RP0106 - Support Ministry in Crisis response and Limited Contingency Operations

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE
1. Given references, support ministry in Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations, per the student handout. (RP00.01.12)

ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
1. Without the aid of references, given a list, identify the types of crisis response and limited contingency operations, per the student handout. (RP00.01.12a)
2. Without the aid of references, given a list, identify the operational environments associated with crisis response and contingency operation, per the student handout. (RP00.01.12b)
3. Without the aid of references, given a list, identify the role of the RMT in crisis response and contingency operations, per the student handout. (RP00.01.12c)

1. General
   a. Crises and Contingencies. US forces need to be able to respond rapidly to certain crises, either unilaterally or as a part of an interagency and/or multinational effort, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. The ability of the United States to respond rapidly with appropriate options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, a joint operation often may be planned and executed as a crisis response or limited contingency. Crisis response and limited contingency operations may include, for example, employment of overwhelming force in Peace Enforcement Operation (PEO), a single precision strike, a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), or Civil Support (CS) mission.
   b. Initial Response. When crises develop and the President directs, Combatant Commanders respond. If the crisis revolves around external threats to a regional partner, Combatant Commanders employ joint forces to deter aggression and signal US commitment (e.g., deploying joint forces to train in Kuwait). If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that threatens regional stability, US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability (e.g., Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti). If the crisis is within US territory (e.g., natural or manmade disaster, deliberate attack), US joint forces will conduct Civil Support/Homeland defense operations as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense. Prompt deployment of sufficient forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later. Effective early intervention also can deny an adversary time to set conditions in their favor or achieve destabilizing objectives; or mitigate the effects of a natural or manmade disaster. Deploying a credible force rapidly is one step in deterring or blocking aggression. However, deployment alone will not guarantee success. Achieving successful deterrence involves convincing the adversary that the
deployed force is able to conduct decisive operations and the national leadership is willing to employ that force and to deploy more forces if necessary.

c. Scope. Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically limited in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific strategic or operational objective in an operational area. They may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a crisis (e.g., NEOs) or executed as an element of a larger, more complex joint campaign or operation. Crisis response and limited contingency operations may be conducted to achieve operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives.

A. D. POLITICAL ASPECTS. TWO IMPORTANT FACTORS ABOUT POLITICAL PRIMACY IN CRISIS RESPONSE AND FOREIGN LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS STAND OUT. FIRST, HAVING AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE HELPS AVOID ACTIONS THAT MAY HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS. IT IS NOT UNCOMMON IN SOME OPERATIONS, SUCH AS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, FOR JUNIOR LEADERS TO MAKE DECISIONS THAT HAVE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. SECONDLY, COMMANDERS SHOULD REMAIN AWARE OF CHANGES NOT ONLY IN THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION, BUT ALSO TO CHANGES IN POLITICAL OBJECTIVES THAT MAY WARRANT A CHANGE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS. THESE CHANGES MAY NOT ALWAYS BE OBVIOUS. THEREFORE, COMMANDERS MUST STRIVE, THROUGH CONTINUING MISSION ANALYSIS, TO DETECT SUBTLE CHANGES, WHICH OVER TIME, MAY LEAD TO DISCONNECTS BETWEEN POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS. FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE CHANGES IN POLITICAL OBJECTIVES EARLY MAY LEAD TO INEFFECTIVE OR COUNTERPRODUCTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS.

B. E. ECONOMY OF FORCE. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT REQUIRES THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN AND PREPARE JOINT FORCES FOR CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS SIMULTANEOUS WITH OTHER OPERATIONS, PREFERABLY IN CONCERT WITH ALLIES AND/OR COALITION PARTNERS WHEN APPROPRIATE. THIS APPROACH RECOGNIZES THAT THESE OPERATIONS WILL VARY IN DURATION, FREQUENCY, INTENSITY, AND THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL REQUIRED. THE BURDEN OF MANY CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS MAY LEND THEMSELVES TO USING SMALL ELEMENTS LIKE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN COORDINATION WITH ALLIED HOST NATION. INITIAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE LEAD OF THESE OPERATIONS AS AN ECONOMY OF FORCE MEASURE MAY ENABLE MAJOR OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS WITH CONVENTIONAL FOCUS TO PROGRESS MORE EFFECTIVELY.

