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Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Contents

PREFACE .............................................................................................................vi

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 1-1
Civil Affairs ........................................................................................................ 1-1
Civil Affairs Operations .................................................................................... 1-2
Civil-Military Operations .................................................................................. 1-4
Levels of Support .............................................................................................. 1-6

Chapter 2 CIVIL AFFAIRS METHODOLOGY................................................................. 2-1
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 2-1
Assess ............................................................................................................... 2-3
Decide .............................................................................................................. 2-6
Develop and Detect .......................................................................................... 2-7
Deliver .............................................................................................................. 2-7
Evaluate .......................................................................................................... 2-8
Transition ........................................................................................................ 2-8

Chapter 3 CIVIL AFFAIRS ANALYSIS AND PLANNING PROCESS............................ 3-1
Overview ........................................................................................................... 3-1
Operations Processes ......................................................................................... 3-2

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*This publication supersedes FM 3-05.401, 23 September 2003.
Joint Operations Planning ........................................................................................................ 3-3
Receipt of Mission and Mission Analysis ............................................................................. 3-4
Information Gathering ........................................................................................................... 3-5
Civil-Military Operations Estimate ...................................................................................... 3-6
Mission Planning .................................................................................................................. 3-12
Strategic Planning ................................................................................................................ 3-15
Operational Planning .......................................................................................................... 3-16
Measures of Effectiveness and Performance ...................................................................... 3-18
Evaluation Products .............................................................................................................. 3-19
Measuring Effects ................................................................................................................. 3-19
Achieving Effects .................................................................................................................. 3-20
Failure to Achieve Effects ..................................................................................................... 3-22
Measuring Performance ....................................................................................................... 3-22
Tactical Planning ................................................................................................................... 3-23
Planning Products .................................................................................................................. 3-25

Chapter 4 CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER ............................................................... 4-1
Overview ............................................................................................................................... 4-1
Function .................................................................................................................................. 4-2
Organization .......................................................................................................................... 4-3
Communications Requirements ......................................................................................... 4-13
Mobility Requirements ......................................................................................................... 4-18
Establishing .......................................................................................................................... 4-19
Location Options ................................................................................................................... 4-21
Facility Considerations ........................................................................................................ 4-24
Security and Force Protection Considerations .................................................................... 4-24
Map Board (Situation Board) ............................................................................................... 4-25
Layout Considerations ......................................................................................................... 4-25

Chapter 5 CORE TASKS ......................................................................................................... 5-1
Overview ............................................................................................................................... 5-1
Populace and Resources Control ......................................................................................... 5-2
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance ......................................................................................... 5-6
Nation Assistance ................................................................................................................... 5-9
Support to Civil Administration .......................................................................................... 5-11
Civil Information Management .............................................................................................. 5-14

Chapter 6 TRANSITION OPERATIONS ................................................................................... 6-1
Overview ............................................................................................................................... 6-1
Transition Planning ................................................................................................................. 6-1
Termination ............................................................................................................................. 6-2
Transfer .................................................................................................................................. 6-2
Transition ............................................................................................................................... 6-3
Continuity of Operations ....................................................................................................... 6-4
Civil Affairs Desired End State Indicators and Measurement ............................................... 6-5

Appendix A ASSESSMENT FORMATS ....................................................................................... A-1
Appendix B OPEN-SOURCE RESEARCH TECHNIQUES ........................................................ B-1
Appendix C USE OF INTERPRETERS .................................................................................... C-1
## Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1-1.</td>
<td>95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Active Army)</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1-2.</td>
<td>Conventional Civil Affairs USAR support model</td>
<td>1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1-3.</td>
<td>Civil Affairs six functional areas</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1-4.</td>
<td>Doctrinal Civil Affairs support relationships</td>
<td>1-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2-1.</td>
<td>Comparison of the Civil Affairs methodology and the various problem-solving and decision-making processes</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2-2.</td>
<td>Two ways to depict the spiraling effect of the Civil Affairs methodology</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-1.</td>
<td>Relationship of system, node, link, and centers of gravity</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-2.</td>
<td>Civil-military operations estimate contributions to military decision making process mission analysis</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-3.</td>
<td>Mission analysis information cycle</td>
<td>3-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-4.</td>
<td>Joint operation area systems and political-military factors data matrix example</td>
<td>3-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-5.</td>
<td>Civil-military operations estimate contributions to military decision making process planning</td>
<td>3-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-6.</td>
<td>Civil-military operations estimate contributions to civil-military operations annex</td>
<td>3-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-7.</td>
<td>Types of joint operations plans</td>
<td>3-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-8.</td>
<td>Civil Affairs command support of geographic combatant commander strategic planning</td>
<td>3-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-9.</td>
<td>Sample measure of effectiveness spreadsheet</td>
<td>3-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-10.</td>
<td>Sample trend analysis spreadsheet</td>
<td>3-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-11.</td>
<td>Sample trend analysis chart</td>
<td>3-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-12.</td>
<td>Sample impact analysis chart</td>
<td>3-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3-13.</td>
<td>Measures of performance worksheet example</td>
<td>3-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4-1.</td>
<td>Notional composition of a civil-military operations center</td>
<td>4-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4-2.</td>
<td>Civil Affairs command civil-military operations center organizational structure</td>
<td>4-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4-3.</td>
<td>Civil Affairs brigade civil-military operations center organizational structure</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4-4.</td>
<td>Civil Affairs battalion civil-military operations center organizational structure</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contents

Figure 4-5. Civil Affairs command functional specialty cell organization ........................................... 4-7
Figure 4-6. U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs brigade or battalion functional specialty cell ................................................................. 4-8
Figure 4-7. Military tactical communications environment ........................................................................... 4-14
Figure 4-8. Army command and control systems architecture ........................................................................... 4-15
Figure 4-9. Civil Affairs unit equipment supporting communication connectivity ................................................. 4-17
Figure 4-10. Standard organizational structure (battalion through CACOM) ...................................................... 4-18
Figure 4-11. Possible arrangement for a civil-military operations center inside the security perimeter of the supported headquarters ........................................ 4-22
Figure 4-12. Possible arrangement for a civil-military operations center outside the security perimeter of the supported headquarters ........................................ 4-23
Figure 4-13. Map board .......................................................................................................................... 4-25
Figure 4-14. Graphics specific to civil-military operations ........................................................................... 4-26
Figure 5-1. National disaster response network .......................................................................................... 5-13
Figure 5-2. Flow of civil information ........................................................................................................... 5-14
Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format ............................................................................................ A-1
Figure A-2. Sample rapid assessment format ............................................................................................. A-24
Figure B-1. Internet research techniques and procedures ........................................................................... B-2
Figure B-2. Top-level domains .................................................................................................................. B-8
Figure B-3. Source reliability ....................................................................................................................... B-9
Figure B-4. Information accuracy ............................................................................................................... B-10
Figure E-1. Steps to conduct a vulnerability assessment ............................................................................ E-6
Figure F-1. Dislocated civilian movement graph ........................................................................................ F-4
Figure F-2. Dislocated civilian movement table example ........................................................................... F-5
Figure F-3. Typical dislocated civilian collection plan ................................................................................ F-10
Figure F-4. Example of dislocated civilian road space usage calculations ................................................... F-12
Figure F-5. Basic equipment of general purpose teams ............................................................................ F-15
Figure F-6. Sample dislocated civilian plan format .................................................................................. F-16
Figure F-7. Designation of hasty control sites by quadrant ......................................................................... F-21
Figure F-8. Dislocated civilian collection point layout model ................................................................... F-22
Figure F-9. Example of barracks rules ....................................................................................................... F-29
Figure G-1. Sample DD Form 448 (Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request) ................................ G-6
Figure G-2. Sample SF 44 (U.S. Government Purchase Order Invoice Voucher) ........................................ G-7
Figure G-3. Sample DD Form 1081 (Statement of Agent Officer’s Account) ........................................... G-8
Figure G-4. Sample DD Form 250 (Material Inspection and Receiving Report). ........................................ G-9
Figure G-5. Military interdepartmental purchase request audit trail documents ........................................ G-10
Figure G-6. Project initiation and planning phase ...................................................................................... G-13
Figure G-7. Project execution phase .......................................................................................................... G-14
Figure G-8. Project closeout phase .......................................................................................................... G-18
Tables

Table 4-1. Civil Affairs unit mobility requirements ............................................................. 4-19
Table B-1. Boolean and math logic operators ........................................................................ B-6
Table E-1. Department of Defense determination of terrorist threat level ............................ E-5
Table E-2. Examples of threat-specific countermeasures .................................................... E-6
Table F-1. Measures to control dislocated civilians ............................................................. F-8
Preface

This manual establishes the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by individuals, teams, and units of United States (U.S.) Army and United States Marine Corps (USMC) Civil Affairs (CA) forces, as well as planners of civil-military operations (CMO) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The TTP prescribed in this manual are used when engaging other government agencies (OGAs), indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other nonmilitary entities in support of conventional and special operations (SO) missions. This manual elaborates on doctrine contained in Field Manual (FM) 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations.

The focus of FM 3-05.401 is the “how to” plan, execute, and assess Civil Affairs operations (CAO) and CMO across the full spectrum of operations at the national, provincial, and local levels of government. The intent is to establish a common foundation for CA Soldiers to apply their unique skills, providing a combat multiplier to the supported commander in Service, joint, interagency, and coalition environments.

Using the perspective of the CA planning team, the CA generalist, and the CA functional specialist, FM 3-05.401 illustrates how to identify and conduct CA actions that are products of effects-based operational analysis. This manual also discusses the preparation, conduct, and transition of CMO in support of brigade combat team (BCT), division, and corps operations across the full spectrum of operations.

As with all doctrinal manuals, FM 3-05.401 is authoritative, but not directive. It serves as a guide and does not preclude CA personnel or units from developing their own standing operating procedures (SOPs). The TTP this manual presents should not limit CA Soldiers from using their civilian-acquired skills, training, and experience to meet the challenges they will face while conducting CA operations and providing support to CMO. This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

The USMC has adopted this publication as a nondirective reference publication to supplement existing USMC doctrine on CMO.

The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-CA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

This manual does not implement any international standardization agreements.
Chapter 1
Introduction

...you will take every step in your power to preserve tranquility and order in the city and give security to individuals of every class and description—restraining as far as possible, till the restoration of civil government, every species of persecution, insult, or abuse, either from the soldiery to the inhabitants or among each other.

General George Washington
19 June 1778

A clear understanding of the specific terminology used to describe CA, CAO, and CMO is required to convey to the supported commander the capabilities and limitations of CA. As the U.S. Army evolves to a modular force, programmed implementation of CA organization and force structure changes enhances the ability of CA to support full spectrum operations.

The addition of CA as an officer branch and enlisted military occupational specialty of the Active Army highlights the increased emphasis placed on the civil characteristics of the twenty-first century operational environment. Increases to the organic CMO staff of Army Service component commands (ASCCs), Army corps, divisions, and BCTs provide commanders the planning and management capabilities to perform CAO and CMO at each level of command.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

1-1. FM 3-05.40 defines CA as “designated Active Army and United State Army Reserve (USAR) forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CAO and to support the commander in planning and conducting CMO.”

1-2. FM 3-05.40 indicates the following: “The primary function of all Army CA units is to support the warfighter by engaging the civil component of the battlefield. CA forces interface with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, other civilian and government organizations, and military forces to assist the supported commander to accomplish the mission. To meet this broad requirement, Army CA units are organized to support the Services, United States Government (USG) agencies, allied forces, agencies of other countries, and various IGOs, and their associated NGOs. Mission guidance and priorities—including prioritized regional engagement activities and language requirements—from respective unified command combatant commanders (CCDRs) provide regional focus.”

1-3. The focus of CA is to engage the civil component of the operational environment by assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioning—both actively and passively—political, economic, and information (social and cultural) institutions and capabilities. The goal of this engagement is the achievement of U.S. national goals and objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war abroad and at home. The unique skills of the CA Soldier are required across the range of military operations, incorporating all elements of national power. As the primary coordinator of CMO, he must be able to perform effectively in the three types of military action (offensive, defensive, and stability operations) in Service, joint, interagency, and multinational environments.

1-4. CA capability requirements have shifted to meet the transforming needs of the Army. CA capabilities are aligned to support Army modularity, while maintaining special operations forces (SOF) support, to execute CA operations across the full spectrum of military operations. CA functions and
Chapter 1

1-5. Although the majority of CA force structure remains in the USAR, programmed additions to the Active Army CA force greatly enhances Army special operations forces (ARSOF) crisis-response CA capability. The Active Army CA force is programmed to grow from one battalion with six regionally aligned companies to a brigade with four regionally aligned battalions, each with four companies (Figure 1-1).

1-6. The Active Army CA force has the capability to rapidly deploy as the initial entry CA force and provides the primary CA support to SOF. As the initial entry CA force, the Active Army CA force plans, enables, shapes, and conducts CAO to support the CCDR’s situational understanding of the civil component and improve overall decision superiority. Active Army CA forces provide the “bridge” to support contingency operations until replaced by USAR CA formations. The significant difference between Active Army and USAR CA organizational structure is the CA functional specialty (FX SP) capabilities maintained in USAR CA units. With the exception of limited public health and rule of law support, the Active Army CA force structure possesses no CA FX SP capability.

1-7. Realignment of the USAR CA conventional force support model meets Army modularity initiatives while providing the required force structure needed to conduct full spectrum operations (Figure 1-2, page 1-3). Other force design changes being implemented within the CA operational structure common to Active Army and USAR units encompass dedicated positions to staff the following organizations:

- Civil-military operations center (CMOC).
- Civil liaison team (CLT).
- Civil information management (CIM) cell.
- Civil Affairs planning team (CAPT).

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

1-8. FM 3-05.40 defines CAO as “those military operations planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by CA forces through, with, or by the OGAs, IPI, IGOs, or NGOs to modify behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of CMO and other U.S. objectives.”
1-9. CA forces conduct CAO within the scope of the five CA core tasks (described in Chapter 5) and the supported CCDR’s overall CMO campaign. CA forces embrace the relationship of military forces with the civil component, including IPI, IGOs, and NGOs in areas where military forces are present. CA operations may also involve the application of CA FX SP expertise in areas normally the responsibility of the civilian government.

