAO/CMO consistent with missions and guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense. They coordinate CAO/CMO with the appropriate chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions. They synchronize all CAO/CMO requirements within regional war on terrorism plans, SCPs, and other Phase 0 (Shape) activities.

Subordinate Joint Force Commanders plan, integrate, and monitor the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of available CA functional assets in appropriate operational areas. They implement multinational CA plans consistent with international law, the law of armed conflict, and U.S. law and treaty obligations with the government and civilian population in countries where U.S. forces are employed. They employ CMO and CA forces to identify and coordinate as necessary sources of assistance, supplies, facilities, and labor from indigenous sources and to deal with local civilians and governments on the commander's behalf. They coordinate CMO and CAO planning with appropriate multinational commanders and HN forces, as directed by the establishing authority (e.g., CCDR) in conjunction with the U.S. embassy country team.

Relationship between Intelligence and Civil-Military Operations

In order to protect the credibility of their operations and for force protection reasons, CA personnel should not be directly involved in

The operational relationship between intelligence and CMO is mutually enhancing, yet highly sensitive. Intelligence, intelligence operations and CMO are an inherent mission for all military personnel. With the rise of the importance of CMO to human intelligence and the concept of "cultural intelligence," the role of

intelligence-gathering in any way.

CMO in the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment process has likewise accelerated. In order to protect the credibility of their operations and for force protection reasons, CA personnel should not be directly involved in intelligence-gathering in any way. Intelligence operators in the field operating openly and directly with CA could also place CA and other personnel in support of CMO and their mission at great risk. Regardless, JFCs need to establish divisions of responsibility between CMO and intelligence and robust yet discreet operational lines of coordination to create operational synergies while managing risks.

Organizations Providing Civil-Military Operations Capabilities

Certain types of organizations, typically CA and PSYOP units, should form the nucleus of CMO planning efforts. Others, such as, but not limited to, other SOF, engineers, HSS, transportation, and MP and security forces, act as enablers. However, for CMO to be successful all commanders must carry out their responsibilities regarding CMO. CMO should not be considered something done only by CA and PSYOP forces.

Special Operations Forces. Small SOF units generally accomplish CMO through operations that assist the HN or FN authorities, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs in restoring peace, strengthening the infrastructure of the country, or providing disaster relief assistance. SOF are regularly employed in mobile training teams, joint and combined exercises, professional development program seminars, and other military-to-military activities that are a vital part of theater security cooperation strategies. CA and PSYOP are mutually supportive within CMO. During some operations, PSYOP support various CAO (e.g., establish populace control measures) to gain support for the HN or FN government in the international community, and reduce support or resources to those destabilizing forces threatening legitimate processes of the HN or FN government. PSYOP publicize both the existence and successes of CMO to generate target population confidence in and positive perception of U.S., HN, or FN actions.

The employment of civil affairs teams at the tactical level links the maneuver commander with the civil populace.

Civil Affairs. CA forces are a multiplier for JFCs. CA functions are conducted by CA teams of various types, to include civil affairs teams (CATs) at tactical levels, civil affairs planning teams (CAPTs) and civil liaison teams at tactical and operational levels, civil-military support elements at operational and theater strategic levels, and civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) and functional specialty cells at all levels. The employment of CATs at the tactical level links the maneuver commander with the civil populace. CA units establish the CMOC and provide direct functional specialist support to HN or FN ministries.

Engineering. Engineers have a critical role in CMO, since engineer operations frequently result in direct effects that support the local civilian population (e.g. building roads, public facilities). Also, engineering frequently uses the capacity of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces.

Health Service Support. The use of HSS resources has historically proven to be a valuable low-risk asset in support of CMO. HSS is generally a noncontroversial and cost-effective means of using the military element to support U.S. national interests in another country. The focus of HSS initiatives, although possibly targeted toward the health problems in the operational area, is not normally curative, but primarily long-term preventive and developmental programs that are sustainable by the HN. HSS activities in support of CMO include health services and dental treatment, veterinarian and preventive medicine services, health services logistics, and aeromedical evacuation.

Transportation. Military transportation organizations can be invaluable in certain types of CMO. These units can be used to distribute food, water, and health services supplies; conduct health services evacuation; and move refugees to a safe environment. Additionally, some of these organizations have the technical expertise to assist in restoration of civilian transportation infrastructure.

Military Police or Security Forces. MP or security forces have the requisite training, experience, and equipment to perform CMO. Aside from having firepower, mobility, and communications necessary to conduct combat support operations, MP or security forces also have a wealth of experience in exercising authority in tense circumstances without escalating the tension. MP or security forces can perform or assist in functions that include staffing checkpoints, liaison with police forces, traffic control, detainees and DC camps, and force protection operations.

Organizing for Civil-Military Operations

Civil-Military Operations Staff Directorate. The CMO staff element may be found within an operations directorate of a joint staff or it may be organized under a separate staff element (usually the J-9) as designated by the JFC.

By design, the U.S.A CA brigade, the maritime civil affairs group, or the Marine Corps civil affairs group (CAG) organizational structure can provide the operational command and control system structure to form a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF).

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force. JFCs are responsible to conduct CMO but they may establish a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities beyond that which the organic CMO capability could accomplish. By design, the United States Army CA brigade, the maritime civil affairs group, or the Marine Corps civil affairs group (CAG) organizational structure can provide the operational command and control (C2) system structure to form a JCMOTF.

Civil-Military Operations Center The CMOC, normally based upon the organic CMOC of the supporting CA unit, is a mechanism for the coordination CMO that can serve as the primary coordination interface provides operational and tactical level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of U.S. military forces, OGAs, IPI, IGOs, the private sector, and NGOs. A CMOC is formed to receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from NGOs, IGOs, IPI, the private sector, and regional organizations. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force for action.

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). A PRT helps stabilize the operational environment in a province or locality through its combined diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities. It combines representatives from interagency and international partners into a cohesive unit capable of independently conducting operations to stabilize the environment by enhancing the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the HN government.

Strategic and Operational Planning Considerations

Some operational and environmental factors that may complicate the U.S. military's relationships with foreign civilians and constrain the conduct of CMO include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Differing legal institutions, customs, social relationships, economic organizations, and concepts of human and fundamental rights;
- Religious, cultural, and legal practices;
- Lack of adequate education or resistance by affected groups that result in poor health and sanitation or inefficient agricultural or industrial practices;
- Effects of labor, procurement, or contracting commodities upon the population, economy, and governmental services;
- Dislocation of civilian populations and damage to facilities and infrastructure requiring military assistance, especially in areas of public health, DC care and control, civilian supply, public safety, transportation, and humanitarian relief;
- Humanitarian motives prompting U.S. personnel to furnish relief or assistance that may conflict with local law, religion, or cultural standards;
- International law, customs and practice governing the sovereign territory of each nation.

Civil-Military Operations Coordination

In CMO, interagency, IGO, NGO, IPI, and the private sector coordination is one of the top priorities. The CMOC, with its standing capability can serve as the JFC's primary coordination interface with OGAs, IPI,

IGOs, NGOs, and multinational forces (MNFs). In many situations, the HN or FN and the private sector also will have a major role in coordination with the military, interagency, IGOs, and NGOs. A JFC's effective use of CMO improves the integration of the military effort with these organizations and links military objectives to the diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives.

Procedures for Effective Cooperation. The interagency, IGO, and NGO process often is described as “more art than science,” while military operations tend to depend on structure and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military C2 can assist in obtaining unity of effort if they are adjusted to the dynamic world of interagency, IGO, and NGO activities. Each geographic combatant command is aligned with both an active component Army CA element and with an Army CA command, which are found only in the U.S. Army Reserve and staffed with functional experts possessing a wide range of critical civilian skills. These functional experts are knowledgeable in working with their respective civilian counterpart agencies responsible for their functional specialty. As such, they already are experienced in the duties, responsibilities, and in some cases the agenda(s) of such agencies.

Political Advisor or Foreign Policy Advisor. The DOS assigns combatant commands a political advisor, also known as a foreign policy advisor who provides diplomatic considerations and enables informal linkage with embassies in the area of responsibility and with DOS – leading to greater interagency coordination.

The chief of mission (COM) provides a de facto coordinating mechanism that can be tailored to each crisis as it arises, based upon the substance of the problem with little need for written rules.

Chief of Mission. The COM is the senior representative of the President in a FN and is responsible for policy decisions and the activities of USG employees in the country. The COM integrates the programs and resources of all USG agencies represented on the country team. The COM provides a de facto coordinating mechanism that can be tailored to each crisis as it arises, based upon the substance of the problem with little need for written rules.

Multinational Coordination. With the ever-increasing involvement with MNFs, it is imperative that the U.S. military forces fully understand the special considerations arising when working with military and paramilitary forces of other nations. Nations' agendas and interests will differ from those of the United States in many ways. In many instances, MNFs will not be able to influence the planning effort without prior approval of their home country and its commitment to the concept of operations and mission.

The joint interagency coordination group provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other United States Government civilian agencies and departments.

Joint Interagency Coordination Group. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments.

Intergovernmental Organizations. IGOs are organizations created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments and may be established on a global or regional basis and may have general or specialized purposes. Responding to humanitarian situations is a fundamental responsibility of the IGOs system. This responsibility runs from the immediate response to the long-term amelioration of a crisis. Prior to arrival in country, it is advisable to contact United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs headquarters in Geneva. This office will have the informational and communications links that will assist the military's in reaching its end state. It also should be the focal point for advance planning and sharing of information on objectives.

Nongovernmental Organizations. NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in the international arena. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical

projects, relief activities, DC assistance, public policy, and development programs. When dealing with NGOs, it is important to remember that they will likely object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the achievement of military objectives. Their mission is one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives. Ultimately, commanders factor NGOs activities and capabilities into their assessment of conditions and resources to integrate them into the selected course of action.

The Private Sector. The private sector is “an umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations.” The private sector can assist the USG by sharing information, identifying risks, performing vulnerability assessments, assisting in contingency and crisis action planning, and providing other assistance as appropriate.

Conclusion

This publication provides doctrine for the planning and execution of civil-military operations.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Military commanders must consider not only the military forces, but also the environment in which those forces operate. One factor of the environment that commanders must consider is the civilian populace and its impact – whether it is supportive, neutral, or hostile to the presence of military forces. A supportive populace can provide resources that facilitate friendly operations.”

FM 3-07

1. General

a. Coordination among, mutual support of, and when practical, integration of the instruments of national power are required to accomplish the national strategic end state. Resolving national security issues in the evolving strategic environment of the 21st century increasingly requires the full range of diplomatic, informational, military, as well as, economic solutions. Both threats and opportunities emanate from the civil sector of society and the seams between nation-states. Potential challenges include ethnic and religious conflict, cultural and socioeconomic differences, terrorism and insurgencies, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), international organized crime, incidental and deliberate population migration, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, and sharpening competition/exploitation of dwindling natural resources. Opportunities, conversely, include the integration and comprehensive use of intergovernmental, regional, national, and local governmental and nongovernmental and private sector organizations, which have proliferated in number, variety, and capability. Recent policy initiatives, national security, military strategies, and military doctrine demonstrate a growing appreciation of the need to leverage more nonmilitary instruments of national power, reposed in the interagency process and the private sector, entailing a more holistic, and balanced strategy. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, for example, tasks the Department of State (DOS) to lead interagency coordination, planning, and civil response for reconstruction and stabilization through the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, notes, “Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations.” At the strategic, operational and tactical levels and across the full range of military operations, civil-military operations (CMO) are a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency (COIN) and other operations dealing with “asymmetric” and “irregular” threats. Because CMO permeate every aspect of applied national security and military strategy, they are inherently strategic in nature and a key element in winning and securing the peace.

(1) CMO are holistic, cumulative, integrative, and synergistic, working in the seams of power and gaps in organizations, phases, and processes. Enabling, moderating, and balancing, they promote unity of effort while managing change, risk, and expectations. CMO foster cooperation largely through power, facilitate civil-military transition, minimize the costs and risks, and mitigate threats and exploit opportunities.

They help overcome frictions in these seams, gaps, and transitions, and accelerate decision cycles to gain advantage over asymmetric adversaries.

(2) CMO need to take into consideration the culture of the indigenous population. CMO are about engaging the population and building relationships. They involve an intrinsically adaptive activity of a learning organization – critical, for example, to defeating asymmetric and irregular threats in COIN operations.

(3) CMO are inherently joint, interagency, and multinational. Always subordinate to policy, they are at the heart of unity of effort and unified action through their coordinating and information management functions.

(4) By expanding the range of options, CMO entail the military principle of offense. By introducing non-military instruments of power to enhance or supplant power and mitigate or reduce the costs and risks of conflict, they apply the principle of economy-of-force. By being the non-lethal component of force protection (FP), they expand the principle of security.

(5) At all levels, CMO use political bargaining, collaboration, consensus, and relationship-building to create conditions for success.

(6) Joint force commanders (JFCs) integrate civil affairs (CA) forces with other military forces (maneuver, health service, military police [MP]/security forces, engineering, transportation, and special operations forces [SOF]), security forces (e.g., national, border, and local police), other government agencies (OGAs), indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), host nations (HNs), foreign nations (FNs), and the private sector to provide the capabilities needed for successful CMO.

(7) The vignette below provides an illustration of CMO with both CA and other military forces working with OGA civilians, NGOs, host nation (HN) representatives,

“The understanding that Civil-Military Operations [CMO] are a key component to winning and securing the peace is ever widening. Commanders, now more than ever, are challenging their staffs to integrate CMO into all aspects of plans, operations, intelligence, logistics, information operations, and information management. Staff officers and NCOs [noncommissioned officers] are breaking new ground by building organizations and developing processes and procedures that enhance staff integration and capitalize on interagency coordination and overcoming the challenges of including stakeholders in their decision cycles through linkages, authorities, and information sharing. All good news stories!”

David B. Morrison
Captain, US Navy Commander, Special Operations Command,
US Joint Forces Command

and local governments. Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are discussed in Chapter II, “Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations,” subparagraph 4h.

For more details on the interagency community, IPI, HNs, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector, refer to Chapter IV, Coordination, and Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II. Collectively, the above terms often are referred to as “stakeholders.”

The downside of this flexibility was confusion, particularly in the NGO and international donor community, about what a PRT is, what it ought to do, and what its limits should be. People who served with some NGOs argued that PRT activities, particularly in the areas of governance and reconstruction, could be counterproductive. For example, in the startup phase, some PRTs constructed schools and clinics without paying enough attention to whether the Afghan government could afford to equip them with teachers, books, doctors, or medical supplies. While many PRTs have taken steps to redress this issue, the NGO and donor community remains concerned about the nature and scope of PRT programs.

**Source: Condensed from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan:
An Interagency Assessment
Department of State
Department of Defense
U.S. Agency for International Development
June 2006**

b. **Civil-Military Operations.** The activities of a commander that establish collaborative relationships among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations are nested in support of the overall U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur throughout the range of military operations. CMO is the responsibility of the command and will be executed by all members of the command. It is not the sole purview of the CA team. CMO are conducted across the range of military operations as depicted in Figure I-1.

c. **Authority to Conduct Civil-Military Operations**

(1) The authority to conduct CMO or exercise controls in a given area or country may arise as a result of military operations, international cooperative agreement, or an agreement between the United States Government (USG) or appropriate military commander, and the government of the area or country in which U.S. forces may be employed. A commander’s authority for undertaking CMO ultimately derives from a Presidential or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) decision. Factors such as mission, policy determinants, and the relationship between the government of the affected country and the USG also influence the authority to conduct CMO.



Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

(2) International law, principally the law of war that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities often called the law of armed conflict (LOAC), places certain responsibilities on occupying powers. These responsibilities include taking all measures within its powers to restore public order and safety, while respecting to the extent possible, the laws of the occupied country, to establish civil administrations, and to control or conduct governmental matters both during and after hostilities. International law, in accordance with state actions, determines whether a state is an occupying power triggering the occupation rights and responsibilities. Occupation occurs when territory is actually under the authority of a power, and generally follows the cessation of hostilities in the occupied territory. Occupation is a question of fact based on the ability of the occupying power to render the occupied government incapable of exercising public authority or, in the absence of a local government, an ungoverned area. However, mere presence of foreign forces in a state does not confer occupation rights or responsibilities on that force. Foreign forces present in a sovereign state by consent exercise rights and responsibilities arising from international agreements. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Stabilization Force and its predecessor Implementation Force) administered the region in accordance with the Dayton Peace Accords. The Stabilization Force was not an occupying force and had neither the rights nor responsibilities of an occupying force.

d. **Liaison.** Effective CMO require extensive liaison and coordination between U.S., multinational, and indigenous security forces and engaged OGAs as well as NGOs, IGOs, IPI, or the private sector. Liaison is the contact by which communications can be maintained between organizations and agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Exchanging liaison officers is the most commonly employed technique for establishing close, continuous, and physical communications between organizations. Liaison personnel will enhance interoperability and contribute significantly to mission success.

e. **Unity of Effort.** One of the most difficult problems for the JFC in CMO is coordinating the activities of the military units with multiple civilian organizations having their own purpose and goals. As a fundamental precept, CMO must be closely coordinated with and through appropriate interagency authorities such as the U.S. embassy country team and higher headquarters. The JFC must ensure that CMO are not only coordinated at the operational level, but also at the country and theater strategic levels.

f. **Responsibility. CMO are an inherent responsibility of command and facilitate accomplishment of the commander's mission.** Military operations continue to involve greater civil interface than in the past. Because the U.S. has substantial military power, adversaries may rely upon asymmetric or irregular warfare to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. combat power. Their targets and means may be more civilian than military. Second, there is less distinction between civilian and military institutions, infrastructures, and systems — dual-use is becoming more prevalent. Third, population-centric and socio-cultural hubs now are often strategic centers of gravity (COGs) or decisive points rather than military forces or remote terrain features. As more people and power migrate to densely populated urban areas, the military force is very likely to be fighting there rather than in jungles or deserts. Consequently, **CMO are integral to every military operation.**

2. Civil-Military Operations and Levels of War

a. **CMO are applicable at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war; importantly, specific actions at one level of war may affect all three levels simultaneously but with different effects at each level.** Further, engaged civilian organizations likely will not distinguish between the various levels of war. NGO or IGO members that communicate with military members may report their conversations to their leadership in Washington, D.C., who may then discuss them directly with the U.S. Government officials. Inadvertent misperceptions of CMO actions by nonmilitary agencies can cause a commander to be distracted from his mission. Most civilian agencies, both NGOs and OGAs, are not organized with an “operational level” distinct from the tactical or strategic organizations. Furthermore, working with NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) will be time consuming since they often do not have the authority to make decisions in the field that may result in a change from their original mission without the permission of the superiors at the U.S. embassy or in Washington, D.C.

b. To achieve the benefits of multitiered CMO, JFCs promulgate their intent early and include appropriate CMO guidance to staffs and subordinate commanders. The JFC's planners develop the commander's intent from the top down with sufficient lead time to enable subordinate commands to produce detailed plans that are in harmony with the commander's objectives. While the effort at each level may be focused on different specific objectives, the activities should be mutually supporting and synergistic.

(1) **Strategic.** At the strategic level, CMO focus is on larger and long-term global or regional issues such as reconstruction, economic development, and stability. CMO can assist the GCC in conducting strategic planning by linking his theater security cooperation plan (SCP) regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. Strategic vulnerability may pertain to political, geographic, economic, informational, scientific, sociological, or military factors; however, a U.S. military strategic objective is subordinate to, and must fulfill, the national strategic objective.

(2) **Operational**

(a) At the operational level, missions supporting security cooperation feature programs to build relationships and mitigate the need for force. Subsequently, CMO focus on immediate or near-term issues such as health service infrastructure; movement, feeding, and sheltering of dislocated civilians (DCs); police and security programs; building FN government legitimacy; synchronization of CMO support to tactical commanders; and the coordination, synchronization, and, where possible, integration of interagency, IGO, and NGO activities with military operations.

(b) As operations have become more complex, the operational level has become the critical juncture at which the coordination of the overall effort takes place, making operational-level CMO critical to present and future operations. It is the level at which the challenges to the success of an international peace operation (PO) are the greatest - not only in the coordination and synchronization of the myriad activities of the expanding number of donor-funded IGOs and NGOs, but also in the flow and management of information. Information is valuable to inter-entity coordination, to efficiently and effectively mobilizing and distributing resources (to include funding), and to winning in an operational environment no longer measured by traditional indicators of operational success. Operational commanders in particular must have an acute understanding of CMO.

(3) **Tactical**

(a) Tactical-level CMO include support of stakeholders at local levels, and promoting the legitimacy and effectiveness of U.S. presence and operations among locals, while minimizing friction between the military and the civilian organizations in the field. Tactical-level CMO normally are more narrowly focused and have more immediate effects. These may include local security operations, processing and movement of DCs, project management and project nomination, civil reconnaissance, and basic health service support (HSS).

(b) Tactical-level commanders conduct CMO consistent with the JFC's intent in order to accomplish designated objectives.

c. It is important that civil-military issues and objectives be incorporated early in the planning process for any operation. CMO are formulated and managed through interagency coordination; multinational partnerships; and coordination with IPI, IGOs,

and NGOs; and integrated with strategic, operational, and tactical level plans and operations. To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the operation/campaign successfully, JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations with other operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or campaign phase. Evaluation of the plan and information from the theater or regional level will be a continuous part of this process. Use of CA planners to conduct measure of effectiveness (MOE) assessments help ensure plans are properly focused to meet the JFC end state.

d. Active participation by interagency and military CMO subject matter experts at the strategic, operational, and tactical planning levels ensure effective CMO. Integration of CMO into the combatant commander's (CCDR's) plans and orders ensures all government activities are considered and coordinated, and that strategic, operational, and tactical level CMO are conducted to achieve the maximum effect.

(1) During complex contingency operations, the interagency community develops and promulgates a **USG strategic plan for reconstruction, stabilization, or conflict transformation** in compliance with NSPD-44. The Secretary of State and SecDef will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans and will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate. The DOS Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization is tasked with the implementation of the requirements of NSPD 44. Integrated planning and effective management of USG agency operations provides a framework at the national strategic level for follow-on theater and operational level planning and creates unity of effort within an operation that is essential for mission success.

(2) For the NSPD-44 planning process, Department of Defense (DOD) participants are the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. CCDR or subordinate JFC participation will coordinate on the strategic plan for reconstruction, stabilization or conflict transformation in conjunction with the Joint Staff. Further, the National Security Council's (NSC's) plan provides guidance on a number of issues and requires interpretation with regard to the portions that relate to the military. Accordingly, the instructions to the CCDR and subordinate JFCs for implementing the operations plan will be issued by the SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

(3) The strategic plan for reconstruction, stabilization, or conflict transformation will guide and influence a CCDR's plan.

e. The primary mechanism for coordinating CMO within an echelon and between echelons is Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) to operation plans and orders. Since CMO involve the activities of a number of staff sections and subordinate units, it is necessary to have a single document to identify, consolidate, deconflict, and synergize the activities of the various sections and units (e.g., engineers, health service, and transportation).




Figure I-2. Phasing Model

For more details concerning Annex G (Civil-Military Operations), refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II Planning Formats.

f. The successful termination of a joint operation is based on more than an assessment of the military factors. An assessment of all political, military, economic, social, and infrastructure factors must be conducted to determine if the required national strategic end state has been achieved. Further, the assessment of stability operations using focused MOEs and measures of performance gauges the level of improvement in the quality of life of the populace and overall progress toward mission accomplishment.

g. Missions are dynamic and, therefore, the relative effort devoted to CMO may change by phase or through unanticipated political or environmental influences. While CMO may play a supporting role through the first four joint operation phases, (see Figure I-2, Phasing Model), CMO are a leading line of operations in other phases. The termination criteria relies heavily on successful CMO efforts to establish a stable environment (Phase IV) for successful transfer to civil authority (in Phase V) prior to the redeployment of U.S. combat forces.

h. Unforeseen changes or shifts in effort may arise from a failure to anticipate changes in the military or political situation as well as unexpected changes in the environment such as the occurrence of a natural or man-made disaster. These changes are most dangerous when the joint force's main effort is unexpectedly diverted from CMO to combat operations. The JFC must identify early indicators and warnings of this possibility, allocate resources for monitoring those indicators, and anticipate the shift in

focus with sufficient warning to posture the force. Branch and sequel planning and early preventive action may mitigate the interruption of CMO. Possible indicators to monitor include, but are not limited to, those depicted in Figure I-3. The application of force supporting CMO within certain areas might occur as the main effort during the initial phases based upon the threat situation. Planning should identify those areas of the country of interest where CMO could be conducted by organizations, military forces or the United Nations (UN) during shaping, deterrence, dominating the enemy, and stabilization of the environment.

3. Objectives of Civil-Military Operations

a. CMO are a range of possible activities that are considered based on the desired level of civilian support, availability of resources, and inadvertent interference by the local population. CMO take place in friendly, neutral, or hostile operational areas independent of, and during, other military operations. The purpose of CMO is to



Figure I-3. Possible Escalation Indicators

facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives, through the integration of civil and military actions while conducting support to civil administration (SCA), populace and resources control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance (NA), and civil information management (CIM). These activities are particularly suited to support the development of a country's material and human resources or to assist the HN or FN in achieving its political, economic, and informational objectives.

(1) **Support to Civil Administration.** SCA helps continue or stabilize management by a governing body of a FN's civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. SCA consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports U.S. and multinational objectives. SCA occurs most often during stability operations. Some SCA is manifested in PRC, FHA, and NA.

(a) **Civil administration in friendly territory** includes advising friendly authorities and performing specific functions within the limits of authority and liability established by international treaties and agreements.

(b) **Civil administration in occupied territory** encompasses the establishment of a temporary government, as directed by the SecDef, to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the populace of a territory that U.S. forces have taken from an enemy by force of arms until an indigenous civil government can be established.

(c) **Domestic and International Considerations.** SCA fulfills obligations arising from U.S. domestic laws, HN laws, international treaties, agreements, memoranda of understanding, and obligations under international law, including the LOAC. Within its capabilities, the occupying force must maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory and must have, as its ultimate goal, the creation of a legitimate and effective civilian government. Subject to the military requirements, the JFC should avoid military activities likely to increase tensions in the occupied territory and conduct those likely to facilitate and accelerate a return to a civil administration. This is especially important in multiethnic, multiracial, or multicultural environments where one or more of the parties to a conflict will almost invariably see a chosen course of action (COA) as biased against them.

(2) **Populace and Resources Control.** PRC assists HN governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. PRC measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation success. PRC measures can be applied across the range of military operations. CA DC planners develop and coordinate PRC in conjunction with HN and NGO resources to include DC evacuation and camps.

(a) Regardless of the operational environment, military operations can be disrupted by:

1. Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of frightened civilians;
2. Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians conducting legitimate activities; or
3. Illegal or illegitimate activities such as insurgent operations or black-market activities.

(b) PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control.

1. **Populace control** provides for security of the populace, mobilization of human resources, denial of personnel availability to the enemy, and detection and reduced effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, identification and registration cards, and voluntary resettlement. DC operations involve populace control that requires extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

2. **Resources control** regulates the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (e.g., roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

(c) These controls normally are a responsibility of indigenous civil governments. PRC measures implemented by a joint force are necessary when HN civil authorities or agencies are either unable or unwilling to undertake that responsibility. They are further defined and enforced during times of civil or military emergency. In friendly territory, joint forces implement PRC measures with the consent of the local government. In hostile territory, PRC measures are applied in accordance with international law and the LOAC.

(3) **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.** FHA is defined as programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The primary planning consideration is the funding available from the primary USG agency. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are conducted outside the U.S., its territories, and possessions.

For further detail concerning FHA, refer to DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, and JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(4) **Nation Assistance.** NA is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the U.S. and that nation.

(a) NA operations support a HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. NA programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance (SA), foreign internal defense (FID), and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA). All NA actions are integrated through the U.S. ambassador's Mission Strategic Plan.

1. Security cooperation is defined as the means by which the DOD encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic goals. As a subset of security cooperation, security assistance is a tool that will be explained more fully later in this chapter.

2. FID programs encompass the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. U.S. military involvement in FID includes indirect support, direct support, and/or combat operations.

a. Types of military operations related to FID are NA and/or support to COIN; combating terrorism; PO; DOD support to counterdrug operations; and FHA.

b. These categories may, to some degree, include FID operations as an integral component in supporting the fight against subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

For further detail in regards to FID and security assistance, refer to JP 3-07.1, Foreign Internal Defense.

(b) HCA, in contrast to FHA, may be rendered by U.S. military personnel in conjunction with military operations and exercises. HCA programs generally encompass planned activities and are limited by law to:

1. Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.

2. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

3. Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

4. Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

5. Detection and clearance of landmines and other explosive remnants of war, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of landmines and other explosive remnants of war.

(c) NA operations support USG efforts to assist and complement the HN with internal programs to promote stability, develop sustainability, and establish institutions responsive to the needs of the populace. They are key military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations that enhance the CCDR's shaping and deterrence efforts.