2. 2. Typical Operations
C. NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO) ARE OPERATIONS DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND MANAGED BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR OTHER APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY WHEREBY NONCOMBATANTS ARE EVACUATED FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES WHEN THEIR LIVES ARE ENDANGERED BY WAR, CIVIL UNREST, OR NATURAL DISASTER TO SAFE HAVENS OR TO THE UNITED STATES. ALTHOUGH PRINCIPALLY CONDUCTED TO EVACUATE US CITIZENS, NEOS ALSO MAY INCLUDE CITIZENS FROM THE HOST NATION AS WELL AS CITIZENS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12656, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROTECTION AND EVACUATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD AND FOR SAFEGUARDING THEIR PROPERTY. THIS ORDER ALSO DIRECTS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO ADVISE AND ASSIST THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN PREPARING AND IMPLEMENTING PLANS FOR THE EVACUATION OF US CITIZENS. THE US AMBASSADOR, OR CHIEF OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PREPARATION OF EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS THAT ADDRESS THE MILITARY EVACUATION OF US CITIZENS AND DESIGNATED FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM A FOREIGN COUNTRY. THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS TO ASSIST IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDER, AS DIRECTED BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

D. (1) NEOS ARE OFTEN CHARACTERIZED BY UNCERTAINTY. THEY MAY BE DIRECTED WITHOUT WARNING BECAUSE OF SUDDEN CHANGES IN A COUNTRY’S GOVERNMENT, REORIENTED DIPLOMATIC OR MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, A SUDDEN HOSTILE THREAT TO US CITIZENS FROM ELEMENTS WITHIN OR EXTERNAL TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY, OR IN RESPONSE TO A NATURAL DISASTER.

E. (2) NEO METHODS AND TIMING ARE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED BY DIPLOMATIC CONSIDERATIONS. UNDER IDEAL CIRCUMSTANCES THERE MAY BE LITTLE OR NO OPPOSITION; HOWEVER, COMMANDERS SHOULD ANTICIPATE OPPOSITION AND PLAN THE OPERATION LIKE ANY COMBAT OPERATION.

F. (3) NEOS ARE SIMILAR TO A RAID IN THAT THE OPERATION INVOLVES SWIFT INSERTION OF A FORCE, TEMPORARY OCCUPATION OF PHYSICAL OBJECTIVES, AND ENDS WITH A PLANNED WITHDRAWAL. IT DIFFERS FROM A RAID IN THAT FORCE USED NORMALLY IS LIMITED TO THAT REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE EVACUEES AND THE EVACUATION FORCE. FORCES PENETRATING FOREIGN TERRITORY TO CONDUCT A NEO SHOULD BE KEPT TO THE MINIMUM CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT AND THE SECURITY OF THE FORCE AND THE EXTRACTION AND PROTECTION OF EVACUEES.
G. B. PEACE OPERATIONS. PO ARE MULTIAGENCY AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS INVOLVING ALL INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER; INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS AND MILITARY MISSIONS; TO CONTAIN CONFLICT, REDRESS THE PEACE, AND SHAPE THE ENVIRONMENT TO SUPPORT RECONCILIATION AND REBUILDING AND FACILITATE THE TRANSITION TO LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE. FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, PO ENCOMPASS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO), PREDOMINANTLY MILITARY PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS (PEO), PREDOMINANTLY DIPLOMATIC PEACE BUILDING ACTIONS, PEACEMAKING (PM) PROCESSES, AND CONFLICT PREVENTION. PO ARE CONDUCTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES AND HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS NECESSARY TO SECURE A NEGOTIATED TRUCE AND RESOLVE THE CONFLICT. PO ARE TAILORED TO EACH SITUATION AND MAY BE CONDUCTED IN SUPPORT OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES BEFORE, DURING, OR AFTER CONFLICT. PO SUPPORT NATIONAL/MULTINATIONAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. MILITARY SUPPORT IMPROVES THE CHANCES FOR SUCCESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS BY LENDING CREDIBILITY TO DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS AND DEMONSTRATING RESOLVE TO ACHIEVE VABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS.