1-10. CA supports full spectrum operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, encompassing the range of military operations. CA forces are the maneuver commander’s primary asset to plan, coordinate, support, and execute CAO. As defined, CAO support the maneuver commander’s overall CMO strategy within the operational area. CMO planners at the strategic and operational levels conduct detailed analysis of the civilian component political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other systems in the development of CMO campaign plans. The application of civil areas, structures,
Chapter 1

capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) categories to the system analysis further refines
the process at each level to shape the environment at the tactical level. The outcome of the planning
process produces operational products, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and measures of performance
(MOPs) discussed in Chapter 3.

1-11. A significant CAO capability is the FX SP expertise found in the USAR CA force. Functional
specialists provide the civilian-acquired education, skills, and experience applicable to areas normally
found in the departments and agencies of the civilian government. CA functional specialties are
categorized within six functional areas, as shown in Figure 1-3.

1-12. Limited CA functional specialties are organic to the USAR CA brigade and USAR CA battalion FX
SP cells. The Civil Affairs command (CACOM) maintains specialists in all functional areas. Based on
mission requirements, specific functional specialists may augment the various CA headquarters (HQ)
elements at each level of operation on a case-by-case basis.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

1-13. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines CMO as
follows: “the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between
military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian
populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area of operations (AO) in order to facilitate military
operations, to consolidate and achieve U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces
activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These
activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if
directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO may be performed by designated civil affairs, by
other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.”
1-14. JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, identifies CMO as “an inherent responsibility of command in order to facilitate accomplishment of the commander’s mission.” Planning of CMO is based on national policy and reflects the legal aspects and constraints applicable to the conduct of military operations. The conduct of CMO is further discussed in JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*.

**CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS AND JOINT DOCTRINE**

It is the inherent responsibility of commanders at all levels to maintain proper, prudent, and lawful relations with the civilian populace and government indigenous to their area of operations. The conduct of such relations is called Civil-Military Operations (CMO). To assist in conducting CMO, civil affairs forces will be made available to commanders when their operations affect, or are affected by, the indigenous civilian populace, resources, government or other civil institutions or organizations in the area of operations.

JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*

1-15. Successful CMO require the integration of a number of diverse entities found within the commander’s operational environment. Although CA plays a key role in the planning, execution, and transition of CMO, all U.S. military forces have some inherent capability of supporting CMO. The integration of engineer, military police (MP), health services, communications, transportation, and other SOF capabilities to the overall CMO effort is necessary for the successful attainment of identified national objectives.

1-16. CMO necessitate interaction between OGAs, multinational and indigenous security forces, HN and other foreign government organizations, IGOs, and NGOs. The challenge is to create an atmosphere of cooperation among extremely diverse groups with different and sometimes conflicting goals, policies, procedures, capabilities, and decision-making techniques. Some IGOs and NGOs may, in fact, have policies that are purposely diametrically opposed to the U.S. military forces’ and USG agencies’ goals and objectives. Only through close and continuous interagency coordination and cooperation can unity of effort be achieved during the conduct of CMO.

1-17. Development of CMO plans and objectives is a top-down process. Planners must incorporate CMO plans and considerations at the onset of the planning process for any operation. CMO must be a part of an overall national strategy, formulated and managed through interagency coordination, and integrated with strategic, operational, and tactical plans and operations. The focus of CMO at the—

- **Strategic level** is on larger long-term global or regional issues such as economic development and stability.
- **Operational level** is on strategic CMO objectives and immediate and near-term issues (for example, dislocated civilian [DC] operations, public safety programs, and so on), synchronization of CMO support to tactical commanders, and integration of interagency operations with military operations.
- **Tactical level** is narrow and has more immediate effects. Examples of tactical-level CMO include food distribution, local security programs, basic health service support to the local populace, and support of IGO and NGO humanitarian operations.

1-18. Commanders at all levels must realize that Soldier actions in dealing with the indigenous populace, local government officials, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs impact the overall CMO situation. Predeployment and sustainment training of all Soldiers regarding the culture and customs of the factions of the indigenous populace enhance the effectiveness of the overall CMO campaign.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PANAMA

1-504th Parachute Infantry Regiment D-Day mission called for an air assault to seize and hold the hilltop garrison at Tinajitas. By nightfall, the “Red Devils” had accomplished their physically demanding task, and the following morning combat patrols eliminated remnants of the PDF [Panamanian Defense Forces] still attempting to harass them from nearby positions. Geographically isolated from the rest of their brigade, the unit found themselves in an unexpected position. The civilian population expected them to perform government functions until the new regime could establish control. Battalion medics started health care programs while the rifle companies moved out to distribute MREs [meals, ready to eat] to the needy and help civilian workers get the local power plant back into operation. The unit won the trust of the population, leading directly to successful programs to recover weapons and persuade former PDF soldiers to turn themselves in. The battalion returned from Panama with a clear sense of the need to train on CMO.

As [Operation] JUST CAUSE moved from initial combat to CMO, units became responsible for running major cities and towns. This follow-on mission for combat arms commanders required identifying what was important in terms of rebuilding a local infrastructure, reestablishing law and order, and dedicating resources to unfamiliar tasks. These unfamiliar tasks included food distribution and medical treatment of the local population, law enforcement, garbage collection, and traffic control. Commanders looked for ways to care for the population and for methods to gain their support and cooperation. Successful CMO were critical. CMO conducted by SF [Special Forces] units in conjunction with conventional forces were extremely effective.

LEVELS OF SUPPORT

1-19. Figure 1-4, page 1-7, depicts the doctrinal CA support relationships across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The modular design of the CA force structure allows a CAPT to augment the supported HQ CMO staff at the various HQ at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. This capability is especially important in the employment of CA functional specialists. CMO and CAO staff planners at all operational levels must be aware of this unique capability to provide the expertise necessary to solve complex civil problems encountered within the operational environment. Supporting CA forces are instrumental in identifying necessary augmentation support during the conduct of CAO.

1-20. The regional alignment of the CA force structure provides a habitual support relationship with the unified combatant commands. At the strategic level, the CACOM has the capability to provide a CAPT to augment the geographic combatant commander (GCC), ASCC, and theater special operations command (TSOC). Likewise, the CA brigade CAPT is capable of augmenting the corps or division HQ, acting as a joint task force (JTF) at the operational level. At the tactical level, the CA battalion CAPT augments the division HQ. The BCT and subordinate maneuver element CMO planners may be augmented by either CA planners from the CA company or by a Civil Affairs team (CAT). With the augmentation of CA forces, the supported commander has the capability to plan, enable, shape, and conduct CAO, improving the overall situational understanding of the civil component.

1-21. Combatant command of Active Army CA forces resides with the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). With the exception of one unit assigned to the United States Pacific Command, command of USAR CA force structure resides with the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) through to United States Army Reserve Command. Requests for CA forces (USAR or Active Army) originate at the GCC and are forwarded through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). USSOCOM
coordinates with the GCC to validate all requests for Active Army CA assets, and USJFCOM validates requests for USAR assets during peace and war. Operational control (OPCON) passes from USSOCOM or USJFCOM to the supported CCDR by a change of OPCON order.

1-22. CA forces require a centralized, responsive, and unambiguous command and control (C2) structure. Normally, CA forces are attached to supported commanders with minimal layering of subordinate levels of command. This command relationship allows for the full integration of CA with the supported unit. Based on mission and theater, OPCON or tactical control of CA forces may pass to the TSOC.

![Diagram of Doctrinal Civil Affairs support relationships]

Figure 1-4. Doctrinal Civil Affairs support relationships
Chapter 2
Civil Affairs Methodology

The problem of achieving maximum civilian support and minimum civilian interference with U.S. military operations requires the coordination of intelligence efforts, security measures, operational efficiency, and the intentional cultivation of goodwill. Failure to use CA in the analysis of political, economic, and social bases of instability may result in inadequate responses to the root causes of the instability and result in the initiation or continuation of conflict.

JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs

The focus of all CAO and CMO is to enable commanders to engage the civil component of their operational environment. CAO and CMO are integrated into the conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) of all operations and include those activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace within an area of responsibility (AOR), a joint operations area (JOA), or an AO. This effort focuses on assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioning political, economic, and information (social and cultural) institutions and capabilities. CA Soldiers assist commanders by conducting these operations and tasks actively, through direct contact, and passively, through observation, research, and analysis.

INTRODUCTION

2-1. The CA methodology describes how CA Soldiers, elements, and units approach all CAO and CMO. It consists of six steps; the first five steps together are known as AD3E:

- Assess.
- Decide.
- Develop and detect.
- Deliver.
- Evaluate.
- Transition.

2-2. CA Soldiers equally apply the CA methodology at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. At each level, the CA methodology supports the commander’s ability to visualize, describe, and direct operations in order to achieve desired effects in the operational environment.

2-3. Elements of the common problem-solving and decision-making processes used at various levels of command are embedded within the steps of the CA methodology. Figure 2-1, page 2-2, demonstrates how the CA methodology and these processes are related.

2-4. The CA methodology is not necessarily linear. It is a spiral in which new missions are spawned during the evaluation phase, which starts the process over again. Several spirals may also occur simultaneously and, at times, overlap as operations become time-sensitive and more complex (Figure 2-2, page 2-3).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assess</td>
<td>Identify the Problem</td>
<td>Receive Mission</td>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>Phase 1—Situation Development</td>
<td>Receive Mission</td>
<td>Receive Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Identify Facts and Assumptions</td>
<td>Initiate the SOMPF</td>
<td>Mission Analysis</td>
<td>Phase 2—Crisis Assessment</td>
<td>Analyze Mission</td>
<td>Issue a Warning Order</td>
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<td>Conduct Mission Analysis</td>
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<td>Decide</td>
<td>Generate Alternatives</td>
<td>Send CONOPS to Mission-Tasking HQ</td>
<td>COA Development</td>
<td>Phase 3—COA Selection</td>
<td>Develop COAs</td>
<td>Make a Tentative Plan</td>
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<td>Analyze the Alternatives</td>
<td>Attend Mission Conference/Orders Briefs and Conduct Predeployment Site Survey</td>
<td>COA Analysis</td>
<td>Phase 4—COA Selection</td>
<td>Analyze COAs</td>
<td>Start Necessary Movement</td>
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<td>Compare the Alternatives</td>
<td>Receive CONOPS Approval</td>
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<td>Make a Decision</td>
<td>Refine Concept into OPLAN, CONPLAN, Supporting Plan, or OPORD</td>
<td>COA Approval</td>
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<td>Conduct Briefback</td>
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<td>Develop and Detect</td>
<td>Execute the Decision</td>
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Legend:
- COA—Course of Action
- CONOPS—Concept of the Operation
- CONPLAN—Concept Plan
- MDMP—Military Decision Making Process
- OPLAN—Operation Plan
- OPORD—Operation Order
- SOMPF—Special Operations Mission-Planning Folder

Figure 2-1. Comparison of the Civil Affairs methodology and the various problem-solving and decision-making processes
ASSESS

2-5. As the entry step into the CA methodology, **assess** normally begins with the receipt of a mission. The preliminary assessment and the mission analysis process characterize this step. CAO and CMO planners take an initial look at the nonmilitary factors (ASCOPE; FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*) that shape the operational environment. They do this for each of the 14 CA functional specialties and the general aspects of the AO. At the end of this step, CA Soldiers produce an
initial estimate and a restated mission statement for CA or task-organized forces. They also determine who (OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, or other military and host nation [HN] civilian agencies) needs to be involved in the next step—the decision-making process.

ASSESSMENTS OVERVIEW

2-6. CA teams and Soldiers conduct assessments upon receipt of a mission, upon arrival in a designated operational area, continuously during operations, and as directed for special or emergency cases. The purpose of each assessment is to determine current conditions, compare them to a defined norm and established standards, and identify needs or requirements that the CMO and/or CAO can address. This includes the needs and requirements of the supported commander or organization associated with the mission, and the local populace.

2-7. The objectives of the preliminary assessment are to—
- Analyze known information about the situation or conditions in the AO.
- Relate U.S. policy, goals, and objectives to the current situation.
- Determine the best use of assigned assets to meet the known requirements of the assigned mission.
- Identify threats to civil society that impact the commander’s desired effects.
- Prioritize and target threats in order to achieve the supported commander’s desired effects.

2-8. The objectives of the deliberate assessment are to—
- Validate the preliminary assessment.
- Update the CMO running estimate.
- Finalize or modify operations planned before deployment into the AO.

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS

2-9. The preliminary assessment is conducted upon receipt of every CA mission or tasking. It is an automatic first step of mission analysis and feeds into the civil intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. This assessment is characterized by an analysis of all information known about the area or situation up to the moment of receipt of the mission or tasking. Much of this information may be old, secondhand, or incomplete. Consequently, CAO and CMO planners must make assumptions until they answer information shortfalls in a more detailed, deliberate assessment upon entry into the AO. The CMO running estimate includes information from the preliminary assessment.

2-10. During the preliminary assessment, the CAO and CMO planner consults previously prepared area studies and CIM-related products for the region that encompasses the AO. The CAO and CMO planner also researches current data and statistics pertaining to the designated area. The CAO and CMO planner uses the CA area assessment format found in Appendix A, and the principles of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) for analyzing a situation. (Chapter 3 of this manual describes the analysis of a situation.) Sources of current information include intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), operational reports, magazine and newspaper articles, and the Internet. When using the Internet, the CAO and CMO planner seeks links to OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs on the ground, such as the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) or NGOs’ ties to the United Nations (UN) Relief Web. The CAO and CMO planner considers accuracy, reliability, and timeliness of the sources during analysis, to include—
- Understanding the CCDR’s strategic intent and operational focus.
- Studying the primary planning document (campaign plan, operation plan [OPLAN], concept plan [CONPLAN], functional plan [FUNCPLAN], or supporting plan).
- Studying all supporting annexes and appendixes to the primary planning document for CAO- and CMO-related assumptions and tasks, and validating the accuracy of these assumptions and tasks.
- Analyzing the geographic AO defined in the primary planning document according to METT-TC, focusing on the strategic-level civil considerations.
• Analyzing and archiving reports from the field.
• Cataloging resources and points of contact (POCs) that will be useful in updating future plans and conducting future operations.

2-11. The CAO and CMO planner also relates U.S. policy, goals, and objectives to the current situation, to include reviewing—
• The national security strategy and national military strategy.
• The political-military (POLMIL) plan.
• The theater security cooperation plan (TSCP).
• UN, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements to which the United States is a signatory.
• Any additional guidance from the CJCS.
• Alliance and coalition plans.