(d) Military Civic Action (MCA). MCA programs offer the JFC an opportunity to improve the HN infrastructure and the living conditions of the local populace, while enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government. These programs use predominantly indigenous military forces at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other areas that contribute to the economic and social development of the nation. These programs can have excellent long-term benefits for the HN by enhancing the **effectiveness** of the host government by developing needed skills and by enhancing the **legitimacy** of the host government by showing the people that their government is capable of meeting the population's basic needs. MCA programs can be helpful in gaining public acceptance of the military, which is especially important in situations requiring a clear, credible demonstration of improvement in host-military treatment of human rights. MCA can also help eliminate some of the causes of civilian unrest by providing economic and social development services.

1. MCA may involve U.S. military supervision and advice but the visible effort should be conducted by the HN or FN military.

2. MCA projects require interagency cooperation, coordination, and monitoring to succeed. The JFC and staff must be aware of legal and financial limitations in authorized projects. The success of MCA, as with all CMO, is dependent on a close relationship between engaged U.S. interagency partners and the joint force staff, as well as the synergy created by the CA, psychological operations (PSYOP), and public affairs (PA) elements.

3. MCA Employment Considerations. Many of the considerations on the use of U.S. military personnel to conduct other CMO activities also apply to MCA support. The essential difference is that in MCA, HN or FN military or government personnel perform tasks that are visible to the indigenous population to garner popular support while U.S. personnel provide training and advice.

For further detail relating to MCA, refer to JP 3-07.1, Foreign Internal Defense.

(5) **Civil Information Management.** (See Appendix B, "Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations," for more details on CIM.)

b. **Civil-Military Operations in Joint Operations.** CMO occur across the range of military operations and throughout the joint operational phases. CMO can be broadly separated into support to military operations and support to civil actions, though at times those become mixed depending upon the operational environment and the potential to expand from military to civil or civil to military support.

(1) **Support to Military Operations.** CMO serve a variety of key roles that impact military mission accomplishment. Some roles are required by international law (e.g., human rights law), such as the need to minimize the effects of the military operation on the civilian population. Other roles facilitate military operations.

(2) **Specific Tasks.** CMO planners must forecast CMO requirements by analyzing the mission to determine specific tasks. This includes establishing guidance for the specific CMO tasks and developing estimates of the situation to include area studies. Special, functional-oriented studies may be needed on certain topics. Planners must consider their knowledge of CMO, geographic areas of specialization, language qualifications, civil sector functional technical expertise, and contacts with IPI. This will allow for timely and critical information on the civilian capabilities and resources in the operational area. The information and insights gained from civilian contacts and professional knowledge is more extensive than the information collected through military intelligence channels. A CA area study followed by an area assessment to update the area study will assist the operation by providing critical information about the operational area. CMO estimates help the JFC conduct operational analysis of the civil component of the integrated operational environment as part of the joint planning process.

(a) CMO tasks vary with the joint operation phases. Although JFCs determine the number and actual phases, use of the phases shown in Figure I-2 provides a flexible model to arrange smaller, related operations. The activities below, although not all inclusive, may occur during the notional joint operation phases, keeping in mind that some may overlap phases. A number of these activities may be performed by only CA personnel, other military forces, or a combination.

1. **Phase 0 -- Shape.** CMO typically support many elements of the CCDRs' SCPs. At the strategic and operational levels, especially during the implementation of the CCDR's SCP, the timely application of CMO can mitigate the need for other military operations in response to a crisis. When a crisis is unavoidable, groundwork laid by CMO can facilitate rapid, decisive operations. CMO also can promote U.S. policy objectives before, during, and after combat operations by influencing the civil component of the operational environment. This may include coordination with civilian organizations, as appropriate.

2. **Phase I -- Deter.** CMO should be integrated with flexible deterrent options to generate maximum strategic or operational effect through synergizing softer, more influential civil and harder, more coercive military power. CA can conduct area studies, updated by area assessments, to include identifying potential civil sector and civilian COGs that may impact anticipated military operations. SCP activities provide an

ideal opportunity for CA to collect current open-source information obtained in the course of their normal duties to update assessments prior to a crisis.

3. Phase II -- Seize Initiative. During this phase, initiatives to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action through CMO are continuous while the JFC seeks to degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. To aid in seizing the initiative, CMO seek to minimize civil-military friction and shape the civil component of the integrated operational environment to support friendly POLMIL objectives, always with a view to the end state.

4. Phase III -- Dominate. More than minimizing civilian interference, CMO help hasten an end to hostilities and attempt to limit collateral damage on IPI from offensive, defensive, or stability operations. Stability operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase, relieve suffering, and set conditions for civil-military transition.

5. Phase IV -- Stabilize. This phase typically is characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. As this occurs, CMO facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration of public services as fighting subsides and emphasis shifts from relief to reconstruction. CMO focus on support to civilian efforts to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population. JFCs and their staffs, especially CA subject matter experts, continuously assess the feasibility of transferring authority to a legitimate civil entity and progress toward the military end state.

6. Phase V -- Enable Civil Authority. CA provide expertise in civil-sector functions normally the responsibility of civilian authorities and implement U.S. policy to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civil-sector functions. This phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in the operational area. This includes coordination of CMO with interagency, multinational, IPI, IGO, and NGO participants; establishing and assessing MOEs and measures of performance; and favorably influencing the attitude of the population regarding both the U.S. and the local civil authority's objectives.

For more details concerning the phasing model, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

(b) Successful DC operations minimize civil-military friction, protect civilians from being combat hazards, alleviate human suffering, and provide for the centralized control of DCs.

(c) CMO assist the commander's other military operations through the associated coordination required with civilian agencies in implementing measures to locate and identify population centers. Coordination with the appropriate civilian agencies also is required to create, restore, and maintain public order. In addition, CMO involve activities to coordinate, safeguard, mobilize, and use civilian resources (e.g.,

labor, supplies, and facilities). CMO will include coordination for immediate life sustaining services to civilians in the operational area(s) and assist with planning for the control of diseases that might endanger military forces. CMO also help minimize civilian movements, which would interfere with military operations and facilitate the equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies and services.

(d) Commanders and their staffs identify populated areas and develop recommended schemes of maneuver and fires to mitigate undesired effects on the IPI. CMO assets may be utilized to designate routes and facilities for DCs to minimize their contact with forces engaged in combat and PSYOP products not intended for them. CMO involve taking action to maintain or restore law and order to protect the control of both public and private property.

(e) CMO can contribute to host-nation support (HNS) or foreign nation support (FNS). Logistic planners identify projected shortfalls and communicate needs to CMO planners. CMO planners then identify the availability of goods and services within theater; to include location, lines of communications (LOCs), quantities available, and their cost. CMO planners' responsibilities range from identifying resources and assisting other joint staff members sections/elements in their procurement to activating preplanned requests for wartime support from the civilian sector.

(f) CMO may be a part of, or support, numerous types of military operations. There are some operations, such as raids and strikes, which probably have limited impact on the civil sector and therefore may have limited CMO requirements. Specific CMO implications for most of these operations are dependent on the mission scope, national strategic end state, and the characteristics of the civil sector in the operational area. Representative CMO activities in support of some of these operations include, but are not limited to:

1. Counterinsurgency Operations. COIN operations consist of those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. CMO support to COIN operations involve decisive and timely employment of military capabilities to perform traditionally nonmilitary activities that assist the HN or FN in depriving insurgents of their greatest weapon — dissatisfaction of the populace. CMO activities combine military with diplomatic, political, economic, and informational initiatives of the HN or FN and engaged OGAs to foster stability. The principle goal of CMO activities is to isolate the insurgents from the populace, thus depriving them of recruits, resources, intelligence, and credibility. CMO are an integral part of COIN activities; these may include aspects of SCA, PRC, NA, CIM, or MCA.

2. Security Assistance. CMO support to security assistance can include training foreign military forces in CMO and civil-military relations. CA can provide training that is beyond the capability of in-country U.S. military assistance elements. The SCP should synchronize CMO planning and CA forces with the other security assistance capabilities.

3. Peace Operations. PO are normally multiagency and multinational contingencies involving all instruments of national power, and may include international humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. CMO foster a cooperative relationship between the military forces, civilian organizations participating in the operation, and the governments and populations in the operational area.

4. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). A CA officer who is a member of a joint force advance party or its forward command element may conduct an initial CMO assessment of the operational area to validate information and assumptions of the CMO estimate and advise the advance party officer in charge (OIC) of CMO related issues affecting the NEO. Also, a CA officer could advise the advance party OIC on how to minimize population interference with evacuation operations, maintain close liaison with embassy officials to ensure effective interagency coordination and delineation of CA responsibilities and activities, and assist the joint force in accomplishing its mission by assisting embassy personnel in receiving, screening, processing, and debriefing evacuees.

(g) Stability Operations. These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. **To achieve the national strategic end state and conclude the operation/campaign successfully, a GCC and subordinate commanders must integrate and synchronize stability operations with other operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or campaign phase** (see Figure 1-4). Stability operations support USG plans for SSTR operations and likely will be conducted in coordination with and in support of HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs.

1. Operation plans should outline an **appropriate balance between offensive and defensive operations and stability operations in all phases**. Most importantly, **planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation planning is initiated**. Planning for the transition from sustained combat operations to the termination of joint operations and then a complete handover to civil authority and redeployment must commence during plan development and be ongoing during all phases of a campaign or major operation. An imbalanced focus on planning offensive and defensive operations in the "dominate" phase may threaten full development of basic and supporting plans for the "stabilize" and "enable civil authority" phases and ultimately impact the joint operation's momentum. Even while sustained combat operations are ongoing, there will be a need to establish or restore security and control and provide humanitarian relief as succeeding areas are occupied or bypassed.

2. Initially, CMO will be conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish civil law and order protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. U.S. military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil



Figure I-4. Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations

authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, U.S. military forces may support such activities as required/necessary.

3. The military's predominant presence and its ability to command and control (C2) forces and logistics under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in stability operations normally governed by other agencies that lack such capacities. However, some stability operations likely will be in support of, or transition to support of, U.S. diplomatic, IGO, or HN efforts. Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to success and military forces need to work competently in this environment while

properly supporting the agency in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting stability operations require a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of interagency and alliance or coalition partners. Military forces should be prepared to operate in integrated civilian-military teams that could include representatives from IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and members of the private sector with relevant skills and expertise.

4. Civilian institutions provide the long term engagement needed to achieve a viable and sustainable peace. The DOS utilizes an interagency management system with five related sectors that should be accomplished to achieve national goals. These sectors are security; humanitarian assistance (HA) and social well-being; justice and reconciliation; governance and participation; and, economic stabilization and infrastructure. These peace building mission sectors are discussed in detail in JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*.

(h) **Civil support operations** are divided into the broad categories of: domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other activities. In many cases, these categories can overlap or be in effect simultaneously, depending on the particular circumstances of the incident. While many aspects of civil support may be applicable in a response to disasters in a FN, civil support applies only in a domestic context with U.S. civil authorities.

For further detail relating to civil support, refer to JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, and JP 3-28, Civil Support.

4. Relationships Between Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations

“The United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of operations. These operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range of military operations that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns. Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.”

JP 3-0, Joint Operations

a. The relationship between CMO and civil affairs operations (CAO) is best considered within the broad context of unified action that involves the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. JFCs seek this synergy by several means, one of the more prominent being through the conduct of CMO that bring together the activities of joint and multinational forces (MNFs) and nonmilitary

organizations to achieve common objectives. Commanders, in carrying out their CMO responsibilities are assisted by CA. This relationship is depicted in Figure I-5.

(1) There are six broad categories of CA functional specialty areas — **rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information**. Each is related to a certain extent, to every other CA functional specialty, and their interconnecting relationships obviate exclusive interest within any functional area. At the same time, some of the individual functions impose requirements for specialist personnel in more than one skill.

(2) Within each functional specialty area, technically qualified and experienced individuals, known as CA functional specialists, advise and assist the commander and can assist or direct their civilian counterparts. These functional specialists, especially at the operational and strategic levels, may be employed to provide analysis in their specialty area that supports planning of interagency efforts or HN efforts, and in a general support




Figure I-5. Civil-Military Operations Relationships

(GS) role to joint force components requiring such capabilities.

b. The GCC and subordinate commanders normally establish a distinct, full-time CMO staff element comprised of CA personnel to centralize the direction and oversight of planning, coordination, implementation, and conduct of CMO. While CA forces are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to support CMO, other joint force enablers performing CMO include SOF, PSYOP, legal support, PA, engineer, transportation, HSS, MP, security forces, and maneuver units.

c. The CMO staff element develops a comprehensive staff estimate and supports planning by providing considerations of the implications on the civil sector and makes recommendations on those actions the JFC can take inclusive with other stakeholders.

d. CAO usually are planned, directed, and conducted by CA forces due to the complexities and demands for specialized capabilities associated with activities normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments or authorities. **While all CAO support CMO, they remain a distinct CMO element.**

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CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

“Unified planning, centralized control, and a single point of responsibility are the very minimum requirements for a unity of effort which will offer success . . . Unity of effort, however, is extremely difficult to achieve because it represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight battles which have primarily political, objectives . . . All the political, economic, psychological, and military means must be marshalled as weapons under centralized coordination and direction.”

John J. McCuen
The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War

1. General

CMO are an inherent command responsibility. They encompass the activities JFCs take to establish and maintain relations with civil authorities, the general population, and other organizations. JFCs are responsible for the organization and centralized direction of CMO in their operational areas. They plan and conduct CMO to facilitate military operations in support of POLMIL objectives derived from national strategic objectives. An integral part of this is maintaining military-to-civil relations as well as emphasizing open and productive communications among OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and selected elements of the private sector.

a. The organization and command relationships for conducting CMO are flexible, to a degree and the principles of effective C2 and staff organizational concepts apply to CMO just as they do for any other military operation. CCDRs are the vital link between those who determine national security strategy and the military forces conducting the military operations. JFCs integrate and synchronize the actions of military forces and capabilities to achieve strategic and operational objectives through joint operations. JFCs consider national objectives, environmental conditions, and availability of resources to aid in determining the options available. This effort is essential to successfully integrating the instruments of national power and leveraging the capabilities of all participants to achieve national strategic objectives.

b. The JFC organizes the force to optimize its ability to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO in support of military operations. Priorities based on the primary mission present challenges for effective CMO under various operational environments throughout the range of military operations. CMO are conducted to synergize civil and military instruments of power, minimize civil-military friction and threats from the civil component, maximize support for operations, and meet the commander’s legal obligations and moral responsibilities to the civilian populations within the operational area. Other challenges affect balancing CMO across requirements for offensive, defensive, and stability operations and to be prepared for potential mission change.

2. Responsibilities

a. **President or Secretary of Defense.** Policy guidance concerning civil-military interaction in an operational area should be communicated from the President or SecDef through the CJCS to the CCDR for detailed operational planning and execution.

b. **Department of Defense/Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities) (ASD [SO/LIC & IC]),** serving under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) is responsible for:

(1) Acting as the principal civilian advisor to the SecDef and the USD (P) on the policy and planning for the use of CA within DOD;

(2) Working within the interagency process as appropriate and translate national security objectives into specific defense policy objectives achievable through CAO;

(3) Supervising the formulation of plans and policy impacting DOD CAO;

(4) Overseeing the implementation of DOD CAO in policies and programs;

(5) Providing policy advice, assistance, and coordination with other offices of the OSD and DOD officials regarding CAO and the use of CA in their responsible areas;

(6) Acting as OSD point of contact for DOD:

(a) Coordinating CAO as they relate to the activities of interagency partners, IGOs, NGOs, IPI, other organizations, and the private sector, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations to plan and conduct CMO.

(b) Monitoring interagency partners' use of DOD forces for the conduct of CAO. The SecDef should be contacted whenever it appears that questions may arise with respect to legality or propriety of such use.

(7) Coordinating with OSD Director of Administration and Management to approve the detail of CA to duty with interagency partners;

(8) Reviewing in conjunction with the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff and Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment, Joint Staff, CA program recommendations and budget proposals from the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM);

(9) Reviewing and coordinating requests for deployments for CA forces and making recommendations to the USD (P);

(10) Developing and publishing DOD-wide standards for CA training and qualifications; and

(11) Participating in and initiating OSD review processes of CAO integrated in component plans and programs to ensure compliance with policy.

c. **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** is responsible for:

(1) Providing, as the principal military advisor to the President, NSC, and the SecDef, advice on the employment of CMO and CA forces and the conduct of CMO and CAO;

(2) Providing guidance to the supported CCDRs for the integration of CMO and CAO into military plans, including SCPs;

(3) Integrating agency and multinational partners into planning efforts as appropriate;

(4) Developing, establishing, and promulgating joint doctrine for CMO to include CA, engineer, medical, security police, and other CMO supporting forces.

(5) Formulating policies for coordinating joint training events that incorporate in CAO; and

(6) Submitting deployment orders for CA forces to the OSD in accordance with current DOD instructions for coordinating deployments.

d. **Geographic Combatant Commanders** have responsibility for:

(1) Planning, supporting, and conducting CMO and CAO. These activities shall be designed to:

(a) Support national security policy and DOD goals and objectives;

(b) Support the goals and programs of other interagency partners related to CMO and CAO consistent with missions and guidance issued by the SecDef; and

(c) Support USG/DOD policy regarding respect for national sovereignty by coordinating with appropriate U.S. embassies to establish HN agreements/arrangements with FNs that will be transited or within which joint forces will stage/operate. Information on existing agreements/arrangements with FNs can be found in DOD 4500.54-G, *Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide*. The DOD Foreign Clearance Guide provides requirements and restrictions information for DOD personnel temporary travel and aircraft overflight and landing in FNs around the world. The information is coordinated daily with DOS, U.S. embassies, and combatant

commands. Reference <http://www.fcg.pentagon.mil> or <http://www.fcg.pentagon.smil.mil> for current copy of the DOD foreign clearance guide.

(2) Ensure the effectiveness of CMO applied into SCPs;

(3) Ensure the organizations having a part in CMO work together to focus and synchronize their efforts in achieving CMO priorities in their area of responsibility (AOR).

e. **Commander, United States Special Operations Command** is responsible for carrying out the relevant responsibilities specified in subparagraph 2d above and to:

(1) Provide GCCs with CA from assigned forces that are organized, trained, and equipped to plan and conduct CAO in support of GCC's missions;

(2) Provide education and individual training in planning and conducting CAO for DOD and non-DOD personnel;

(3) Assist in developing DOD-wide standards for CA training and qualifications under the direction of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD [SO/LIC & IC]));

(4) Assist in developing training opportunities for CA forces with interagency partners, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector in accordance with applicable laws and regulations under the direction of ASD (SO/LIC & IC);

(5) Assist in integrating CMO and CAO into joint strategy and doctrine under direction of the CJCS;

(6) Establish standards to ensure interoperability of equipment and all U.S. CA forces;

(7) Prepare and submit to the SecDef program recommendations and budget proposals for activities and equipment unique to special operations (SO) for assigned CA forces;

(8) Exercise authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds for activities and equipment unique to SO for assigned CA forces;

(9) Establish prioritization and validate requirements for the deployment of assigned CA forces;

(10) Serve as the joint proponent for CA, including doctrine, combat development, and institutional training; and

(11) Conduct the research, development, testing, and evaluation of joint CA equipment and perform the acquisition of SOF peculiar CA equipment, materiel, supplies, and services.

f. **Commander, United States Joint Forces Command** is responsible for carrying out the responsibilities specified in subparagraph 2d above and to:

(1) Effect integration of CMO into joint doctrine, experimentation, training, exercises, and operations;

(2) Ensure CMO are properly represented in joint training exercise scenarios;

(3) Coordinate with United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for the development of collective training standards related to CAO;

(4) Validate operational requirements for the deployment of assigned CA forces;

(5) In coordination with the CJCS and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, provide conventional CA forces that are manned, trained and equipped to accomplish the CAO missions required to support the CCDR's CMO priorities; and

(6) Validate requirements for the activation, mobilization, deployment, and reconstitution of Reserve Component (RC) CA forces.

g. The **Secretaries of the Military Departments** are responsible for:

(1) Developing and maintaining programs necessary to support CMO and CAO to meet their Service and combatant command requirements;

(2) Providing for CA units and personnel in their force structures or requesting such CA from the SecDef, who will then coordinate the request with the CJCS;

(3) Providing for the timely activation and mobilization of RC units and personnel as required to perform CAO in accordance with DODD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve*, for those Secretaries of the Military Departments with CA in their portion of the RC;

(4) Assuming DOD-wide responsibilities for specific CAO as directed by the SecDef; and

(5) Coordinating with the CDRUSSOCOM for CA training and professional education as it relates to Service-specific operations and forces.

h. **The Secretary of the Army** is responsible for:

(1) Carrying out the responsibilities specified in subparagraph 2g above; and

(2) Recruiting, training, organizing, equipping, and mobilizing units and personnel to meet the CA requirements of the supported commander and provide CA forces requested by the other DOD components as directed by the SecDef in accordance with the force levels, programs, plans, and missions approved by the SecDef.

i. **The Secretary of the Navy** is responsible for:

(1) Carrying out the responsibilities specified in subparagraph 2g above; and

(2) Recruiting, training, organizing, equipping, and mobilizing units and personnel to meet the CA requirements of the supported commander and provide CA forces requested by the other DOD components as directed by the SecDef in accordance with the force levels, programs, plans, and missions approved by the SecDef.

j. **Services.** As heads of their respective Services, the Service Chiefs have the responsibility to support interagency partners, the other Services, and multinational commanders and U.S. CCDRs with appropriate forces or specialists capable of performing CMO and CAO, as directed by the SecDef, as well as with techniques and items of equipment typical or peculiar to their Service. Additionally, the Service Chiefs have responsibility for considering the following:

(1) Supporting U.S. policy and CCDR CA force requirements across the range of military operations, when required;

(2) Directing their respective Services to include sufficient coverage of CMO and CAO responsibilities in Service planning;

(3) Making recommendations to the CJCS concerning the adequacy and supportability of CMO and CAO portions or annexes of combatant command plans and orders as a part of normal review procedures; and

(4) Providing for training of U.S. CA as required to execute theater-specific plans. The training shall be coordinated with CDRUSSOCOM for CA and with the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command.

k. **Geographic Combatant Commanders.** The GCCs provide regional coordination and direction to their subordinate commanders for the integration of CAO/CMO into military plans and operations. These activities are designed to achieve the following:

(1) Support the goals and programs of other U.S. Government departments and agencies related to CAO/CMO consistent with missions and guidance issued by the SecDef.

(2) Designation of a staff element within the headquarters and subordinate command(s) for planning and coordinating CAO/CMO.

(3) Coordination of CAO/CMO with the appropriate chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions.

(4) Synchronization of all CAO/CMO requirements within regional war on terrorism plans, SCPs, and other Phase 0 (Shape) activities.

1. **Subordinate Joint Force Commanders** are responsible for:

(1) Planning, integrating, and monitoring the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of available CA functional assets in appropriate operational areas;

(2) Implementing multinational CA plans consistent with international law, the LOAC, and U.S. law and treaty obligations with the government and civilian population in countries where U.S. forces are employed, and ensuring that established agreements/arrangements for en route transit of U.S. military forces/materiel to support the operation are in place;

(3) Taking necessary actions, as directed, in accordance with appropriate laws and outlined in formal agreements to control DCs, maintain order, prevent and treat disease, provide relief of civilian suffering, and provide maximum protection and preservation of property and other resources usable to achieve U.S. military objectives;

(4) Ensuring all assigned or attached personnel are fully aware of the importance of their actions while in contact with or in the presence of civilian authorities or population;

(5) Provide training and orientation all assigned or attached personnel of indigenous cultural, religious, and social attitudes or customs and sensitivities and of their expected or actual effects on the outcome of military operations;

(6) Communicating civilian attitudes and needs to higher command levels and OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, IPI, and the private sector;

(7) Securing the understanding, acceptance, and support of IPI to reduce or minimize frictions inherent in stationing or employing U.S. military forces;

(8) Employing CMO and CA forces to identify and coordinate as necessary sources of assistance, supplies, facilities, and labor from indigenous sources and to deal with local civilians and governments on the commander's behalf;

(9) Incorporating CMO estimates and CA assessments in developing strategy and objectives for plans and orders, as appropriate;

(10) Ensuring staffs and subordinate commands have sufficient CA representation with political, legal, cultural, linguistic, and economic-related skills to plan and conduct CMO support required by plans;

(11) Ensuring that deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of CA forces and conduct of CAO are coordinated with respective U.S. embassy country teams, interagency partners and IGOs, NGOs, and IPI, and HN or FN military and civilian authorities;

(12) Requesting guidance from the establishing authority (e.g., CCDR) on implementation of multinational policies and objectives, as appropriate;

(13) Assisting regional friends and allies in planning and developing the operational skills and infrastructure necessary to ensure domestic stability through CMO and CAO; and

(14) Coordinating CMO and CAO planning with appropriate multinational commanders and HN forces, as directed by the establishing authority (e.g., CCDR) in conjunction with the U.S. embassy country team, as appropriate. Supported CCDRs and subordinate JFCs should consider establishing CMO working groups. The goal of these working groups is to bring all the players who have a part in CMO together to focus and synchronize their efforts in achieving CMO priorities.

3. Organizations Providing Civil-Military Operations Capabilities

a. Every contact between U.S. military or government personnel and HN or FN population is a CMO engagement. This paragraph broadly highlights the capabilities of a number of U.S. military organizations and their support to CMO. Other organizations such as OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, HNs, FNs, IPI, and the private sector are involved with CMO but will be discussed in Chapter IV "Coordination." Every U.S. military organization has some capability to support CMO. Certain types of organizations, typically CA and PSYOP units, should form the nucleus of CMO planning efforts. Others, such as, but not limited to, other SOF, engineers, HSS, transportation, and MP and security forces, act as enablers. However, for CMO to be successful all commanders must carry out their responsibilities regarding CMO. CMO should not be considered something done only by CA and PSYOP forces.

“In order to address the underlying conditions that foster terrorism, SOCPAC [Special Operations Command, Pacific] works with its host nation partners in order to help provide security and stability. This attracts economic development and shapes conditions for good governance and rule of law.

Much of SOCPAC’s activities consist of foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. SOF’s [special operations force’s] primary contribution in this interagency activity is to organize, train and assist host nation security forces. The indirect approach relies heavily on SOF’s organic capability to build host nation defense capacity, provide civil affairs assets to assist in humanitarian and civic assistance, and offer information operations resources to aid the host nation in countering violent ideological threats.

By working closely with our host nation and US embassy partners, we actively promote peace and prosperity and offer options other than violence and despair to the citizens in the region.”

**MG David P. Fridovich, Commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific in
Special Operations Technology, 15 Mar 2007**

b. Special Operations Forces

(1) Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef (assigned in Forces For Memoranda for Unified Commands), SOF are under the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of the CDRUSSOCOM.

(2) CA and PSYOP are mutually supportive within CMO. During some operations, PSYOP support various CAO (e.g., establish populace control measures) to gain support for the HN or FN government in the international community, and reduce support or resources to those destabilizing forces threatening legitimate processes of the HN or FN government. PSYOP maximize these efforts through information products and programs. PSYOP publicize both the existence and successes of CMO to generate target population confidence in and positive perception of U.S., HN, or FN actions.

(3) Psychological Operations

(a) PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP can provide key support and information when effectively integrated into CMO. For example:

1. Sharing information concerning the location, state of mind, and health of civilians and the physical characteristics of the operational area.

2. Disseminating information concerning the safety and welfare of the civilian population.

3. Influencing a civilian population's attitude toward U.S. policy and preparing it for CMO involvement in post conflict activities.

4. Maximizing the impact of CMO by publicizing the existence or successes of efforts in the areas directly impacting the civilian population like: health services and veterinary aid, construction, and public facilities activities, etc., to generate confidence in and positive perception of U.S. and HN actions to the populace.

5. Assisting in assessments before and after the operation to determine the most effective application of effort and documenting the results.

6. Providing direct support to CMO units conducting emergency relocation operations of DCs and for DC camp operations.

7. As a corollary, when conducted within the framework of a viable CMO concept, CAO can contribute significantly to the overall success of PSYOP activities (deeds versus words).

For further detail concerning PSYOP related activities and Service capabilities, refer to JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

(4) **Other SOF Support.** Small SOF units generally accomplish CMO through operations that assist the HN or FN authorities, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs in restoring peace, strengthening the infrastructure of the country, or providing disaster relief assistance. SOF are regularly employed in mobile training teams, joint and combined exercises, professional development program seminars, and other military-to-military activities that are a vital part of theater security cooperation strategies.

c. **Civil Affairs**

(1) **Concept of Employment for United States Army (USA) CA**

(a) CMO staffs at every level, frequently augmented by deployed USA CA planners review and, if necessary, update plans and orders. An important element of the contingency or crisis action planning process focuses on developing a recommended CA task organization. The recommended CA task organization is validated by the supported GCC and included in the request for deployment of forces from the Joint Staff. The forces are sourced once the Joint Staff validates the request and assigns a joint force provider; USSOCOM for Active Component (AC) SOF CA and U.S. Joint Forces Command for RC and conventional CA. Although AC CA primarily supports SOF, in the event the response time is too short for RC forces, AC CA forces can be tasked to deploy in support of an operational area or directly to the supported unit until RC CA can be deployed. This rapid response capability enhances the supported commander's efforts to achieve timely interagency coordination that ultimately leads to a strong unity of effort.