H. (1) PEACEKEEPING OPERATION (PKO) ARE MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDERTAKEN WITH THE CONSENT OF ALL MAJOR PARTIES TO A DISPUTE, DESIGNED TO MONITOR AND FACILITATE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT (CEASE FIRE, TRUCE, OR OTHER SUCH AGREEMENTS) AND SUPPORT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO REACH A LONG-TERM POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. AN EXAMPLE OF PKO IS THE US COMMITMENT TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE OBSERVERS IN THE SINAI SINCE 1982.

I. (2) PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS (PEO) ARE THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY FORCE OR THREAT OF ITS USE, NORMALLY PURSUANT TO INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATION, TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS OR SANCTIONS DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN OR RESTORE PEACE AND ORDER. PEO MAY INCLUDE THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AND EXCLUSION ZONES, PROTECTION OF FHA, RESTORATION OF ORDER, AND FORCIBLE SEPARATION OF BELLIGERENT PARTIES OR PARTIES TO A DISPUTE. UNLIKE PKO, SUCH OPERATIONS DO NOT REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF THE STATES INVOLVED OR OF OTHER PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT (E.G., OPERATIONS JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, AND JOINT FORGE, 1995-2001 IN BOSNIA AND JOINT GUARDIAN, 1999-2001 IN KOSOVO).
J. (3) PEACE BUILDING. PB CONSISTS OF STABILITY ACTIONS (PREDOMINANTLY DIPLOMATIC,

K. ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY RELATED) THAT STRENGTHEN AND REBUILD GOVERNMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS, BUILD CONFIDENCE, AND SUPPORT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION TO PREVENT A RETURN TO CONFLICT. MILITARY SUPPORT TO PB MAY INCLUDE REBUILDING ROADS, REESTABLISHING OR CREATING GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, OR TRAINING DEFENSE FORCES.

L. (4) PEACEMAKING. PM IS THE PROCESS OF DIPLOMACY, MEDIATION, NEGOTIATION, OR OTHER FORMS OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT ARRANGES AN END TO A DISPUTE OR RESOLVES ISSUES THAT LED TO CONFLICT. IT CAN BE AN ONGOING PROCESS, SUPPORTED BY MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND IO. THE PURPOSE IS TO INSTILL IN THE PARTIES AN UNDERSTANDING THAT RECONCILIATION IS A BETTER ALTERNATIVE TO FIGHTING. THE MILITARY CAN ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING INCENTIVES, DISINCENTIVES, AND MECHANISMS THAT PROMOTE RECONCILIATION. MILITARY ACTIVITIES THAT SUPPORT PM INCLUDE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

M. (5) CONFLICT PREVENTION CONSISTS OF DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN IN ADVANCE OF A PREDICTABLE CRISIS TO PREVENT OR LIMIT VIOLENCE, DETER PARTIES, AND REACH AN AGREEMENT BEFORE ARMED HOSTILITIES. THESE ACTIONS ARE NORMALLY CONDUCTED UNDER CHAPTER VI, “PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES,” OF THE UN CHARTER. HOWEVER, MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS DESIGNED TO DETER AND COERCSE PARTIES WILL NEED TO BE CREDIBLE AND THIS MAY REQUIRE A COMBAT POSTURE AND AN ENFORCEMENT MANDATE UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF CHAPTER VII, “ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION,” OF THE UN CHARTER. CONFLICT PREVENTION ACTIVITIES INCLUDE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES, EFFORTS DESIGNED TO REFORM A COUNTRY’S SECURITY SECTOR AND MAKE IT MORE ACCOUNTABLE TO DEMOCRATIC CONTROL, AND DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES DESIGNED TO PREVENT A DISPUTE OR CONTAIN IT FROM ESCALATING TO HOSTILITIES. OTHER CONFLICT PREVENTION ACTIVITIES MAY INCLUDE MILITARY FACT-FINDING MISSIONS, CONSULTATIONS, WARNINGS, INSPECTIONS, AND MONITORING. MILITARY FORCES USED FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON SUPPORT TO POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL EFFORTS TO AMELIORATE THE CAUSES OF TENSION AND UNREST. MILITARY
ACTIVITIES WILL BE TAILORED TO MEET POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENT DEMANDS.