2-12. The CAO and CMO planner determines the best use of assigned assets to meet the known challenges of the assigned mission, to include—
• Identifying specified, implied, and the priority of CMO tasks for military forces.
• Identifying specified, implied, and the priority of CA tasks for CA forces.
• Apportioning CA forces against CA task requirements and ensuring the forces are included in time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).
• Incorporating CMO considerations into the primary planning document and supporting annexes and appendixes, as appropriate (for example, rules of engagement [ROE], indirect fires, information operations [IO], logistics, interagency operations, and civil engineering support).

DELIBERATE ASSESSMENTS

2-13. Deliberate assessments normally are conducted upon entry into the AO, continually throughout an operation, and as directed for special or emergency cases. Firsthand observation, interviews, surveys, and other tools used to make more knowledgeable decisions are characteristics of the deliberate assessment. Elements may be task-organized for each deliberate assessment mission.

2-14. The deliberate assessment consists of two categories—the initial assessment (conducted upon entry into the designated AO) and the rapid assessment. When conducting initial and rapid assessments, CA Soldiers obtain information by conducting direct observation, using checklists, and interviewing civilians in various settings. Gathering information should not be a haphazard process. As with all military missions, this task requires a well-formed, practical plan. The basic steps of this plan include the following:
• Determine what information to gather.
• Determine the most likely source (such as a person, place, event, or reference) from which to obtain the information.
• Prepare a list of questions for the source that supports the information requirements.
• Engage the source (for example, research references, observe activities, and interview individuals).
• Compile the results obtained in the step above.
• Report the results according to unit SOP.

2-15. Every assessment must contain well-defined geographical boundaries and time frames within which the assessment is valid. As mere “snapshots in time,” assessments and surveys must be updated as often as necessary to remain current. At a minimum, CA assessments and reports cover the five Ws—who, what, when, where, and why. To make this data and information easy to enter into a database, reports are quantified—such as the number of hospital beds in a hospital, the kilowatt output of a power plant, and so on. It is also crucial to geo-reference what is reported; in other words, a global positioning system latitude and longitude reading or military grid location. Names and official positions, if any, of the local people engaged together with an assessment of the general attitude of the populace are vital elements of CIM process. Assessments quantify and identify civil component information.
Chapter 2

Initial Assessments

2-16. CAO and CMO planners identify those information requirements necessary to satisfy information gaps and assumptions made during the conduct of the preliminary assessment. These information requirements result in tasks to subordinate CA teams and units to conduct the initial CA assessment upon entry into the designated AO. The objectives or focus of the initial assessment should be broad, but not so broad that specific objectives cannot be assigned. For example, assess general conditions of the AO in the areas of public health, public safety, public works and utilities, and civil information. CATs conducting initial assessments must be aware of the security situation at all times.

2-17. During the initial assessment, the CAT takes a cursory look at the conditions of the area as directed by the mission statement. Using the CA area assessment format found in Appendix A and the principles of METT-TC for analyzing a situation, the CAT visits locations that will most likely provide the information it has been directed to find. Sources of pertinent information include HN officials, municipal government and public safety offices, hospitals, medical clinics, food distribution centers, and IGO and NGO relief sites.

2-18. Products of the initial assessment include situation reports (SITREPs), spot reports, and requests for assistance. The findings of an initial assessment may lead to refined mission statements, updates to the CA area study, CMO annex to the base order, and reallocation of forces and resources.

Rapid Assessments

2-19. The rapid assessment is a determination of current conditions, capabilities, or attitudes of a specific village, facility, or population group. The objectives or focus of the rapid assessment should be well-defined; for example, assess the generating capacity of the XYZ power plant, or assess the needs of Town X to sustain the populace for the next 72 hours. The CATs conducting rapid assessments must continuously be aware they have no authority to commit resources during the assessment process, and they must maintain situational awareness of the security environment at all times.

2-20. Rapid assessments are normally tasked during the decide step to appropriate elements that will be in a position to satisfy information shortfalls. Rapid assessments can also be directed for emergencies, single issues, or special situations, such as a damage assessment incident to a claim or to determine the current conditions of a specific location. An example of a rapid assessment format may be found in Appendix A. Formats may vary among CA units, supported elements, and interagency elements.

2-21. Products of the rapid assessment include updated SITREPs that portray actual conditions, project nominations, and interim or final reports validating the status of projects. The findings of a rapid assessment may lead to refined mission statements or reallocation of forces and resources.

DECIDE

2-22. Completion of the first step of the CA methodology—assess—provides the CAO and CMO planner a thorough understanding of the background and current conditions of an area, identifies the needs or requirements (supported commander, organization, or populace) to be addressed by CAO or CMO, and formulates a restated mission statement for CA or task-organized forces. The second step—decide—determines who, what, when, where, why, and how to focus CA and other assets and operations to address the needs and requirements identified in the first step. The ultimate goal of the decide step is to ensure all participating organizations, military and civilian, are focused and synchronized toward the attainment of operational objectives and ultimately national strategic goals and theater strategic objectives. This step encompasses CA COA analysis, COA decision, and creation of the CAO and CMO plan. The plan should direct task-organized CA elements to create or observe those conditions or events that would either mitigate or trigger a specific CAO and CMO response. It also addresses all CAO and CMO in civil lines of operations from initial response through transition to other (military or civilian) authorities.

2-23. The processes that develop and analyze COAs and create plans or orders characterize the decide step. This step includes initiation of the interagency process as a part of collaborative planning. With consideration for the nonmilitary factors of ASCOPE, CAO and CMO planners, together with the
supported staff and participating civilian agencies, determine the tasks and task organizations required to manage the civil component challenges of the operation. They do this not only for the steps of develop and detect, and deliver, but for the transition step and, if applicable, redeployment, as well.

2-24. The products of this step include the commander’s concept for CMO, CA priorities, and the CMO annex. At the operational level, the joint force commander (JFC) develops operational-level objectives supported by measurable operational effects and assessment indicators. Joint operation planning uses measurable effects to relate higher-level objectives to component mission, tasks, and actions.

2-25. During initial mission analysis, the JFC and staff ensure they understand the operational end state and associated objectives, and design the tactical end states and supporting objectives. They develop a set of desired effects that support the objectives. Equally important, they identify a set of associated undesired effects that could adversely influence the objective. In addition, they identify MOEs and MOPs for the various related objectives and tasks, respectively.

2-26. During these processes, CAO and CMO planners assign responsibilities and procedures (civil-military objectives) for the identified tasks and task-organized elements along civil lines of operation. For the develop and detect step, these tasks are normally related to creating or observing those conditions or events (civil decisive point outcomes). For the deliver step, these tasks include the general and specialized tasks that support the CAO of populace and resources control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance (NA), CIM, and support to civil administration (SCA). For the evaluate step, these tasks include the collection and analysis of data related to the identified indicators measuring effectiveness and performance. The transition step includes those tasks required to be completed before, during, and after a relief-in-place or transition of authority.

**DEVELOP AND DETECT**

2-27. Execution of the CA plan is initiated during the develop and detect step. This begins when CA elements enter into the AO to establish relationships, develop rapport, and conduct deliberate assessments to confirm or deny the plan. This step is characterized by numerous activities, such as expanding the CMOC to facilitate increased interagency operations; conducting interviews, surveys, and local meetings; supporting DC operations; monitoring indigenous public information programs; making contact with key communicators; submitting periodic CAO and CMO reports; and CIM.

2-28. CAO and CMO develop the civilian component of the common operational picture (COP) and assist commanders in finalizing their situational understanding (as opposed to the situation as it was understood during preliminary assessments and mission planning). They detect (confirm or deny) the conditions, standards of care, and attitudes, which serve to either cancel or trigger planned and on-call CAO and CMO branches and sequels to the operation. The execution of these planned contingencies is the subject of the deliver step.

2-29. The develop and detect step emphasizes developing rapport and relationships with the nonmilitary participants of the operation (including the IPI) and detecting those conditions or events that would call for a specific CAO and CMO response. CA Soldiers accomplish this through numerous actions and operations, such as facilitating the interagency process in the CMOC, hosting meetings, participating in selected DC operations, conducting civil reconnaissance (CR) in support of CIM, and monitoring public information programs and CAO- and CMO-related reports from the field. The products of this step include continuous assessments, revised or updated plans, formalized CMOC terms of reference, and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).

**DELIVER**

2-30. During the deliver phase, CA generalists and functional specialists engage the civil component with planned or on-call CAO defined by the CA core tasks—PRC, FHA, NA, CIM, and SCA. Executed in support of a commander’s well-planned, coordinated, and synchronized CMO campaign, the executed tasks by CA Soldiers, non-CA Soldiers, OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and assets of IPI define the deliver step.
These actions may occur individually and selectively across the AO or simultaneously at various levels of operations and government.

2-31. At the strategic and operational levels, application of some CAO can mitigate or facilitate application of others. For example, engaging the civil sector with CAO during the execution of combatant command TSCPs may reduce the need for crisis-action operations. Should crisis-action operations occur, relationships and programs put in place during the TSCP can facilitate certain operational aspects within the AO. As an illustration, systems, facilities, programs, and knowledge developed during NA, developmental military civic action (MCA), or humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) projects conducted during peacetime can ward off potential crises caused by natural, man-made, or technological factors. In the event of a crisis, the same systems, facilities, programs, and sources of knowledge can be useful in conducting NA, PRC, FHA, and SCA.

2-32. CA functional specialists are task-organized to meet the various strategic, operational, and tactical requirements of the operation. CA generalists participate in CAO as staff action officers and executors of nonspecialized CA tasks. When called upon to perform specialized CA tasks in the absence of CA functional specialists, CA generalists seek clarification, support, and guidance from CA functional specialists via reachback. The CA core tasks are defined in detail in Chapter 5 and the CA roles at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels for each core task are discussed.

2-33. The duration of the CA methodology deliver step will vary based on the factors of METT-TC. While executing these actions, CA Soldiers generate routine CAO and CMO briefings and reports according to unit SOP. These briefings and reports feed directly into the evaluate step in which Soldiers monitoring CAO determine when the deliver step is over and transition step may begin.

EVALUATE

2-34. The evaluate step is a vital part of the CA methodology. The evaluate step should not be confused with the assess step of the methodology. This step actually begins during the develop and detect step and continues through the deliver step.

2-35. Once execution of the CAO and CMO plan begins, every task performed or mission executed requires a critical evaluation to determine the results of the action. The evaluation validates the CAO and CMO concept of operations and determines whether the established MOEs and MOPs have been met. It also helps commanders decide when and how to adjust the plan, when to develop new plans to address unforeseen consequences of operations, and when to terminate or transition an operation.

2-36. During the evaluate step, evaluators at the strategic and operational levels focus on the MOEs established for the operation during the decide step. At the tactical level, the focus is on MOPs. Evaluations determine the sustainability of any projects or programs initiated during the deliver step. Evaluators look at aspects of the 14 CA functional specialties to determine if the operation caused any unintended effects in other areas of the civil component, and recommend follow-on actions.

2-37. The products of this phase include CA and CMO briefings and reports, after-action reviews, additional project nominations, new mission requirements (for example, FRAGOs), a finalized transition plan, and termination, transfer or transition timelines.

TRANSITION

2-38. The transition planning and execution is vital if stability operations are to be a success. It prioritizes and plans for the successful handover of missions to a follow-on agency or force, being either military or civil in nature. Examples of these organizations are peacekeeping entities under a UN mandate, IPI, IGOs, or NGOs. CAO and CMO planners are uniquely qualified to advise the commander on activities that reduce turmoil and stabilize the situation until OGAs, the international community, or the indigenous government and institutions assume control. Detailed information regarding the transition step is contained in Chapter 6.
Chapter 3
Civil Affairs Analysis and Planning Process

Analysis: a separating or breaking up of any whole into its parts, especially with an examination of these parts to find out their nature, proportion, function, interrelationship, etc.


CA Soldiers, elements, and units are assigned to, have a command relationship with, or provide support to, Army, joint, or other Service HQ at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. As such, CA leaders must clearly understand Army planning and orders production and joint operations planning (crisis-action and contingency planning). They must understand the mechanics that underline Army and joint planning, and how CA integrates into the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and the unit’s concept of operations. Although there are many similarities between Army and joint planning, joint operations planning is focused at the strategic theater and operational levels within a GCC’s AOR or JFC’s JOA. Army planning is focused at the tactical level within a commander’s AO. This chapter provides doctrine for CA Soldiers participating in Army and joint planning. For detailed doctrine on joint operations planning, see JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. For Army planning, see FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production.

Army corps HQ functions at the operational or tactical level depending on the mission. When a corps performs its primary role as a contingency JTF or land component HQ, it functions at the operational level. In these roles, it directs either a campaign (as a JTF) or major operation (as a land component). Army divisions, BCTs, and smaller units normally function at the tactical level. However, divisions can serve as operational-level HQ or as a JTF for small contingencies. In rare circumstances, a BCT may function at the operational level, serving as a small JTF or land component (FM 3-0, Operations).

OVERVIEW

3-1. The mainstay of CA support to CCDRs are CA generalists and functional specialists capable of planning, executing, and transitioning CAO and CMO across the full spectrum of operations in all environments. Planning, coordinating, and executing CAO and CMO at the Service, joint, interagency, multinational, and coalition levels define the primary CA mission focus.

3-2. The ability to produce quality assessment and operational planning products is a skill developed by a combination of training and experience in the operational art. The JFC’s CMO staff planners gather and analyze data regarding the civilian component’s political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other systems of the AO in the development of CMO campaign and operational plans. Mission analysis leads to the development of CMO COAs supporting the attainment of strategic national policy objectives and the CCDR’s mission desired end state.

3-3. CAO and CMO factor into every offensive, defensive, and stability operation. At the operational and tactical levels, civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on the
Knowledge of the civil component of the COP enhances the commander’s decision process for the selection of objectives; location, movement, and control of forces; use of weapons; and force protection (FP) measures.

OPERATIONS PROCESSES

3-4. The operations process consists of the major C2 activities performed during operations: planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment. The activities occur continuously throughout the operation, overlapping and recurring as required. The operations process serves two important functions for commanders by providing a framework that describes the exercise of C2 and for organizing the C2 system and using it to conduct operations.

PLANNING

3-5. Planning is the process by which commanders (and staff, if available) translate the commander’s visualization into a specific COA for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. Planning involves envisioning a desired end state and describing effective methods to achieve it. Planning for joint operations is continuous and uses two closely related, integrated, collaborative, and adaptive processes—Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the military decision making process (MDMP). JOPES and MDMP share the same basic approach and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and course-of-action development. The steps of MDMP provide an orderly framework for planning in general, and Army staffs employed at the tactical level use the steps exclusively. The focus of MDMP is on the interaction between an organization’s commander, staff, and the commanders and staffs of the next-higher and next-lower commands. Following the steps of MDMP, CMO planners organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders. The planning process can be as detailed as time, resources, experience, and situation permit. Although the formal process begins with the receipt of a mission and has as its goal the production of an order, planning continues throughout the operations process.