(b) Following the deployment of AC CA and completion of the initial CA assessments, a long-term plan is developed that articulates the specific functional skills required to support the mission. This plan is formulated with significant reachback input from continental United States (CONUS)-based CA functional specialists (note: the functional specialists should only deploy when or if there is a specific need for their expertise). The results of the initial CA assessment and the validated task organization flow from the supported GCC to the Joint Staff for validation, feasibility assessment, and resourcing. Resourcing of conventional force requirements will generally be provided by the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command's regionally aligned CA commands found in the United States Army Reserve (USAR).

1. Concurrently, requests for the Presidential Reserve Call-up (if required) or other authorities for mobilization are initiated through the Joint Staff and DOD. When authorized, reserve CA elements are mobilized and deployed.

2. Mission hand-over or transition occurs when the RC CA arrive. The AC CA are redeployed as needed.

(2) **Civil Affairs Operations.** CA forces are a multiplier for JFCs. This occurs both within staff functions in GS as well as unit functions in direct support at all levels of command. CA functions are conducted by CA teams of various types, to include civil affairs teams (CATs) at tactical levels, civil affairs planning teams (CAPTs) and civil liaison teams (CLTs) at tactical and operational levels, civil-military support elements at operational and theater strategic levels, and civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) and functional specialty cells at all levels.

(a) The employment of CATs at the tactical level links the maneuver commander with the civil populace. Direct interaction with the civilian population and the environment provides commanders awareness and the ability to affect desired outcomes through operational tasks.

(b) CA units establish the CMOC and provide direct functional specialist support to HN or FN ministries.

(c) CA units perform staff functions by augmenting the CMO staff element or by being employed to subordinate commands where the specialized CA skills required are greater than the capability of attached CA forces.

(d) CAO refer to activities performed or supported by CA that:

1. Enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present.

2. Require coordination with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, IPIs, and the private sector.

3. Involve the application of CA functional specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of civil government to enhance conduct of CMO. Use of dedicated CA and the conduct of CAO will enhance planned CMO by helping to ensure civil or indigenous understanding of, and compliance with, controls, regulations, directives, or other measures taken by commanders to accomplish the military mission and attain U.S. objectives.

4. CAO are distinguishable from CMO insofar as the former are characterized by applications of functional specialties in areas normally the responsibility of indigenous government or civil authority. CMO may extend to assumption of governmental functions required in an occupied territory during or immediately subsequent to hostilities.

(3) **Policies.** The pattern and objectives of CAO in friendly, neutral, hostile, or occupied territories in any given area will correspond with applicable international and domestic law and depend on such variables as U.S. foreign policy, the requirements of the military situation, participation of MNFs, and other factors. Specific guidance as to policy, plans, procedures, and doctrine to be followed in any given territory can be modified during the onset of hostilities or after the outbreak of an armed conflict as circumstances warrant. In the absence of guidance, military commanders take the initiative to request guidance and be prepared to execute command CAO and support U.S. objectives.

(a) **Policy Flow.** Because of the POLMIL nature and sensitivity of CAO undertaken by U.S. commanders, whether in a joint or multinational context, their conduct is governed by deliberate policy developed and promulgated by the President or SecDef. Policy decisions generally are transmitted to commanders through command channels. Guidance for specific policies concerning the degree of civil-military interaction to be followed in any operational area is transmitted from the SecDef through the CJCS to the GCC.

(b) **U.S. Commanders Serving as Multinational Commanders.** Policies normally are developed by agreement between member nations of a MNF and provided to commanders through a council of ministers or a similar policy making body of which the United States is a participant. Should multinational CMO guidance be in conflict with international law or specific national instructions, commanders must immediately request guidance through U.S. channels. Multinational commanders operating as part of a NATO force or with NATO forces should be mindful of the principles of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), which govern CMO for NATO forces (to include U.S. forces under such circumstances). See subparagraph 4i for additional CIMIC details.

(c) **Geographic Combatant Commanders.** Policies concerning the scope of CMO and procedural guidance normally are covered in an Executive Order or by a policy directive originating within the NSC. Commanders receive guidance transmitted through the SecDef and the CJCS. Commanders provide guidance to subordinate commanders, including specific instructions regarding the exercise of authority for CAO.

Commanders need to maintain close liaison with supporting CCDRs to work with U.S. diplomatic representatives and liaise with U.S. diplomatic representatives in their own AORs to ensure effective coordination and delineation of CA responsibilities and activities.

(4) **Principles.** Certain general principles apply to all CAO. They are the basis for initial planning purposes in the absence of specific guidance. These principles are listed in Figure II-1 and described below.

(a) **Mission.** CAO are conducted in support of military operations to further the U.S. national interests and fulfill international obligations.

(b) **Command Responsibility.** Responsibility for the conduct of CMO, is vested in the senior military commander, guided by directive, national policies, military strategy, and international law, including applicable agreements.

(c) **Continuity and Consistency of Policy.** Essential to the success of CAO, in light of their inherent complexity and political sensitivity, is a comprehensive and clear USG policy transmitted through command channels.

(d) **Security Responsibility.** Under Article 64 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the commander of an occupying force has the legal right to require the inhabitants within an operational area to comply with directives necessary for the security of the occupying force and proper administration of a given area.



Figure II-1. Principles of Civil Affairs Operations

(e) **Economy of Personnel and Resources.** The activities of CA should be limited, where possible, to those involving coordination, liaison, and interface with existing or reestablished civilian authorities. Maximum use of local or indigenous resources should be made consistent with satisfaction of minimum essential civil requirements.

(f) **Humanitarian Considerations.** The use of force beyond that required to fulfill the mission is prohibited. Military commanders plan operations that strive to ensure minimum suffering for noncombatants, and comply with approved rules of engagement (ROE), rules for the use of force (RUF), and the LOAC.

(5) Assets

(a) Although CA capability resides in the USA, United States Navy (USN), and United States Marine Corps (USMC), the USA has the preponderance of the units and personnel.

(b) CA personnel assigned or attached to GCCs.

(c) Other active and reserve personnel possessing functional specialty skills applicable to CAO across the range of military operations.

(d) Appendix A, “Service Capabilities,” discusses CA assets in more detail.

d. **Intelligence.** The operational relationship between intelligence and CMO is mutually enhancing, yet highly sensitive. In this operational environment, most actionable intelligence is of the “human intelligence” (HUMINT) variety. Most HUMINT originates from open sources and comes through information and cultural or situational awareness and understanding derived from personal contacts and relationships through diplomacy, commercial activities, IO, and CMO. Intelligence, IO and CMO are an inherent mission for all military personnel. With the rise of the importance of CMO to HUMINT and the concept of “cultural intelligence,” the role of CMO in the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process has likewise accelerated. Through civil-military liaison activities such as key leader engagement and its CMOC and CIM functions, CA can contribute significantly as an information source for JIPOE. In order to protect the credibility of their operations and for FP reasons, CA personnel should not be directly involved in intelligence-gathering in any way. Intelligence operators in the field operating openly and directly with CA could also place CA and other personnel in support of CMO and their mission at great risk. Regardless, JFCs need to establish divisions of responsibility between CMO and intelligence and robust yet discreet operational lines of coordination to create operational synergies while managing risks.

e. Engineering

(1) Engineers have a critical role in CMO, since engineer operations frequently result in direct effects that support the local civilian population (e.g. building roads, public facilities). Also, engineering frequently uses the capacity of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces. If the experiences of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Hurricane Katrina are repeated in future military operations, engineer operations will include many DOD civilians as well as the services of NGOs, IGOs, interagency partners, and contractors. The total engineer force of military active and reserve, civilian, contractor, HN and allies constitute the primary resources commanders can draw upon to accomplish the engineer mission.

(2) **Capabilities.** Engineer units support the JFC through combat engineering, geospatial engineering, and general engineering (GE), including construction. Each Service has engineering units and capabilities to meet specific operational needs. Within Service limitation, U.S. military engineer units provide specialized capabilities as depicted in Figure II-2. In addition, technical engineering support and contract support are provided by a variety of supporting organizations within Service limitations. The HN may also have certain engineering capabilities specifically adapted to the local environment. Hired contractors and multinational military engineers in an immature



Figure II-2. Specialized Engineering Capabilities

theater also can provide valuable capabilities that may not be available in U.S. engineer units. This mixture of capabilities may change during phases of the operation. Therefore, capabilities must be managed across Service lines throughout the course of an operation.

(3) **Support to CMO.** Within a joint force, engineers may operate with OGAs, NGOs, IGOs, and private sector participating in the operation. Given the multitude of organizations and capabilities involved, it is important that the joint force engineer coordinate with these organizations to ensure resources are focused on accomplishing the mission. Establishing and maintaining effective liaison with all participating agencies is critical to achieving unity of effort. The CMOC can be a focal point within the joint force for coordination with these agencies and organizations.

For further detail concerning Service capabilities and other related engineer activities, refer to Appendix A, "Service Capabilities," and JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

f. **Health Service Support**

(1) The use of HSS resources has historically proven to be a valuable low-risk asset in support of CMO. HSS is generally a noncontroversial and cost-effective means of using the military element to support U.S. national interests in another country. The focus of HSS initiatives, although possibly targeted toward the health problems in the operational area, is not normally curative, but primarily long-term preventive and developmental programs that are sustainable by the HN. HSS operations conducted to enhance the stability of a HN must be well coordinated with all concerned agencies, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and integrated into the respective U.S. embassy plans. Independent, unplanned health service civic action programs should not be undertaken.

For more details concerning HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

(2) **HSS Activities.** HSS activities in support of CMO include health services and dental treatment, veterinarian and preventive medicine services, health services logistics, and aeromedical evacuation (AE). However, consideration must be given to the differences when planning for CMO, for example, legal and policy issues regarding the treatment of foreign civilians; greater focus on preventive medicine and prevention and treatment of diseases rather than combat casualties, and significant patient population differences, (e.g., normal military population, pediatric, and relative health status of the local population and environmental/infrastructure conditions).

(3) **Policies.** Based upon the HSS estimate of the situation, and in coordination with the component command surgeons, the joint force surgeon must plan for health services policies and procedures that can be best adapted to the joint operation.

(a) GCCs are ultimately accountable for coordinating and integrating HSS within their theaters. Medical intelligence can provide the CCDR an occupational and

environmental threat analysis to ensure force health protection (FHP) of the deployed assets during CMO.

(b) Where practical, dual use of available health services assets will be accomplished to support CMO requirements and military operations.

(4) **Assets.** The Services have organic health services support capabilities that can be applied to CMO.

(5) **Support to CMO**

(a) There are several HSS activities that constitute CMO as illustrated in Figure II-3. In addition, all HSS activities listed in JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*, should be considered.

(b) HSS activities enhance HN stability by:

1. Developing HSS programs tailored for the HN (e.g., appropriate and affordable).
2. Developing sustainable training and acquisition programs.



Figure II-3. Health Service Support Activities in Civil Military Operations

3. Increasing the effectiveness of other USG agency programs such as USAID and U.S. State Department Public Diplomacy program.

4. Recommending and coordinating health services education opportunities for HN personnel.

(c) Improving the economic well-being through veterinary medicine and animal husbandry.

For further detail concerning Service capabilities, refer to Appendix A, Service Capabilities.

g. Transportation

(1) There are many transportation resources available to the JFC that may augment the range of military operations. These military and commercial resources include airlift, sealift, land surface transportation, overseas resources (including vehicles), port operations, pre-positioning programs, and intermodal resources. The Commander, United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) is assigned the mission to provide common-user air, land, and sea transportation for DOD, across the range of military operations. In this capacity, except for those assets that are Service-unique or theater-assigned, or HN transportation support assets the joint task force (JTF) or GCC has negotiated, CDRUSTRANSCOM exercises COCOM of the strategic transportation assets of the Military Departments and is the DOD Single Manager for Transportation. CDRUSTRANSCOM aligns traffic management and transportation single manager responsibilities to achieve optimum responsiveness, effectiveness, and economy for the supported CCDR. GCCs assigned transportation assets should ensure the assets are managed, controlled, and capable of full integration into the Defense Transportation System (DTS). Security of transportation assets at forward locations is a GCC responsibility with the task performed by subordinate commanders.

For further information on the DTS, refer to JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.

(2) **Transportation Activities.** Transportation organizations plan, coordinate, conduct, monitor, and control inter- and intratheater movement of personnel and materiel.

(3) **Policies.** The Military Departments retain the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing the logistic support (including Service-unique transportation) of their respective forces. These forces and other DOD agencies also depend on common-user military transportation services. In this role, the Services, U.S. Coast Guard, Defense Logistics Agency, and other DOD agencies are all generically called shipper services. Each Service and agency is responsible for establishing transportation policy for the movement of equipment and supplies funded by the applicable shipper service and for administrative support and performance of

transportation operations assigned by CCDRs at either their local shipping installations or throughout the theater.

EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS IN CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

In the aftermath of Hurricane MITCH, the devastated nations of Central America requested helicopter support to distribute relief supplies as well as conduct search and rescue operations in areas that had been cut off by land slides, road washouts, and bridge damage. As USSOUTHCOM [US Southern Command] planners executed Operation FUERTES APOYO, a strictly civil-military operation; helicopter units were the first to deploy, and were followed by engineer and bridging units. The ability of helicopters to access remote areas was critical during the emergency phase of the operation, when the priority of effort was to save lives. Later, during rehabilitation and restoration phases, as roads were cleared and bridges repaired, helicopters redeployed as less expensive ground transportation could again be utilized.

Source: United States Southern Command—Hurricane MITCH 1998

(4) **Assets.** The JFC conducting CMO has available the transportation structure organic to the components of the joint force as well as support provided by United States Transportation Command. Organic transportation varies with force composition but typically will include trucks, helicopters, and possibly watercraft.

(5) **Support to CMO.** Military transportation organizations can be invaluable in certain types of CMO. These units can be used to distribute food, water, and health services supplies; conduct health services evacuation; and move refugees to a safe environment. Additionally, some of these organizations have the technical expertise to assist in restoration of civilian transportation infrastructure. The versatility of military transportation assets (air, sea, and land) allows the JFC to select the mode of transportation most appropriate for the situation. JFCs should consider national transportation system infrastructure to include consulting with international agencies, such as the International Civil Aeronautics Organization. This will enable a smooth transition to civil stability operations and ensure a great source of revenue for the new national government. As some capabilities, such as international air traffic control, do not exist within military channels, detailed plans should address what civil agencies or contract organizations will eventually act as the interim service provider and transition agency from military to civil control.

For further detail concerning Service transportation assets and capabilities, refer to Appendix A, Service Capabilities.

h. **Military Police or Security Forces**

(1) MP or security forces have the requisite training, experience, and equipment to perform CMO. Aside from having firepower, mobility, and communications necessary to conduct combat support operations, MP or security forces also have a wealth of experience in exercising authority in tense circumstances without escalating the tension.

MP or security forces are the force of choice for CMO situations in which their signature as a police force, rather than a combat force, often defuses tension between the joint force and the parties in conflict.

(2) **MP or Security Forces Activities.** MP or security forces activities include a wide range of specialized and routine operations in support of the joint force. Typical activities are shown in Figure II-4.

(3) **Policies.** Commanders must have a clear understanding of the legal basis and limits pertaining to employment of MP or security forces and law enforcement activities in a foreign country. They must also provide appropriate direction to subordinate commanders.

(4) **Assets.** The Services are organized with a variety of MP or security forces organizations providing the joint force with significant capabilities.

(5) **Support to CMO.** MP or security forces force structure and training are well suited for CMO roles. MP or security forces can perform or assist in functions that include staffing checkpoints, liaison with police forces, traffic control, detainees and DC camps, and FP operations.

(a) Commanders must exercise caution not to create an unintended impression on the civilian population that U.S. forces, particularly MP or security forces,



Figure II-4. Military Police or Security Forces Activities

are exceeding their legal and moral limits in conducting police activities. Frequent consultation between the Ambassador, joint force staff judge advocate (SJA), provost marshal, CA representatives and appropriate OGAs, HN, FN, IGOs, and NGOs representatives can prevent misunderstandings and enhance cooperation in conducting MP or security forces activities.

(b) Training and support of foreign police forces is tightly governed by statutory regulations. This includes restrictions on funding sources for support of training of foreign police forces. Commanders must ensure that they have a clear understanding of these restrictions when planning CMO that include training or reestablishing the police force of a FN.

For further detail on Service MP or security forces capabilities, refer to Appendix A, Service Capabilities.

4. Organizing for Civil-Military Operations

There are numerous organizations that can assist in the CMO planning and execution and some of these will be subsequently addressed. The most logical first step is for the GCC to direct subordinate JFCs to establish a CMO staff element (e.g., staff directorate), if one has not been established early in the planning process. The CMO staff element may be found within an operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) or it may be organized under a separate staff element (usually the J-9) as designated by the JFC. By doing so, the CMO process will become more visible to, and better integrated with, the rest of the headquarters staff. This in turn, will better support the commander in planning and conducting offensive, defensive, and stability operations to meet the strategic military objectives.

a. **Civil-Military Operations Staff Directorate. CMO are a key component to winning and securing the peace.** To accomplish this not only takes a dedicated military staff but a relationship with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, HNs, FNs, private sector, and IPI that brings these organizations into the realm of U.S. military planning and information sharing. This synchronization of activities requires a staff directorate that possesses the know-how and experiences to deal on a day-to-day basis with a variety of organizations that have their own agendas and objectives. A CMO staff element can bridge the gap of the unique characteristics of these organizations enabling a common-shared understanding of the environment, collaboration, and deconfliction of policy, priorities for execution, and inclusion for cooperative planning. The CMO directorate coordinates with the above organizations to provide a conduit for information sharing, support requests, synchronize activities, compile relevant information of the civil environment, and perform analysis that supports the commander's assessment. Other staff functions the CMO element can accomplish are the following:

(1) Provide liaison as needed (to U.S. country team, UN, USAID [Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance {OFDA}], NGOs, IGOs, other JTFs).

(2) Provide staff oversight and direction to the CMOC if established by the JFC.

(3) Provide representatives to the various headquarters centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups (e.g., joint planning group), and planning teams support to the battle rhythm.

(4) Ensure OGA, IGO, NGO, HN, FN, IPI, and private sector participation in the planning and operations process, as appropriate. It is important to remember that a good number of these organizations may be “outside the wire” further complicating unified action. CA personnel are the most likely to lead and compose a CMO element.

For further details on joint staff directorates, see JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

b. Joint Task Force

(1) In most scenarios, JTFs will conduct CMO.

(2) The SecDef, a CCDR, a subunified commander, or an existing JTF commander may establish joint civil-military operations task forces (JCMOTFs), joint psychological operations task forces (JPOTFs), or joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) when the scope of CMO in the joint operations area requires coordination and activities beyond that which other representation on the staff could accomplish.

(3) Figure II-5 illustrates possible JTF organization.

For further JTF guidance, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

c. Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force. JFCs are responsible to conduct CMO but they may establish a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities beyond that which the organic CMO capability could accomplish.

(1) It is resourced to meet specific CMO requirements (e.g., stability operations). Figure II-6 highlights some of the typical JCMOTF responsibilities.

(a) The composition of this organization should be representative of the forces comprising the JCMOTF. A JCMOTF may have both conventional and SOF assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. By design, the USA CA brigade, the maritime civil affairs group (MCAG), or the Marine Corps civil affairs group (CAG) organizational structure can provide the operational C2 system structure to form a JCMOTF. A notional JCMOTF staff organization is depicted in Figure II-7.




Figure II-5. Possible Joint Task Force Organization

(b) A JCMOTF is a U.S. joint force organization, similar in organization to a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) or JTF and is flexible in size and composition, depending on mission circumstances. It usually is subordinate to a JTF.

(c) In rare instances, and depending on resources availability, a JCMOTF could be formed as a standing organization.

(d) A JCMOTF can be formed in theater, in the United States (within the limits of the law), or in both locations, depending on scope, duration, or sensitivity of the CMO requirement and associated policy considerations.



Figure II-6. Typical Functions Performed by a Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

(2) Advantages of a JCMOTF

- (a) Consolidated and coordinated CMO
- (b) Unity of command

(c) Allows the JFC to centralize CMO and transition efforts under one headquarters

(3) Disadvantages of a JCMOTF

(a) Lack of synchronization between the joint force and JCMOTF commanders




Figure II-7. Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Organization

- (b) Duplication of effort (if JTF is established to conduct CMO mission)
- (c) Increased force (personnel and logistic) requirements

d. **Joint Special Operations Task Force.** Establishment of a JSOTF is appropriate when SOF C2 requirements exceed the capabilities of the theater special operations command (TSOC) staff. The core of the JSOTF staff normally is drawn from the TSOC or an existing SOF component with augmentation from other Service SOF. A JSOTF may be specifically established as a joint organization and deployed as an entity from outside the theater. The JSOTF commander will control assigned SOF as well as any conventional forces provided by the JFC in support of specific missions.

For further details on JSOTFs, refer to JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

e. **Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC).** The HOC is a senior level international and interagency coordinating body that seeks to achieve unity of effort among all participants in a large FHA operation. HOCs are horizontally structured organizations with no C2 authority, and all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries. The HOC normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or possibly OFDA during a U.S. unilateral operation. Because the HOC operates at the national level, it should consist of senior representatives from the affected country, the U.S. embassy or consulate, joint force, OFDA, NGOs, IGOs, and other major organizations in the operation.

f. **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC).** In an FHA operation, the combatant command's crisis action organization may organize as a HACC to assist with the interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and planning. Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or HOC has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the combatant command's staff and crisis action organization.

g. **Civil-Military Operations Center**

(1) The CMOC, normally based upon the organic CMOC of the supporting CA unit, is a mechanism for the coordination CMO that can serve as the primary coordination interface provides operational and tactical level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of U.S. military forces, OGAs, IPI, IGOs, the private sector, and NGOs.

(2) Despite its name, the CMOC generally does not set policy or direct operations. Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders. In reality, the CMOC may be physical or virtual and conducted collaboratively through online networks. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent — flexible in size and composition. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC. In fact, more than one CMOC may be established in an operational area, and each is task-organized based on the mission.

“Possibly the most practical mechanism for ensuring coherence and cooperation is the CMOC [the civil-military operations center] . . . the civil-military operations center attached to a Joint Task Force, where operational contact in the field between military and humanitarian participants in complex emergencies can take place. As many of you know, there is no ‘one size fits all’ for the CMOC. The way a commander makes use of it depends on the situation. Commanders have used the CMOC to reach out to host-country nationals in a locality as well as to NGO [nongovernmental organizations] and international organizations, to offer a forum for airing problems as well as a vehicle for shaping expectations realistically regarding what forces in the field can and cannot do. The flexible, situation-specific CMOC may well be the instrument of choice for broad international and other coordination in the field.”

**Under Secretary of State
Thomas R. Pickering
Exercise EMERALD EXPRESS 1998**

(3) A CMOC is formed to:

- (a) Carry out guidance and JFC decisions regarding CMO;
- (b) Exchange information. Sharing information is a key function of the CMOC, but military staff must be careful to avoid the impression that stakeholder organizations are being used for intelligence gathering;
- (c) Perform liaison and coordination between military capabilities and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace;
- (d) Provide a partnership forum for military and other participating organizations. It is important to remember that these organizations may decide to attend CMOC meetings but may choose not to consider themselves members of the CMOC to maintain the perception of their neutrality. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for stakeholder discussions but not as a stakeholder forum; and
- (e) Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from NGOs, IGOs, IPI, the private sector, and regional organizations. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force for action.

(4) A CMOC can be tailored to the specific tasks associated with the mission. In establishing the CMOC, the JFC should build it from a nucleus of organic assets and CA personnel, logistic, legal, and communications elements. USA CA units have been reorganized to provide the JFC the manpower and equipment, to include a robust communications package, as the standing capability to form the nucleus of the CMOC. The JFC should invite representatives of other agencies that include the following:

- (a) Liaisons from Service and functional components and supporting infrastructure, such as ports and airfields;

- (b) USAID or OFDA representatives;
- (c) DOS, country team, and other USG representatives;
- (d) Military liaison personnel from participating countries;
- (e) Host country or local government agency representatives; and
- (f) Representatives of NGOs, IGOs, IPI, the private sector (as appropriate), and regional organizations.

(5) The composition of a notional CMOC is illustrated in Figure II-8. It is not the intent of this figure to emphasize the CMOC as the center of coordination for all activities but rather to illustrate organizations that a JFC may cooperate with and hold discussions with concerning an ongoing operation.

(6) Political representatives in the CMOC may provide avenues to satisfy operational considerations and concerns, resulting in consistency of military and political actions. Additionally, the CMOC forum appeals to NGOs and IGOs because it avoids guesswork by providing these organizations a single-point of coordination with the military for their needs, ensuring that the unified efforts of a joint force and the relief community are focused when and where they are most needed. Although U.S. forces may be latecomers compared to many relief agencies and IGOs, they bring considerable resources with them.

(a) It is incumbent on the military not to dictate what will happen but to coordinate a team approach to problem resolution.

(b) A JFC cannot direct interagency cooperation among engaged agencies. However, working together at the CMOC on issues like security, logistic support, information sharing, communications, and other items, can build a cooperative spirit among all participants.

(7) The CMOC usually conducts daily meetings to identify participants capable of fulfilling needs. Validated requests go to the appropriate joint force or agency representative for action. Figure II-9 depicts some of the CMOC functions.

(8) A joint force PA officer (PAO) or PA representative should attend recurring CMOC meetings. As an active member of the CMOC, the PAO or PA representative works with other CMOC communication specialists (as available) to develop comprehensive communication strategies that support CMO activities.




Figure II-8. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center

(9) The CMOC OIC typically reports to the CMO officer on the J-3 staff. The OIC also might be assigned to the J-3, the chief of staff (COS), or the commander of the JCMOTF, if established. During certain operations, such as the conduct of FHA, the JFC might assign a deputy commander or the COS as the Director of the CMOC, perhaps with another officer assigned to provide detailed supervision of its operation. The CMOC officer requires access to the JFC based on the situation and mission.

See Figure II-10 for a comparison between a HOC, HACC, and CMOC.



Figure II-9. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

By early 2006, 22 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) were operating in Afghanistan, 13 managed by the US-led Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan and 9 by the International Security and Assistance Force. Initial guidance on the structure and functions of US-led PRTs was agreed to by senior civilian and military leadership in Afghanistan and approved by the US Deputies Committee in June 2003. US PRTs comprised 50–100 personnel. A small number were US civilians, generally a Department of State representative, a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) representative, and a representative from United States Department of Agriculture. There was usually an Afghan representative from the Ministry of Interior. Not all PRTs had a full civilian complement. On the military side, there was a PRT commander, two civil affairs teams (with four members each), operational and administrative staff, and force protection elements.

Each PRT was expected to address the most important issues in its area of responsibility, and many did so with remarkable creativity and success. In Gardez, for example, the USAID representative supported the work of the Tribal Liaison Office, an Afghan nongovernmental organization (NGO) dedicated to enabling dialogue between powerful tribes in unstable areas and the new central government. Building on this work, the Gardez PRT and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan sponsored a provincial reconstruction workshop that brought together 100 tribal elders, local government officials, and representatives from Kabul to discuss national reconstruction plans. Similarly, in Jalalabad, the PRT commander held regular meetings with religious leaders, university students, and tribal elders. After riots in May 2005 over alleged US disrespect for the Koran, these meetings served as a forum to discuss local concerns. To demonstrate that the United States was not opposed to Islam, the PRT commander helped refurbish the city's main mosque.

h. Provincial Reconstruction Team. A PRT helps stabilize the operational environment in a province or locality through its combined diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities. It combines representatives from interagency and international partners into a cohesive unit capable of independently conducting operations to stabilize the environment by enhancing the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the HN government. Focus on combined military and civil efforts to diminish the means and motivations of conflict, while developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance, providing basic services, economic development, and enforcing the rule of law.

(1) PRTs are tools for achieving objectives to stabilize and enable civil authority phases of the joint operation. Interagency planning, organization, and training of a PRT should take place during the initial planning and execution stages of an operation. As progress is made in stabilizing the area, the PRT will transition to civil authorities.

(2) The focus of the PRT is on the provincial government and local infrastructure. Normally, PRTs are assigned by province, but may be assigned to local governments within a province or to more than one province.

Implementing the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), coalition forces established PRTs throughout Afghanistan and Iraq. Although PRTs were used in both operations to help stabilize the operational environment following major combat operations, the structure, oversight, and implementation differed in several significant ways.

OEF PRTs

All US-led PRTs commanded by military officer. PRTs generally maintain their own forward operating bases with their own force protection and support services. More focus on helping local governments rebuild infrastructure to meet basic needs.

Each PRT has a different structure that meets the needs of the individual area of operations and those of the coalition country providing the manning and funding for the PRT.