N. C. FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (FHA). FHA OPERATIONS RELIEVE OR REDUCE THE IMPACT OF NATURAL OR MANMADE DISASTERS OR OTHER ENDEMIC CONDITIONS SUCH AS HUMAN PAIN, DISEASE, HUNGER, OR PRIVATION IN COUNTRIES OR REGIONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. FHA PROVIDED BY US FORCES IS GENERALLY LIMITED IN SCOPE AND DURATION; IT IS INTENDED TO SUPPLEMENT OR COMPLEMENT EFFORTS OF HN CIVIL AUTHORITIES OR AGENCIES WITH THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING ASSISTANCE.

O. DOD PROVIDES ASSISTANCE WHEN THE NEED FOR RELIEF IS GRAVELY URGENT AND WHEN THE HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY DWARFS THE ABILITY OF NORMAL RELIEF AGENCIES TO EFFECTIVELY RESPOND.

P. (1) THE US MILITARY IS CAPABLE OF RAPIDLY RESPONDING TO EMERGENCIES OR DISASTERS AND RESTORING RELATIVE ORDER IN AUSTERE LOCATIONS. US FORCES MAY PROVIDE LOGISTICS (E.G., HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT), PLANNING, AND COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES REQUIRED TO INITIATE AND SUSTAIN FHA OPERATIONS.

Q. (2) FHA OPERATIONS MAY BE DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WHEN A SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL SITUATION THREATENS THE POLITICAL OR MILITARY STABILITY OF A REGION CONSIDERED OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES, OR WHEN THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEEMS THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION ITSELF SUFFICIENT AND APPROPRIATE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF US FORCES. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR THE US AMBASSADOR IN COUNTRY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DECLARING A FOREIGN DISASTER OR SITUATION THAT REQUIRES FHA. WITHIN DOD, THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY HAS THE OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING THE MILITARY POLICY FOR INTERNATIONAL FHA OPERATIONS.

R. (3) FHA OPERATIONS MAY COVER A BROAD RANGE OF MISSIONS AND INCLUDE SECURING AN ENVIRONMENT TO ALLOW HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS TO PROCEED. US MILITARY FORCES PARTICIPATE IN THREE BASIC TYPES OF FHA OPERATIONS — THOSE COORDINATED BY THE UN, THOSE WHERE THE UNITED STATES ACTS IN CONCERT WITH OTHER MULTINATIONAL FORCES, OR THOSE WHERE THE UNITED STATES RESPONDS UNILATERALLY.
S. D. RECOVERY OPERATIONS MAY BE CONDUCTED TO SEARCH FOR, LOCATE, IDENTIFY, RECOVER, AND RETURN ISOLATED PERSONNEL, SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT, ITEMS CRITICAL TO NATIONAL SECURITY, OR HUMAN REMAINS (E.G., JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) - FULL ACCOUNTING TO ACHIEVE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF AMERICANS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR AS A RESULT OF THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA). REGARDLESS OF THE RECOVERY PURPOSE, EACH TYPE OF RECOVERY OPERATION IS GENERALLY A SOPHISTICATED ACTIVITY REQUIRING DETAILED PLANNING IN ORDER TO EXECUTE. RECOVERY OPERATIONS MAY BE CLANDESTINE, COVERT, OR OVERT DEPENDING ON WHETHER THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IS HOSTILE, UNCERTAIN, OR PERMISSIVE.