PREPARATION

3-6. Preparation consists of activities by the unit before execution to improve its ability to conduct the operation; it includes plan refinement, rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and movement (FM 3-0). Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ chances for success. It facilitates and sustains transitions, including those to branches and sequels. Several preparation activities—particularly reconnaissance operations, security operations, and FP—begin in planning and occur throughout the operation. Preparation continues during execution.

EXECUTION

3-7. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions (FM 6-0). Operations are dynamic; therefore, commanders must make and implement decisions during execution. Similar dynamics occur in stability and civil support operations. Instead of an action–reaction–counteraction between opposing commanders, this dynamic usually occurs between commanders and changing civil considerations or conditions.

ASSESSMENT

3-8. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes to actual events to determine the overall effectiveness.
PROCESSES SUMMARY

3-9. The recent publication of Army and joint doctrine refined the processes used in planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of military operations. CA leaders, functional specialists, and CMO staffs must clearly understand Army planning, preparation, and orders production and joint operations planning and execution. CAO and CMO planners apply the CA methodology (Chapter 2) throughout the operations process at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

3-10. The basis for the development of all supporting CAO and CMO plans and concepts is the application of the factors of METT-TC and the analysis of civil considerations using the ASCOPE discussed later in this chapter.

JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING

3-11. Joint doctrine incorporates a systems-perspective approach in the analysis of an operational environment. System analysis defines how military and nonmilitary actions, or set of actions, effect the physical and behavioral state of an adversary’s political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, and other systems. Analysis of the gathered systems data details the prevailing conditions within the JOA.

3-12. Analysis of the systems data in an operational environment assists in centers of gravity (COG) analysis and operational design by identifying nodes (a person, place, or physical thing) that are a fundamental component of a system and links (the behavioral, physical, or functional relationship) between the nodes (Figure 3-1). The analysis includes an assessment of the important capabilities and vulnerabilities of the systems and nodes, which enables the subsequent identification of COGs and decisive points.

Figure 3-1. Relationship of system, node, link, and centers of gravity
3-13. A systems approach integrates people and processes. The systems approach uses multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build a common, shared, and holistic knowledge base of the operational environment. System analysis emphasizes a multidimensional approach toward situational understanding. Situational understanding occurs through the analysis of the six interrelated characteristics of ASCOPE within each system.

3-14. The six CA functional areas (rule of law, governance, infrastructure, economic stability, public education and information, and public health and welfare) coincide with the systems approach to operational environment awareness of the civil component. CA functional specialists have successfully used systems analysis to develop CA area assessments and CA area studies. (Appendix A provides more information on assessments and studies.)

RECEIPT OF MISSION AND MISSION ANALYSIS

3-15. The initiation phase of JOPES coincides with the first two steps of MDMP—receipt of mission and mission analysis. A preliminary CMO assessment is conducted upon receipt of every CAO and CMO mission or tasking. It is an automatic first step of mission analysis and feeds into the civil component of the IPB process. The preliminary CMO assessment includes an analysis of data collected about the area or situation up to the moment of receipt of the mission or tasking. Much of this information may be dated, secondhand, or incomplete, requiring CMO planners to make assumptions until information shortfalls can be answered by a more detailed, deliberate assessment made upon entry into the AO. The preliminary assessment becomes the basic building block of the CMO estimate.

3-16. The CMO estimate is a process and a product. The process calls for a disciplined approach to gathering and processing information, and recording the analytical results. Automated tools such as databases and word processing programs give the CMO planner the flexibility and responsiveness needed to tailor the estimate to meet a variety of requirements. The CMO estimate is a living document that is continuously refined as additional information becomes available. A current estimate allows the CMO planner to quickly provide accurate information to meet planning requirements as they change.

3-17. The mission analysis step of the process produces the first two paragraphs of the CMO estimate (Figure 3-2) and integrates the information gathered into the IPB process. This integration of data with the intelligence and operations staffs refines the civil component of IPB to identify the COGs within the AO.

Figure 3-2. Civil-military operations estimate contributions to military decision making process mission analysis
INFORMATION GATHERING

3-18. Information necessary to describe and define the civil situation of an AO is obtained from classified and open sources. At the strategic theater and operational levels, CMO planners organize data collection according to the analysis of the six interrelated characteristics of ASCOPE within each of the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other systems.

**POLITICAL**

3-19. Political data collection—
- Defines the overall political situation in the AOR.
- Identifies the political leadership and type of government.
- Identifies those key aspects of the commander’s operational environment, such as political boundaries and centers of the foreign nation (FN) government—strengths, weaknesses, role in society, and so on.
- Includes IGOs present in the AO.

**MILITARY**

3-20. Military data collection identifies—
- The CMO capabilities of all U.S. and non-U.S. forces available in the AO.
- How the military situation within the AO influences the current mission requirement.
- How the current military situation is affecting stability, government security, and so on.
- What the role of the military is in the applicable country.

**ECONOMIC**

3-21. Economic data collection—
- States the strengths and weaknesses of the economic systems along with nation’s plans for economic development goals and objectives impacting on the military mission.
- Includes shortages affecting the commander’s ability to use FN supplies or impacting the operation, including the FN’s ability to supply enough foodstuffs to meet the civil populace’s need.
- Identifies the agricultural calendar—harvest, planting, and spraying seasons.
- Identifies the economy fiscal calendar.

**SOCIAL**

3-22. Social data collection—
- States the current social climate in the AO.
- Identifies key civilian personnel inside and outside the AO and their link to the population. Key is the identification of leaders of the various factions of the population, to include—
  - Figureheads.
  - Clerics.
  - Subject matter experts (SMEs) associated with the operation of critical civil infrastructure (water production and treatment, communications, electrical generation, transportation, health services, and so on).
- Identifies the role of religion in society—religious and fraternal groups.
- Identifies events that can affect the commander’s mission—significant weather events (floods), elections, school events, fiscal schedules, and holidays (religious periods and traditional vacation time).
INFORMATION

3-23. Information data collection—
- Describes the current status and ability to transmit and receive information within the AO.
- Lists locations and meeting cycles of key nonmilitary agencies in the AO (IGOs and NGOs, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], World Food Program [UN], OFDA, governing bodies, health services, judicial and law enforcement, and community organizations).

INFRASTRUCTURE

3-24. Infrastructure data collection—
- Describes the civil infrastructure in the AO. Concentrates on how the state of the infrastructure assists or hinders the commander’s mission.
- Identifies condition and location of key structures including—
  - Government facilities.
  - Medical treatment facilities.
  - Cultural sites—monuments, religious shrines, libraries, museums, and so on.
  - Facilities with practical applications—detention facilities and warehouses.
  - Power generation and transmission facilities.
  - Transportation grids; port, rail, and aerial facilities.
  - Water purification and sewage treatment plants.
  - Radio and TV production and transmission facilities.
- Identifies agricultural and mining regions, and other significant geographic and economic features.

3-25. The data sources CMO planners used for gathering information include U.S. and foreign government agencies; IGOs, and private humanitarian or charitable organizations; and digital libraries. Access to classified military database networks and the World Wide Web (WWW) greatly enhances the CMO planner’s ability to obtain the critical information needed to conduct mission analysis. (Appendix B provides more information on open-source research techniques.)

3-26. Open-source information or data gathered for use during mission analysis might be dated, secondhand, or incomplete. Verification of critical data from multiple sources establishes the data as fact. If CMO planners cannot verify data elements, they must identify the data as assumptions until verification occurs. CMO planners continuously gather, validate, analyze, and integrate information during mission analysis (Figure 3-3, page 3-7).

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ESTIMATE

3-27. To focus the estimate process, planners first develop a restated mission statement that delineates those CMO tasks necessary to successfully support the commander’s mission. The mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph describing the unit’s CMO essential task (or tasks) and purpose that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. It contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, and the reasons thereof, but seldom specifies how (see FM 5-0). The restated mission becomes paragraph 1 (mission) of the CMO estimate. The CMO restated mission answers the following five elements:
- Who will execute CMO (unit, organization, or other CMO assets)?
- What is the unit’s priority CMO task(s)?
- When will the operation begin (by time or event), or what is the duration of the operation?
- Where will the operation occur (AO, objective, latitude and longitude, or military grid location)?
- Why will the force conduct CMO (mission objectives and end state)?
3-28. Development of the “why” begins the integration of effects. Joint operation planning uses measurable effects to relate higher-level objectives to component missions, tasks, or actions. CMO planners develop a set of desired effects that support the mission’s objectives. Equally important, CMO planners identify a set of associated undesired effects that could adversely influence the objectives.

3-29. Effects are not descriptions of tasks to subordinate units. A specified effect describes desired or undesired conditions, generally described as behavior or capability within individual ASCOPE characteristics of the operational environment’s systems that result from actions or a set of actions. An example of a desired effect is “general populace supports U.S. and coalition efforts.” An effect is achievable and measurable, and it can support more than one objective. CMO planners use effects to bridge the gap between objectives and tasks. CMO planners identify tasks that, when executed against specified key nodes, should achieve the desired effects.

3-30. Mission analysis continues with the development of paragraph 2, Situation and Considerations, of the CMO estimate. This section of the estimate examines four distinct elements:

- Characteristics of the operational area.
- Enemy forces.
- Friendly forces.
- Assumptions.

3-31. The element “characteristics of the operational area” describes the civil environment’s status or condition and capabilities. This description begins with a short narrative that identifies key CMO factors derived from the analysis of the current intelligence estimate, area studies, and the preliminary CMO assessment. This element is further subdivided into three subsections:

- Weather.
- Terrain.
- Civil considerations.

3-32. Analysis of the weather patterns in the operational area describes the military aspects of weather that affect CMO. These include seasonal events (rain, flooding, wind storms, and snow) that may impact mobility or the agricultural production capability of the area.
3-33. Terrain analysis identifies those aspects of the topography of the AO that affects CMO. It also identifies indigenous population centers and likely movement corridors of DCs that may impact military operations.

3-34. CMO planners analyze civil considerations at the strategic and operational levels for how the physical or behavioral state of a system results from a military or nonmilitary action or set of actions. Analysis of the information gathered is meant to detail the prevailing conditions within the AO, especially—

- The attitudes of the various factions of the populace within the AO—cooperative, uncooperative, or neutral.
- Availability of necessities (food, clothing, water, shelter, and medical care), including civilian capabilities of self-support.
- Availability of local material and personnel to support military operations.
- Location, magnitude, and demographics of the DC population in the AO.
- Severity and type of damage suffered by the economy (particularly in transportation, public utilities, and communications).
- Status and character of the civil government.
- State of health of the civilian populace.
- Ability of local police, judicial authorities, and correction officials to maintain public order.
- CMO environment.

3-35. The application of the elements of ASCOPE during system analysis addresses each subsystem. For example, CMO planners would apply ASCOPE to the entire concept of “economics.” The staff would ask the following questions:

- Where are the key and decisive areas of economic activity?
- Where are the key and decisive structures (infrastructures) associated with economic activity?
- What are the key and decisive economic capabilities that must be engaged and restored (for example, banking)?
- What are the key and decisive economic organizations?
- What are the key and decisive economic people?
- What are the key and decisive economic events?

Note. Answers to the above questions lead to an effective concept of operation, MOEs, and a troops-to-task analysis.

3-36. A more in-depth technique, time permitting, of analyzing the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other systems is for CMO planners to apply the 14 POLMIL factors that pertain to each subsystem. The information derived ultimately describes the effectiveness, vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, and the accessibility of each system. Moreover, the process highlights the critical or key decision makers, those that may influence the decision makers, and those that carry out the policies of the leadership. CMO planners organize data by a simple matrix as shown in Figure 3-4, page 3-9.

3-37. The POLMIL analytical framework represents a multidisciplinary approach to understanding the factors that affect CMO. CMO planners use a multidisciplinary approach because no single factor is sufficient to understand the civil-military dimension of a mission. Analysis of each factor as it pertains to the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other systems clarifies the COP and provides insight to planning desired effects with regards to CMO actions. Factor analysis includes the following:

- **History.** In broad terms, history serves three purposes—to understand the past, highlight the present, and cast light on the future. The CMO staff planner studies the history of an AO for four reasons:
  - **Discern a pattern of behavior.** To discern, if possible, a pattern of behavior in a culture means to help predict how a populace will react to various actions of the force. Consider, for example, the introduction of external military forces into a foreign territory. Studying
POLMIL Factors

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Figure 3-4. Joint operation area systems and political-military factors data matrix example

History may reveal that the populace embraces external military forces as a stabilizing entity. Conversely, history may instruct that the populace will likely reject the intervention force as a violation of sovereignty and unwanted meddling in what they perceive to their internal affairs no matter how chaotic those affairs may appear to external states. Determining preference in this case is crucial to advising the commander and developing an effective CMO plan.

- **Understand how a populace perceives its history.** It is more important to the CMO planner to understand how a populace perceives its history than to be an expert in the factual historical record—perception is reality. Also, there may be a significant contradiction between the population’s internal or “insider” view of the historical events and the external, foreign, or factual one.

- **Determine the relative importance of POLMIL factors.** History provides a basis for determining how relevant POLMIL factors were manifested in the past. From long-term behavioral patterns, the CMO planner can identify which factors to emphasize in developing effective programs and products.

- **Identify historical issues that remain significant today and resonate with the population.** Examples of such issues are historically-based border disputes, perceived historical wrongs, sources of historical pride or contention, and major historical figures. The basis for the identification of such historical issues is their continuing potency as symbols and motivators even though they may have occurred in the distant past.

- **Natural environment.** The economic, political, social, cultural, and military behavior and development of any society is affected by the natural environment. The effects of the environment can be discerned—
  - In the way a society is organized and ruled.
  - By its trade patterns.
  - By its population growth, distribution, and migration.
  - By its eating habits and style of clothing.
  - By its military formations.

- **Cultural environment.** Culture is a critical POLMIL analytical concept. In studying culture, the CMO planner learns how a populace perceives reality—the physical and social universe—as indicated through the institutions, ideas, and behavior within a population. Culture is the learned and shared attitudes, values, and ways a populace behaves.
Political system. A political system is a set of structures and processes by which people make authoritative collective decisions. All nations and cultures have at least one such system. In most cases, a political system is a complex web of formal and informal structures and processes that extend past the official state organizations. The two leading issues for CMO planners to consider are as follows:

- **Legitimacy.** The degree of support that a government has is instrumental in determining the CMO plan. Identification of key stakeholders and decision makers can be derived from knowing how legitimate a government is and what the sources of that legitimacy are.