OIF PRTs

PRTs led by senior Foreign Service officer.

PRTs generally collocated with combat forces on an established base where support services are provided. Less focus on rebuilding infrastructure, more focus on coaching and mentoring government officials to build and grow the economies of their provinces. PRTs generally share a modular organizational structure.

**Source: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq:
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Center for Army Lessons Learned
January 2007**

COMPARISON BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS CENTER, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COORDINATION CENTER, AND CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

	ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY	FUNCTION	COMPOSITION	AUTHORITY
HOC	Designated Individual of Affected Country, United Nations, or US Government Agency	Coordinates Overall Relief Strategy at the National (Country) Level	Representatives from: Affected Country United Nations US Embassy or Consulate Joint Task Force Other Nonmilitary Agencies Concerned Parties (Private Sector)	Coordination
HACC	Combatant Commander	Assists with Interagency Coordination and Planning at the Strategic Level. Normally is disestablished once a HOC or CMOC is established	Representatives from: Combatant Command Nongovernmental Organizations Intergovernmental Organizations Regional Organizations Concerned Parties (Private Sector)	Coordination
CMOC	Joint Task Force or Component Commander	Assists in Coordination of Activities at the Operational Level with Military Forces, US Government Agencies, Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations, and Regional Organizations	Representatives from: Joint Task Force Nongovernmental Organizations Intergovernmental Organizations Regional Organizations US Government Agencies Local Government (Host Country) Multinational Forces Other Concerned Parties (Private Sector)	Coordination

LEGEND	
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
HACC	Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Center
US	United States

Figure II-10. Comparison between Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, and Civil Military Operations Center

(3) PRT functions may include:

(a) Increase provincial stability through international military presence and assist in developing nascent HN security and rule of law capacity.

(b) Assist the establishment and improvement of local government by advising and empowering stakeholders and legitimate government bodies.

(c) Coordinate with DOS for reconstruction at a pace that would begin to provide basic services, an economic system that provides necessary support to the people, gain buy-in for change and support of representative government, and ensure the popular expectations for international assistance are met or abated.

(4) Military participation within the PRT will vary depending on the operational requirements, but should include CA representation as well as other forces for CMO, and security and staff forces as required. Interagency memoranda of agreement will be required in the establishment of PRTs to define roles, responsibilities, command relationships, and funding lines. When possible, PRT members should receive their training as a unit to facilitate unity of effort upon arrival in country.

i. **NATO Civil-Military Cooperation.** Allied doctrine uses the construct of CIMIC to describe CMO. CIMIC staff elements for the NATO commander provide essentially the same functions as CMO staff elements for the JFC. Similar to a CMOC, CIMIC centers may be established at the operational and tactical levels solely for the purpose of communication and coordination of effort.

For further details concerning CIMIC, refer to AJP (Allied Joint Publication) – 9, NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine.

j. **United Nations Operations**

“The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: military means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at the same time civil support to military operations is important for logistics, communications, medical support, and public affairs. Cooperation between the Alliance’s military and civil bodies will accordingly remain essential.”

NATO Strategic Concept 1999

(1) **UN Civil-Military Coordination.** The UN concept for employment of military forces in support of its operations is defined in the UN CMCoord Handbook as: “The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals.” The key elements of UN CMCoord are information sharing, task division, and planning. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. The humanitarian and military actors have fundamentally different institutional thinking and cultures, characterized by the distinct chain-of-command and clear organizational structures of the military vis-à-vis the diversity of the humanitarian community. Civil-military coordination is a shared responsibility of the humanitarian and military actors.

(2) Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with the DOS through the U.S. Representative to the UN. The U.S. Representative to the UN may be an invited member of the NSC and participates in the formulation of policy matters relevant to the UN and its activities. An assistant from one of the Services coordinates appropriate military interest primarily with the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).

(3) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206, Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes, authorize various types of U.S. military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis.

(4) U.S. military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," or Chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," of the UN Charter.

(5) The UN normally will conduct PO or FHA under the provisions of a resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly. Politicians and diplomats trying to reach compromise develop mandates. Because of this, military commanders often have found it difficult to translate these mandates into workable mission orders. Commanders can use the interagency process and the USG strategic plan for reconstruction, stabilization, or conflict transformation (if developed) to feed back their concerns through the political apparatus of the UN. Though not always successful, clarity of mission should always be sought from the ambassador or UN resident coordinator, as appropriate.

(6) The UN headquarters coordinates PO and FHA around the world. The UN organizational structure consists of the headquarters and the operational field elements. Thus, there is a combined strategic/operational level and separate tactical-level equivalent to the Armed Forces of the United States.

(7) At the headquarters, the Secretariat plans and directs missions. Either the UNDPKO or the UNOCHA serves as the headquarters component during emergencies. Additional support by temporary augmentation from the Joint Staff and Service headquarters staffs may be provided for specific requirements. UN special missions, such as the UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, operate under the direction of the UN Secretary General (SYG).

(8) Field-level organization often is based on the resident coordinator system administered by the UN Development Program in conjunction with the UNOCHA. The resident coordinator mobilizes and manages the local UN humanitarian resources and provides direction for the field relief effort.

(9) In serious emergencies, the UN SYG may appoint a special representative who reports to the SYG directly, as well as advises UNDPKO and UNOCHA at UN

headquarters. The special representative may direct day-to-day operations, as was the case in the UN operation in Cambodia.

(10) The JFC deploying to a contingency site may discover the need for a direct channel to either the resident coordinator, the special representative of the SYG, or both. The arrangements between the joint force and UN forces should be set forth in the deployment order.

(11) UN-sponsored operations normally employ a force under a single commander. The force commander is appointed by the SYG with the consent of the UN Security Council and reports directly to the SYG's special representative or to the SYG. In any multinational operation, the U.S. commander will retain command authority over all assigned U.S. forces. The U.S. chain of command will flow from the SecDef through the GCC. On a case-by-case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under the operational control (OPCON) of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council.

“Unique to this mission was the fact that an American commander was dual-hatted as Commander of both UN Forces and US Forces. . . . Note that while US Forces were under operational control of UNMIH [United Nations Mission in Haiti], national command of these forces was never relinquished as was the case for all other nations contributing forces to UNMIH. This relationship was satisfactory since the goals and objectives of the US and the UN remained the same throughout the mission. To allay concerns of the troop-contributing nations with respect to these command relationships, the FC [force commander] and the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) visited UN Headquarters to inform national representatives of the operational concept and the Commander's Intent for the operation. This joint appearance by the top leaders of the mission served to reassure contributing nations about the employment of their forces in the mission.”

United Nations Mission In Haiti In The Service Of Peace

k. **Other Organizational Humanitarian Structures.** In an affected country or joint operational area there may be other humanitarian relief organizations with similar goals and objectives as the HOC, HACC, CMOC, CIMIC center, or others. These organizations may be referred to by a variety of names or acronyms and are usually established early on and are temporary in nature. No matter the organizational name, the key is providing the link between all relief organizations for the betterment of the affected region(s). Once a HOC, HACC, CMOC, or CIMIC center has been established by the lead relief agency, the coordination role of others diminishes, and functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the JFC's staff. Effective coordination is the key to success, remembering all are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries and may have an agenda that does not support the U.S. position, goals, or end state.

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CHAPTER III PLANNING

“Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of command. It is performed at every echelon of command and across the range of military operations. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end state.”

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning

1. General

a. It is important that CMO considerations be incorporated into the contingency and crisis action planning processes. **It is the responsibility of a GCC and their subordinate JFCs to plan and conduct CMO.** CMO contribute to shaping the operational environment and supporting the GCC’s SCP. In all situations, CMO planning enhances the transition to civilian control from the outset of an operation. As the resident staff experts, CMO planners must ensure their input to the planning process supports the JFC’s objectives.

b. **Planning.** The CMO staff element (usually the J-9) coordinates with numerous organizations and provides a conduit for information sharing, and support requests. The CMO staff also synchronizes activities, compiles relevant information on the civil environment, and performs analysis that supports the commander’s assessment.

c. **Deployment, Employment, Sustainment, and Redeployment Planning.** A clear concept of CMO mission requirements enhances selection of forces to perform CMO. JOPES integrates all elements of contingency or crisis action CMO planning, and identifies, resources, and phases CMO required forces. The combination of JOPES and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) promotes coherent planning across all levels of war and command echelons, whether the requirement is for a limited, single-phase operation such as noncombatant evacuation or for a multiphase campaign involving high-intensity combat operations. JOPP is a less formal but proven analytical process. It provides a methodical approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during joint operations. The focus of JOPP is on the interaction between an organization’s commander, staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, and supporting commanders and their staffs to develop plans or orders for a specific mission. Figure III-1 depicts general planning considerations.

For further detail concerning planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, and JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

d. **War.** It may be prudent to overestimate the requirement for HA in planning assumptions. Certain areas may be devastated and lack self-sufficiency in facilities, services, and personnel as a result of hostilities. U.S. and MNFs may be required to distribute emergency food/water, clothing, shelter, and health services supplies to civilians. At the same time, identification of CMO requirements derived from analysis of



Figure III-1. Civil Military Operations General Planning Considerations

both current operational and conflict termination or consolidation missions may entail any combination of the planning considerations identified above for contingencies or crisis-response operations.

e. **Conflict Termination or Consolidation Considerations.** Planning considerations concerning use of forces conducting CMO include, but are not limited to, the following:

- (1) The post conflict mission objectives;
- (2) The need for and roles of integrated military-civilian organizational and oversight elements or agencies;
- (3) The extent of devastation and the potential of the affected country to regain its place in the family of nations;

(4) The complexity and duration of stability and reconstitution assistance efforts often require counteracting local violence and mobilizing IPI resources toward self-sufficiency;

(5) The availability of indigenous leaders and civil servants;

(6) The desires and objectives of other governments;

(7) The degree of U.S. domestic political support to involve U.S. military forces in NA activities, regardless of identified needs;

(8) The use of the U.S. military in supporting reconstitution of failed states.

f. **Joint Lessons Learned Program.** Commanders and their staffs should review CMO lessons learned from previous operations and exercises. In turn, upon completion of operations, it is the responsibility of the command to ensure lessons learned are recorded for future use.

2. Strategic and Operational Planning Considerations

Some operational and environmental factors that may complicate the U.S. military's relationships with foreign civilians and constrain the conduct of CMO include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Differing legal institutions, customs, social relationships, economic organizations, and concepts of human and fundamental rights;

b. Public communications media controlled, censored, or considered inconsistent with US standards;

c. Universal public education considered undesirable for economic or cultural reasons such as poverty, religion, race, or caste;

d. Ownership of land or other forms of wealth-producing property;

e. Religious, cultural, and legal practices;

f. Lack of adequate education or resistance by affected groups that result in poor health and sanitation or inefficient agricultural or industrial practices;

g. Effects of labor, procurement, or contracting commodities upon the population, economy, and governmental services;

h. Dislocation of civilian populations and damage to facilities and infrastructure requiring military assistance, especially in areas of public health, DC care and control, civilian supply, public safety, transportation, and humanitarian relief;

- i. Humanitarian motives prompting U.S. personnel to furnish relief or assistance that may conflict with local law, religion, or cultural standards;
- j. Availability of U.S. and HN civil communications resources to support CMO when competed for by information news agencies;
- k. Media coverage and perspective shapes local, HN, FN, and international opinion and support for CMO;
- l. International law, customs and practice governing the sovereign territory of each nation.

3. Other Functional Planning Considerations

a. Implementation of a comprehensive strategic communication process is critical to CMO success. This process engages all aspects of a GCC's responsibilities to include IO, PA, CMO, PSYOP, the country team, and the various organizations and partner countries that are involved in the given operation. Subordinate JFCs employ a strategic communication plan to ensure early and continuous coordination so their messages are not contradictory and damaging to the credibility of the joint force or compromise the essential elements of friendly information.

b. Information Operations

(1) There are three military functions (PA, CMO, and defense support to public diplomacy) specified as **related capabilities for IO**. These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and synchronized with the core and supporting IO capabilities. For this reason, **the PA and CMO staffs must work in close coordination with the IO planning staff**.

(2) The CMO staff also has an important role to play in the development of broader IO plans and objectives. As the accessibility of information to the widest public audiences increases and as military operations increasingly are conducted in open environments, the importance of CMO to the achievement of IO objectives will increase. At the same time the direct involvement of CMO with core, supporting and related IO capabilities (for instance PSYOP, computer network operations, and counterintelligence) will also increase. CMO, by their nature, usually affect public perceptions in their immediate locale. Distribution of information about CMO efforts and results through PA and PSYOP can affect the perceptions of a broader audience and favorably influence key groups or individuals.

(3) CMO support IO by:

(a) Multiplying the effects of CMO at strategic, operational, and tactical levels by incorporating CMO activities in the strategic communication plan;

- (b) Identifying key CMO targets, coordinating with targeting cell;
 - (c) Synchronizing communications media, assets, and messages with IO capabilities; and
 - (d) Providing news and information to the local people.
- (4) IO support CMO by:
- (a) **“Key leader engagement”** By establishing and maintaining liaison or dialogue with key IPI, NGOs, and IGOs, CMO can secure the most expedient and credible means of disseminating information and influencing behavior;
 - (b) Assistance in creating and assessing messages and target audience;
 - (c) Influencing and informing populace of CMO activities and support;
 - (d) Neutralizing misinformation and hostile propaganda directed against civil authorities;
 - (e) Gaining and maintaining information superiority;
 - (f) Promoting civilian legitimacy for IPI; and
 - (g) Controlling electromagnetic spectrum for legitimate purposes.

(5) **IO Cell.** JFCs normally **assign responsibility for IO** to the **J-3**. When authorized, the director of the J-3 has primary staff responsibility for planning, coordinating, integrating, and assessing joint force IO. **The J-3 normally designates an IO cell chief** to assist in executing joint IO responsibilities. The organizational relationships between the joint IO cell and the organizations that support the IO cell are per JFC guidance. Nevertheless, **the IO cell should have CMO or CA representation.** JFCs employ the IO cell to ensure early and continuous coordination among PA, CA, PSYOP, and operations security (OPSEC) so their messages are not contradictory, damaging to the credibility of the JFC, or compromising the essential elements of friendly information.

For more details concerning IO, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations.

c. Public Affairs

- (1) Media coverage of CMO impacts perceptions of success or failure and may influence the commander’s decisions.
- (2) The mission of joint PA is to plan, coordinate, and synchronize US military public information activities and resources to support the commander’s operational and

strategic objectives through the communication of truthful, timely, and factual unclassified information about joint military activities within the operational area to foreign, domestic, and internal audiences.

(3) The synchronized and coordinated use of PA with other military (e.g., MNFs) and nonmilitary (e.g., DOS) communication capabilities can shape the operational environment, prevent misinformation/disinformation from inciting protest or hostilities and aid in establishing or maintaining political and public support necessary for achieving the commanders objectives relative to CMO.

(a) Coordination is required to ensure that the information released by one staff element does not conflict with or complicate the work of the other. PA, CMO, and PSYOP messages may be different, but they must not contradict one another or the credibility of all three will be lost.

(b) PA tasks in support of CMO might include the following:

1. Coordinate releases to the media with all appropriate agencies to ensure consistency and accuracy of information to the local population.

2. Develop and disseminate media releases about CMO efforts to local, national, and international media, as well as to command information outlets.

3. Assist media in covering known CMO or CAO. It may not always be in the United States' best interest to take credit for all activities. Highlighting the participation of the affected nation or civilian group or organization may lead to a quicker and sounder solution to the situation.

4. In cooperation with CA, ensure the publication and broadcasting of information to protect DCs.

5. PA can support CMO objectives by communicating clearly-stated US objectives and US intent to transition operations to HN agencies or NGOs (in the case of HA/disaster assistance operations) as soon as conditions permit. By highlighting US intention to provide assistance until the HN government or NGOs can lead operations, PA supports the exit strategy. This is particularly key for HA/disaster assistance operations.

6. The JFC and PAO are the only official spokespersons.

For further details concerning PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

d. Legal

(1) Many aspects of CMO require scrutiny by legal experts. Key members of both the planning and operations staffs and legal advisors should review and assist in

preparing plans or orders, as well as any agreements or memoranda of understanding established between U.S. forces and the affected country or nonmilitary organizations inherent in CMO. Legal personnel must know the legal status of relief workers from the numerous agencies involved, DC, and refugees. CMO involve a myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations, both foreign and domestic, in addition to the normal constraints associated with deployments and operations. Many CMO staffs will have a CA legal team embedded for planning and legal analysis. The SJA is another important source of legal expertise whether or not a CA legal team is available.

(2) In the planning phase, CA legal teams or SJAs provide advice and assistance in the preparation and review of CMO plans for consistency with U.S. law, SecDef guidance, and the rules and principles of international law, including treaties, other international agreements, and the laws of the place where U.S. military forces will conduct operations. Also during the planning phase, the CMO staff element will provide planning input into the development of ROE and RUF; CMO missions may warrant supplemental ROE due to unique mission parameters/requirements.

(3) CA legal teams and SJAs review the legal section of area studies and assessments and of plans and orders compiled before deployment or hostilities. CA legal teams and SJAs also provide predeployment training to personnel and units preparing to conduct CMO. This training should include:

(a) Law of Armed Conflict;

(b) Human Rights Violations and Reporting Requirements. Personnel should be trained in the law of war to recognize and report violations to their chain of command;

(c) Rules of Engagement or Rules for the Use of Force;

(d) Status of Forces. The status of forces is an important concern for CMO planners. Numerous legal issues affecting the success of the operation must be resolved. Some of these include HN criminal and civil jurisdiction, authority to conduct law enforcement activities including trials by courts-martial, claims against the U.S or U.S. personnel, authority for U.S. forces to carry arms and use force, FP, entry and exit requirements, customs and tax liability, contracting authority, authority to provide health care without a local medical license, vehicle registration and licensing, communications support, facilities for U.S. forces, contractor status (local, U.S. or other nationals), authority to detain or arrest, and provisions for transferring custody. The SJA provides legal advice concerning status of forces issues, to include the provisions of current agreements, the need for additional agreements, and the procedures for obtaining agreements.

(e) Environmental Law Issues.

(4) During combat operations, CA legal teams address legal issues concerning population control measures; targeting to minimize collateral damage or injury to the civilian population; treatment of DC, civilian internees, and detainees; acquisition control of private and public property for military purposes; legal concerns for PSYOP and IO; and other operational law matters as necessary.

(5) During the stabilization phase, CA legal teams may provide legal services concerning such matters as claims submitted by local civilians and FHA issues.

(6) Additionally, the joint staff SJA and the CA SJA will be called upon to give advice and assistance on matters relating to civil administration within a friendly or enemy country. SJAs also may provide counsel regarding the creation and supervision of military tribunals and other activities for the proper administration of civil law and order. In addition, legal services may be necessary with respect to the issue of a local court's jurisdiction over US military personnel and activities. Figure III-2 highlights some of the legal issues that may influence joint force operations.

For more details concerning legal matters, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

e. **Mortuary Affairs**

(1) The death of civilians and noncombatants presents a unique set of circumstances that requires specific political and cultural sensitivities. While not responsible for mortuary affairs, CA with their expertise in cultural awareness and contact with civil organizations can help the JFC avoid these complications.

(2) CA could act as intermediaries between the affected organization and the families to ensure the command honors cultural traditions and complies with local national regulations.

(3) CA can assist local agencies interface with military assets providing support to remove the remains. This can include handling customs, location of storage facilities, burial sites, transportation options, and providing linguists.

(4) CA advise the command on cultural traditions impacting the handling and removing of remains.

For further guidance on mortuary affairs, refer to JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

f. **Intelligence.** The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) must establish a wide ranging and interconnected intelligence function in support of CMO. In planning for CMO, the J-2 must conduct a thorough analysis of the operational environment using the JIPOE process. Through the JIPOE process, the J-2 is able to advise the JFC on the effects the operational environment, physical and cultural, will have on mission

accomplishment; the goals and objectives of any potential adversaries, their COGs, and range of possible COAs.

For more information on JIPOE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.



Figure III-2. Legal Issues

g. Logistics

(1) Logistic planners should assess CMO logistic requirements and affected country and theater support capabilities. Attendant risks and logistic objectives also should be identified. Emphasis must be placed upon locating logistic bases as close as possible to the recipients. Logistic planners should avoid locating distribution points in major population centers to reduce movement of large portions of the population from traditional economic and social areas. All potential supply sources should be considered, including affected country, commercial, coalition, and pre-positioned supplies. Lessons learned indicate that logistics and the associated support facilities and infrastructure necessary to sustain CMO are frequently underestimated. CMO often are logistics and engineering intensive. Therefore, the overall logistic concept should be closely tied into the operational strategy and be mutually supporting. This includes:

(a) Identifying time-phased material requirements, facilities, and other resources. Remote and austere locations may require deployment of materials handling equipment and pre-positioned stocks.

(b) Identifying support methods and procedures required to meet air, land, and sea lines of communications. This also will require plans to deconflict civil and military transportation systems.

(c) Establishing procedures for coordinating and controlling material movements to and within the operational area. Priorities may be established using apportionment systems, providing the commander flexibility to reinforce priority efforts with additional assets.

(2) Planning must include logistic support that normally is outside the bounds of military logistics, such as support to the civilian populace (e.g., women, children, and the aged). CMO forces often are going to provide support for these categories of individuals, and planners must take appropriate steps early on to ensure proper aid is administered.

(3) Planning also should consider the potential requirements to provide support to nonmilitary personnel (e.g., NGOs, IGOs, IPI, and the private sector).

(4) Cultural and religious considerations are particularly important for logistic planners supporting CMO. Inappropriate foods, materials, and methods may have a dramatic impact on effects of CMO operations.

(5) Logistic support to the joint force will likely require contracting and contractor management related interaction with foreign governments, commercial entities, OGAs, NGOs, IGOs, and IPI. During stability operations, contracting will normally have a large CMO component; requiring contracting actions must be carefully considered in the joint planning process. The JFC and subordinate commanders should publish sufficient guidance on contracting for operation plans and orders. Depending on

the nature of the operation, some contracting support plans may need to include specific CMO related guidance such as directives to maximize theater support contracts. Local hires and contractors may need to be divided between multiple population groups (i.e., religious sects, nationalities, or tribes) to demonstrate impartiality.

h. **Civil-Military Impact of Contracting.** Theater support contracting and some external support contracting actions can have a positive (and sometimes negative) effect on the civil-military aspects of the overall operation or campaign. Since the majority of theater support contracts are awarded to local vendors, these actions can have a tangential positive benefit by providing employment opportunities to indigenous personnel, promoting goodwill with the local populace and improving the local economic base. In some operations, there may be a high degree of local unemployment that can lead to local unrest and cause local nationals to support an insurgency simply for monetary compensation. Maximizing local hires through theater support contracting or civil augmentation programs can help alleviate this situation.

(1) Depending on the nature of the operation, **some contracting support plans may need to include specific CMO related guidance such as directives to maximize theater support contracts or local hires in support of crisis action planning task orders.**

(2) **Integrating contracting efforts to the civil-military aspects of the campaign plan.** Integrating the contracting support plan into the civil-military aspects of the GCCs' campaign or operation plan requires very close coordination between the lead contracting activity, normally a Service, and the GCC plans and operations staff. This effort can be especially important in major stability operations where there may be significant reconstruction and transition to civil authority requirements. Normally, this reconstruction and transition to civil authorities related contracting effort will be done in support of the chief of mission (COM) or NGOs. In any case, these efforts can be a major challenge to the JFC contracting organizations.

(a) **Management Challenges.** Planning and executing these civil-military related contracting actions can be very manpower intensive. **If not properly staffed, staff sections and supporting organizations can be quickly overwhelmed in their dual mission to coordinate forces support and support to civil authorities.**

(b) **Assessing and Balancing Risk to Forces Support.** Another major challenge in planning for and executing contracting support in support of CMO is identifying both the potential risk CMO may cause to overall force support and any potential positive results toward achieving the civil-military objectives. What may be good for forces support may not meet the needs of the civil-military aspects of the overall campaign plan. In all cases, both the increased security risks and contract management requirements must be closely analyzed prior to making any formal decisions.

(c) **Balancing Contracting Business Practices with Operational Needs.** The JFC planners must work closely with the lead Service or joint contracting personnel

to balance acceptable contracting business practices and operational needs. In some cases, general contracting business practices may be reinterpreted to achieve best value in terms of overall civil-military strategic objectives, schedule, performance, and cost factors. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that contracting officers do not violate Federal Acquisition Regulations in this effort.

For further detail concerning logistics and contracting, refer to JP 1-06 Financial Management Support in Joint Operations, JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, JP 4-0, Joint Logistics Support, and JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

i. Financial Management

(1) Financial management supports accomplishment of the JFC's mission by providing two different but mutually supporting core functions: resource management (RM) and finance support. The joint force director for force structure, resource, and assessment or comptroller is responsible for integrating RM and finance support policy planning and execution efforts. Financial management objectives include:

(a) Providing mission-essential funding as quickly and efficiently as possible using the proper source and authority of funds as provided for in applicable guidance and agreements.

(b) Reducing the negative impact of insufficient funding on readiness.

(c) Implementing internal controls to assure fiscal year integrity and to prevent antideficiency violations.

(d) Ensuring detailed Financial Management planning is conducted and coordinating efforts between Services and combatant commands to provide and sustain resources.

(2) Financial managers may be collocated with the joint force SJA and logistic officer to obtain legal opinions and consolidate efforts in the use of JFC fiscal resources.

(3) Resource managers provide decision support to the commander, develop command resource requirements, identify sources of funding, determine costs, acquire funds, distribute and control funds, track costs and obligations, capture costs, conduct reimbursement procedures, establish an internal control process, and coordinate finance support which may include banking and currency support, financial analysis and recommendations and funding.

(4) Civil support operations normally are conducted by DOD units under a cost reimbursement basis from either the primary agency, the local or state civil governmental authority requesting assistance, or under a cost share of both of the previous. Service comptroller should provide cost data capturing requirements and forwarding procedures

to all installations and units supporting the civil authority. Installations and units should be prepared to gather cost data and submit their Service comptroller for proper reimbursement under the Stafford Act, Economy Act, or other reimbursement vehicle.

For further detail pertaining to financial management, refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.

j. **Information Management**

(1) The complexity of operations requires a process to assist the commander in exercising C2. This process complements the commander's decision making by improving the speed and accuracy of information flow as well as supporting execution through reliable communications. **The goal of common understanding of information and appropriate sharing of the same is achieved through the proper management of personnel, equipment and facilities, and procedures.** This management is achieved through a viable information management organization.

(2) The information management organization is operationally focused on the facilitation of the command's information flow processes (internally, externally, vertically, and horizontally), and solidifies and disseminates this in their command information management plan or standing operating procedure. **Information management refers to the processes a command uses to receive, obtain, control, process, and transfer data into useful information.**

For more details on information management, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

k. **Communications**

(1) Any force deploying to an operational area must bring or coordinate for the ability to communicate. This should include the capability to communicate in secure and nonsecure modes using voice, data, and video teleconferencing through a combination of military and commercial systems. The ability to communicate with all the interagency partners, military forces, NGOs, IGOs, HN or FN agencies, IPI, the private sector, and other organizations may be essential during CMO.

(2) Effective communications systems are vital to planning, mounting, and sustaining successful CMO. Operations, logistic, and intelligence functions depend on responsive communications. Communications is the central system that not only ties together all aspects of joint operations, but also allows commanders to maintain C2 of their forces. Therefore, the CMO plan must provide for interoperable and compatible communications using available commercial telecommunications networks, military satellite channels, C2 radio and radar coverage, and conventional military communications system to support the exchange of orders, directions, and information among all participants. Establishment of direct communications between commanders, interagency partners, NGOs, IGOs, IPI, and the private sector facilitates effective

coordination and decision making. Information protection for nonsecure communications must be implemented. Additionally, communications systems planning must consider the termination or transition of US involvement and the transfer of responsibility to the UN, regional organizations, another military force, or civilian organizations.

(3) **Communications Security.** Communications may be secured against monitoring through encryption or codes. Physical hardening, OPSEC (to include physical security), and redundancy reduce system failures stemming from sabotage and elements of nature. Coordination with other agencies (e.g., interagency partners and non-US organizations) and MNFs also complicates communications security. A policy for the release of classified information should be considered early in the planning process and introduced as soon as practical in an operation. It is important to remember that non-US military organizations may require access to classified material to accomplish their missions. Procedures for the release of classified information to support CMO must be established before it negatively affects the mission. These organizations often are force multipliers in CMO.

(4) **Frequency Management.** Communication planners must include frequency management and coordinate radio frequency spectrum requirements at the earliest planning stage to help assure mission success. Also, MNFs and nonmilitary agency frequency requirements need to consider security precautions and coordinate accordingly. Lastly, host governments strictly control their sovereign spectrum use.