T. E. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT (CM). CM IS ACTIONS TAKEN TO MAINTAIN OR RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND MANAGE AND MITIGATE PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM DISASTERS AND CATASTROPHES, INCLUDING NATURAL, MANMADE, OR TERRORIST INCIDENTS. CM MAY BE PLANNED AND EXECUTED FOR LOCATIONS WITHIN US OWNED TERRITORY AT HOME AND ABROAD AND IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AS DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. MILITARY SUPPORT FOR DOMESTIC CM WILL BE PROVIDED THROUGH COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND (CDRUSNORTHCOM), COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND (CDRUSSOUTHCOM), OR COMMANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND (CDRUSPACOM) DEPENDING UPON THE LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT. DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS THE FEDERAL AGENCY WITH LEAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN CM AND DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) IS THE “PRIMARY AGENCY” FOR DOMESTIC CM. US MILITARY SUPPORT TO FOREIGN CM NORMALLY WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE COMBATANT COMMAND WITHIN WHOSE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR) THE INCIDENT OCCURS.

U. F. STRIKES AND RAIDS

V. (1) STRIKES ARE ATTACKS CONDUCTED TO DAMAGE OR DESTROY AN OBJECTIVE OR A CAPABILITY. STRIKES MAY BE USED TO PUNISH OFFENDING NATIONS OR GROUPS, UPHOLD INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR PREVENT THOSE NATIONS OR GROUPS FROM LAUNCHING THEIR OWN ATTACKS (E.G., OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON CONDUCTED AGAINST LIBYA IN 1986, IN RESPONSE TO THE TERRORIST BOMBING
OF US SERVICE MEMBERS IN BERLIN. THE STRIKE ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.

W. (2) RAIDS ARE OPERATIONS TO TEMPORARILY SEIZE AN AREA, USUALLY THROUGH FORCIBLE ENTRY, IN ORDER TO SECURE INFORMATION, CONFUSE AN ADVERSARY, CAPTURE PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT, OR DESTROY AN OBJECTIVE OR CAPABILITY (E.G., OPERATION URGENT FURY, GRENADA 1983, TO PROTECT US CITIZENS AND RESTORE THE LAWFUL GOVERNMENT). RAIDS END WITH A PLANNED WITHDRAWAL UPON COMPLETION OF THE ASSIGNED MISSION.


Y. (1) HOMELAND DEFENSE (HD). THE PURPOSE OF HD IS TO PROTECT AGAINST AND MITIGATE THE IMPACT OF INCURSIONS OR ATTACKS ON SOVEREIGN TERRITORY, THE DOMESTIC POPULATION, AND CRITICAL DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE. DOD IS THE FEDERAL AGENCY WITH LEAD RESPONSIBILITY, SUPPORTED BY OTHER AGENCIES, IN DEFENDING AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS/AGGRESSION. HOWEVER, AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS DOD MAY BE IN SUPPORT OF AN OGA. WHEN ORDERED TO CONDUCT HD OPERATIONS WITHIN US TERRITORY, DOD WILL COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (OGAS). CONSISTENT WITH LAWS AND POLICY, THE SERVICES WILL PROVIDE
CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT COMBATANT COMMANDERS REQUIREMENTS AGAINST A VARIETY OF THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH THE AIR, LAND, MARITIME, AND SPACE DOMAINS, AND THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT. THESE INCLUDE INVASION, COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK (CNA), AND AIR AND MISSILE ATTACKS.

Z. (2) CIVIL SUPPORT (CS). CS INCLUDES USING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND DOD PERSONNEL, CONTRACTORS, AND ASSETS FOR DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER ACTIVITIES WHEN DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. FOR CS OPERATIONS, DOD SUPPORTS AND DOES NOT SUPPLANT CIVIL AUTHORITIES. WITHIN A STATE, THAT STATE’S GOVERNOR IS THE KEY DECISION MAKER.