- **Key issues.** Every system has a set of issues that are at the center of its attention. Generally, the ruling regime formed around a solution to a past set of issues. Over time, some issue may gain or lose importance, especially as the result of crisis. Understanding the issues over which the existing regime formed and changes to perceived importance of those issues is important to understanding the stability and potential for change in the ruling regime.

Political economy. Politics and economics are intertwined as a major determinant of state or group power. Economics (the process of the authoritative allocation of a culture’s resources) pervades politics because almost every political decision has economic ramifications. Economic strength affects foreign policy in four areas—governmental (regime) legitimacy, military capabilities, determination of national interests, and international influence. Economic issues are important to CMO planners in determining key stakeholders and the relative strength of competing groups in a society.

Role of the military. The military plays an important role in virtually every nation. Determining the nature of that role and its relationship to other analytical factors will enable the CMO planner to better determine causality in a critical area of society. The word “military” when used in the context of POLMIL analysis describes those armed forces identified by a government as its military. If a country considers its police forces to be part of the military, then the CMO planner should treat them as so. Key issues for the CMO planner in studying the role of the military include—

- Identifying the mode of the force (regular, paramilitary, police, or other).
- Identifying the nonpolitical and political roles of a society’s military force.
- Recognizing the tendency of a military force to intervene in politics (and by implication the extent to which the military controls—or is controlled by—civilian authorities).

Ideology. An essential element in any societal values system is its ideology. An ideology can serve to integrate communities, to advance the position of a particular group, and to strengthen group resolve to act to change the status quo. For POLMIL analysis, CMO planners must distinguish ideology from philosophy. Philosophies tend to encourage introspection and be profound and personal. Ideology is the tool from which a philosophical belief becomes reality. Ideology—

- Is political.
- Consists of a view of the present and the future.
- Is action-oriented.
- Is directed at the masses.
- Is usually explained in simple terms.

Religion. There are no historic examples of cultures that are entirely free of religion, and all governments and states that have tried to eliminate religion have failed. Religion has influenced the types of political systems under which we are governed, the economic systems in which we trade, and the social systems in which we live. For POLMIL analysis, CMO planners need to define the role of a populace’s religion in an effort to determine the effect it has on political, social, economic, and cultural events.

Foreign influence. Recognizing and understanding the role foreign influence plays in the POLMIL environment of a country is crucial in planning how CMO will influence another nation. Foreign influence relates directly to several other influence conduits such as history,
religion, culture, geography, and economics. Foreign influence can be either direct or indirect. Direct influences are actions (for example, military force or economic sanctions) taken by a foreign government or actor with the express purpose of influencing policy or actions of a specific state. Indirect actions (for example, immigration and technological advances) are not under the direction of a specific outside agency, but can be equally as important as direct actions.

- **Leadership.** This factor addresses the behavior of leaders. Leaders can use motives, purposes, and resources to mobilize other people to realize goals independently or mutually held by leaders and followers. For CMO planners, influencing the influencer (leader) can be a key step in affecting the behavior of a population. Identifying key decision makers and formal and informal leaders is a critical task for CMO planners. An understanding of the leadership’s decision-making process is also essential to influence that process.

- **Regional perspectives.** Regional perspectives are an important factor with which the CMO planner must deal. They affect the manner in which the regional populace perceives events, leading to reactions that may be unanticipated. CMO planners must be able to identify and understand the general regional perspectives on a broad range of issues to judge their effect on future actions within the region. Regional perspectives focus on those issues that more immediately threaten local security and stability. Key issues for CMO planners to consider include to which regional organization the country in question belongs, regional treaties and alliances, foreign policy trends, and the pattern of crisis response.

- **National interests.** In the international arena, self-interested behavior is the principal assumption upon which the actions of nations and populations are interpreted. All actors will choose and pursue policies according to their own perception of their national interests. It is critical for CMO planners to see another actor’s national interests from that actor’s perspective. For POLMIL analysis, CMO planners can identify national interest in terms of survival, sovereignty, and economic well-being.

- **Ethnicity.** The modern nation-state is based on citizenship; that implies a degree of loyalty and individuality from other people. However, within the nation-state, there are those ethnic groups who may not belong to the politically dominant groups and hold to distinct cultural or social differences. These ethnic differences may transcend all other POLMIL factors. A group may benefit economically from living within the borders of another nation; however, this in no way diminishes their desire to form their own state or join one with which they have a common ethnic heritage. The CMO planner must see within the nation-state to understand if ethnicity is a critical element in the behavior of the populace.

- **Role of the media.** The media, news and literary, plays a vital role in a society. The increasing availability of news media and other information networks to influence a society’s leadership, population, and infrastructure can have significant impact on national will, political direction, and national security objectives and policy. CMO planners must understand the role of the media as it affects each potential populace and actors external to the AO. CMO planners must also examine the literary media because literature itself conveys important insights of that culture and society.

3-38. CMO planners obtain data for the analysis of enemy forces in the AO from the intelligence estimate and the preliminary CMO assessment. CMO planners describe enemy capabilities by considering sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, and movement of DCs. CMO planners discuss the enemy’s ability to influence or affect planned military operations and CMO in this section. Continuous coordination with the intelligence staff enhances the CMO planner’s ability to accurately describe the potential impact of enemy forces on the CMO mission.

3-39. Analysis of friendly forces identifies those military and OGAs operating in the AO, their assets, and their capability to support the CMO requirement. CMO planners develop separate narratives first to describe the status of military CMO resources and secondly the status of OGAs’ resources. This section concludes with a comparison of available capabilities versus those requirements necessary for CMO mission accomplishment. CMO planners clearly describe discrepancies between capabilities and requirements. CMO planners include solutions to rectify the discrepancies as recommendations.
3-40. CMO planners conclude this paragraph of the CMO estimate with a list of assumptions developed during mission analysis. An assumption is appropriate if it meets the tests of validity and necessity. Validity means the assumption is likely to be true. “Assuming away” potential problems, such as weather or likely enemy COAs, produces an invalid assumption. Necessity is whether the assumption is essential for planning. If planning can continue without the assumption, it is not necessary, and CMO planners should discard it.

3-41. CMO planners continuously integrate the results of the CMO mission analysis step of MDMP with the estimates of the other staff sections. Synchronization of the various staff products assists in the development of COAs by the operations staff and refinement of IPB products. Dependent on time available, the mission analysis products of the staff may be presented to the commander in the form of a mission analysis briefing.

3-42. The mission analysis brief by the staff results in an approved restated mission statement and the commander’s initial intent, planning guidance, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). These elements form the basis for COA development.

MISSION PLANNING

3-43. During mission analysis, the commander and staff ensure they understand the operational desired end state and associated objectives. The mission analysis process designs the tactical desired end states and supporting objectives through the identification of desirable and undesirable effects. Mission planning begins with the development of a COA and concludes with the production of an OPLAN or operation order (OPORD) (Figure 3-5, page 3-13).

COA DEVELOPMENT

3-44. The commander’s planning guidance may limit the number of COAs requiring development. Normally, the operations staff produces the narrative statement and supporting graphics that describes each distinct COA. When considering COAs, each must be fully capable of accomplishing the commander’s mission. Each COA is then developed as fully as time allows, filling in as many details as possible, given the current facts and assumptions. Like all military forces, CA participates in the full range of military operations. CMO staff planners support COA development by identifying supporting actions conducted by available CA and other forces that accomplish the CMO tasks identified during mission analysis. COAs may vary due to differences in employment of the main effort, task organization, populace situation or objectives, the use and composition of forces, and the scheme of maneuver.

COA ANALYSIS

3-45. A COA analysis consists of a feasibility check, war gaming, risk assessment, and comparison of war-game results. The war game of the COA is critical for the commander and staff to ensure all elements are fully integrated and synchronized. Prior to the war game, CMO planners select criteria by which to evaluate the results of the war gaming of each COA. CMO planners focus on the ability of available CA and other forces to accomplish the CMO tasks identified during mission analysis. Analysis of each COA determines—

- **Is the COA suitable?** Will it actually accomplish the mission when carried out successfully? Is it aimed at influencing the correct target audience or decision makers? Does it focus on the restated mission? Does it comply with the higher commander’s intent? Does it follow the commander’s guidance? Is the CAO and CMO mission appropriate? Does the mission profile allow the application of CA and CMO force capabilities? Does the mission support the theater CMO campaign? Is the mission consistent with other ongoing CMO programs in theater? If not, is that acceptable to the commander?

- **Is the COA feasible?** Does the supporting CA element have the required resources (communications, transportation, equipment)? Can the resources be made available in the time contemplated (pre-positioned materials or equipment, or maximizing preexisting arrangements with HN or contractor support that capitalize on indigenous capabilities)? Is the plan adaptable to significant changes (logistics support changes, reprioritization of CMO tasks, a drastic
decrease in CMO assets)? Feasibility is a quantitative measure that primarily involves time, space, and means. Is this mission operationally feasible?

- **Is the COA acceptable?** Does the expected outcome justify the risk? Even though the action will accomplish the mission and the unit either possesses or controls the required resources, is executing that COA worth the cost in terms of possible losses of personnel, time, material, and position? This analysis is largely based on intuition, experience, and a complete understanding of the situation.

![Figure 3-5. Civil-military operations estimate contributions to military decision making process planning](image-url)
• **Is the COA distinguishable?** To present viable alternatives for the commander’s consideration, COAs must be substantively different. Developing superficially different alternatives stifles creativity, wastes time, increases risk, reinforces undesirable certainty, and largely prevents effective staff analysis. It is better to develop one good COA and war-game it properly than to develop three superficial COAs.

• **Is the COA complete?** After reducing COAs to a manageable number, CMO planners perform a last check to confirm the COAs are technically correct. Does each retained COA adequately answer what, when, where, why, and how?

**COA COMPARISON**

3-46. The COA comparison discovers the strengths and weaknesses of a COA. Governing factors may include the speed of deployment, risk, capability, flexibility, and logistics. Not all of these governing factors, however, are equal. Some may be based on the commander’s guidance and intent. For example, is the COA under consideration more likely to achieve the essential tasks, or does it support the achievement of all CMO objectives equally well?

**COA APPROVAL**

3-47. The CMO planner makes a recommendation to the commander based only on essential information such as mission, situation, deductions about the situation, critical analysis, and sound doctrine. The commander’s decision may be based on experience, estimate of the situation, the COA’s inherent flexibility, task organizations, and risk.

**ORDERS PRODUCTION**

3–48. The commander’s approval of a COA initiates the publication of the OPLAN and OPORD. The CMO staff produces the CMO annex (Annex Q, per FM 5-0) largely from the information contained in the CMO estimate developed during the MDMP process. Figure 3-6 reflects the relationship between the two products.

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**Figure 3-6. Civil-military operations estimate contributions to civil-military operations annex**
3-49. CMO planners must maintain situational awareness after the publication of an OPLAN and OPORD. As new information becomes available, CMO planners update the CMO estimate. A staff section first synchronizes critical data impacting the plan with the other staff sections and then disseminates the information, as appropriate.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

3-50. Planning at the GCC and higher levels (Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense [DOD]) is based on national policy directives and strategies. Three of the main strategy documents include—

- The National Security Strategy of the United States of America developed by the President.
- The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America developed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).
- The National Military Strategy of the United States of America developed by the CJCS.

3-51. The GCCs plan at the strategic level of war through participation in the development of national military strategy, the development of theater estimates, and theater strategies. The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to U.S. national strategy and operational activities within the theater (JP 5-0). Theater strategic planning follows the joint operational planning process. Joint operation planning prepares for the use of existing capabilities to achieve objectives defined in national military strategy. The resultant plans are a measurement of the ability of the nation to successfully prosecute the national military strategy within the constraints of available forces and resources. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national objectives.

3-52. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Contingency Planning Guidance, prepared by the CJCS, task the GCCs to develop plans for potential operational contingencies and deterrence. The JSCP is a single instruction that covers planning guidance, objectives, tasks, assumptions, and forces. The JSCP tasks the development of GCC-prepared OPLANs, selected CONPLANs (with or without TPFDD), and FUNCPLANs. The JSCP specifies which plans will be submitted to the Chairman for approval. The GCC approves the remaining plans.

3-53. JOPES formalizes the planning process and provides for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision making in two related but distinct categories—contingency planning and crisis-action planning (CAP)—which differ primarily in the amount of available planning time.

3-54. Within the context of JOPES, a crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests. It typically develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that the President or SecDef considers a commitment of U.S. military forces and resources to resolve the situation. It may occur with little or no warning and requires accelerated decision making. JOPES provides crisis-action procedures for the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the likely use of military forces in response to a crisis.

3-55. Contingency planning relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when a crisis arises. There is not a seamless transition between contingency plans and CAP since the products are different. To transition to CAP, CMO planners must examine contingency planning assumptions and the plans adjusted accordingly to account for any differences between the assumptions and the actual circumstances at the time of crisis.

3-56. Joint operation planning further encompasses campaign planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. A campaign is a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Campaign planning may begin during contingency planning but it is normally not completed until after selection of the COA during CAP. Figure 3-7, page 3-16, depicts the various types of joint operations planning.
3-57. CAPTs of the regionally aligned CACOMs support strategic CMO planning at the theater level. These teams develop complete CA plans, policy, and programs that support the GCC’s strategic CMO plans. Each CACOM has the capability to employ five CAPTs that provide SME support at the GCC, TSOC, joint force land component commander (JFLCC), and the ASCC staff levels (Figure 3-8, page 3-17). The CAPTs support the GCC CMO staff and other military planners with integrating the supported commander’s military campaign plans into wider POLMIL, or comprehensive civilian-military strategic campaign plans.

3-58. Individual CA functional specialists from the CACOM’s organic FX SP cells support the CAPTs. SMEs in the areas of governance, rule of law, infrastructure, economic stability, public health and welfare, and public education and information provide detailed analysis products relating to the various elements of the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other subsystems during joint operational planning.

3-59. Analytical CMO products developed at the theater level focus on the analysis of the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other subsystems of a potential AO. The various CMO estimates and annexes, when distributed, provide the basis necessary for the development of detailed products at the operational level that define the corps and JTF operational environment civil-military situation.