(5) **Interoperability.** Identify communications equipment interoperability among all participants. Nonmilitary agencies may have their own communications networks, and the degree of sophistication will vary. These may include commercial leased circuits and satellite services, and high frequency radio equipment. Commercial satellite services can provide worldwide voice, data, and facsimile communications. This system can provide an excellent communications link between both military and nonmilitary organizations. Regardless of the systems available to military and nonmilitary organizations, it is critical that CMOCs are equipped with communication equipment that facilitates coordination with all participants. CMOC communications requirements must be identified early. Deployment planners should use commercial off-the-shelf equipment to meet end-user requirements. The need for interoperability of communications equipment in CMO also may necessitate using unclassified communications means during the operation. The key to success is evaluating the use of all available means of communicating (military, commercial, HN, and FN) to put together a network that supports CMO. Every situation will be unique.

(6) **Reports.** JFCs should standardize similar communication reports to increase efficiency of operations.

For further details on communications support, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

1. Religious Support

(1) Wars and conflicts in the 21st century are increasingly nonconventional and ideologically motivated. Religion plays a pivotal role in the self-understanding of many people and has a significant effect on the goals, objectives, and structure of society. **In some cases, religious self-understanding may play a determinative or regulating role on policy, strategy, or tactics.** While it may not be the primary catalyst for war, religion can be a contributing factor. Some examples include:

(a) Invoking religious overtones to develop an exclusivist vision and program for national and international action.

(b) Using governments or groups religion as a motivating factor for socializing conflict.

(c) Linking ideologies with theological concepts that have mass appeal to achieve the ideal; conflicts “theologized” to justify existence, establish legitimacy, gain popularity, and enact policies, laws, and COAs for internal and external activities.

(d) Achieving an end being gained by using theological concepts as a means to that end.

(2) **By recognizing the significance of religion, cultural sensitivities, and ideology held by allies, multinational partners, and adversaries,** JFCs may avoid unintentionally alienating friendly military forces or civilian populations that could hamper military operations. Commanders and their staffs also must consider religion, other cultural issues, and ideology while planning CMO. Chaplains, as military staff officers with expertise in matters of religion, may support CMO planning and execution within limits of endorsement, professional education or qualification, and individual conscience. Chaplains shall not participate in activities that might compromise their noncombatant status under the Geneva Conventions, nor shall they function as intelligence collectors. However, the joint force chaplain (JFCH) may provide relevant information on the religious, cultural and ideological environment in the area of operations.

(3) Religious support teams, consisting of at least one chaplain and one chaplain assistant/religious program specialist, serve as the primary advisor to the commander on matters pertaining to religion as it impacts on the morale and welfare of personnel assigned to the command. The JFCH, as a staff officer, will participate as appropriate in planning for the impact of religion on current and future operations.

(4) During CMO, the JFCH performs key religious support staff functions to include religious support planning as discussed above. Primarily, the JFCH provides worship services and pastoral care to authorized civilians (DOD and contracted).

(5) As directed by the JFC, and in coordination with the CMOC, a JFCH may also function as a goodwill ambassador, in order to develop relationships with key civilian religious leaders and faith-based organizations, with the goal of fostering understanding and reconciliation. Examples of goodwill activities include gatherings of religious leaders for interfaith dialogue, support to reconstruction teams, and humanitarian projects to rebuild infrastructure like schools and cultural centers.

For more details concerning religious support, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations.

m. Civil Affairs Planning Considerations

(1) Successful accomplishment of CAO in large part depends on adequate plans and policy determinations, an adequate staff capability, and availability of dedicated CA to assist the commander in carrying out responsibilities for CMO. It is important that CA be concentrated on those tasks that are most likely to lead to mission accomplishment.

(2) CA should be involved as early as possible in contingency or crisis action planning processes to accomplish required coordination efforts.

For further details on CA planning, refer to Appendix B, “Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations.”

CHAPTER IV COORDINATION

“Successful interagency, IGO, [intergovernmental organization] and NGO [nongovernmental organization] coordination enables the USG [United States Government] to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared international goals.”

JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I

1. General

a. In CMO, interagency, IGO, NGO, IPI, and the private sector coordination is one of the top priorities. JFCs must understand civilian agencies roles, procedures, and processes to plan and operate within this arena. The CMOC, with its standing capability can serve as the JFC’s primary coordination interface with OGAs, IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and MNFs.

(1) An appreciation of the skills and resources of various OGAs and an understanding of how they interact with NGOs, IGOs, IPI, private sector, and regional organizations are critical to mission accomplishment.

(2) Civil-military relations can create economic, political, and social stability as they encourage the development of the affected nation’s materiel and human resources. JFCs utilize annex V (Interagency Coordination) of plans and orders to provide guidance for incorporating the interagency, IGO, and NGO communities into military operations.

For more details concerning Annex V (Interagency Coordination), refer to CJCSM 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats.

(3) In many situations, the HN or FN and the private sector also will have a major role in coordination with the military, interagency, IGOs, and NGOs. A JFCs effective use of CMO improves the integration of the military effort with these

“Responding to the challenges facing the nation almost inevitably requires a multiagency, interdisciplinary approach that brings to bear the many diverse skills and resources of the Federal government and other public and private organizations. The requirement for coordination between these agencies and organizations is not new. The continually changing global security environment requires increased and improved communications and coordination among the numerous agencies and organizations working to achieve established national security objectives. This cooperation is best achieved through active interagency involvement, building on the core competencies and successful experiences of each.”

JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I

organizations and links military objectives to the diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives – unity of effort is one of the keys to success in achieving strategic objectives in a complex security environment.

b. Interagency Coordination at the National Level

(1) The integration of political, economic, civil, and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action always have been essential to success at all levels of operations.

(2) The new, rapidly changing global environment is characterized by regional instability, the challenges of pluralistic governments, and unconventional threats will require even greater interagency, IGO, and NGO cooperation within a fully functioning civil-military partnership. Military operations must be synchronized with those of other interagency partners, as well as with MNFs, NGOs, IGOs, and regional organizations. These actions must be mutually supporting and proceed in a logical sequence. The military must understand the roles and relationships among the interagency, state and local governments, country teams, and engaged organizations to accomplish CMO.

(3) Coordination forges the vital link between the military and the economic, political or diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as NGOs and IGOs. Successful coordination and planning enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation — achieving unity of effort.

(4) The common thread throughout all major operations is the broad range of agencies — many with indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities — that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States.

(5) The intrinsic nature of coordination demands that planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these instruments to achieve the objective. This consideration is dictated because the security challenges facing the United States today are growing in complexity, requiring the skills and resources of many organizations.

(6) Because the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of a single agency, plans and orders must be developed to leverage the core competencies and functional responsibilities of all available agencies, synchronizing their efforts with military capabilities toward a single objective. The President or SecDef employ the Armed Forces of the United States when it is necessary to use military means to promote national interests. The use of the military instrument of national power as a component of the national security strategy takes the form of military objectives. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives. The military instrument often plays a supporting role to other national agencies. Understanding how military coordination efforts interface with other

"It is essential to appreciate the strength of what I call bureaucratic faultlines-policy areas where agencies have overlapping responsibilities and very distinctive institutional interests and perspectives. The most important faultline of this sort occurs at the intersection of political and military affairs. . . . What is required is not coordination in an administrative or technical sense but the integration of divergent (and sometimes mutually antagonistic) perspectives through the active exercise of strategic thought."

Carnes Lord
Strategy and Organization at the National Level,
Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process

organizations toward mission accomplishment is essential to the success in joint operations and unified actions.

(7) Each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the table. This diversity is the strength of this process, providing a cross-section of expertise, skills, and abilities. In one coordinated forum, the process integrates many views, capabilities, and options.

c. Procedures for Effective Cooperation

(1) The USAID Administrator usually is designated as the USG HA coordinator for emergency response. However, various agencies' different and sometimes conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make unity of effort a challenge. Some NGOs may have policies that are purposely antithetical to both the US military forces and USG agencies.

(2) The interagency, IGO, and NGO process often is described as "more art than science," while military operations tend to depend on structure and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military C2 can assist in obtaining unity of effort if they are adjusted to the dynamic world of interagency, IGO, and NGO activities. Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations. Each geographic combatant command is aligned with both an AC Army CA element and with an Army CA command, which are found only in the US Army Reserve and staffed with functional experts possessing a wide range of critical civilian skills. These functional experts are knowledgeable in working with their respective civilian counterpart agencies responsible for their functional specialty. As such, they already are experienced in the duties, responsibilities, and in some cases the agenda(s) of such agencies.

d. Political Advisor or Foreign Policy Advisor

(1) The DOS assigns combatant commands a political advisor (POLAD), also known as a foreign policy advisor (FPA) who provides diplomatic considerations and

enables informal linkage with embassies in the AOR and with DOS – leading to greater interagency coordination.

(2) The POLAD or FPA provides the commander the following additional capabilities:

(a) Supplies information regarding DOS policy goals and objectives that are relevant to the GCC's theater strategy;

(b) Uses regional knowledge and language skills to assist the CCDR in translating political objectives into military strategy;

(c) Coordinates with, and facilitates cooperation between, the primary US political and military personnel or their designated representatives; and

(d) Moves more freely and works more easily with different participants than military personnel.

(3) Under certain circumstances, a POLAD or FPA may be assigned to strategic, operational or tactical level organizations.

e. **Interagency Structure in Foreign Countries**

(1) The COM, i.e., the ambassador or senior US Foreign Service official, has authority over all elements of the USG in country, except forces assigned or attached to a combatant command. Other key USG organizations in place within most nations include the US defense attaché office (USDAO) and the security assistance organization (called by various specific names, such as the office of defense cooperation, the security assistance office, the military group, and others, largely governed by the preference of the receiving country) — both part of the country team. In some countries, a single military office may perform these two functions. It is important to understand the differences between these agencies in theater interagency coordination.

(2) **Chief of Mission.** As discussed, the COM is the senior representative of the President in a FN and is responsible for policy decisions and the activities of USG employees in the country. The COM integrates the programs and resources of all USG agencies represented on the country team. The COM provides a de facto coordinating mechanism that can be tailored to each crisis as it arises, based upon the substance of the problem with little need for written rules. Additionally, the COM functions at both the operational and tactical levels where recommendations and considerations for crisis action planning are provided directly to the GCC and subordinate JFCs. While forces in the field under a geographic combatant command or subunified command are exempt from the COM's statutory authority, the COM's political role is important to the success of military operations involving US military forces. In special cases, the COM has the

authority to deny US military access into the country and can compel military personnel to leave.

(a) **US Defense Attaché Office.** The senior defense official/defense attaché is the COM's principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. Service attachés also comprise the USDAO. The Defense Intelligence Agency rates and funds defense attachés and keeps the CDR informed of their activities. These attachés are valuable liaisons to their HN counterparts. The attachés also serve the ambassador and coordinate with, and represent, their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attachés assist the FID program by exchanging information with the CDR's staff on HN military, social, economic, and political conditions.

(b) **Security Assistance Organization.** These are the GCCs representatives in a foreign country responsible for executing the theater security cooperation strategy. These include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions.

1. Security assistance programs are authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services.

2. Security assistance functions and programs provide furtherance of national policies and objectives.

(3) **Country Team.** The country team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation, coordination, and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US missions, programs, and policies. The country team typically includes political, economic, administrative, and consular officers as well as a PAO, regional security officer, and communications staff. Security cooperation officers, senior defense officials from DOD and attaches from USG agencies, law enforcement agencies, and USAID are often represented on the team. The country team often is less than adequately staffed for every need. The relationship with military chains of command is frequently ad hoc. Coordination is necessary to achieve unity of effort.

(a) The country team concept encourages agencies to coordinate their plans and operations and keep one another and the COM informed of their activities.

(b) Although the GCC is not a member of the diplomatic mission, the GCC may participate or be represented in meetings and coordination conducted by the country team.

(c) The JFC should request that a joint force liaison officer participate in a country team's meetings, when appropriate.

f. **Comparison of United States Agency Organizational Structures**

(1) One difficulty of coordinating operations among US agencies is determining an appropriate counterpart. Another significant difficulty is the determination of the primary agency for a given interagency activity. Organizational differences exist between the military hierarchy and other USG departments and agencies. Further, overall lead authority in a complex contingency operation is likely to be exercised not by the GCC, but by a US ambassador or other senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all USG agencies and military organizations in the operation.

(2) Decision making at the lowest levels often is thwarted because field coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for parent agencies, departments, or organizations. Figure IV-1 depicts comparative US agency organizational structures using the three "levels of war" among DOD, executive departments and agencies, and, state and local government.

g. **Organizational Environments**

(1) In order for the interagency process to be successful, it should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. This cohesion is even more complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations. When the other instruments of national power — diplomatic, informational, and economic — are applied, the complexity and the number and types of interactions expand significantly.

(2) **The Nature of Interagency Bureaucracy.** Interagency coordination processes tend to be bureaucratic and diffused, inhibiting the concentration of power within a small or select group of agencies.

(a) **Core Values and Requirements.** **Each agency has core values and legal requirements that it will not compromise.** These values form the foundation upon which key functions of the agency grow. In any interaction, all participants must be constantly aware that each agency will continuously cultivate and create external sources of support and maneuver to protect its core values.

(b) **Individual Agency Perspective.** Individual agencies have differing perspectives on many issues. This can complicate policy development and creation of a common approach across all USG elements.




Figure IV-1. Comparisons of United States Agency Organizational Structures

(c) **Reduction of Uncertainty.** Many bureaucracies try to standardize their operations but often fail to prepare for crisis management. Uncertainty

increases in a crisis and it is likely that compromises will be made. Compromise may bring the sacrifice of power, security, or prestige. Uncertainty allows for the coexistence of varying views about the likely outcomes of a given action; these differences in viewpoint often lead to conflicting interests. An organization will seek to reduce uncertainty and lessen the threat to its own stability. Information can reduce uncertainty and increase an organization's power. **Thus, information equates to power in interagency coordination, as it provides those who possess it a decided advantage in the decision-making process.**

(3) **Consensus Within the Department of Defense.** Before attempting to gain consensus in the interagency arena, it must first be attained within DOD. The various elements — OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, DOD agencies and field activities, Military Departments, and combatant commands — should develop a common position on the appropriate military role in interagency coordination before broadening the discussion to include other agencies, departments, and organizations. DOD has a common culture, procedures, and a hierarchical structure.

For further detail on interagency coordination at the national level, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I.

2. Host Nation and Foreign Nation

a. In interacting with the HN or FN, the role of CMO is to provide coordination, consultation, liaison, and a unification that leads to achieving US military objectives. Additionally, it assists in making civil resources (i.e., HNS or FNS) available to the joint force and ensures a balance exists between the joint force, IGOs, NGOs, and the HN in regards to the use of these resources. Furthermore, by interacting with the HN or FN, CMO forces also can prevent unnecessary civilian hardship, while promoting the commander's intent as related to legal obligations and moral considerations.

b. CA functional specialists may assist HN or FN governmental organizations and agencies, as required. In turn, this enhances access to appropriate HN or FN authorities at the governmental level with whom negotiations will need to be conducted and at the regional and local levels with whom the execution of HNS or FNS will need to be coordinated. For example, these specialists can provide JFCs the overall status and capability of a HN or FN economy, infrastructure, health care, and LOCs to support the commander's operational requirements (i.e., develop the civil components to the common operational picture [COP]).

3. Multinational

a. With the ever-increasing involvement with MNFs, it is imperative that the U.S. military forces fully understand the special considerations arising when working with military and paramilitary forces of other nations.

“While the United States will retain the capability to act alone, the current US National Security Strategy reflects that ‘America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions — as broad as practicable — of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.’ US commanders should expect to conduct military operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). These operations could span the full range of military operations and require coordination with a variety of US Government (USG) agencies, military forces of other nations, local authorities, IGOs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).”

JP 3-16, Multinational Operations

b. Political and military intentions of multinational partners will impact planning and operations. Nations’ agendas and interests will differ from those of the United States in many ways. In many instances, MNFs will not be able to influence the planning effort without prior approval of their home country and its commitment to the concept of operations and mission.

c. Additional factors should be considered when planning with an MNF. Figure IV-2 highlights some of these planning factors.

d. To effectively and efficiently plan with a MNF, the GCC must recognize and accept the differences between US and MNFs and work to develop a harmonizing approach to the planning effort. The GCC must be sensitive to MNFs position(s) while ensuring the planning process is a team effort. Where possible, the GCC should develop standardization procedures to reduce uncertainty between and among MNFs.

e. In addition to operating as part of a joint force, CA prepare for combined operations with allied governments’ land, air, and maritime forces. Unity of effort in multinational operations proceeds from the political and strategic leadership of the alliance. Allied governments normally develop directives covering a combined command’s POLMIL objectives. They include objectives and policies for the conduct of CMO. CA personnel may provide staff augmentation for joint or combined headquarters in support of multinational CMO. US military standard staff planning and coordination as well as interagency coordination activities are the most likely mission support activities that CA elements will undertake in the joint or multinational environment. Senior level combatant command or Service component plans, policies and programs teams are best suited for conducting joint or multinational operations due to the rank and experience of the team members.

For further details concerning operating with multinational forces, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

4. Interagency

a. JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, Volume I states: “In order for the



Figure IV-2. Planning Factors for Multinational Forces

interagency process to be successful, it should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. This cohesion is even more complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations. When the other instruments of national power — diplomatic, informational, and economic — are applied, the complexity and the number and types of interactions expand significantly. **The essence of interagency coordination is the effective integration of multiple agencies with their diverse perspectives and agendas.”**

b. Internal interagency bureaucracy often inhibits the integration of multiple interagency partners that may further affect the civil-military relationship.

(1) As noted earlier, each agency has core values and legal requirements that it will not compromise.

(2) Individual agency perspective and agendas complicate policy development.

“We must...improve the responsiveness of our government to help nations emerging from tyranny and war...[O]ur government must be able to move quickly to provide needed assistance. So last summer, my administration established a new Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department.”

President Bush, May 18, 2005

“The purpose . . . is to present and refine an interagency planning process for reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation operations that will serve as the future framework for integrated civilian and military planning. This planning framework, developed by the S/CRS [Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization], enables USG [United States Government] civilian agency planners to identify and gain policy-level approval for overarching policy goals, corresponding major mission elements, and the essential tasks of an operation. The process develops a resource strategy to achieve policy goals, identifies lead agencies responsible for essential tasks, and incorporates a structure for metrics and evaluation. . . .

S/CRS was established to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy. To fulfill this mission, a standardized interagency approach to planning for conflict transformation operations is needed. S/CRS and other organizations within the USG must have tools to develop clear policy options concerning states and regions of greatest risk and interest, to facilitate USG decision-making on these options, and to lead USG planning focused on these priorities.

The planning process is designed to:

- **Assess the operational environment** to determine drivers of conflict or instability, define assumptions and interests, and focus all efforts on transforming these dynamics.
- **Determine clear and measurable goals** of intervention based on US national interests and drivers of instability.
- **Harmonize policy goals with available resources**, and focus policymakers on resource implications that may limit goal achievement.
- **Identify essential tasks and assign agency responsibility** for tasks.
- **Orchestrate the application and integration of all USG “tools”** to accomplish policy goals.
- **Integrate US national efforts** with those of other international partners and organizations.
- **Create a meaningful evaluation** system to measure progress in achieving goals and mission elements.
- **Incorporate lessons learned** from international experience.”

United States Joint Forces Command J7 Pamphlet

(3) Many bureaucracies try to standardize their operations but often fail to prepare for crisis management.

(4) For all their strengths, each agency represents particular interests.

c. The challenge for JFCs is to achieve unity of effort between the different interagency partners and the military to close the integration gap culminating in “situational awareness” and interoperability. This is necessary not only for military operations, such as Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, but also for civil support operations.

d. There are organizations that have the assets to perform such functions. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels through the civil-military organizations established by the NSC Interagency Management System. Members participate in contingency, crisis, and transition planning, and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize JTF operations with the efforts of interagency partners. A CA command has the capabilities to provide theater level analysis of civil considerations in coordination with the JIACG and to develop strategic level civil input to the supported commander. A CMO staff section plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of CMO and civilian component issues through direct coordination with the supported unit’s operations officer. Throughout the process, this staff section’s plans officer continuously ensures the fusion of the civil inputs received from subordinate CA elements, maneuver elements, OGAs, NGOs, IGOs, and HN sources (private/non-private sectors) to the unit commander’s COP. At the CA brigade level, the functions may fall under the purview of the joint, interagency, multinational, and coalition element. The establishment of an operational level CMOC is capable of supporting all military operations. The specific name of the staffing element may change with the level of authority, the integration of CMO into the staff or working group is imperative. The capabilities of the private sector partnership when orchestrating interagency coordination can and may prove to be unlimited.

5. Intergovernmental Organizations

a. **IGOs are organizations created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments and may be established on a global or regional basis and may have general or specialized purposes.** NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are regional security organizations, while the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity) and the Organization of American States are general regional organizations. A new trend toward subregional organizations also is evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of

West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination.

b. Coordination with IGOs

(1) **Role of IGOs.** Responding to humanitarian situations is a fundamental responsibility of the IGOs system. This responsibility runs from the immediate response to the long-term amelioration of a crisis. One or more of these organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) or the World Food Program will represent this community in a crisis.

(2) The body within this community charged with the coordination of the IGOs humanitarian activities is the UNOCHA. It does not have the authority to enforce coordination but plays a more facilitating and informational role. UNOCHA also has responsibility for organizing the consolidated appeals document, which presents to the donor community the best thinking of the IGO community on their needs in relation to a specific crisis or crisis area.

(3) The IGOs relate to UNOCHA in organizing joint assessments and reporting to the donor community.

(4) IGOs generally will have specific responsibility for certain specialties. For example, a major role is played by the World Food Program in the delivery of food and determination of an appropriate nutrition standard. The UNHCHR takes the lead in providing legal protection and material support to DCs or those in refugee-like situations.

(5) The role of the IGOs, along with that of the NGOs, is fundamental to the resolution or stabilizing of a humanitarian situation. They will be present and it is essential that contact be made at the earliest opportunity.

(6) Taking individual action in reaction to an occurrence or perceived need without some form of consultation with the IGO community can easily backfire. Providing humanitarian daily ration as an immediate solution to a food crisis can be exactly the wrong thing to do. While such relief efforts may provide a critical stopgap allowing civilian agencies to overcome a temporary problem, it may further distort the local market and negatively affect the economy.

(7) Typically, UNOCHA will have set up a coordination center. The NGOs will be aware of its location and role as will the US embassy. UNOCHA also will be in contact with government ministries (if the government is functioning) as the main responsibility eventually will fall into the hands of the host country.

(8) Prior to arrival in country, it is advisable to contact UNOCHA headquarters in Geneva. This office will have the informational and communications links that will

assist the military's in reaching its end state. It also should be the focal point for advance planning and sharing of information on objectives.

6. Nongovernmental Organizations

*"Whereas the military's initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces, NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an **end state which they had no part in determining**. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably. NGOs desire to preserve the impartial character of their operations, accept only minimal necessary assistance from the military, and ensure that military actions in the relief and civic action are consistent with the standards and priorities agreed on within the civilian relief community."*

JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I

a. **Role of NGOs.** NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in the international arena. Working alone, alongside the US military, or with other US agencies, NGOs are assisting in all the world's trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. **Capability, equipment, resources, and expertise vary greatly from one NGO to another.** NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, DC assistance, public policy, and development programs. The sheer number of lives they affect, the resources they provide, and the moral authority conferred by their humanitarian focus enable NGOs to wield a great deal of influence within the interagency and international communities. In fact, individual organizations often are funded by national and international donor agencies as implementing partners to carry out specific functions. Similarly, internationally active NGOs may employ indigenous groups, such as the Mother Teresa Society in Kosovo, as local implementing partners.

(1) There are thousands of NGOs. These can be US- or foreign-based organizations.

(2) It is incumbent upon JFCs through their legal counsels to verify that US persons are not prohibited from dealing with a particular organization by virtue of its inclusion on the list of individuals and entities subject to the various economic sanctions programs administered by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

“Although DOD has combined Private Voluntary Organization into the NGO [nongovernmental organization] category, personnel working with these organizations should be aware that this combination is not necessarily widely accepted across the USG [United States Government] or by the organizations themselves. As a point of reference, USAID [United States Agency for International Development] defines a private voluntary organization as a tax exempt, non-profit organization working in, or intending to become engaged in, international development activities. These organizations receive some portion of their annual revenue from the private sector (demonstrating their private nature) and voluntary contributions of money, staff time, or in-kind support from the general public (demonstrating their voluntary nature). USAID defines NGOs as any private or nonprofit entity that is formed or organized independently from any national or local governmental entity. These can include for-profit firms, academic degree-granting institutions, universities and colleges, labor institutions, foundations, private voluntary organizations.”

JP 3-08, *Interagency Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume II*

b. **When dealing with NGOs, it is important to remember that they will likely object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the achievement of military objectives.** Their mission is one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives. **Ultimately, commanders factor NGOs activities and capabilities into their assessment of conditions and resources to integrate them into the selected COA.**

(1) When humanitarian organizations choose, they set up coordinating structures usually by sectors such as health and food. One of the military’s first tasks is to establish contact with these entities or any NGOs capable of providing assistance in contacting the larger community. A positive and open approach to this sort of outreach bears big dividends when the supported command decides to establish a CMOC. When possible and within FP restraints, the military should coordinate with humanitarian organizations in the most open forum possible (i.e., outside the wire). This type of cooperation will foster a better relationship between the military and humanitarian organizations.

(2) The military may expect NGOs to come with a variety of resources but they will, very often, lack logistic capability to include transportation. That capability may be high on their list of expected support from the military.

c. The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make private organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional affairs and civilian attitudes, and they are sometimes willing to share such information based on collegiality. Virtually all IGO and NGO operations interact with military operations in some way — they use the same (normally limited) LOCs; they draw on the same sources for local interpreters and translators; and they compete for

buildings and storage space. Thus, **sharing of operational information in both directions is an essential element of successful CMO.**

(1) Information acquired through interaction with IGOs and NGOs can be invaluable in answering commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs). Personnel conducting CMO should submit reports that answer CCIRs through appropriate channels. However, this information and knowledge should be acquired in a collateral fashion, and not part of intelligence collection operations. NGOs will share what they know of the environment and conditions in general but they will hesitate or refuse to cooperate if there are any implications that this comes under the heading of "intelligence gathering."

(2) Conversely, NGOs will expect the military to function as a partner in dealing with a difficult situation. For example, sharing information on mine locations and areas of hostility leads to more cooperation and coordination with these organizations.

7. The Private Sector

The private sector is "an umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations." The private sector can assist the USG by sharing information, identifying risks, performing vulnerability assessments, assisting in contingency and crisis action planning, and providing other assistance as appropriate.

a. **Role of Private Sector.** When the military is employed in coordination with other instruments of national power, the NSC normally coordinates the effort. In wielding the economic and informational instruments, the United States must be cognizant of the significant role the private sector can play in these arenas. Leveraging the private sector, during Phase 0, IV, and V operations, to assume such roles as economic and business development is more than an economy-of-force measure. It often is the most expedient, effective, and enduring way to introduce the connectivity of globalization, grow a stakeholder community, and achieve a POLMIL end state receptive to broad-based, long-term US interests. The military force and the interagency that have responsibilities and activities in these areas must incorporate the private sector perspectives into their assessments of strategic and operational issues. CMO encourage individual businesses, trade associations and other NGOs to foster dialogue with the US military and the FN or HN government. **The sharing of operational information with and coordinating support of the private sector is an essential element of successful CMO.**

b. Establishing and maintaining communications between the US military and the private sector promotes US national interests/policy and objectives. CMO, through establishing and maintaining communications is one of the best ways to unify military

and public/private partnerships and best practices to improve the FN's or HN's internal security and promote stability operations in the operational area. Stability operations task when dealing with the private sector includes fostering dialogue, helping revive the interface between all parties, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure. The private sector, even in some third world countries, possess the skills and expertise to contribute to the overall US objectives.

c. Critical infrastructure protection is a shared responsibility among the established government, local officials, factions, and tribal governments and the owners and operators of the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources. Partnership between the public and private sectors is essential. The private sector can own and operate a large portion of the HN's or FN's critical infrastructure; government agencies have access to critical threat information, and each controls security programs, research and development, and other resources that may be more effective if discussed and shared, as appropriate, in a public/private partnership setting.

d. The lead agency for federal response to disasters or emergencies within the homeland is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is charged with coordinating the overall federal response. Within FEMA, the joint field office and defense coordinating officer are the focal points for coordination of civil support operations. DOD provides civil support when requested by a lead or primary agency. The President or SecDef may direct DOD to provide support to civil authorities, as required to provide expertise and capabilities to other lead agency authorities.

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APPENDIX A SERVICE CAPABILITIES

Annex	A Civil Affairs Service Capabilities
	B Engineering
	C Medical Civil-Military Operations
	D Military Police or Security Forces
	E Psychological Operations

1. General

The purpose of this appendix is to provide an overview of some of the Service capabilities that would most likely support CMO.

2. Service Capabilities

Each annex to this appendix will discuss a different Service capability. For example, Annex A to Appendix A, “Civil Affairs Service Capabilities.”