AA. (A) THE MAJORITY OF CS OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN (NRP). THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN (NRP), IS THE PRIMARY FEDERAL MECHANISM THROUGH WHICH DOD SUPPORT IS REQUESTED FOR DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES. THE NRP DESCRIBES THE POLICIES, PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS, AND A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) THAT GUIDE FEDERAL OPERATIONS FOLLOWING A PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION OF A MAJOR DISASTER OR EMERGENCY. THE NRP IS COORDINATED AND MANAGED BY DHS/FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) AND IS THE RESULT OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN DHS/FEMA AND THE PRIMARY AND SUPPORTING FEDERAL AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING DISASTER RELIEF AND OTHER EMERGENCY SUPPORT. DOD SUPPORT IS DESCRIBED IN THE NRP AS “DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES” AND IS PROVIDED WITH THE PROVISION THAT IT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH DOD’S MISSION OR ITS ABILITY TO RESPOND TO MILITARY CONTINGENCIES.

BB. (B) OTHER CS OPERATIONS CAN INCLUDE COUNTER DRUG (CD) ACTIVITIES, INTELLIGENCE OR INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT, OR OTHER SUPPORT TO CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIFIC DOD POLICIES AND US LAW.

CC. (3) GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE. COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND (CDRUSNORTHCOM), COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND (CDRUSSOUTHCOM), AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

DD. (CDRUSPACOM) HAVE SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES FOR HD AND CS. THESE INCLUDE CONDUCTING OPERATIONS TO DETER, PREVENT, AND DEFEAT THREATS AND AGGRESSION AIMED AT THE UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES, AND INTERESTS WITHIN THEIR ASSIGNED AORS AND, AS DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PROVIDING CS INCLUDING CM. HOWEVER, DOD SUPPORT TO HD IS GLOBAL IN NATURE AND IS OFTEN CONDUCTED BY ALL COMBATANT COMMANDERS BEGINNING AT THE SOURCE OF THE THREAT. IN THE FORWARD REGIONS OUTSIDE US TERRITORIES THE OBJECTIVE IS TO DETECT, DETER, OR WHEN DIRECTED, DEFEAT THREATS TO THE HOMELAND BEFORE THEY ARISE.

3. Operational Environments

Evacuation operations are characterized by uncertainty and may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country’s government, reoriented political or military relationships with the United States, or a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from a force within or external to a host country. The key factors in noncombatant evacuation planning are situational awareness, a correct appraisal and understanding of the changing political and military environment in which the JTF will operate, and preparation of the evacuation force for a situation that may rapidly move from permissive to uncertain or hostile. Alternative plans should be developed for permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments.

EE. A. PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT. UNDER THIS CONDITION, NO RESISTANCE TO EVACUATION OPERATIONS IS EXPECTED, AND THUS THE OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE LITTLE OR NO ASSEMBLY OF COMBAT FORCES IN COUNTRY. EVACUEES MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN PROCESSED AND ASSEMBLED AT DESIGNATED ASSEMBLY AREAS, EVACUATION POINTS, AND SITES. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT, A JTF CAN EXPECT HOST NATION CONCURRENCE AND POSSIBLE SUPPORT. THE JTF’S PRIMARY CONCERNS MAY BE LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS INVOLVING EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT, TRANSPORTATION, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING, AND COORDINATION WITH THE DOS AND OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE EVACUATION. A MINIMUM NUMBER OF SECURITY FORCES SHOULD BE USED DURING THE NEO. NONETHELESS, DISCREET, PRUDENT PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE IN PLACE TO ENABLE THE FORCE CONDUCTING THE NEO

FF. TO RESPOND TO THREATS TO THE EVACUEES.

GG.
HH. B. UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT. AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH HOST GOVERNMENT FORCES, WHETHER OPPOSED OR RECEPTIVE TO THE NEO, DO NOT HAVE TOTAL EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE TERRITORY AND POPULATION IN THE INTENDED AREA OR COUNTRY OF OPERATIONS. BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTY, THE CJTF MAY ELECT TO REINFORCE THE EVACUATION FORCE WITH ADDITIONAL SECURITY UNITS OR A REACTION FORCE. THE ROE DEVELOPED ARE DISSEMINATED EARLY TO ENSURE THAT THE JTF HAS HAD SUFFICIENT TRAINING AND IS PROFICIENT IN APPLICATION OF THE ROE. PLANNING FOR NEOS CONDUCTED IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT MUST ALWAYS INCLUDE ANTICIPATING THE POSSIBILITY FOR ESCALATION TO A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT.