**OPERATIONAL PLANNING**

3-60. Planning at the operational level (corps and JTF) synchronizes the achievement of national operational objectives through the conduct of tactical operations. Operational-level planning concentrates on developing plans for campaigns, subordinate campaigns, and major operations. CCDRs develop theater campaign plans to accomplish multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives. Subordinate unified commands typically develop subordinate campaign plans or operation plans that accomplish theater strategic objectives. If the mission requires military operations of sufficient scope, size, complexity, and duration, JFCs may develop subordinate campaign plans. Land component commanders normally develop plans for major operations that support the campaign plan.

3-61. The Army’s transformation of the corps and divisions has created organizations that are joint-capable by design and need only joint manning to achieve JFLCC or JTF capability. The HQ is functionally organized along joint operational lines. Important capabilities of the HQ are an early entry command post and follow-on deployable C2. The corps may serve as the ASCC, exercising administrative control over Army forces, planning and controlling support to other Services, interagency, and multinational forces with selected theaterwide support.
3-62. At the operational level, the CA brigade CAPT supports CAO and CMO G-9 planning staff at the corps or the division HQ (acting as a JTF). In crises situations requiring rapidly deployable CA forces, the Active Army CA brigade CAPT normally provides this support until transition to follow-on USAR forces is accomplished. CAO and CMO operational planning concentrates on the civil components of the supported commander’s AO at the regional and provincial level. Key to this support relationship is the “plug and play” organizational structure of the CAPT from regionally focused USAR CA brigades. The relationship between the G-9 primary staff officer to the supporting CA unit is the same relationship as the G-2 to the supporting military intelligence (MI) unit.

3-63. National level CAO and CMO analysis data developed at the theater level is refined and validated as it pertains to the assigned corps and JTF AO. The G-9 (designated as the J-9 or CJ-9 during joint and coalition operations) staff directorate has the primary responsibility for the planning and integration of CAO and CMO at the operational level.

3-64. The G-9 and his staff ensure the effective integration of civil considerations into the planning cycle. Like operations and intelligence (O/I) officers, the G-9 and his staff focus on the operational area. However, like personnel and logistics officers, the G-9 and his staff also must focus on logistics issues, particularly those regarding FHA and PRC such as the care of DCs.

3-65. During the operational-level MDMP, the G-9 staff is proactive. The staff integrates CAO and CMO planning considerations with the other staff elements according to the development of the CMO estimate. FM 3-05.40 details the principal duties of the G-9 staff officer. CAO and CMO examples of planning integration include the following:

- **G-1:**
  - Developing Soldier cultural awareness briefings.
  - Identifying sources of civilian and contract labor within the AOR.

- **G-2:**
  - Contributing the IPB process by providing pertinent civil considerations information.
  - Identifying civil considerations information requirements as either priority intelligence requirement (PIR) or CCIR.
- Creating threat assessments of enemy actions or reactions to planned CMO.
- Creating overlays of items impacting maneuverability (DC movement routes and significant cultural, political, and economic infrastructure).

- **G-3:**
  - Providing civil inputs to the COP.
  - Organizing, using, and integrating attached CA forces.
  - Identifying forces available to support CMO.
  - Integrating PRC to minimize civilian interference with operations.
  - Providing recommendations regarding no-fire areas (NFAs), restrictive fire areas (RFAs), and protected targets.
  - Producing supporting graphics and overlays.

- **G-4:**
  - Identifying civil sources of supplies and services within the AO to support operations.
  - Identifying sources of necessary supplies and services to meet legal and moral obligations with regard to DC operations and FHA.

- **G-7:**
  - Synchronizing CAO and CMO plans with the IO campaign.
  - Assisting integration of indigenous information systems and institutions within the AO.

- **Boards and working groups:**
  - Establishing the CMO working group.
  - Providing representatives to the various working groups, boards, centers, and cells established within the HQ, as required.

3-66. Full spectrum operations follow a cycle of planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment. These cyclic activities are sequential but not discrete. They overlap and recur as circumstances demand (FM 3-0). The integration of CAO and CMO at the operational level requires the development of—

- The commander’s CMO objectives supporting the attainment of strategic goals.
- Prioritized CA tasks required to meet CMO objectives.
- MOPs that are focused on task accomplishment.
- MOEs focused on effects attainment.

### MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE

3-67. MOEs focus on effects attainment by demonstrating the impact that completed actions have had in attaining the desired adversary behaviors. MOPs focus on task accomplishment. In other words, MOP has confirmed or denied that we have “done things right.” MOE answers the question, “Are we doing the right thing or are additional or alternate actions required?”

3-68. There are important differences between task accomplishment and effects attainment. MOEs measure the attainment of desired effects via quantifiable indicators. Effects fill the gap between an objective (either strategic or operational) and tasks to subordinate units. CAO and CMO planners identify specific tasks that must be performed to obtain the desired effects. Achieving the desired effect will result in the desired end state or realization of the objective. CAO and CMO planners use MOPs and MOEs collectively to provide an evaluation to identify trends that can affect future operations.

3-69. Excessive numbers of MOEs and MOPs become unmanageable. At that point, the cost of collection efforts outweighs the value of assessing. Consequently, higher echelon staffs ensure that their numerous MOEs and MOPs do not overly burden lower echelons—especially battalion and below.

3-70. CAO and CMO planners identify MOEs for desired and undesired effects. MOEs indicate how the ASCOPE characteristics of the systems in the operational environment are behaving (for example, how the adversary is acting). Indicators for each MOE are developed and fed into intelligence collection planning.
3-71. Measuring effects improve planning and assessment by emphasizing the following:

- The linking of operational objectives to tactical-level actions through a specified set of effects.
- The systemic situational awareness and understanding of the adversary and operational environment enabled by a systemic analysis process.
- The command and staff interaction across multiple echelons enabled by significant collaboration capabilities through CIM support to the collaborative environment.
- The enhanced unity of effort between joint, multinational, and interagency organizations supported by the CIM process and fed through the civil information grid (CIG).
- A more accurate, rigorous assessment of the attainment of objectives focused on system behavior rather than discrete task accomplishment.

3-72. CAO and CMO planners develop CMO MOEs to determine how well or poorly an operation is proceeding in achieving CMO objectives according to the commander’s mission statement and intent. CMO MOEs identify effective strategies and tactics and determine points at which to shift resources, transition to different phases, or alter or terminate the mission.

3-73. With an understanding of desired and undesired effects, CAO and CMO planners connect nodes to specific effects. A node connected to an effect is a key node, and some of these may become high-value nodes if they contribute to more than one desired effect when acted on. CAO and CMO planners then consider specific actions that can be taken against these nodes. Success is measured by MOPs.

3-74. The JFC’s orders to subordinates will specify the tasks, purpose, and associated effects for action. At tactical levels, desired effects are reflected as part of the higher commander’s intent statement—the concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state—that serves as impetus for the subordinate unit planning effort.

EVALUATION PRODUCTS

3-75. In addition to deciding what MOEs to evaluate, CAO and CMO planners develop plans to observe and validate each MOE. These plans determine—

- Who will observe the MOE?
- When will the MOE be observed?
- How will the MOE be observed?
- Where will the observations be made?
- Who will approve and validate achievement of the MOE?
- What actions will be taken when the MOE is satisfactorily achieved? By whom?

MEASURING EFFECTS

3-76. Observation of MOEs can be assigned to individuals, CATs, or an all-source analysis center, such as the CMOC. Observation of MOEs may be event-driven or time-driven. Some MOEs can be observed and measured immediately after an event. Other MOEs can only be observed after a cycle of time has passed, such as the attitude of a local population toward the presence of coalition forces.

3-77. MOEs may be observed in a variety of ways. The deliberate assessment, described in Chapter 2, is the most effective method. Using a combination of surveys, interviews, and direct observation, the observers of an MOE obtain detailed, current information at the source of the issue. Some MOEs may be observed in the course of routine CMOC, or interagency, operations. As the CMO planners analyze reports from CATs and various civilian agencies and record statistics, the CMOC provides input to the COP.

3-78. An MOE spreadsheet (Figure 3-9, page 3-20) provides criteria to measure an effect’s success that directly supports the commander’s objective. Usually identified in a quantifiable format, the collection of MOE data provides trends to determine positive progress toward a stated objective or desired effect. The MOE spreadsheet allows the staff to track, by AOR and key terrain, where indicators are occurring that shows whether the unit is having success or failure with a particular effect.
3-79. CAO and CMO planners use the historical information from the MOE spreadsheet to complete the trend analysis spreadsheet (Figure 3-10, page 3-21). The trend analysis spreadsheet allows the commander and staff to visually see where positive and negative activities are occurring within the AOR. As shown in Figure 3-10, the commander’s objective and desired effects are clearly identified. MOE indicators are aligned for each effect. From this information and analysis of why a trend is up or down, the staff can identify trouble spots and plan operations to reverse the negative trend.

3-80. CAO and CMO planners can capitalize on the positive trends. They can identify what is causing the positive trend (increase). CAO and CMO planners with higher HQ and subordinate task force (TF) commanders, apply those TTP identified. The analysis from this product, TF commander’s assessments, and INTSUMs are used to develop the trend analysis slide.

3-81. The trend analysis chart (Figure 3-11, page 3-21) is a product that provides a visual tool for the assessment of the commander’s objectives and effects. CAO and CMO planners complete the chart by using data derived from the trend analysis spreadsheet, commander’s assessment, CMO assessments, and INTSUMs. It also shows in time how the commander evaluates each objective and desired effects.

3-82. The impact analysis chart (Figure 3-12, page 3-22) is part of the overall visual assessment for the commander. This product shows the impact of upward or downward trends. It does this by color-coding AORs with a red, yellow, or green status and the events or indicators that have occurred to make that assessment (printing limitations preclude Figure 3-12 from appearing in color). This chart allows commanders to quickly focus and graphically control forces.

**ACHIEVING EFFECTS**

3-83. Effects must be validated and approved before final disposition of an event or program can be made. The approval authority must be identified during the decide phase. The approval authority may be a commander, HN authorities, organized representatives of the international community, or some other entity.
3-84. Achievement of effects must be tied to a disposition action. This action may be the—

- Termination of an activity or task.
- Transfer of an activity or task to follow-on CA forces, other military forces, or the international community.
- Transition of an activity or task to the IPI.

3-85. As the evaluation phase progresses and satisfaction of MOEs indicates an operation is nearing completion, CAO and CMO planners finalize transition plans and begin executing termination or transition timelines. Chapter 6 discusses these actions.
3-86. Execution of an event or program may result in unexpected outcomes. As new problems present themselves, CAO and CMO planners must restart the CA methodology. They assess the new situation; decide what, if any, action to take; develop the new situation and detect conditions through deliberate assessments; deliver the appropriate CAO and CMO; and evaluate the effects using MOEs. When effects are satisfactorily achieved, CAO and CMO planners move on to the transition phase.

**FAILURE TO ACHIEVE EFFECTS**

3-87. If there is a failure to achieve effects, CAO and CMO planners must determine why. The evaluated effect of an event or program may be unsuccessful because levels were set too high, the wrong action was measured, or some other reason. CA Soldiers must be careful not to redefine success to what has been achieved.

3-88. At this point, CAO and CMO planners must decide what to do next. Some options include—

- Continue the operation as currently planned and reevaluate at a future date.
- Accept the results and proceed with transition of the operation as planned.
- Redefine the mission, using the CA methodology, and develop a new plan with new effects and MOEs.

**MEASURING PERFORMANCE**

3-89. MOPs focus on task accomplishment by answering the following questions:

- Was the task or action performed as the commander intended?
- Did the assigned force produce the fires, maneuver, or information required by the specified or implied tasks, regardless of effect?
- Have the expected results of the desired influence or the changes in system behavior after the assigned tasks been accomplished?
- Are assigned forces doing things right?
3-90. Measuring performance is normally a quantitative analysis that determines whether the task or action was performed to a standard. The standard may be derived from either a procedure (for example, an SOP) or may be time-sensitive. Figure 3-13 illustrates a technique for managing and measuring performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Node #</th>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>MOP</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| NI 101 | Electrical substation | Suliyah  | Conduct initial assessment of Suliyah electrical substation | • Determine physical condition of facility.  
• Determine capability of facility to meet village power distribution needs. | • Initial assessment conducted NLT D+21  
• CMO report completed IAW SOP NLT D+22  
• Report identifies condition and capability of facility |                                                             |

**Figure 3-13. Measures of performance worksheet example**

**TACTICAL PLANNING**

3-91. At the tactical level, division and BCT CAO and CMO planners concentrate their analysis and planning efforts on the unit AO described in the higher HQ OPLAN and the supported commander’s areas of interest. The following provide the framework for CAO and CMO planning at the tactical (local) level:

- Information developed during systems analysis at the corps and JTF level.
- Prioritized CA tasks.
- MOPs.
- MOEs.
- Operational CMO objectives described in the OPLAN received from higher HQ.

3-92. Tactical level CAO and CMO planners apply the factors of METT-TC concentrating on the civil considerations aspect of the AO during the conduct of MDMP. Planners analyze civil considerations by using ASCOPE. The six characteristics of ASCOPE are—

- Areas.
- Structures.
- Capabilities.
- Organizations.
- People.
- Events.

**AREAS**

3-93. Civil areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s operational environment that are not normally considered militarily significant. The failure of planners to consider key civil areas, however, can seriously affect the success of any military mission.

3-94. CAO and CMO planners analyze key civil areas from two perspectives: how do these areas affect the military mission and how do military operations impact on civilian activities in these areas? At times, the
answers to these questions may dramatically influence major portions of the COAs under consideration. The following are examples of key civil areas requiring analysis:

- **Locations of government centers.** These areas are often richer, more populated, better educated, and contain greater and more advanced infrastructure than outlying areas. They are also often the center of influence over the populace in outlying areas. Depending on mission priorities, commanders may consider aggressively engaging these areas rather than bypassing them.

- **Areas defined by political boundaries (districts within a city or municipalities within a region).** Political boundaries are often well defined and respected not just by political leaders but also by the population of the areas. Commanders might consider overlaying unit boundaries on political boundaries for long-term operations for practical control purposes.

- **Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves.** These can be sources of potential problems that pose a threat to U.S. forces, or sources of sympathetic allies that can be exploited for PRC purposes.

- **Agricultural and mining regions and trade routes.** Routine economic activities may hinder the movement or staging of military resources. Likewise, interfering with operations related to the economy of an area may bring an unnecessary burden on military units or logistical resources in the area.