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A CIVIL AFFAIRS SERVICE CAPABILITIES

1. United States Army

SecDef assigns USA CA units stationed in CONUS to CDRUSSOCOM or Commander, US Joint Forces Command. One USA Reserve CA brigade headquarters is assigned to the Commander, US Pacific Command.

a. **Active Army.** USSOCOM provides one active USA CA brigade consisting of a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and four regionally focused battalions structured to deploy rapidly and provide initial CA support to SOF and contingency operations. The four battalions with four line companies are capable of performing Defense Planning Guidance-directed missions, of executing comprehensive SCPs, and of supporting GCCs across the range of military operations. The CA battalions are flexible, multipurpose organizations for training, equipping, and deploying task organized CATs in support of CMO. The CA battalions support US SOF missions conducted under geographic combatant commands or country teams. They provide CA support to the respective geographic combatant command, as necessary by attaching task organized elements from their headquarters or attached CA assets. These CA elements support SOF at the operational and tactical levels. The CA battalion has an HHC, a civil affairs planning team (CAPT), a CMOC capable of providing a CLT, and four CA line companies, each with a CMOC. Each CA line company can provide C2 to the assigned CATs and can provide planning, coordination, and assessment at the tactical level.

(1) The CA brigade has a worldwide mission.

(2) The brigade is rapidly deployable through various means of infiltration, to include static-line parachute, providing US SOF with a responsive, flexible, and modular CA force package. The brigade has the ability to deploy classified and unclassified communications links that provide communications capability with supported forces (SOF and conventional), IPI, IGOs, the interagency, private sector and NGOs.

(3) The brigade has the structure to form the core of the theater-level JCMOTF and is C2 system-capable.

b. **United States Army Reserve.** The majority of the Army's CA organizations are USAR and consist of commands, brigades, battalions, and companies capable of supporting SOF and conventional forces at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

(1) There are currently four CA commands, each commanded by a USAR brigadier general. They are regionally aligned to support US Pacific Command, United States European Command, United States Central Command, and United States Southern Command. The CA command develops plans, policy, and programs through planning teams, fusion of information management, engagement, and analysis at the strategic and theater level. Their primary mission is to provide theater-level CA planning, coordination, policies, and programs in support of stabilization, reconstruction, and development efforts. The CA command may deploy a theater-level CMOC to coordinate, analyze, and enable policies, programs, and CMO capabilities in support of the

geographic combatant command and to develop and manage the strategic-level civil inputs to the COP for the geographic combatant command. A typical CA command consists of a HHC, five CAPTs, and a CMOC capable of split operations (forward and rear) with three functional specialty cells, two CLTs, and one CIM cell. Each CA command has one or more CA brigades assigned, each CA brigade has two or more subordinate CA battalions. All are regionally focused and have expertise in the cultural and political aspects of countries within a region.

(2) CA brigades function as the regionally focused, expeditionary, operational level CA capability that supports an Army Service component command (ASCC)/corps or three-star JTF. Dependent on the staffing, the brigade commander may be required to be dual-hatted: commander and staffer. Without a CA element on the staff, the commander may serve as the ASCC/corps/JTF commander's senior CA advisor. The brigade's focus is development, reconstruction, and stabilization. The CA brigade enables SCA and is the operational C2 system structure to form a JCMOTF, if required. The brigade headquarters provides C2 and staff supervision of the operations of the CA brigade and assigned CA battalions or attached units. Its focus is on tactical and operational employment of CA forces and attached CMO forces. The CA brigade plans, enables, shapes, and manages CAO in coordination with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and the OGAs through its CLT, which is found in the CA brigades CMOC.

(3) The CA battalion focus is on the division commander's ready-capability to plan, enable, shape, and manage stabilization and reconstruction and the enablement/reestablishment/support of civil administration at the provincial level. USAR CA battalions possess CA functional specialty support- in the areas of rule of law, governance, public health and welfare, and infrastructure, and provide tactical CA support to the division command. This battalion has an HHC, a CAPT, a CMOC capable of providing one CLT, a functional specialty cell, and four CA companies, each with a CMOC and five CATs. Each CA line company can provide planning, coordination, and assessment at the tactical level, and C2 to the assigned CATs.

(4) **Employment Considerations.** Reserve CA employment as attached forces requires detailed management of time-phased force and deployment data and task organizations by unit identification code. Supported unit commanders are responsible to provide the vast majority of administrative and logistic support because these capabilities are not usually organic to CA. By table of organization and equipment, CA units are authorized the latest in conventional and SO communications equipment and computers to allow secured and unsecured Internet communication, over-the-horizon and satellite-capable radios and laptop computers with access to the Internet. Additionally, CA units must be equipped with the current and most common civilian communications equipment to allow them to interface with IGOs, NGOs, IPI, and private sector in the AOR. Specific requirements beyond these capabilities are determined during mission analysis and forwarded to the supported command as a statement of requirements.

2. United States Marine Corps

a. USMC commands have the capability to plan and conduct CMO across the range of military operations. Dedicated CA structure is maintained within the RC and consists of two CAGs, each commanded by a colonel (O-6). While every effort is made to recruit and train Marines with a broad variety of military and civilian skills, each member of the CAG is a CA generalist. The CAGs are organic to the Marine expeditionary force (MEF): they augment and reinforce the capabilities of the MEF or other Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). USMC CAGs are not apportioned separately under the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, but are inherent when a MEF is provided to a combatant command for planning or operations. Each CAG is regionally oriented to the projected employment of the MEF it supports. MAGTF commanders request USMC CA support via their Marine Corps component commander. USMC CA participate in security cooperation efforts when made available by their component commanders.

b. USMC CMO typically are centrally planned by the MAGTF staff for decentralized execution by assigned forces. Each MAGTF has organic air, ground, C2, and logistic capabilities that provide immediate and integrated CMO options to the JFC. Operational maneuver from the sea, implementing ship-to-objective maneuver and seabased logistics, enables rapid execution of USMC CMO, without the need to establish extensive infrastructure ashore. Qualified USMC volunteers must provide initial CA support to a deployed MAGTFs and be prepared to deploy within days of a validated request, even if no Presidential Reserve Call-up is authorized. Additional volunteers may provide further support, by Presidential Reserve Call-up of CAG elements for contingencies, or by mobilization of entire CAGs. Regardless of size, USMC CA elements will require support from the MAGTF in such areas as transportation, health services, supply, and messing.

c. USMC CMO are performed to directly support the MAGTF's assigned mission, which typically is of limited duration, performed under austere conditions, and expeditionary in nature. These missions might include NEOs, the offload of maritime pre-positioning ships, HA in response to complex emergencies, amphibious operations, or employment as an enabler for follow-on operations. These types of limited contingency operations rarely will allow for exhaustive coordination of details or extensive planning prior to execution. Instead, the MAGTF must understand the goals and priorities of the JFCs, COMs, and US embassy country teams within the operational area. CA and CMO initially focus on confirming, updating, and disseminating the assessment of the situation; providing an initial response to emergencies; stabilizing the operational area; and enhancing the legitimacy of the force. Initial CA plans prepare for a transition of responsibilities to other agencies, such as other US military forces, the interagency, IGOs, or NGOs. USMC CA are also prepared to assist a supported Navy commander. This support might be required when amphibious shipping is tasked to transship evacuees, provide emergency medical support to civilian casualties, or control sea approaches, pier space, or cargo handling.

d. As a self-contained, combined arms force, the MAGTF may become involved in sustained operations ashore. These situations will require detailed coordination with the GCC's CA assets, IGOs, NGOs, and the other interagency organizations operating within the MAGTF's area of operations. Deployed CA forces (and those accessed via reach-back) facilitate mission accomplishment by focusing on noncombatants. They leverage the MAGTF's resources, especially in C2 systems, by integrating the complementary capabilities of other agencies to achieve success and allow timely force redeployment. Throughout, Marine CA efforts help the commander to meet moral and legal responsibilities while accomplishing the military mission.

e. To complement the CAGs, the USMC has assigned its artillery community with the secondary mission of conducting CMO.

3. United States Navy

All USN maritime CA units are based within CONUS and are assigned by the SecDef to Commander, US Joint Forces Command. They report administratively to the Chief of Naval Operations via Commander, US Fleet Forces Command and Commander, to the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), a subordinate organization of US Fleet Forces Command.

a. USN CA forces were established primarily to support naval units engaged in the conduct of CMO within the maritime domain. The USN has developed or enhanced capabilities to operate in the maritime domain through aggregating forces within its NECC. Among the many capabilities found within NECC are Riverine, Naval Coastal Warfare, Explosives Ordnance Disposal, Naval Construction Force (SEABEES), Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, Expeditionary Security Force, Expeditionary Training Command, and the MCAG. MCAG, together with other NECC Navy expeditionary forces or other USN forces, provides capabilities for the conduct of CMO within the coastal riverine, and near shore environments. These capabilities range from projection of CMO forces ashore from carrier and amphibious ships utilizing small surface craft and helicopters to ground transportation, engineer, communications, medical, and security force capabilities provided by NECC as an adaptive force package or that are organic to individual ships or carrier and expeditionary strike groups. The MCAG serves as the link between USN forces and the civil element within the maritime domain. MCAG conducts CAO across the maritime domain supporting GCC, USN component commanders, numbered fleets, and strike groups, in the planning and conduct of the full range of CMO.

b. The MCAG is a multi-composition organization containing a mix of Active and Reserve Components. It is organized with a group headquarters staff and a functional specialty team, two regionally aligned maritime CA squadrons along with subordinate maritime CA unit headquarters and maritime civil affairs teams (MCATs). The MCAG is immediately available for contingency operations and is trained for worldwide operations within the maritime domain. MCAG core competencies include:

(1) **Maritime CA Plans and Operations.** MCAG provides a highly mobile group or squadron forward headquarters serving as a CMO plans and operations element integrating with Navy component and fleet headquarters that are also capable of integrating as joint CMO planners and operations staff within a JTF. This forward headquarters element is capable of providing C2 for direction of employed Maritime Civil Affairs Team (MCAT) assessment operations and in directing/synchronizing the efforts of the CMOC. This forward headquarters maintains communications with their parent maritime CA headquarters and reach-back to maritime CA functional experts.

(2) **Maritime Civil Affairs Team Assessment.** MCAG provides regionally aligned, highly mobile MCATs capable of rapid deployment to their assigned theaters. MCATs provide a reconnaissance capability producing a civil assessment of the supported commander's area of operations. They deploy with ground and maritime mobility packages along with a robust communications suite with long-distance radio and satellite communications, digital photo and video capabilities.

(3) **Civil-Military Operations Center.** MCAG is capable of establishing and operating a CMOC.

(4) **Maritime Functional Area Expertise.** MCAG provides a full range of functional expertise tailored for use within the maritime domain. Additionally, MCAG provides unique functional expertise in marine fisheries and resources, commercial port operations, and harbor and channel construction and maintenance.

c. **Employment Considerations.** Although MCAG possesses the capability to respond rapidly in support of contingency operations, its multi-composition (Active/Reserve) nature and size constrains its ability to respond to large scale operations outside of its intended purpose, the support of theater naval component forces. MCAG forces are not substitutes for USA or USMC CA forces and should only support other Services in extreme situations.

4. United States Air Force

a. The United States Air Force (USAF) does not maintain CA units. The USAF has tasked its Judge Advocate General to provide an organic capability within the Air Force to advise and assist in CAO. Many Air National Guard (ANG), active duty Air Force, and Air Force reserve judge advocates and paralegals are trained in CA issues and have been involved in significant CAO (e.g., PRTs in Afghanistan). A variety of functional organizations and capabilities within the Air Force Reserve Command and ANG as well as the active force can support or complement CAO. These include legal, air mobility, chaplain, health services, security forces, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, civil engineering, bioenvironmental, and meteorological services. In supporting CCDRs, the USAF upon request can provide specially qualified personnel for service in Army or joint CA units as specialists.

b. **Air National Guard Readiness Center.** Access to ANG personnel with CA-related skills may be accomplished through the Air National Guard Readiness Center, an active Air Force unit that exercises administrative control over such personnel ordered to active duty under conditions short of full mobilization.

c. The Air Force International Health Specialist (IHS) Program develops a cadre of multi-corps health professionals with expertise in CMO including domestic and international interagency coordination. IHS personnel are ideally suited to integrate public health and welfare with all CA functional specialty areas.

5. United States Coast Guard

a. The Coast Guard does not maintain CA. However, the Coast Guard can provide a variety of capabilities, assistance, equipment, and training in helping a country organize and establish a coast guard. Generally, maritime USCG forces have four principal missions: military operations and preparedness, law enforcement, maritime safety (including search and rescue), and enforcement of shipping and navigation laws.

b. The Coast Guard Model Maritime Service Code is a valuable reference for other nations to use for establishing a maritime force.

For additional information on the Model Code, refer to Annex G, United States Coast Guard to Appendix A Service Capabilities.

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A ENGINEERING

1. United States Army

a. The USA has a wide variety of engineer units at division, corps, and theater level that provide particular technical capabilities required to accomplish essential, diversified tasks throughout the depth of the theater. The engineer architecture forms these units into an organization that is responsive to commanders at all echelons.

b. US Army operational engineer headquarters, assigned to Army and joint organizations, include 2 theater engineer commands (TECs), 13 engineer brigades, and over 85 engineer battalions. The TEC, headed by major general, provides C2 to engineer brigades and other engineers in a theater as well as joint civil engineering support planning for a theater and operates in close conjunction with the senior contract construction agent from the US Army Corps of Engineers in the operational area. TECs and engineer brigades composed of up to five engineer battalions are normally assigned to an ASCC for major operations. Engineer brigades and battalions also may be assigned or attached to corps, divisions, or combat support brigades (maneuver enhancement) for the conduct of operations. Engineer battalions consist of a task organized companies and teams. Engineer companies include a variety of combat engineer units to support the mobility, countermobility, and survivability of maneuver forces; geospatial units; and vertical and horizontal construction companies for GE. Engineer teams include specialized units for diving, mine dog detection, facilities management, construction management, geospatial planning, explosive hazards coordination, water well drilling, real estate management, quarrying, asphalt, and firefighting.

c. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the Army's major command assigned responsibility to execute Army and DOD military construction, real estate acquisition, and development of the nation's infrastructure through the civil works program. Other services include wetlands and waterway management and disaster relief support operations. With its subordinate divisions, districts, laboratories and centers, USACE provides a broad range of engineering service support to the Military Departments, federal agencies, state governments, and local authorities. The USACE also provides technical assistance and contract support to joint forces deployed worldwide.

d. US Army engineers are capable of providing the senior engineer command headquarters in the operational area or integrating into a joint force and supporting other Services as well as multinational and civilian organizations.

For additional information on the employment of US Army engineers, refer to Field Manual (FM) 3-34, Engineer Operations, and JP 3-34 Joint Engineer Operations.

2. United States Marine Corps

a. The MEF is supported by an engineer support battalion (ESB) that is organic to the Marine logistics group (MLG) contained within the MEF. The ESB is structured to facilitate task organization and provide GE and combat service support to the MEF. The

ESB is organized to plan, coordinate, and supervise GE support functions. The GE support includes enhancing the MEF's mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability (M/CM/S), in addition to conducting the MEF's explosive ordnance disposal missions.

(1) ESB provides vertical and horizontal construction, gap crossing, water purification, and mobile electric power.

(2) ESB can conduct limited counter obstacle missions.

(3) ESB is the primary USMC engineering unit to support CMO.

b. The Marine division is supported by one combat engineer battalion (CEB), which provides combat engineering support and limited GE support through task-organized combat engineer elements. The mission of the CEB is to enhance the M/CM/S of the Marine division. The Marine division contains three infantry regiments, and a combat engineer company that normally supports each regiment. The CEB and combat engineer company both enhance the movement of operational forces in much the same manner as the ESB. The Marine aircraft wing has engineer capabilities embedded in the Marine wing support squadrons (MWSSs). These support squadrons possess capabilities for the construction and maintenance of airfields, fuel handling, materials handling, and limited vertical and horizontal construction. They also can provide mobile electric power and can purify water to potable standards. Engineer requirements exceeding MWSS capabilities are augmented by the ESB. The Marine division, wing, and MLG structure outlined here is similar for I and II MEFs. The organizational structure for engineering support for III MEF is similar but slightly reduced due to a smaller end strength.

3. United States Navy

a. Naval civil engineering forces are organized and equipped to meet the requirements of diverse CMO engineering tasks. They are versatile, flexible, expandable, rapidly deployable, sustainable, and are able to reconstitute for expeditionary operations. Naval civil engineering forces combine the complementary but distinct capabilities of the engineering operating forces of the First Naval Construction Division (1NCD) and naval amphibious construction battalions (PHIBCBs) of the naval beach groups, the business enterprise of Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), and combatant command staff engineer positions.

(1) Because of integral working relationships, naval civil engineering forces are able to leverage an unlimited range and scope of engineering and construction capabilities to support the warfighter. Mission support areas include construction of advance bases, horizontal and vertical construction, battle damage repair, the full range of facility planning, design, construction, contracting, operation and maintenance, and environmental compliance.

(2) With expertise ranging from amphibious and underwater construction, to construction contracting, facilities management, real estate acquisition, environmental

compliance, ship-to-shore support, pier construction and repair, well-drilling, fleet hospital erection, construction of standard and nonstandard bridges, water and fuel storage and distribution, electrical power generation systems, and utilities systems. They also provide technical engineering and contract support.

b. The naval construction force (NCF), also known as the SEABEES, provides the JFC with flexible expeditionary engineering forces capable of supporting a wide range of missions. The NCF primarily supports the MEF and Navy ashore forces as directed by existing plans and orders. The NCF also supports component missions specified by the CCDRs. NCF capabilities enable the JFC to optimize the effectiveness of dedicated Armed Forces across the range of military operations.

(1) NCF units enhance the MAGTF through complementary, not duplicative, support.

(2) NCF units are highly skilled specialists capable of executing projects of a more sophisticated and permanent nature than normally accomplished by USMC engineer battalions. Their capabilities include the following:

(a) Military construction engineering support to GCCs, the USN, and the USMC;

(b) Battle damage repair;

(c) Construct and maintain expeditionary airfields, main supply routes, advanced bases and port facilities, ammunition supply points, deliberate bridging, as well as a wide range of other combat support and combat service support facilities;

(d) In a contingency environment, provide organic capability for defensive military operations and sustainment for independent operations; and

(e) In a peacetime environment, provide Navy component commanders and joint force maritime component commanders with contributory support and GCCs with recovery operations, FHA, PO, and other operational support with a rapid, expeditionary engineering response capability.

c. 1NCD provides forces to fulfill operational requirements of a CCDR exercising C2 over subordinate naval construction regiments (NCRs). It may deploy when two or more subordinate NCR units (e.g., five or more naval mobile construction battalions [NMCBs]) deploy to a theater. 1NCD is comprised of 3 active and 4 reserve NCRs, 9 active and 12 reserve NMCBs, 2 active construction battalion maintenance unit (CBMUs) with reserve augment support, two active underwater construction teams (UCTs), and a reserve naval construction force support unit (NCFSU). NCF units include the following:

(1) The NMCB is the basic operating organization and most capable SEABEE unit for conducting construction and engineer operations. It is a modular task

organization of air transportable, ground, and logistics elements. NMCBs can deploy rapidly as part of amphibious ready forces, maritime pre-positioning forces, and air contingency forces. It constructs advance base facilities in support of the USN, USMC, and other Armed Forces and provides repair, maintenance, and construction support during contingency, emergency, or recovery operations;

(2) CBMU provides follow-on public works operations, maintenance and repair at existing advanced base shore facilities or facilities constructed by NMCBs in contingency operations. It also provides public works support for various expeditionary medical facility configurations during military operations. Designated personnel are assigned in accordance with Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 4-02.4, *Fleet Hospitals*. In peacetime, CBMUs provide repair and maintenance support to US shore installations and have a secondary mission to conduct disaster recovery missions;

(3) UCT provides underwater engineering, construction, repair, and inspection support and performs complex inshore and deep ocean underwater construction tasks, including ocean bottom surveys for potential underwater facilities;

(4) NCFSU provides construction and engineering support for NCF units, including specialized civil engineering support equipment, material, repair parts, and technical expertise; and

(5) NCR exercises C2 over subordinate NCF units, providing planning, coordination, and oversight. It deploys when two or more subordinate NCF units deploy to a theater.

For additional information on the employment of the NCF, refer to Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 4-04, Navy Civil Engineering Operations, and NTTP 4-04.1, Seabee Operations in the MAGTF.

d. NAVFAC is the Navy's global shore facilities manager. It is an Echelon II systems command reporting to the Chief of Naval Operations and consists of more than 13,000 military, civilians, and contractors who serve as engineers, architects, contract specialists, and professionals. This command's primary mission is to provide facilities engineering, acquisition, and technical support to the operating forces of the USN and USMC. It provides construction supplemental and contingency contracting capability for planning, designing, and executing construction in theater including architectural/engineering services, real estate, environmental compliance, and base operation support/facility services. It also provides technical support across a broad spectrum of engineering and scientific disciplines during contingency and crisis action planning, and solves challenging problems related to engineering, infrastructure, and environmental compliance during contingency operations using reach-back capabilities. NAVFAC also maintains standing contingency contracts with large international and continental US civil construction, engineering, and facility support service firms for contingency response missions.

For additional information on the employment of NAVFAC, refer to NWP 4-04, Navy Civil Engineering Operations.

e. Amphibious construction battalions, also known as PHIBCBs, are an integral part of naval civil engineering operating forces organized under the naval beach group. They provide over-the-shore logistic movement and construction support to amphibious forces.

For information on the employment of the PHIBCBs, refer to NWP 3-02.1, Ship to Shore Movement, and NTTP 3-02.14 (REV A), The Naval Beach Group.

4. United States Air Force

a. The USAF engineering mission is to provide the necessary assets and skilled personnel to prepare and sustain global installations as stationary platforms for projecting air and space power across the range of military operations. Air operations are highly dependent on operating bases; consequently, engineering planners must participate in all stages of operational planning for bases to be available when they are needed. Air Force engineering units can deploy either as a part of an expeditionary force, or as detached units operating in support of specific missions and operational taskings. The USAF civil engineering mission in support of a typical plan or order includes rapid runway repair, emergency war damage repair to other essential facilities, force beddown, operations and maintenance, crash rescue and fire suppression, explosive ordnance disposal, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazard mitigation including toxic industrial materials, and improvised explosive devices, and construction management of emergency repair of war damage and force beddown that are necessary for employing USAF forces and weapons systems. These engineering forces are organized either as Prime Base Engineer Emergency Forces (Prime BEEF), or Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair Squadron, Engineers (RED HORSE) units. During any type of military operation, engineer requirements will be numerous, and military engineers may be stretched beyond their capability. A force multiplier for USAF engineering is the Air Force contract augmentation program (AFCAP) that allows civil engineers to focus on the most critical missions.

b. Prime BEEF is the primary organizational structure for supporting both mobility and in-place contingency requirements. The principle objective of deploying Prime BEEF teams is to beddown and support an air and space expeditionary task force. Force beddown generally divides into three categories — aircraft, personnel, and infrastructure support. Aircraft support provides the maintenance shops, hangars, squadron operations centers, munitions storage, fuel storage, and other facilities directly supporting the flying mission. Personnel support provides the housing, feeding facilities, latrines, showers, administrative offices, and other indirect support facilities. Infrastructure support provides the utility systems, solid and hazardous waste disposal, roads, and communications that serve the beddown site. Beddown locations range from main operating bases with adequate existing facilities to bare bases with no facilities other than runways, taxiways, and aircraft parking aprons. Tasks accomplished by Prime BEEF

units include airfield support, fire protection, fuel systems setup and support, explosive ordnance disposal functions, FP, base defense, base denial, rapid runway repair, facility repair, and utility repair.

c. The AFCAP provides commanders with another option to relieve military engineers, particularly for critical high threat or critical missions. AFCAP has installation support capabilities that mirror the USAF engineering and Services functional capabilities. AFCAP can provide all the installation support services and operations inherent in the Air Force engineering and Services functional areas, except explosive ordnance disposal; CBRN operations; field operations and mortuary affairs. AFCAP may be used after an initial military beddown response, for facility erection and construction requirements, or to support recovery operations at existing locations across the full spectrum of conflicts.

d. RED HORSE squadrons and their associated unit type code configurations provide highly mobile, largely self-sufficient, rapidly deployable echelons to support major force beddown requirements and to repair heavy war damage. RED HORSE units are stand-alone squadrons not tied to peacetime base support. They provide Air Force component commanders a dedicated, flexible, airfield and base heavy construction and repair capability that allows the GCCs to move and support missions as the air order of battle dictates. RED HORSE units accomplish major construction in forward locations, often in advance of the main deploying force. They provide heavy horizontal (earth moving and pavements) and vertical (facility and utility skills such as petroleum, oils, and lubricants; structural, mechanical, and power generation) engineer capability, and possess special capabilities such as quarry operation (blasting and rock crushing), well drilling, concrete or asphalt batch plant operations, specialized building construction (K-Spans), and constructive explosive operations. RED HORSE units also are required to be current in a variety of other capabilities across the range of military operations.

For more details on engineering, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A MEDICAL CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Overview

An assessment of total HSS requirements for CMO comes from careful mission analysis, resource application, and an adequate survey of existing health service infrastructure. This health service assessment should then be coordinated within the theater HSS community. Medical civil-military operations (MCMO) will be performed by health service units directly and in conjunction with CA units. These activities must always be in line with the overall JFC's CMO objectives. DODD 2205.2, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations*, lists medical and other health interventions as primary tools to promote the security interests of the USG and the HN, enhance operational readiness skills of US military units, and promote USG foreign policy interests. There is significant DOD policy on HCA and HA based on legal authority within Title 10, USC. Additionally, there are several funding sources for CA and medical forces to perform MCMO missions legally and effectively.

2. Civil Affairs and the Health Sector

a. It is important for health personnel to be involved directly with the assessments, planning, and execution of CMO that directly and indirectly affect the health sector. The health sector is a term used internationally to include all aspects within a country or area that affects the population's health. It is critical to consider all the aspects of that particular country to develop positive relationships and acquire information to maximize the health of the largest number of people. A viable health sector that can lead to better overall health is thus very important to a population and in stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

b. The term "health" is considered in the broadest sense as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." Thus, health includes direct care, disease surveillance and prevention, sanitation, nutrition, potable water, hazardous waste and material management, and consideration of physical and psychological impact of conflict and hardship. All of these components of health are typically disrupted, and often destroyed, in nations in which military operations are conducted or other natural or man-made crises have occurred. Many times, these services were already in disrepair and a new emergency or conflict makes them even worse.

c. Other sectors of a society that, overlap with and, impact the health sector include governance, administration, logistics, economics, and security. The amount of HN governmental control over health infrastructure, policy, and personnel, or lack thereof, will determine how the health assets will be employed and if they can be reconstructed. A country's processes and alternative processes for acquiring medical materiel will be affected by its other logistic needs and capabilities. Finally, if the environment is insecure, the risk to health sector workers may prevent them from delivering services to the population.

3. Medical Civil-Military Operations

a. MCMO are CMO that are accomplished by health service personnel and typically affect the health sector of the involved nation and where other civil sectors integrate with the health sector. MCMO can be employed across the range of military operations. Cooperation and coordination with joint military assets, the interagency, HN, FN, IPI, NGOs, IGOs, private sector, and other entities will facilitate better long-term effects and outcomes.

b. **MCMO through the Range of Military Operations.** MCMO include peacetime medical engagement cooperation activities, HA, disaster response and disease outbreak response in a permissive environment, pre-conflict health-related CMO, and health related activities during major campaigns and operations, and post-conflict stability operations. Although the primary mission of HSS is to enable FHP, HSS personnel may be tasked to conduct or support MCMO in activities that build HN or FN capacity in the public health sector. These operations often are conducted in areas where social services have been disrupted, resulting in poor sanitation, inadequate and unsafe food and water (as well as distribution problems), civil disturbances, and general civil unrest, diseases, uncontrolled distribution of hazardous wastes and hazardous materials, and environmental extremes. In this environment, there are several HSS activities that may be appropriate for MCMO that include: public health activities, to include preventive medicine initiatives, personal sanitation and hygiene training, safe food and water preparation and handling, infant and child care, preventive dental hygiene, immunizations of humans and animals, veterinary care and behavioral health surveillance and support. Additional efforts can include the development of logistic programs, continuing HSS education programs and HSS medical intelligence and threat analysis, and assistance in upgrading and devising methods for supplying and sustaining existing HN medical infrastructure and facilities.