II. C. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT. PERSONNEL MAY BE EVACUATED UNDER CONDITIONS RANGING FROM CIVIL DISORDER OR TERRORIST ACTION TO THE JTF MUST BE PREPARED FOR A WIDE RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES. THE COMMANDER JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF) MAY ELECT TO DEPLOY A SIZABLE SECURITY ELEMENT WITH THE EVACUATION FORCE OR POSITION A LARGE REACTION FORCE, EITHER WITH THE EVACUATION FORCE OR AT AN INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE (ISB). IN ADDITION TO NORMAL FUNCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH PERSONNEL EVACUATIONS (EMBARKATION, TRANSPORTATION, MEDICAL, AND SERVICES), THE JTF MAY BE REQUIRED TO CONDUCT A FORCED ENTRY, ESTABLISH DEFENSIVE PERIMETERS, ESCORT CONVOYS, PARTICIPATE IN PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS, AND PERFORM THE SCREENING OF EVACUEES NORMALLY ACCOMPLISHED BY DOS OFFICIALS.

4. Role of the RMT in Crisis Response and Contingency Operations

JJ. A. ADVISE THE COMMANDER ON RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL MATTERS WITHIN THE AOR (THIS WILL BE COVERED IN ANOTHER CLASS).

KK. B. SERVE AS LIAISON WITH UN, HUMANITARIAN, INDIGENOUS AND/OR RELIGIOUS GROUPS WITHIN THE AOR.

LL. C. ADVISE THE COMMANDER ON MORALE WITHIN THE FORCE AND THE INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY.

MM. D. COORDINATE OR CONDUCT PROGRAMS THAT ENHANCE MORALE, MORAL AND PERSONAL WELL-BEING.

NN. E. DURING HA OR NEOS THE RMT WILL:

OO. (1) IDENTIFY AGENCIES/ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE WITHIN THE AOR
PP.  (2) IDENTIFY RESOURCES AVAILABLE WITH EACH GROUP

QQ.  (3) IDENTIFY KEY PERSONNEL WITHIN EACH GROUP

RR.  (4) CONTACT GROUPS TO ESTABLISH PROTOCOLS, COORDINATE SUPPORT AND ASSIST WITH THE DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES AND SERVICES

SS.  (5) RECRUIT VOLUNTEERS FOR HUMANITARIAN AID PROJECTS

TT. (6) ASSIST AND ADVISE PAO ON CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES

UU.  (7) ASSIST AND ADVISE CIVIL AFFAIRS PERSONNEL

VV.  (8) PARTICIPATE IN MISSION DESIGN, PLANNING AND INTERAGENCY DISCUSSIONS

WW.  (9) COORDINATE VISITS OF RELIGIOUS DIGNITARIES

XX.  (10) ASSIST THE COMMANDER WITH RESPONSES TO LETTERS, INVITATIONS, DONATIONS, ETC

YY.  (11) PROVIDE PASTORAL CARE AND SUPPORT TO EVACUEES (BASIC NEEDS, REUNITE FAMILIES AND COUNSELING

ZZ. (12) RECRUIT MISSIONARIES AND OTHER CLERGY TO ASSIST IN PROVIDING PASTORAL CARE AND SUPPORT TO EVACUEES.

AAA.  (13) ASSIST THE COMMANDER IN RUMOR CONTROL

BBB.  (14) RECOMMEND, DEVELOP AND/OR FACILITATE PROGRAMS AND PROCEDURES WHICH REDUCE SITUATIONAL SHOCK, AND DEFUSE STRESS

CCC.  (15) MONITOR MORALE OF CIVILIAN DETAINEE