- **Possible sites for the temporary settlement of DCs or other civil functions.** Often, the same considerations that make a site ideal for positioning a military unit will also make it ideal for a DC camp or other such settlement. Commanders must consider the long-term practical and environmental consequences of occupying certain civil areas.

**Structures**

3-95. Existing civil structures take on many significant roles. Some, such as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams, are traditional high-payoff targets. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals, are cultural sites that international law or other agreements generally protect. Still others are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, TV stations, radio stations, and print plants, which may be useful for military purposes.

3-96. Structures analysis involves determining the location, functions, capabilities, and application in support of military operations. It also involves weighing the consequences of removing them from civilian use in terms of political, economic, religious, social, and informational implications; the reaction of the populace; and replacement costs.

**Capabilities**

3-97. CAO and CMO planners can view civil capabilities from several perspectives. The term capabilities may refer to—

- Existing capabilities of the populace to sustain itself, such as through public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture systems.

- Capabilities with which the populace needs assistance, such as public works and utilities, public health, economics, and commerce.

- Resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission, such as interpreters (Appendix C), laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. Local vendors, the HN, or other nations may provide these resources and services. In hostile territory, civil capabilities include resources that military forces could use consistent with international law.

3-98. The CAO and CMO planners normally conduct the analysis of the existing capabilities of the AO on the basis of the CA functional specialties described in FM 3-05.40. The analysis also identifies the capabilities of partner countries and organizations involved in the operation. In doing so, CAO and CMO planners consider how to address shortfalls, as well as how to capitalize on strengths in capabilities.
ORGANIZATIONS

3-99. Civil organizations are organized groups with or without affiliation to government agencies. They can be church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, and community watch groups. They might be IGOs or the NGO community.

3-100. Organizations can assist the commander in keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and influencing the actions of the populace. They can also form the nucleus of humanitarian assistance (HA) programs, interim-governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.

PEOPLE

3-101. People, individually and collectively, can have a positive, a negative, or no impact on military operations. In the context of ASCOPE, the term “people” includes civilians or nonmilitary personnel encountered in an AO. The term may also extend to those outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In all military operations, U.S. forces must be prepared to encounter and work closely with civilians of all types.

3-102. Regardless the type of operation, military forces will usually encounter various civilians living and operating in and around the supported unit’s AO. To facilitate determining who they might be, it is useful to separate civilians into distinct categories. In foreign operations, these categories might include—
- Local nationals (town and city dwellers, farmers and other rural dwellers, and nomads)
- Local civil authorities (elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government).
- Expatriates.
- Foreign employees of IGOs or NGOs.
- USG and third-nation government agency representatives.
- UN representatives.
- Contractors (U.S. citizens, local nationals, and third-nation citizens providing contract services).
- DOD civilian employees.
- The media (journalists from print, radio, and visual media).

3-103. The environment primarily dictates civilian activities. Planners should consider each category of civilian separately since their activities will impact differently—positively and negatively—on the unit’s mission. Military operations affect civilian activities in various ways. Commanders should consider the political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal impact of operations on the categories of civilians identified in the AO.

EVENTS

3-104. Many categories of civilian events exist that may affect the military mission. Some examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary). Likewise, there are military events that impact on the lives of civilians in an AO. Some examples are combat operations, including indirect fires, and deployments and redeployments. CAO and CMO planners determine what events are occurring and analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, moral, and legal implications.

PLANNING PRODUCTS

3-105. Joint or Army Service doctrine defines the types and formats of products developed during planning. Specific formats can be found in the following publications:
- For the joint OPLAN format: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03B, Joint Operational Planning and Execution System, Volume II: Planning Formats and Guidance, 28 February 2006.
- Army OPLAN format: FM 5-0.
- CMO plan, estimate, and annex formats: FM 3-05.40.
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Chapter 4

Civil-Military Operations Center

No two operations are alike. I want you to remember that because the most important thing we can do is to understand that there is so much differences in these operations that they don’t lend themselves to recipes or checklists. The danger when we start to take on doctrine is we want to prepare a synchroharmonization matrix for every operation. When we do that, we develop a “hammer to fit” mind-set. And so we are going take—by God—that CMOC if it is set up a certain way, and it is going to work in this operation. That is, if we did it this way in [Operation] PROVIDE COMFORT, it is going to work in [Operation] PROVIDE HOPE, and it is going to work in [Operation] RESTORE HOPE, or [Operation] ABANDON HOPE, or whatever operation. But, it won’t. You are going to screw it up. I think the Ambassador [Robert B. Oakley] has already mentioned the need for flexible thinking and reward for initiative.

General Anthony Zinni
United States Marine Corps
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, 1997–2000
National Defense University Symposium, June 1999

Since World War II, an otherwise clever nation has fallen prey to several erroneous premises, among them that intelligence demands secrecy; that technology is a fine substitute for thinking...

Robert David Steele
“The New Craft of Intelligence”
OSS Net
July 2001

OVERVIEW

4-1. The CMOC is the location for assessment, planning, coordination, knowledge management (collaboration, information management, and information sharing), integration, deconfliction of CMO, and numerous other activities. The term “CMOC” leaves most with an image of a place. However, as the quote above demonstrates, a CMOC is more about function and effect than architecture.

4-2. FM 3-05.40 indicates the CMOC is a standing capability formed by all CA units from the company level to the CACOM level. The CMOC serves as the primary coordination and knowledge management interface for the U.S. armed forces between OGAs, IPI, IGOs, NGOs, humanitarian organizations, and multinational military forces. The CMOC facilitates continuous coordination of knowledge management among the key participants with regards to CMO and CAO from local levels to international levels within a given AO, and develops, manages, and analyzes the civil inputs to the COP. The CMOC is the operations and support element of the CA unit as well as a mechanism for the coordination of CMO.

4-3. A CMOC is—

- An analysis center for the civil component of the operational environment.
- A collaborative planning cell for CMO.
- A meeting place for interagency coordination, mediation (Appendix D), and consensus building.
- A knowledge and document management center for the civil component of the operational environment.
- A link to the nonmilitary partners and participants.
Chapter 4

- A clearinghouse for requests for military support from nonmilitary organizations.
- An element that is employed with a task and purpose.

FUNCTION

4-4. The CMOC is the commander’s tool in purposefully shaping the commander’s civil operational environment. It is the smallest element capable of performing the full range of CA core tasks. The CMOC is modular, scalable, and enables the execution and monitoring of CMO. It is the focal point for collaboration, coordination, and communication dealing with the civil component of the commander’s operational environment. The CMOC coordinates the interaction of U.S. and multinational forces with IPI, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. Figure 4-1 shows a notional composition of a CMOC.

4-5. The CMOC plans, coordinates, directs, and controls CMO and provides the C2 of forces assigned under it. The CMOC manages projects within its AOR and facilitates disengagement plans. The CMOC provides access and CMO-related data and information from and to nonmilitary agencies operating away from the military HQ.

4-6. A major change resulting from the transformation of CA to a modular force is the creation of the CMOC as an organizational structure within the Active Army and USAR CA units from the CACOM down to the CA company. The CMOC is no longer considered an “ad hoc” organization. Force design changes provide the supported commander an organization manned and equipped to plan, conduct, execute, and assess CAO and CMO. Active Army CA units differ from their USAR counterparts in that the FX SP cell consists of USAR CA functional specialists and only resides in USAR CA units. The CACOM

Figure 4-1. Notional composition of a civil-military operations center
CMOC organization differs from the CA brigade and CA battalion in that the CACOM has three FX SP cells and two CLTs. The CACOM has the capability to task-organize its forces to establish two separate CMOCs.

4-7. CA units provide the supported commander the capability to establish a CMOC within their respective AO (Figure 1-4, page 1-7). The CMOC section of the CA company provides the BCT supported commander the capability to manage, direct, and assess CMO within his AO. The section provides a robust communications capability and, in the case of USAR CA units, limited CA functional specialist expertise in the areas of public safety, public facilities, and public health. Depending on mission requirements, CA functional specialists from any level within the CA force structure may augment the section.

4-8. The BCT S-9 has staff oversight and is responsible for the overall function of CMO for the BCT commander. Typically, the S-9 of the BCT, with the CA company commander, ensures the timely and efficient employment of the company’s CMOC Soldiers. The CMOC provides the S-9 planning augmentation support and manages ongoing CMO within the BCT AO. Based on METT-TC, the establishment of subordinate CMOCs within the BCT’s AO may be required. This is normally accomplished by tasking of an organic CAT with the mission by means of a FRAGO.

**ORGANIZATION**

4-9. The size of the organizational structure and the operational focus of the CMOC changes from the CACOM (Figure 4-2) to the CA brigade (Figure 4-3, page 4-4) to the CA battalion (Figure 4-4, page 4-4), but the roles of the various elements of the CMOC are basically the same. The duties of the members, the functional responsibilities of the center, and general functions of the CMOC are discussed in the following paragraphs.

4-10. The supported unit G-9 or S-9 conducts detailed CAO or CMO analysis and planning and provides staff oversight of the supporting CA unit. The supporting CMOC executes, assesses, and provides feedback relating to the effects of the operation.

![Figure 4-2. Civil Affairs command civil-military operations center organizational structure](image)
Chapter 4

Figure 4-3. Civil Affairs brigade civil-military operations center organizational structure

Legend:
ISOCA  Integrated special operations communications assemblage

Figure 4-4. Civil Affairs battalion civil-military operations center organizational structure

Legend:
ISOCA  Integrated special operations communications assemblage

USAR CA BDE only
HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT

4-11. The HQ element consists of the CA unit G-3 or S-3, operations sergeant major or operations sergeant, and a CA noncommissioned officer (NCO). The HQ element provides detailed supervision of the CMOC operation and manages the execution of the overall CMO effort within the supported commander’s AO.

OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SECTION

4-12. The O/I section consists of the combined G-2 and G-3 or S-2 and S-3 assets of the supporting CA unit. The O/I section is the nexus for planning, coordinating, and integrating the various CMOC sections and capabilities with the supported unit staff sections. It is important to remember that the supported commander’s objectives are the focus of support for the CMOC and the supporting CA unit. The responsibilities of the O/I section include—

- Integrating the battle rhythms of the supported unit and the CMOC.
- Coordinating and integrating logistics reporting with CAO and CMO needs and resources.
- Ensuring the supported commander’s COP has updated CIM inputs.
- Battle-tracking all CAO and CMO to ensure the situational awareness and situational understanding of CMO by the supported staff and commander and its effect in the AO.
- Supervising and directing the tasks of the CIM cell and CLTs.
- Supervising, directing, and integrating the capabilities of the FX SP cells.
- Providing intelligence analysis products regarding the civil environment.

Civil Information Management Cell

4-13. The CIM cell receives assessments, spot reports, after action reports (AARs), lessons learned, and intelligence reports from supporting the CA element, as well as additional information from OGAs, IPI, IGOS, and NGOs in the AO. The CIM cell then collates and processes the information. The MP, engineers, CA, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and other U.S. forces may perform formal CR to acquire information for the CIM cell processing and integration. Proper coordination with non-CA forces must be done to ensure they are able to perform CR and act in that capacity.

4-14. The CIM cell collects civil information, enters it into a central database, through the knowledge management system, and analyzes that information internally and with the supported unit, higher HQ, other USG and DOD agencies, and other agencies and organizations, as appropriate. Coordination among other elements ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of raw and analyzed civil information to all levels throughout the AO.

4-15. The CIM cell director is responsible for supervising the network and communications specialists organic to the cell. The CIM product is deliverable in several forms to the O/I director as well as to the S-9 of the BCT. The CIM product is—

- A textual compilation of information and data that includes an analysis from the integrated collection management director of the supported unit’s G-2 or S-2 and the CMOC intelligence analysts.
- A graphical compilation of data and information placed as a geographic information system (GIS) layer on the COP.
- A Web site for information management and collaboration.
- A briefing or running estimate contribution to the supported commander’s daily updates and targeting process.

4-16. The CIM cell noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) is a networking specialist. As a networking specialist, the NCOIC is directly responsible for maintaining the connectivity for all inputs and personnel that send information and data to the CIM cell. Some elements of civil information are—

- Typography, hydrography, climate, weather, and terrain, including landforms, drainage, vegetation, and soils.
- Census, location, ethnic composition, and health factors of the population.
● Attitude of the population, including ideological, religious, and cultural aspects.
● Government structure, including forms, personalities, existing laws, and political heritage.
● Educational standards and facilities.
● Important cultural activities and repositories.
● Communications, transportation, utility, power, and natural resources.
● Labor potential, including availability by type and skill, practices, and organizations.
● Economic development, including principal industries, scientific and technical capabilities, commercial processes, banking structure, monetary system, price and commodity controls, extent and nature of agricultural production, and accustomed population dietary habits.
● Cores of resistance movements.
● Organization and operation of guerrilla forces in rear areas and the extent and degree of volition involved in local support.
● Hostile activities, including espionage, sabotage, and other factors of subversion and disaffection.

4-17. The CMOC CIM cell acts as the repository for AO-wide data. It is the focal point for all CIM policy, analytical algorithms, predictive models, and validation of subordinate CA element CIM programs. The CIM cell conducts collation and analysis of civil information. It develops civil inputs to the COP in conjunction with the CMOC while linking civil information to the appropriate military and civil (OGA, IGO, NGO, and IPI) systems via geospatially referenced data. CIM cell key tasks include the following:

● Collect relevant information (open-source and classified).
● Process relevant information to create COP.
● Display COP tailored to unit needs.
● Store relevant information.
● Disseminate COP and other relevant knowledge products to higher, lower, adjacent, and supported organizations.
● Communicate information to outside agencies.
● Supervise collection, analysis, processing, and dissemination of operational and tactical civil information.
● Supervise the receipt, analysis, dissemination, and storage of civil information.
● Assist in the conduct of IPB.
● Analyze current civil reconnaissance to identify gaps and subsequent information-collection requirements.
● Conduct quality control reviews of analysis performed by subordinate CA elements.
● Receive, produce, and disseminate reports containing civil information.

4-18. CIM cell mission requirements include the following:

● On an ongoing basis, the CIM cell monitors reporting by subordinate CA and supported unit elements to identify information for addition to the COP. It provides premission base data (such as digital mapping, historic files, and current operations) to deploying elements. It conducts analysis of ongoing operations to provide the supported G-9 or S-9 with recommendations on force utilization.
● During mission analysis, the CIM cell provides products that depict the civil terrain. The cell also illustrates key personnel linkages that will affect the mission. In coordination with the O/I cell, the CIM cell identifies important nodes that may be targeted by use of CAO. The cell further assists in the identification of civil related COGs.