4. Planning for Medical Civil-Military Operations

a. Medical planners must consider FHP and direct care needs of US forces as well as the assets and resources needed to support CMO designed for the indigenous population. For example, the medical planners may have to adjust typical personnel and logistic packages to care for women and children affected even in operations not originally of a humanitarian nature.

b. Medical planning should account for the appropriate MCMO that will enhance each type of operation and at each operational phase. The medical planner in conjunction with other experts within the joint force surgeon's office must liaison with the CMO staff, the HN or FN ministry of health, the country team, USAID, and other USG and international agencies that address the health sector. An understanding of the capabilities, intentions, and efforts of these organizations will allow the joint force surgeon and the medical planners to include, or exclude, joint US military health assets as appropriate.

c. Needs assessment should be led or conducted in conjunction with the HN or FN ministry of health or governance leadership in the health sector, when possible. Civilian health partners such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, WHO, USAID, and any NGOs/IGOs familiar with the operational area also can help with this process. The goal is to identify the health sector priorities of the HN or FN and the most threatening issues to the local population. In doing so, the medical health service can then target resources and health assets to projects that will help build indigenous health system capacity and capabilities, save lives, meet the commander’s CMO objectives, and be sustainable by the HN or FN upon transition.

d. Medical logistics play a significant role in the delivery of health care during stability operations. Prior to a deployment, the joint force surgeon determines if there are any special medical supplies or equipment requirements for the operation; due to the variety of operations there will be different priorities to meet MCMO needs. The medical planner must include plans on how logistics experts will obtain and coordinate transportation, and transport, receive, sort, store, and distribute Class VIII materiel. Further, health service logistic personnel can collaborate with IGOs, NGOs, and the HN or FN in assisting the military or civilian medical supply infrastructure and industry. See Figure A-C-1 for CMO medical planning considerations.

5. Caring for Non-United States Patients

Past lessons in stability operations indicate that although providing care and health resources to non-US patients has not been specifically planned for except in pure humanitarian missions, it is done in almost every operation. Populations that are cared




Figure A-C-1. Medical Planning Considerations in Medical Civil-Military Operations

for include DCs, enemy wounded, and detainees. In practice, concepts of international law, under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, have adopted into DOD policy as part of the LOAC. Additionally, the care of local populations that are affected by conflict in which the United States is involved has been assumed to be a moral obligation by the precedent of US military actions. Often times, health care experts from preventive medicine to surgical care act and treat people in need regardless of the person's affiliation or combatant status.

6. Health Sector Capacity Building

a. Health sector capacity building includes interventions with intent to rebuild indigenous capability and ownership in the health sector. The goal is to equip, or re-equip, the HN or FN to take care of their own people instead of the US military providing care and services of a different kind, quality, scope, and logistic package than what will be present upon transition. Basically, capacity building should avoid providing parallel health services support that foster different expectations or standards than HN or FN can sustain in the future.

b. Health sector capacity building should focus on public health and preventive medicine, which are the basis of a strong health sector. The most common causes of morbidity and mortality are addressed mainly with sanitation, potable water availability, and nutritious food availability. Direct medical care and ancillary health services have a role as well and the US military medical forces can partner with other agencies to do so. Capacity building includes planning for the transition of health services totally to HN or FN control with other long-term NA health sector entities in support, such as USAID, the Red Cross, NGOs, or IGOs.

c. The focus of HSS initiatives during MCMO is to improve HN or FN capacity to provide public health and medical services to its population, thereby enhancing legitimacy of the HN or FN, enhancing FP, and accomplishing the JFC's objectives. Capacity building initiatives during MCMO should emphasize long-term developmental programs that are sustainable by the HN or FN.

7. Teams

Multiple teams and cells can be established to bring military and civilian minds together, both indigenous and multinational, to coordinate and cooperate on CMO. Health/medical personnel can be members on these teams and function in advisory and planning capacities to help achieve success in the health sector that supports USG objectives. The health care experts on these teams may come from different US agencies including DOD, USAID, the US embassy in the HN, Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control Prevention or NGO/IGO experts in MCMO and public health. Additionally, WHO and other regional or international health organizations may provide invaluable collaboration.

8. Joint Medical Assets for Civil-Military Operations

The seven functional capabilities of HSS are: policy and resource acquisition, prevention and protection capability, first responder capability, forward resuscitative care capability, theater hospitalization capability, definitive care capability, and en route care capability. These functions, although not necessarily available at each level, are considered throughout the continuum of the health care system by the command surgeons and medical planners. MCMO is not one of these seven listed capabilities, and there are no stand alone medical units from any Service primarily designated to accomplish MCMO; theater medical assets must be designated to accomplish MCMO as an additional mission. However, capabilities are present within each Service that can adapt to providing civic assistance. There are a limited number of medical personnel within each Service who have acquired training and experience in CMO related activities and are well suited for leading, planning, and executing MCMO.

a. **United States Army.** CA units have health service personnel assigned with the duties of providing evaluation and advice on health sector issues pertinent to the CAO. Particular emphasis of the health service CA team member is placed upon preventive medicine sanitation and disease prevention, veterinary medicine and prevention of zoonotic diseases. CA health personnel are not intended to provide joint FHP, casualty care, or patient movement capabilities to the CA unit, nor deliver medical supplies to the populations to achieve CA objectives. Consequently, CA units are dependent on theater HSS assets for the care of the CA unit and dependent upon theater HSS assets in conjunction with HN and NGO assets to execute MCMO. USA battalion and brigade size units and higher contain attached or assigned Professional Filler System doctors, assigned physician's assistants and organic medical platoons and companies that can provide health service expertise to maneuver units conducting CMO.

b. **US Navy.** The Navy does not have any medical personnel or units primarily dedicated to MCMO or CA support. Hospital corpsmen in SO have some CA training as do all SOF. Forward deployable preventive medicine units are ideally suited to assume a civic assistance role and accomplish collaborative MCMO with HN or FN and international assets. Navy hospital ships are capable of bringing US standard medicine and personnel to a region in a sustainable and visible fashion. These and other organic medical assets can be employed to provide civic assistance in various operations but again should be employed with the planning principles noted previously into primarily capacity building activities with long-term sustainability and effects for the allies being supported.

c. **USMC.** The Navy provides all medical support to the Marines including medical corpsmen who embed in Marine Corps units. The Marine Corps' CAG is similar to the Army CA in that they do not necessarily have a medical expert on the team.

d. **US Air Force.** The Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) deploys modular, expandable field health service units and equipment packages to accomplish care in expeditionary force operations. The AFMS provides an infrastructure designed to field

and sustain a medically ready force throughout the entire range of military operations. This postures the AFMS to cover the full range of global engagement and enlargement and to respond in HA, disaster response, as well as traditional health care operations. Due to the modularity and rapid deployment capability, AFMS assets may be used to support a primarily humanitarian, civic, or other multinational stability operations. AFMS personnel participate at the start of force employment planning and expeditionary force operations. Health service surveillance teams are critical assets in this process and can report on health threats at deployment locations. The USAF IHS program serves combatant and component command surgeons by providing medics with proficiency in a second language, regional and cultural expertise, medical planning, medical diplomacy, CMO, knowledge of IGOs and NGOs, knowledge of HA and disaster response, and other medical stability operations. IHS personnel assigned to combatant commands or to a JTF surgeon's staff work at the strategic and operational levels with CA to monitor and guide MCMO. IHS personnel from the AC and RC can lead or augment other health assets in tactical execution of MCMO.

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX A MILITARY POLICE OR SECURITY FORCES

1. United States Army

a. MP perform five functions in any combination needed to accomplish the mission in both joint and multinational operations. These functions are:

(1) **Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations** — support to river crossing operations, breaching operations, passage of lines, straggler and DC control, route reconnaissance and surveillance, main supply route regulation enforcement.

(2) **Area Security Operations** — reconnaissance, rear area and sustainment operations security, response force operations, critical asset, site, and high-risk person security.

(3) **Law and Order Operations** — law enforcement, criminal investigation and US Customs operations.

(4) **Internment and Resettlement Operations** — Detainee handling, PRC, and US military prisoner operations.

(5) **Police Intelligence Operations** — MP functions that support, enhance, and contribute to a commander's situational understanding and operational environment visualization and FP program by portraying the relevant criminal threat and friendly information which may affect the operational and tactical environments.

b. The US Army provides the JFC a complete range of MP organizations from theater-level MP commands, headed by a major general, through MP brigades task organized with five to seven MP combat support or internment/resettlement battalions, to a variety of companies and teams. Combat support MPs focus on providing maneuver and mobility support or area security operations to their supported unit. Internment/resettlement battalions are designed to provide personnel service, logistic support, and custodial care for either 4,000 detainees or life support and protection for 8,000 DCs. Specialized MP teams include military working dogs and law and order detachments. MP commands and brigades normally are assigned to an ASCC while MP battalions also may be assigned to division-level combat support brigade (maneuver enhancement).

c. **US Army Criminal Investigations Command (USACIDC)** is the USA sole agent responsible for investigating felony crimes. USACIDC provides investigative support to commanders at every echelon. USACIDC investigates violations of international agreements on land warfare and provides forensic science support to other USACIDC units in the theater. In addition, at the direction of the commanding general of USACIDC or higher authority, they conduct special investigations.

For more information on US Army MPs, see FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, and FM 3-19.40, Internment/Resettlement Operations.

2. United States Marine Corps

a. A Marine Corps MP company is assigned to the division, wing, and MLG. A provost marshal assigned to the MAGTF command element coordinates their efforts. While MP assets are currently resident within each MAGTF subordinate element, a variety of task organizations and control options may be employed by the MAGTF commander depending on the mission and situation. The MP company's sole purpose is to provide security support to the MAGTF; thus, it is dependent upon the other organizations for administration, supply, maintenance, health services, and food service support.

b. The security support provided to the MAGTF commander encompasses the following operations:

(1) **Antiterrorism (AT)/FP support** — Vulnerability assessments to identify command areas that are vulnerable to terrorist attack. Assist criminal and tactical information gathering. Assist in AT/FP training.

(2) **Traffic control maneuver and mobility support** — Route reconnaissance and surveillance; main supply route regulation and enforcement; area damage control identification; and information collection, reporting, and dissemination.

(3) **Area security** — Security and protection of LOCs, critical assets (e.g., airfields, service support areas), physical security, and MAGTF rear areas.

(4) **Detainee operations** — US military prisoner operations; DC and straggler control.

(5) **Law and order** — Services to assist the MAGTF commander in maintaining good order and military discipline including law enforcement, criminal investigations, customs support, and MP information control.

(6) The four USMC artillery regiments are assigned CMO responsibilities as a secondary mission in support of Marine Corps divisions.

3. United States Air Force

a. The USAF has a security and law enforcement arm, Air Force security forces that perform security and law enforcement functions on bases and installations.

b. Security forces have overall mission responsibilities throughout the USAF for the following:

(1) **Air and Space Systems Security** provides security for and the protection of all operational and combat-ready weapon systems from sabotage, espionage, subversion, and attack.

(2) **Law enforcement** is responsible for installation entry control, crime prevention, traffic control, resource protection, limited criminal investigations, and motor vehicle accident investigations.

(3) **Antiterrorism** maintains the capability to protect USAF resources and personnel from terrorism and respond to terrorist attacks.

(4) **Air Base Defense.** During increased tensions, conflict, or war, security forces provide combat capability to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy ground attacks. Air base defense is a common task of all security forces specialties.

(5) **Corrections.** Security forces control USAF inmates at its corrections facilities and are responsible for movement, local security, and transient prisoner security throughout the Air Force.

(6) **Information security manages** USAF information security, personal security, industrial security, and the classification management programs.

c. Security forces conduct these missions throughout the USAF, CONUS, and OCONUS. Security forces conduct these missions fully armed and prepared to confront any threat against US national security.

d. In a tactical environment, OCONUS the air base defense mission may include a base boundary that extends outside the air base permitting tactical maneuver to assess and defend the threat of attack using standoff-type weapons. SF conduct combat patrols outside the physical boundaries of the perimeter fence within the base boundary. Security forces are doctrinally trained to coordinate these operations with local law enforcement, or in a theater of war, with HN, FN, or MP assets. MP ensures the area of security for the base is understood and procedures to respond and reinforce the security forces are carefully coordinated.

e. The Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI) is a field operating agency that has been the Air Force's felony-level investigative service since 1948. It reports to the Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. The AFOSI provides professional investigative service to commanders of all Air Force activities. It further identifies, investigates, and neutralizes criminal, terrorist, and espionage threats to the USAF and DOD personnel and resources. The command focuses on four priorities: detect and provide early warning or worldwide threats to the USAF; identify and resolve crime impacting USAF readiness or good order and discipline; combat threats to USAF information systems and technologies; and detect and defeat fraud impacting USAF acquisitions and base level capabilities.

f. Security forces are also actively involved in the military working dogs security missions, and are responsible for the DOD military working dogs center at Lackland Air Force Base, TX. In view of the large geographical areas that security forces must secure (air base), the military working dogs greatly assist in patrolling and are an excellent addition to enhance the security of the facilities.

ANNEX E TO APPENDIX A PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. United States Army

a. PSYOP are planned operations conveying selected information and indicators to foreign audiences and are intended to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, attitudes and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to US national policy objectives.

(1) PSYOP are a core capability of IO and have a central role in the achievement of IO objectives in support of the JFC across the range of military operations. The effectiveness of PSYOP is enhanced by the synchronization and coordination of the core, supporting, and related capabilities of IO. Conversely, dissemination of information about CMO efforts and results via PSYOP can affect the perceptions of a broader audience and favorably influence key groups or individuals.

(2) Commander, USSOCOM exercises COCOM of CONUS-based active USA PSYOP forces; CONUS-based USA Reserve PSYOP forces are assigned to US Joint Forces Command and further assigned to the USA Reserve Command. When directed, CDRUSSOCOM and Commander, US Joint Forces Command provide trained and ready PSYOP personnel to GCCs and US ambassadors. C2 of PSYOP forces normally is executed by the establishment of a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) directly under the JFC. The USA PSYOP capability consists of one active and two USA Reserve PSYOP groups.

b. **Psychological Operations Group (POG).** The POG plans, coordinates, and executes PSYOP activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. A POG is structured to support conventional and SOF deployed worldwide. It can operate up to two PSYOP task forces at the combatant command and the JTF level. A POG typically contains the following organizations:

(1) **Regional PSYOP Battalion (POB).** Found only in the active USA POG, regional POBs provide cultural and linguistic expertise and are capable of providing simultaneous PSYOP support to two or more organizations within the combatant command.

(2) **Dissemination PSYOP Battalion.** Dissemination POBs provide audio, visual, and audiovisual materials production, signal support, and media broadcast capabilities to the POG, JPOTF, and tactical PSYOP units. The dissemination POBs can simultaneously support two separate operational areas at the combatant command level.

(3) **Tactical PSYOP Battalion (TPB).** TPBs provide tactical PSYOP support to corps-level units and below and select SO and conventional task forces at Army-level equivalent-sized units. The TPB develops, produces, and disseminates tactical products within the guidance (themes, objectives, and target audiences) assigned by the JPOTF and authorized by the product approval authority (CCDR or subordinate JFC). The

primary capability of the TPB is the dissemination of PSYOP products to include loudspeaker messages, leaflets, handbills, posters, and face-to-face communications.

c. In addition to supporting CMO, PSYOP also can support the SO missions of FID, unconventional warfare, direct action, and counterterrorism. PSYOP also support the SO collateral activity, and humanitarian demining operations.

2. United States Marine Corps

The USMC has the capability to execute both audible and visible actions designed to convey specific impressions to the enemy (e.g., broadcasts from either shore-based or airborne loudspeaker systems). Furthermore, the KC-130 or helicopter assault support assets organic to the Marine aircraft wing can conduct leaflet dissemination. PSYOP expertise within the USMC resides principally within the RC. The CAGs form PSYOP detachments from personnel drawn from the CAG, or trained for PSYOP. The CAGs, when activated, require support from the MAGTF command element's support unit in such areas as supply, health services, mess, and transportation.

3. United States Navy

a. Capabilities to produce audiovisual products are available from Fleet Imaging Command, Pacific; Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic; various film libraries; Naval Media Center; and from aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious ships. A Navy Reserve PSYOP audiovisual unit assigned to the US Joint Forces Command also is available to provide support.

b. Navy personnel assets have the capability to produce documents, posters, articles, and other material for PSYOP. Administrative capabilities ashore and afloat exist to prepare and produce various quantities of printed materials. Language capabilities exist in naval intelligence and among naval personnel for most Asian and European languages.

4. United States Air Force

a. The USAF has a variety of assets capable of conducting or supporting PSYOP. Some are specifically modified for the PSYOP role. A limited number of EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO aircraft have PSYOP as their primary mission and are equipped for airborne broadcasts of radio and television signals. MC-130 COMBAT TALON and COMBAT SHADOW are capable of leaflet airdrop missions.

b. Most all other USAF air and space assets have the inherent capability to support PSYOP. USAF satellites and aerial reconnaissance photos can be used to support PSYOP targeting and discredit adversary claims or intentions. C-130 and HC-130 aircraft can be configured for leaflet airdrop operations. Additionally, USAF fighter and bomber aircraft can dispense leaflets by dropping M-129 leaflet bombs.

c. PSYOP can be conducted across the range of military operations. In peacetime, the major command/numbered Air Force operations officer, in conjunction with the IO team, is the operational planning element for IO and may coordinate IO actions when an air operations center (AOC) has not been activated. When the AOC is activated, a portion of the information warfare flight is established as an IO team and integrates into the warfighting divisions within the AOC. The IO team provides the IO expertise to plan, employ, and assess IO capabilities prior to the initiation of hostilities, transition to conflict, and reconstitution. It is important to note that some IO are planned or executed throughout the USAF every day, regardless of the status of an operational AOC.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-13.2, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

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APPENDIX B

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

1. General

TSOCs provide C2 of SOF deployed in theater. They ensure that SOF capabilities are employed and that SOF are synchronized with conventional military operations. TSOCs also ensure SOF personnel participate in theater mission planning and that theater component commanders are thoroughly familiar with SOF capabilities in addition to operational and support requirements. Regardless of the command relationship, TSOCs are the link between theater SOF and the geographic combatant commands. JFC CMO staffs provide staff support of USA, USMC, and USN CA forces deployed in theater. They ensure that CA capabilities are employed and that CAO are synchronized with conventional military operations. JFC CMO staffs also ensure CA personnel participate in theater mission planning and that theater component commanders are thoroughly familiar with CA capabilities in addition to operational and support requirements.

a. **CA Selection.** Selection of CA in support of a plan or order should be based on a clear concept of CA mission requirements. Once requirements are developed, the CMO staff element should determine appropriate augmentation requirements based on CA functional expertise.

b. **Analyzing the Civil Dimension.** The challenge to CMO planners is to articulate their contribution to the JFC's mission. In the course of mission analysis, the COGs concept is useful as an analytical tool while designing campaigns and operations to assist commanders and staffs in analyzing friendly and adversary sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Commanders and CMO planners must look beyond the traditional military-to-military construct in considering the impact of the civil dimension on operations. While the civil dimension applies to both adversary and friendly COGs, in some operations, it can dominate the focus of analysis. Additionally, analysis of the civil dimension is a continuous process throughout an operation and looks at the following six interrelated factors:

(1) **Key Civil Geographic Areas.** Key civilian areas are localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander's operational environment, which are not normally thought of as militarily significant. The commander must analyze key civilian areas in terms of how these areas affect the military's mission as well as how military operations impact these areas. Examples of key civilian areas that a commander should analyze are areas defined by political boundaries (e.g., districts within a city and municipalities within a region); locations of government centers; social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; economic and industrial zones; ethnic fault lines; trade routes; and possible sites for the temporary settlement of DCs or other civil functions. Failure to consider key civilian areas can seriously affect the success of any military mission.

(2) **Infrastructures and Buildings.** Existing structures take on many significant roles. Bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams, are often considered high-value targets. Others, such as churches, mosques, and national libraries, are cultural sites that are generally protected by international law or other agreements.

Hospitals are given special protection under international law. Other facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television and radio stations, and print plants may be useful for military purposes. Analyzing structures involves determining the location, functions, capabilities, application, and consequences of supporting military operations. Using a structure for military purposes often competes with civilian requirements for the same structure and requires careful consideration. Additionally, if exigent military operations require decisions whether or not to destroy specific structures, consideration must balance the short- and long-term effects of such actions.

(3) **Institutional Capabilities.** Capabilities can be analyzed from different levels. The analyst views capabilities in priority from the perspective of those required to save, sustain, or enhance life. Capabilities can refer to the ability of local authorities — be they HNs or FNs, aggressor nations, or some other bodies — to provide key functions or services to a populace (e.g., public administration, public safety, emergency services, food, water and agriculture). Capabilities include those areas with which the populace needs assistance in revitalizing after combat operations (e.g., public works and utilities, public health, economics, and commerce). Capabilities also refer to resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission (e.g., interpreters, laundry services, and construction materials and equipment). The HN or other nations may provide these resources and services.

(4) **Influential Organizations.** These organizations are nonmilitary groups or institutions that influence and interact within the operational area. They generally have a hierarchical structure, defined goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and a means of financial or logistic support. Some organizations may be indigenous to the area, such as church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, labor unions, criminal organizations, and community watch groups. Other organizations may be introduced to the area from external sources, such as multinational corporations, the interagency, IGOs, and NGOs.

(a) The commander must be familiar with the organizations operating within the operational area (e.g., their activities, capabilities, and limitations). Additionally, the commander must understand how the operations of different organizations impact on the command's mission, how military operations impact on organizational activities, and how organizations and military forces can work together towards common goals, as necessary.

(b) The commander uses the CMOC to keep advised of all these issues.

(5) **Key Communicators and Populace.** This general term is used to describe the nonmilitary personnel encountered by military forces during operations. The term includes all the civilians within an operational area as well as those outside this area whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. Individually or collectively, people impact military operations in positive, negative, or neutral manners.

(a) There may be many different groups of people living and working within a given operational area. Like the discussion of organizations above, people may be indigenous to the area or introduced from external sources. An analysis of demographics should identify various capabilities, needs, and intentions of a specific population.

(b) It is useful to separate people into distinct categories that consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors. It is critical to identify key communicators as well as the formal and informal communication processes used to influence a given population.

(6) **Events.** Events include routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that significantly impact both civilian lives and military operations. Some civil events that affect organizations, people, and military operations are national and religious holidays, agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles, elections, civil disturbances, and celebrations. Other events are disasters from natural, man-made, or technological sources that create civil hardship and require emergency response. Examples of events precipitated by military forces include combat operations, deployments, redeployments, and paydays. Once the analyst determines which events are occurring, it is important to template the events and to analyze them for political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

c. **Predeployment Planning**

(1) The early deployment of CA in the operational area can be a great force multiplier, setting the stage for the introduction of follow-on forces into an environment that has benefited from specialized interaction with the local population.

(2) The functional composition of CA varies with mission, availability, qualifications of CA, plus the supported commander's preferences.

(3) Mobilization of RC CA must be a consideration during predeployment planning.

(a) The USA, USN, and USMC all have authorizations for CA specialists. The majority these CA authorizations are in the RC.

(b) USA RC CA units normally arrive in theater 130 days after Presidential Reserve Call-up for contingencies or upon mobilization.

(4) Ensure agreement/arrangement is in place with the HN through the appropriate en route and operational area US embassies for personnel and aircraft diplomatic clearances to support CA arrival.

d. **Post-Conflict Operations.** Post-conflict activities typically begin with significant military involvement, and then move increasingly toward civilian dominance as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished. US forces frequently will be in transition from one mission to another. The transitions may cause the US military to be engaged in several types of joint operations across the range of operations. Transitions at the conclusion of any major military operation require significant preparation, planning, and coordination between the interagency community, NGOs, IGOs, and the HN/FN government. US military forces, at the conclusion of hostilities, will support long-term US interests and strategic objectives including the establishment of security and stability in the region.

(1) Transition or termination occurs either upon accomplishment of the mission or as the President or SecDef so directs. CMO planners play a major role in transition and termination not only in the planning process (by establishing a transition mechanism) but also with assisting civilian organizations in clarifying their respective roles and responsibilities after US military forces leave the area.

(2) MOEs or success, availability of resources, or a specific date is the basis for transition or termination criteria. A successful harvest or restoration of critical facilities in the crisis area are examples of events that might trigger termination of the mission. An acceptable drop in mortality rates, a certain percentage of DCs returned to their homes, or a given decrease in threat activity is statistical criteria that may prompt the end of US military forces' involvement.

(3) When other organizations (such as UN, NGOs, HN, FN, and IGOs) have marshaled the necessary capabilities to assume the mission, US forces may execute a transition plan.

(4) Transition may occur between the US joint force, another military force (e.g., United States, multinational, and affected country), regional organization, the UN, or civilian organizations. A detailed plan addressing the various functions and to whom they will transition will greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. A major aspect during transition is the movement of large numbers of military forces and civilians out of or within the operational area.

(a) An unclassified transition plan written in easily understood terms particularly is required when transitioning to nonmilitary organizations. Organizing the plan by specific functions (such as provision of food, restoration of facilities, and medical care) also enhances the transition.

(b) The joint force staff should periodically review the transition plan with all organizations that have a part in it. This will help ensure that planning assumptions are still valid, and determine if changes in the situation require changes in the transition plan.

(5) Termination plans should cover transition to post-disaster or emergency activities and conditions, as well as disposition of military forces. Orders and termination plans should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with the deployment plan, with the termination plan serving as a supporting plan to an order. See Figure B-1 for a sample checklist for termination planning.

(6) **Transition Planning.** CMO planners play a major role in transition planning and may be the best group to perform this function because of their expertise. In order for these planners to accomplish this task, a clearly identifiable end state and transition or termination criteria for the operation must be developed.

(a) Transition planning is an integral part of operation planning and mission analysis.

(b) Transferring control of an operation from US military to a nonmilitary organization or another military force requires detailed planning and execution. Mission analysis (analysis of mission statement), an identifiable end state, USG strategic plan for reconstruction, stabilization, or conflict transformation, and the national policy will all



Figure B-1. Sample Checklist for Termination

play an important role in the transition process. Transferring control of an operation is situation dependent and each one will possess different characteristics and requirements.

(c) Transition planning must be initiated during the initial phases of operation planning to ensure adequate attention is placed in this critical area — plan for transition when planning for intervention.

(d) As the redeployment phase for US military forces approaches, it is important to continue emphasizing FP. The redeployment phase can be the most hazardous because the tactical focus shifts toward redeployment and away from FP.

(e) Areas that will significantly impact the development of a transition plan are:

1. Identification of issues.
2. Key events (past and present).
3. Work required to accomplish the transition.
4. A thorough knowledge of the organization or force taking over control of the operation.

(f) The CMOC is heavily involved in the transition process. The CMOC prepares to hand over its role as the facilitator between US forces and IGOs, NGOs, other interagency organizations, and local government agencies. CMOC personnel prepare a transition plan that includes all ongoing projects and coordination, points of contact for all agencies with which the CMOC has worked, possible resources, and any other information that may facilitate the transition process. The CMOC can support joint, combined, or single-Service operations from the strategic to the tactical level. In general, the CMOC is a structured coordination center in which transition planning is an essential activity.

(g) All CMO assets involved in a mission must be prepared to assist in the planning and execution of transition operations. The civil dimension may be the most complex portion of this process. It is imperative that all teams or sections develop historical files to aid in the transition process. The transition process must be considered from the initial planning of the mission. CA play a major role in this planning process because of their functional expertise, regional focus, and ability to operate and facilitate activities with a variety of organizations. Figure B-2 depicts a sample checklist for transition planning.

SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION PLANNING

- **Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?**
- **Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?**
- **Who will fund the transition?**
- **What is the new mission?**
- **What US forces, equipment, and/or supplies will remain behind?**
- **What will be the command relationship for US forces that remain behind?**
- **What will be the communications requirements for US forces that remain behind?**
- **Who will support US forces that remain behind?**
- **Can intelligence be shared with the incoming force or organization?**
- **Will new rules of engagement be established?**
- **Will ongoing operations (e.g., engineer projects) be discontinued or interrupted?**
- **Will the United States be expected to provide communications capability to the incoming force or organization?**
- **Will the incoming force or organization use the same headquarters facility as the joint force?**
- **What is the policy for redeployment of the joint force?**
- **Will sufficient security be available to provide force protection? Who provides it?**
- **How will the turnover be accomplished?**
- **Who will handle public affairs for the transition?**
- **Have redeployment airlift and sealift arrangements been approved and passed to the United States Transportation Command?**

Figure B-2. Sample Checklist for Transition Planning

e. **Force Protection**

(1) FP includes actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. FP does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Elements of FP include but are not limited to the following:

(a) **Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear.** Joint warfighter CBRN defense capability requirements are divided into four functional concept areas – sense, shape, shield, and sustain. Core capabilities for sense include reconnaissance, detection and identification (contamination avoidance); shape includes information systems; shield includes individual and collective protection, and medical prophylaxes and pretreatments; and sustain includes decontamination, restoration, and post-exposure medical capabilities (i.e., therapeutics and diagnostics).

For further guidance concerning nuclear, biological, and chemical defense, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments.

(b) **Antiterrorism.** AT programs support FP by establishing measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. These measures may include limited response and containment by local military forces. They also consist of defensive measures to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information, and equipment.

For further guidance on AT, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

(c) **Security.** Security of forces and means enhances FP by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security operations protect flanks and rear areas in the operational area. Physical security measures deter, detect, and defend critical installations, facilities, information, and systems against threats from intelligence assets, terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. Measures include fencing and perimeter stand-off space, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.

For further guidance on physical security measures, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

(d) **Operations Security.** Effective OPSEC measures minimize the “signature” of joint force activities, avoid set patterns, and employ deception when

patterns cannot be altered. OPSEC measures are an integral element of IO. Although strategic OPSEC measures are important, the most effective methods manifest themselves at the lowest level. Varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals, and conducting vehicle and personnel searches and identification checks on a set but unpredictable pattern discourage terrorist activity.

For further guidance concerning OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(e) **Law Enforcement.** Law enforcement aids in FP through the prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crime. A cooperative police program involving military and civilian or HN or FN law enforcement agencies directly contributes to overall FP.

(f) **Personal Security.** Personal security measures consist of common-sense rules of on- and off-duty conduct for every Service member. They also include use of individual protective equipment, use of hardened vehicles and facilities, employment of dedicated guard forces, and use of duress alarms.

(2) Planning for Force Protection

“ . . . I try to make the point that there is no way to guarantee 100 percent force protection while accomplishing the variety of missions we undertake out there. Somewhere, sometime, we are going to lose people again to terrorist or other actions that take advantage of our own less-than-perfect protective measures.”

General Anthony Zinni, US Marine Corps Commander in Chief, US Central Command, 1997-2000 Address at the US Naval Institute

(a) JFCs and their subordinate commanders must address FP during all phases of contingency action planning. All aspects of FP must be considered and threats minimized to ensure maximum operational success. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must implement FP measures appropriate to all anticipated threats, to include terrorists.

(b) Supported and supporting commanders must ensure that deploying forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel protection requirements prior to and upon arrival in the operational area.

(c) In addition, JFCs and their subordinate commanders must evaluate the deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting the threat and those not directly supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the situation.

(d) CA forces must address their particular FP concerns with JFCs. For example, it may be inappropriate and counterproductive for CA in full combat attire to conduct liaison with local officials. These type concerns should be addressed early in the

planning process. Additionally, CA must address with JFCs how the various elements of FP (discussed above) impact on how they perform their mission.

(e) CA, because of their ability to work with the populace and their overall expertise, can provide JFCs insight into FP concerns before they become major issues.

(f) Intelligence support to FP consists of monitoring and reporting activities, intention, and capabilities of adversarial groups and determine their possible COAs. Detecting the adversary's methods in today's operational environment requires a higher level of situational understanding, informed by current and precise intelligence. This type of threat drives the need for predictive intelligence based on analysis of focused information from intelligence, law enforcement, and security activities.

For more detailed discussion of FP, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

f. Joint Urban Operations

(1) In any operational area, most of the civil authority and the greater part of the population are likely to reside in one or more urban areas. Because of the numbers and density of civilians, any urban operation will require a significant CMO (CAO) effort on the part of the joint force.

(2) CMO conducted as part of urban operations strive to achieve the same objectives as in other types of operations. These are:

(a) Enhance military effectiveness,

(b) Support national objectives, and

(c) Reduce the negative impact of military operations or other destructive force on civilians.

(3) CMO and Urban Operations

(a) As with other activities, the complex, physical aspects of urban terrain can hamper CMO. The urban terrain can fragment and channel CMO efforts, particularly FHA. It will be difficult to find and reach all those in need of support. Constricted terrain makes it more difficult to control large numbers of people in PRC operations. Urban areas normally offer many buildings usable for shelter, medical care, and other forms of support, but the damage to those structures from military operations or natural or man-made disaster can make them unusable, thus adding to the support difficulties.

(b) Noncombatants are the primary focus of CMO, and urban areas may contain huge numbers of civilians. These numbers may range from the thousands to the millions. Depending on the circumstances, many will be displaced and in need of basic support. Services may be degraded or nonexistent. The requirement to control and

support the noncombatant population can easily overwhelm local capabilities. Effective urban CMO requires knowledge of the ethnic, cultural, religious, and attitudinal characteristics of the populace. Noncombatant populations in urban areas are rarely homogenous, therefore effective CMO will require the understanding of neighborhoods, tribal relations, and the basic allegiances and daily life of the inhabitants.

(c) Urban infrastructure may be functioning with some degree of effectiveness, in which case CMO must work through and with local authorities and services. It may be necessary to repair physical infrastructure facilities and means, such as power plants or water stations, as part of CMO. Existing service infrastructure may be totally lacking or overwhelmed by circumstances, requiring the joint force to provide not only basic subsistence and shelter, but the full gamut of support personnel — police, legal, administration, engineer, sanitation, medical, transportation, and other.

(d) The proximity of civilians to military targets increases the requirement to actively screen the joint integrated prioritized target list for indirect fires and minimize the impact of collateral damage. The proximity to civilians increases the risks that diseases and other public health hazards will pose health risks to military personnel.

(4) **CMO Considerations in Joint Urban Operations.** Urban operations will include CMO. Urban CMO can support overall operational objectives or be the main focus of operations, but are in any case the responsibility of the CCDR to plan and conduct.

(5) **Planning Considerations.** Planning for CMO support of urban operations is generally the same as for other CMO with special emphasis on the nature of the urban area. The JFC and staff should consider the impact of military operations on noncombatants to include their culture, values, and infrastructure; thereby viewing the urban area as a dynamic and complex system — not solely as terrain. General planning considerations were addressed earlier in this chapter. Additional planning considerations are below:

(a) CMO planners should carefully consider these aspects of the urban area — terrain, civilian populace, environment, and infrastructure.

(b) Some other factors to consider include legal implications, communications, culture, education, economic, religious, labor, health, and administrative infrastructure.

(c) NGOs, IGOs, the interagency community, and IPI also play a major part in all CMO but may be of more importance in urban operations.

(6) **Synchronization.** CMO must be synchronized both internally and with other operations. The relation of CMO to the overall operation can vary a great deal depending on the situation. Joint urban operations could require the full extent of CMO in one portion of an urban area while another is still being heavily contested. Most likely,

regardless of the situation, civilians in the operational area will have a great impact on operations. Planning must be synchronized to ensure CMO and other operations (e.g., combat operations) support the USG overall objectives.

(7) **Support.** CMO may require support in a number of key areas from other forces (e.g., HSS, engineer, and MP/security forces).

(8) **Other Operational Considerations.** The most important urban operation consideration is that CMO will most likely occur simultaneously with, not subsequent to, other operations — including combat. The JFC must therefore identify sufficient forces and synchronize the planning and execution of these operations as well as the support required. The relation of CMO to other operations in joint urban operations will vary, but CMO will be a significant part of any operation.

For further guidance concerning urban operations, refer to JP 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations.

g. **Consequence Management (CM).** DOD defines CM as actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents.

(1) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management. The CM activities for all deliberate and inadvertent releases of CBRN that are undertaken when directed or authorized by the President. CBRN CM supports the United States, its territories, and possessions. This type of response occurs under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government. The Federal government provides assistance when required. When situations are beyond the capability of the state, the governor may request federal assistance from the President. In accordance with the National Response Plan, the President may direct the Federal government to provide supplemental assistance to state and local governments to alleviate the suffering and damage resulting from disasters or emergencies. FEMA bears primary responsibility for coordination of federal assistance to state and local governments.

(2) The Commander, United States Northern Command acts as the supported CCDR for all CM operations conducted in CONUS. The Commander, United States Northern Command exercises OPCON of all DOD forces in such operations with the exception of JSOTFs and the US Corps of Engineers supporting the primary agency.

(a) Commander, US Northern Command, Commander, US Southern Command, and Commander, US Pacific Command. These GCCs have specific responsibilities for assisting domestic civil authorities in their AORs and are the supported commanders during CBRN CM operations. In addition to the homeland defense mission, these commanders, when directed by the President or SecDef, provide civil support, to include CBRN CM operations. Other geographic and functional commands support Commander, US Northern Command, Commander, US Southern Command, and Commander, US Pacific Command in their CBRN CM efforts.

(b) Additionally, there are standing forces such as Joint Task Force-Civil Support and US Army North with its two operational command posts that may be employed as task forces or JTFs (with augmentation) and tasked by US Northern Command to respond to CBRN CM situations. Other organizations with specific missions to respond to CBRN CM situations include the USMC Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, the USA Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team, USN Response Task Force, and three USAF Response Task Forces (Air Combat Command, Air Force Space Command, and United States Air Forces, Europe). The President also can federalize the National Guard WMD civil support teams.

(c) WMD civil support teams assigned to each state's National Guard will provide CM assistance to that state or to other states, in the event of a WMD event.

(3) The Commander, US Southern Command acts as the supported CCDR for all CM operations conducted in Puerto Rico or the US Virgin Islands.

(4) The Commander, US Pacific Command acts as the supported CCDR for all CM operations conducted in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, American Samoa, or any of the other US possessions in the Pacific AOR.

For further detail on CM support in the United States, refer to JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, JP 3-28, Civil Support, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management.

(5) **Foreign CM** is support to the HN or FN in response to the use of CBRN contaminants against an ally, regional friend, or US vital interest. These operations involve those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Such services may include transportation, communications, public works, fire fighting, information planning, care of mass casualties, resources support, essential or routine health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy.

(6) Primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of foreign WMD incident resides with the HN or FN government. The DOS is designated as the primary agency for foreign CM operations in support of a foreign government. All DOD support will be coordinated through the responsible US embassy COM and country team.

For further detail concerning foreign CM, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01B, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations, JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management.

(7) **CA Support to CM**

(a) CM operations require extensive interagency coordination.

(b) In CM operations, CA may provide liaison to the USG agencies, conduct assessments of the situation, or provide other expertise as required to include providing consultation to HN decision makers with the approval of the lead agency.

h. Humanitarian Demining Operations. The general role of CA in these types of operations is to assist SOF and other forces in their efforts in supporting USG and geographic combatant commands in achieving their objectives.

(1) CA execute programs that build capabilities in management, administration, logistics, equipment maintenance, communications, and data processing. CA are instrumental in the establishment of the HN Humanitarian Demining Office and the coordination of support with NGOs and IGOs.

(a) Special forces teams train HN cadre in techniques to locate, identify, and destroy landmines and unexploded ordnance.

(b) PSYOP teams assist HN governments to develop and implement mine awareness programs to train local populations to identify, avoid, and report locations of landmines and unexploded ordnance until these threats are removed.

(c) CA train the HN demining headquarters in management and C2 of its subordinate elements. CA also provide liaison with the USG, IGOs, NGOs, and local organizations to coordinate support of the HN or FN demining infrastructure.

(2) CA possess the expertise to support other SOF, conventional forces, and civilian organizations in humanitarian demining operations. CA possess the unique skills that foster relationships with the civilian community, which allow them to be a logical choice as part of a team to assist FNs in demining operations.

For further guidance on military support to humanitarian demining operations, refer to CJCSI 3207.01A, Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action Operations, JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management.

i. Negotiation and Mediation

(1) Although negotiation normally is not a primary responsibility for CA, often it falls upon them. CA often find themselves in the role of a mediator or even arbitrator at some point during operations. Each role requires different attributes, but there are many common ones and the following focuses on those common attributes and techniques. The US COM is the lead USG representative in-country and must authorize JFC personnel to coordinate with HN departments, IGOs, and NGOs.

(a) Negotiations do not occur in a vacuum. It is important to understand the broader issues of conflict and their changing nature.

(b) In many operations, it is essential to maintain dialogue with all parties, groups, and organizations — including of course the government if one exists, but also the opposition or various factions or militias.

(c) It is also important not to allow any one incident to destroy dialogue (even if force is applied) — creating an atmosphere of hostility will not lead to a resolution.

(2) Negotiation is an exercise in persuasion. It is a way to advance the command's interests by jointly decided action. Cooperation of the other parties is a must; consider them partners in solving problems.

(3) Think carefully about the full range of the force's interests and prepare thoroughly for the full range of interests of the other parties. What are the underlying interests behind a particular position that a party has taken on a particular issue? People negotiate for different reasons such as:

(a) tasks (e.g., the lease of a compound);

(b) relationships (e.g., to get to know the other party and find out more information about whom that person is); and

(c) status (e.g., legitimacy as a participant in the eyes of others).

(4) Think carefully about alternatives in negotiating an agreement. How will you as a negotiator be most persuasive in educating others to see a negotiated settlement as being in their best interests?

(5) Be attuned to cultural differences. Actions can have different connotations. The use of language can be different; “yes” may mean “no”. How people reason and what constitutes facts and what principles apply are shaped by culture. Solutions often are best when they come from the factions themselves. Nonverbal behavior such as the symbolic rituals or protocols of the arrangement for a meeting also is important. It is particularly important to look at opportunities for small interim agreements that can be seen as “trust building” steps that are necessary when it will take time to reach agreement on larger issues.

(6) Negotiations will be conducted at several levels: negotiations among US agencies and departments; between the multinational partners; between the joint force and UN agencies; between the joint force and local leaders. This complex web of negotiations requires the following to build consensus: tact, diplomacy, honesty, open

mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful planning.

(7) **Procedures for Negotiation and Mediation.** Successful negotiations should be based on the following steps:

(a) Establish communications. The first step is to establish an effective means of communicating with the political or faction leader(s). Do not assume that certain leaders or elements are opposed to your efforts without careful investigation. Insist on fact finding before forming any opinions.

(b) Carefully develop a strategic plan and diagram the results of your analysis. Useful questions to answer in this analysis are:

1. What are the main issues?
2. Who are the relevant parties? First order? Second? Third?
3. What are these parties' publicly stated positions? Privately stated positions?
4. What are the underlying interests behind these positions?
5. What are the bottom-line needs of each party?
6. What are their concerns? Fears? To what degree does "historical baggage" affect them?

(c) There will be a negotiation on the conduct of negotiations. This process must be addressed in the initial planning sessions.

(d) Set clear goals and objectives. Know what the joint force is trying to accomplish as well as the limits of its authority. Think carefully about how the joint force wants to approach the issues. Settle the easy issues first. Settle issue by issue in some order. Look to create linkages or to separate nonrelated issues. For example, security issues might be separated from logistic issues. Consider having details worked out at later sessions with the right people. Understand these sessions also will be negotiations.

(e) Work with the parties to identify common ground on which to build meaningful dialogue. Expect to spend considerable time determining the exact problem(s). At this stage, be problem-oriented rather than solution-oriented.

1. If a party perceives more benefits from an alternative to negotiations than to any outcome negotiations could produce, do not expect that party to

negotiate to achieve an agreement. You need to educate and persuade them that negotiations will in fact produce the most benefits.

2. Focus on underlying interests. Differences in the relative value of interests, forecasts of future events, aversion to risk, and time preferences may offer opportunities to develop options for mutual gain.

3. Learn from the parties. Seek ways through partnering with them to find possible alternatives beyond their present thinking.

4. When necessary, assume the role of convener, facilitator, or mediator. Be patient.

(f) Composition of negotiating forum and decision-making mechanisms. In some cases a committee or council can be formed with appropriate representation from the various interested parties. It is critical to identify the right participants in advance. For example, will it include COM and JFC-level, mid-level, or working-level personnel?

1. In deciding what constitutes the appropriate construct for a meeting, consider the culture. For example, what role do women play in the society? How is status defined in the culture?

2. Composition of the committee or council also may include legal advisors, political representatives (e.g., DOS, UN agencies, or others), military representatives, and other civilian representatives from the joint force, NGOs, or IGOs.

3. Members should possess the status and ability to deal with the leadership representing all involved parties.

4. For those members seen as part of the joint force, it is important that they understand the issues and speak with one voice. This will require a prior coordination within the joint force's delegation. They must understand policy and direction from higher authority.

5. Negotiations are time-consuming and can be frustrating. As the head negotiator, be attentive to whether you have the people negotiating who can effectively recommend that their superiors ratify an agreement reached. Are all the decision makers who will determine whether the agreement reached is implemented represented in the committee or council?

6. A supportive climate needs to be developed for the decision makers to complete an agreement. In that vein, it is useful to talk to those who are not decision makers but from whom the decision makers will need support. In this way, they may assist you in helping their decision makers reach agreement.

7. In zones of severe conflict and state collapse, it is frequently difficult to determine the legitimate community leaders with whom any lasting agreement must be made.

8. The JFC must ensure that all of his or her negotiators understand the scope and latitude of their authority. Their requirement to obtain the JFC's prior approval will empower them in their role as negotiator or mediator.

(g) Establish the venue. What is the manner in which meetings can be called? Can a neutral ground be found that is acceptable to all sides? Should US representatives go to the factional leader's location, or will this improperly affect the negotiations? What about the details such as the seating arrangements or specific settings traditionally used in the culture?

1. Selection of a negotiating venue also should be based on security for all involved parties, accessibility, availability of communications facilities, and comfort.

2. Ensure that appropriate information arising from, or relevant to, the negotiations is shared with all parties. The timing of this sharing may vary depending on the circumstances.

3. Sharing of information notwithstanding, all information generated from the negotiations may be held in confidence until officially released. That decision will depend on the nature of the talks. For example, if publicity may help create support and empower the negotiators to agree, release of information may be constructive. Flexibility is needed here rather than a hard and fast rule.

(h) Cultural Considerations

1. There are organizational cultures within the various agencies and departments of the USG that shape the context of negotiations. Equally important are national cultural differences.

2. It is imperative that experienced interpreters be part of the negotiating team. What is critical is their understanding of the cultural context of terms used. The team needs more than literal translators.

3. Negotiation is only one means of resolving conflict. It is worthwhile to consider indigenous conflict resolution techniques in selecting an approach. Adapting your techniques to indigenous ones (degradation of US objectives is not acceptable) may improve the prospects for a settlement.

4. There are differences in styles of reasoning, manner in which an individual negotiates, who carries authority, and behavior in such dimensions as protocol and time. For example, in our culture it is accepted that one may offer concessions early

in a negotiation to reach an agreement. That approach may not have the same connotation in other cultures. Moreover, the concept of compromise, which has a positive connotation for Americans, may have a negative one in other cultures.

5. Where we as Americans tend to be direct problem solvers with a give-and-take approach, other cultures are indirect, most concerned with the long-term relationship, historical context, and principles. Issues of symbolism, status, and face may be important considerations.

6. For example, answers may not be direct and you will have to look for indirect formulations and nonverbal gestures to understand what the other party is telling you. In turn, this means you need to be careful with your wording and gestures so that unintended meanings are not sent. The other party may not say no directly to a proposal but that is what is meant.

7. If you cannot reach agreement, keep the dialogue going. At a minimum, seek agreement on when the parties will meet again. Look for something to keep the momentum alive. Go back to earlier discussions on common ground. Seek to keep trust alive in the process.

8. Within your own team, consider selecting one person who understands conflict dynamics and cross-cultural issues to look at the process of the negotiations and advise you. This individual can watch for body language and other indicators of how the process is working. In turn, they may be able to coach the joint force negotiators in more effective techniques.

(i) Implementation

1. At the conclusion of negotiations, a report should be prepared to ensure all accomplishments, agreements, and disagreements are recorded for future use.

2. Consider giving one person the task of reporting and presenting to all participants what has taken place. This can build trust in the process if it is viewed as an honest effort to understand each side's position.

2. Use of Civil Information Management

Civil information is information developed from data about civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events that can be fused or processed to increase interagency, IGO, and NGO situational awareness. **It is a CA planning consideration.**

a. CIM is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and fused with the supported JFC, higher headquarters, DOD and joint intelligence organizations, other USG and DOD agencies, interagency partners, NGOs, and the private sector to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and

nonmilitary partners. CIM is not solely the task of the CA officer or noncommissioned officer in the CIM Cell. It is an essential task for all components of a CA unit in coordination with the J-2, and should be broadly tasked to the supported units intelligence and maneuver elements to enhance the COP and facilitate the JIPOE process. The CIM goal is the enhancement of situational awareness and understanding for all elements in the operational environment to achieve decision superiority.

b. **Civil reconnaissance** is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the operational environment. It should be coordinated with the combatant command's joint intelligence operations center to ensure integration and deconfliction with the intelligence collection plan. CA or other assets (e.g., engineer, medical, MP/security forces, HN or FN organizations, unmanned aircraft systems, interagency partners, or intelligence systems) can conduct civil reconnaissance. It is related to and often performed in conjunction with infrastructure reconnaissance (assessment and survey). The focus of collection in the JFC's operational area for civil reconnaissance is the daily interaction between civilians and US forces. This results in capturing contacts and data points. CAO and CMO planners in coordination with the CMOC integrate civil reconnaissance into the overall supported commander's plans and orders, enhancing COP development.

For further information on infrastructure reconnaissance, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

c. The **civil information grid** provides the capability to coordinate, collaborate, and communicate. This grid provides a common shared collaborative information environment between the joint force components headquarters, CMO staff, and civil partners or stakeholders.

APPENDIX C REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-57 is based upon the following primary references.

1. General

- a. NSPD-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*.
- b. *Unified Command Plan*.

2. Department of Defense Publications

- a. *Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum*.
- b. DOD 3210-R, *Grant and Agreement Regulations*.
- c. DOD 4500.54-G, *Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide*.
- d. DODD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve*.
- e. DODD 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*.
- f. DODD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

- a. CJCSI 3207.01A, *Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action Operations*.
- b. CJCSI 3214.01B, *Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations*.
- c. CJCSM 3122.03C, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II Planning Formats*.
- d. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.
- e. JP 1-04, *Legal Support to Joint Operations*.
- f. JP 1-05, *Religious Support in Joint Operations*.
- g. JP 1-06, *Financial Management Support in Joint Operations*.
- h. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.
- i. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

- j. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.
- k. JP 3-05.1, *Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*.
- l. JP 3-07.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
- m. JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*.
- n. JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*.
- o. JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, Volumes I and II.
- p. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments*.
- q. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*.
- r. JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security*.
- s. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.
- t. JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*.
- u. JP 3-28, *Civil Support*.
- v. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
- w. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.
- x. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.
- y. JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*.
- z. JP 3-40, *Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*.
- aa. JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management*.
- bb. JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*.
- cc. JP 3- 61, *Public Affairs*.
- dd. JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.

- ee. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
- ff. JP 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*.
- gg. JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.
- hh. JP 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning*.
- ii. JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations*.
- jj. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.
- kk. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

3. Allied Joint Publication

AJP – 9, NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine.

4. US Army Publications

FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

5. United States Marine Corps Publications

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.1, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*.

6. United States Navy Publications

Tactical Memorandum 3-07.6-05, *Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Operations Planning*.

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APPENDIX D ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent is the United States Special Operations Command and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-57, 8 February 2001, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, and JP 3-57.1, 14 April 2003, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOKF-J7-DD//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//
CDR USJFCOM NORFOLK VA//DOC GP//

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, –Doctrine and Education Group and info the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS
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5. Distribution Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS at <https://jdeis.js.mil> (NIPRNET), and <https://jdeis.js.smil.mil> (SIPRNET) and on the JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-7400.

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications.

GLOSSARY

PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
AFCAP	Air Force contract augmentation program
AFMS	Air Force Medical Service
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigation
AJP	Allied joint publication
ANG	Air National Guard
AOC	air operations center
AOR	area of responsibility
ASCC	Army Service component command
ASD (SO/LIC & IC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities)
AT	antiterrorism
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAG	civil affairs group
CAO	civil affairs operations
CAPT	civil affairs planning team
CBMU	construction battalion maintenance unit
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CDRUSTRANSCOM	Commander, United States Transportation Command
CEB	combat engineer battalion
CIM	civil information management
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CLT	civil liaison team
CM	consequence management
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COG	center of gravity
COIN	counterinsurgency
COM	chief of mission
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operational picture
COS	chief of staff
DC	dislocated civilian
DHS	Department of Homeland Security

DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DOS	Department of State
DTS	Defense Transportation System
ESB	engineer support battalion
INCD	First Naval Construction Division
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP	force health protection
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual
FN	foreign nation
FNS	foreign nation support
FP	force protection
FPA	foreign policy advisor
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GE	general engineering
GS	general support
HA	humanitarian assistance
HACC	humanitarian assistance coordination center
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HHC	headquarters and headquarters company
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HOC	humanitarian operations center
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human intelligence
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IHS	international health specialist
IO	information operations
IPI	indigenous populations and institutions
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
JCMOTF	joint civil-military operations task force
JFC	joint force commander
JFCH	joint force chaplain
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPP	joint operation planning process

JP	joint publication
JPOTF	joint psychological operations task force
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTF	joint task force
LOAC	law of armed conflict
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MCA	military civic action
MCAG	maritime civil affairs group
MCAT	maritime civil affairs team
MCMO	medical civil-military operations
M/CM/S	mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
MLG	Marine logistics group
MNF	multinational force
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MP	military police (Army and Marine)
MWSS	Marine wing support squadron
NA	nation assistance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFAC	Naval Facilities Engineering Command
NCF	naval construction force
NCFSU	naval construction force support unit
NCR	naval construction regiment
NECC	Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NMCB	naval mobile construction battalion
NSC	National Security Council
NSPD	national security Presidential directive
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
NWP	Navy warfare publication
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OFDA	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
OGA	other government agency
OIC	officer in charge
OPCON	operational control
OPSEC	operations security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PHIBCB	amphibious construction battalion

PO	peace operations
POB	psychological operations battalion
POG	psychological operations group
POLAD	political advisor
POLMIL	political-military
PRC	populace and resources control
Prime BEEF	Prime Base Engineer Emergency Forces
PRT	provincial reconstruction team
PSYOP	psychological operations
RC	Reserve Component
RED HORSE	Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair Squadron, Engineers
ROE	rules of engagement
RUF	rules for the use of force
SCA	support to civil administration
SCP	security cooperation plan
SEABEE	Navy construction engineer
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SJA	staff judge advocate
SO	special operations
SOF	special operations forces
SSTR	stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
SYG	Secretary General (UN)
TPB	tactical psychological operations battalion
TSOC	theater special operations command
UCT	underwater construction team
UN	United Nations
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USA	United States Army
USACIDC	United States Army Criminal Investigation Command
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USDAO	United States defense attaché office
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

WHO World Health Organization (UN)
WMD weapons of mass destruction

PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02; JP 3-07.2)

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil affairs operations. Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Also called CAO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57)

civil-military operations center. An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called

CMOC. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02; JP 5-0)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through the subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

complex contingency operations. Large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that involve one or more of the elements of peace operations that include one or more elements of other types of operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsurgency. Also called CCOs. (JP 1-02; JP 3-08)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02; JP 2-0)

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02; JP 3-07.4)

dislocated civilian. A broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called DC. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57)

evacuee. A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57)

expellee. A civilian outside the boundaries of the country of his or her nationality or ethnic origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that country or to a third country for political or other purposes. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57)

force health protection. Measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well-being of Service members. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. Also called FHP. (JP 1-02; JP 4-02)

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02; 3-0)

foreign humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (JP 1-02; JP 3-33)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05)

foreign nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation when operating outside its national boundaries during military operations based on agreements mutually concluded between nations or on behalf of intergovernmental organizations. Support may come from the nation in which forces are operating. Foreign nation support also may be from third party nations and include support or assistance, such as logistics, rendered outside the operational area. Also called FNS. (JP 1-02; JP 1-06)

homeland defense. The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. Also called HD. (JP 1-02; JP 3-27)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02; JP 4-0)

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401 and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also called HA. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

humanitarian assistance coordination center. A temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning. A humanitarian assistance coordination center operates during the early planning and coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations by providing the link between the geographic combatant commander and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations at the strategic level. Also called HACC. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57)

humanitarian operations center. An interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations, or a United States

Government agency during a United States unilateral operation. The humanitarian operations center should consist of representatives from the affected country, the United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the United Nations, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other major players in the operation. Also called HOC. (JP 1-02; JP 3-08)

indigenous populations and institutions. A generic term used to describe the civilian construct of an operational area to include its populations (legal citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians), governmental, tribal, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called IPI. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-13)

interagency. United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02; JP 3-08)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02; JP 3-08)

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-08)

joint civil-military operations task force. A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one Service. It provides support to the joint force commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or civil-military operations concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater. Also called JCMOTF. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05.1.)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

joint psychological operations task force. A joint special operations task force composed of headquarters and operational assets. It assists the joint force commander in developing strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a

theater campaign or other operations. Mission requirements will determine its composition and assigned or attached units to support the joint task force commander. Also called JPOTF. (JP 1-02; JP 3-53)

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

law of war. That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

lead mobility wing. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02; JP 3-57)

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10, US Code programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or intergovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-08)

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas

include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. Also called OA. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

other government agency. Within the context of interagency coordination, a non Department of Defense agency of the United States Government. Also called OGA. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. Also called PO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-07.3)

Presidential Reserve Call-up. Provision of a public law (title 10, US Code, section 12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (of whom not more than 30,000 may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve), for not more than 270 days to meet the requirements of any operational mission. Members called under this provision may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection. This authority has particular utility when used in circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization. Also called PRC. (JP 1-02; JP 4-05)

private sector. An umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

provincial reconstruction team. An interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services. Also called PRT. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02; JP 3-53)

refugee. A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return. (JP 1-02; JP 3-07.6)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57)

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. Also called SAO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-07.1)

special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment,

independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05)

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05.1)

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. Also called SOFA. (JP 1-02; JP 3-16)


strategic communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02; JP 5-0)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02; JP 3-07.2)

theater special operations command. A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander's assigned operational area. Also called TSOC. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05.1)

unified action. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-57** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