4-19. When the CIM cell is deployed as part of a CMOC, it receives all assessments, spot reports, AARs, lessons learned, intelligence reports, and comments from supported units, IPI, NGOs, and other partners in the AO. The CIM cell then collates and processes the information. Sources of information may include reports from supporting forces (such as MP, engineers, CA, PSYOP, and other U.S. forces) that perform formal civil reconnaissance to acquire information for the CIM cell’s processing and integration.
CIVIL LIAISON TEAM

4-20. The CLT extends the outreach of its parent CMOC into multiple areas. It provides limited civil-military interface capability as a spoke for the exchange of information between IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and OGA and has limited capability to link resources to prioritized requirements. The CLT is a stand-alone CAT that responds to the operations section of the CMOC. It provides the supported level CMOC with a “storefront” for CAO and CMO coordination capability without interfering with the regular staff functions.

4-21. The CLT provides the connectivity and interface to the IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and multinational agencies and organizations to ensure a constant and accurate flow of information from and to the civil components of the AO. The CLT has the capability to liaise between civil, military, HN, and humanitarian elements within the AO at the local, provincial, and national levels of the civil environment dependent on the mission of its parent CMOC.

4-22. The primary task of the CLT is fostering cooperation between the various civil organizations and agencies and the CMOC. The CLT accomplishes this task by identifying and directly engaging the various civil components within the AO. Additionally, the CLT may be directed to—

- Conduct IPI assessments as directed by the CMOC.
- Conduct CR as directed by the CMOC.

FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY CELL

4-23. The FX SP cell resides only in the USAR CA force structure within the CACOM, CA brigade, and CA battalion. The FX SP cell provides technical expertise and staff assistance in planning, coordinating, and executing CAO in support of CMO. The number of cells and types of functional specialists found within the structure vary with type of unit, but the roles are the same and the modular design allows for augmentation across the operational spectrum.

4-24. The CACOM provides three CA FX SP cells that contain specialists in all six of the CA functional areas (Figure 4-5). The FX SP cells are composed of Soldiers (officer and enlisted) with technical expertise in the civilian sectors most likely to have an impact on CMO.

4-25. The brigade and battalion organizations have one FX SP cell with limited capabilities in four (rule of law, infrastructure, governance, and public health and welfare) of the six functional areas (Figure 4-6, page 4-8). Each CAO that a cell supports may require a different emphasis on skills and team composition. Depending on mission requirements, augmentation by specific technical CA functional specialists from anywhere within the deployed CA assets may be necessary for mission accomplishment.

Figure 4-5. Civil Affairs command functional specialty cell organization
Rule of Law Section

4-26. Close coordination between the rule of law section and the governance section for synchronization and synergy between efforts to restore, reform, and assist the court and legal system and efforts to restore, reform, and assist the public safety system is critical. The rule of law specialists discern the most effective and supportable actions to establish or reestablish rule of law sectors within the AO. The rule of law specialists—

- Provide for the restoration of order in the immediate aftermath of military operations.
- Provide for reestablishing routine police functions, such as controlling the population, preventing crime, investigating crimes, and arresting those who commit crimes.
- Restore and enhance the operation of the court system, to include vetting and training judges, prosecutors, defense counsels, legal advisors, and administrators, and restoring and equipping court and administrative facilities.
- Restore and reform the HN civil and criminal legal system, to include reviewing and revising statutes, codes, decrees, and other laws to ensure compliance with international legal standards, as well as adopting transitional measures for the immediate administration of justice.
- Provide for an effective corrections system that complies with international standards, to include selecting, vetting, and training corrections officials, and constructing or renovating appropriate facilities.

Governance Section

4-27. The governance section provides assistance to FN ministries and local government officials. The section consists of functional specialists in public administration and services who support the following:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public administration systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public administration systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.
- Coordinate with FN government administrators and agencies in support of CMO.
- Advise on and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating public government systems and agencies.
- Advise on and assist in developing technical administrative requirements, policies, and procedures for providing government services to the local population.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and the impact of those systems on the supported commander’s mission.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.
Civil-Military Operations Center

5 July 2007  FM 3-05.401/MCRP 3-33.1A  4-9

- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and penal systems).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government public safety systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing public safety resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use.

Public Health and Welfare Section

4-28. The public health and welfare section provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command in creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes through which a society maintains the physical, mental, and social health of its people. Some skills required in this section include doctors, dentists, hospital administrators, nurses, public health specialists, cultural relations specialists, museum curators, archivists, and others whose civilian duties include health and welfare management in addition to arts, monuments, and archives.

4-29. The public health and welfare section specialists—
- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing IPI public and private health systems, sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public health systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.
- Coordinate the use of IPI government and private health resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
- Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public health services and resources to support government administration (clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, ambulance transportation, skilled personnel, and education).
- Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government public health systems and agencies.
- Assist in coordinating IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.
- Advise on and assist in IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. agencies on preventing, controlling, and treating diseases (education, immunization, and sanitation).
- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on FN social and cultural matters and determines the impact of those matters on social and mental well-being of the society and the possible effects on CMO.
- Assist in familiarizing, educating, and training U.S. personnel in the FN social, cultural, religious, ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior, and language.
- Advise and assist in locating, identifying, preserving, and protecting significant cultural property.
- Develop plans for and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, preserving, and restoring significant cultural property and facilities (religious buildings, shrines and consecrated places, museums, monuments, art, archives, and libraries).
- Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government, community, and private systems and agencies to protect, preserve, and restore cultural property.
- Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining cultural property systems and agencies.
- Assist in locating, identifying, and safeguarding cultural property and in determining ownership.
- Assist in environmental management:
  - Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN environmental and pollution control systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of environmental and pollution control systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing environmental resource management systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.

Coordinate FN government and private environmental management resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration to mitigate, prepare, respond to, and recover environmental activities.

Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for environmental management services and resources to support government administration (plans, policies, and procedures to protect natural resources and provide pollution control).

Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government environmental management as part of CMO.

Advise, assist, and support the coordination of IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government environmental management as part of CMO.

Infrastructure Section

4-30. The infrastructure section assesses the municipal and public infrastructure needs of the civilian population in the AO. The infrastructure section consists of functional specialists in public works, transportation, utilities, and communications. The section conducts assessments of the indigenous public infrastructure and systems. Using these assessments and their civilian skills, the team determines methods to design, build, and maintain the organizations, the architecture, and the systems required to support transportation, water, communications, and power. The infrastructure section provides recommendations and direction for maintaining, sustaining, and improving the indigenous public systems and services, when appropriate. The infrastructure section specialists—

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public and commercial transportation systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of transportation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing transportation equipment, facilities, and systems.
- Facilitate the coordination of government and commercial transportation resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
- Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial transportation resources to support government administration (motor vehicles and roads, trains and railways, boats and waterways, aircraft and airports, and pipelines).
- Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government transportation systems and agencies.
- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public and commercial works and utilities systems, agencies, services, and facilities.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works and utilities systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public works and utilities equipment, facilities, and systems.
- Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial works and utilities resources to support government administration (electric power, natural gas, water production and distribution; sewage collection, treatment, and disposal; sanitation; and public facilities).
- Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining government works and utilities systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing (coordinating) public works and utilities resources to support government administration and CMO.
- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing government and commercial communication systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of communication systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing communication equipment, facilities, and systems.
- Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial communications resources to support government administration (postal services, telephone, telegraph, radio, TV, computer systems, and print media).
- Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government communications systems and agencies.

**Economic Stability Section (CACOM Only)**

4-31. The economic stability section consists of functional specialists in economic fields and business administration such as—
- Economists.
- Bankers.
- Supply technicians.
- Business administrators.
- Agricultural and food specialists and technicians.
- Marketing and distribution specialists.

4-32. The economic stability section assesses government, corporate, and private resources and systems. Using these assessments, the team determines how to assist in the efficient management of resources, goods, and services to enhance the viability of the society’s economic system. The economic stability section specialists—
- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing food and agricultural systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of food and agricultural systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans, policies, and procedures for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing food and agricultural systems and agencies for producing, processing, storing (especially perishables), transporting, distributing, and marketing.
- Coordinate the use of indigenous government and commercial food and agricultural resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
- Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for food and agricultural resources (livestock, poultry, grain, vegetables, fruit, fish, fiber, and forestry) management to support government administration.
- Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining food and agricultural systems and agencies.
- Assist in coordinating IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support food and agricultural systems as part of CMO (crop and livestock improvement, agricultural training, and education).
- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in monitoring and assessing the indigenous economy, economic systems, commercial activities, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of economic systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans, policies, and procedures for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing economic and commercial systems, agencies, and resources.
- Advise on and assist with budgetary systems, monetary and fiscal policies, revenue-producing systems, and treasury operations.
Advise on and assist in price control and rationing programs.
Develop and implement plans to prevent black-market activities.
Conduct liaison and coordinate with local government administration agencies and commercial enterprises in support of CMO.
Advise on and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating economic and commerce systems, agencies, and organizations.
Advise on and assist in the technical administrative requirements of employing economic controls (price controls, rationing programs, prevention of black-market activities, monetary and fiscal policies, and labor).
Advise on ways to rapidly boost the local economy in the AO.
Advise on and assist in employing local commercial resources, including labor, to support government administration, CMO, and military use.
Assist in coordinating IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local economic development as part of CMO.
Advise and assist the Staff Judge Advocate and contracting officials in indigenous cultural intricacies. Ensure compliance with international laws and conventions regarding use of labor and when acquiring and using local resources (supplies, equipment, and facilities).
Provide technical expertise on, advice on, and assistance in identifying and assessing public and commercial supply systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
Determine the availability of local supplies.
Identify private and public property available for military use.
Develop plans for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing government and commercial supply systems and facilities.
Facilitate the coordination of government, commercial, and private property, facilities, supplies, equipment, and other resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government and commercial supply systems and agencies.
Advise on and assist in the technical administrative requirements for government and commercial supply resources to support government administration (transportation; storage; distribution, including rationing; and the use of captured and salvaged items).
Establish policies and procedures on custody and administration of public and private property.

Public Education and Information Section (CACOM Only)

4-33. The public education and information section consists of functional specialists in education and information services including educators at all levels, education specialists, school administrators, public relations personnel, and media specialists. This section provides technical expertise in designing, resourcing, and implementing public education and information programs and systems through media and formal education institutions. The public education and information section specialists—

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN and HN public, parochial, and private education systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of education systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans for and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public education systems, agencies, facilities, and resources.
- Advise on and assist in establishing the technical requirements for the public education system to support government administration (primary, secondary, and postsecondary educational systems).
- Advise on and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining public education systems and agencies.
- Advise on and assist FN and HN institutions in developing and coordinating public relations activities to support government administration and the “single voice” message.
- Recommend information control and civil censorship policies.

**SUSTAINMENT SECTION**

4-34. The sustainment section consists of the combined G-1 and G-4 or S-1 and S-4 assets of the CA unit. In addition to the normal functions necessary in providing personnel and logistics support to the organic CA unit, the section contributes to the CMOC mission by—
- Maintaining a database of all POCs and HN resources that can be used for military or humanitarian purposes (facilities, transportation assets, goods, and services).
- Coordinating and tracking logistics activities in support of CMO.
- Maintaining adequate levels of supplies for use in CMO operations (for example, office supplies, fuel, batteries, and light bulbs).
- Managing operator-level maintenance on vehicles, communications, and generator equipment.
- Maintaining current status of routes used in CMO.
- Producing records and reports, as required.
- Managing the orders process for the attachment of augmenting CA Soldiers.

**COMMUNICATIONS SECTION**

4-35. The communications section consists of the G-6 or S-6 assets of the CA unit and includes signal system technicians and maintainers and computer network information technicians, managers, and maintainers. The section’s communications technicians maintain the radios and satellite systems supporting unit communications systems, direct network communications to FX SP cells, and for CMO reachback to their respective continental United States (CONUS) C2 HQ networks. The section is responsible for establishing and maintaining signal connectivity via multiple communications means. The nature of CMO operations presents communications requirements that are more extensive than the average tactical operations center. Figure 4-7, page 4-14, depicts the military tactical communications environment in which the CMOC must operate. The nature of CMO operations presents communications requirements beyond the Army C2 systems. The CMOC requires knowledge management and collaboration systems that cannot be supported with the current Army C2 systems. The CMOC requires direct access to the Civil Information Database and the CONUS server collaboration sites. The CMOC’s network is set up and maintained as a persistent tactical local area network (TACLAN) and telecommunications system at home station within CONUS in preparation for deployment and is used in CONUS by the CMOC for training, mission planning, and communications support to specialty teams not collocated at the CMOC’s home station.

**COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS**

4-36. The CMOC must be able to enter secure tactical digital networks and nonsecure civilian networks via the Internet. The CMOC must be able to communicate over secure and nonsecure military radio and telephone systems, nonsecure NGO radios, and nonsecure commercial telephone systems for voice and data transmission. The CMOC must be able to monitor other open sources of information, such as commercial TV and radio. Additionally, the CMOC must have redundant systems to enable it to operate in split operations.

4-37. The following paragraphs provide a list of the capabilities and examples of systems CMOCs should have to fully perform routine CMOC operations. Systems should be upgraded coincidentally with the fielding of follow-on Army C2 systems (Figure 4-8, page 4-15) to ensure compatibility with the supported unit’s communications capability according to CA habitual planning associations.
Secure digital capability with the supported military units is necessary to provide input into the common tactical picture and COP through the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), which consists of the following:

- **Global Command and Control System-Army (GCCS-A) (strategic, theater, and echelons above corps [EAC]).** The GCCS-A provides force tracking, HN and CA support, theater air defense, targeting, C2, logistics, and medical and personnel status. The GCCS-A is deployed from theater (EAC) elements down to the corps JTF and joint contingency force.

- **Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) (Corps to Battalion).** ATCCS consists of the—
  - **Maneuver control system (MCS).** The MCS provides corps- through battalion-level commanders and staffs with the ability to collect, coordinate, and act on near-real-time battlefield information and to graphically visualize the battlefield.
  - **All-Source Analysis System-Remote Work Station (ASAS-RWS).** The ASAS-RWS provides battle commanders with analyzed intelligence and unanalyzed combat information.
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). The AFATDS provides C2 systems for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps cannon, rockets, missiles, mortars, CAS, and naval surface weapon systems. AFATDS provides fire support coordination measures, weapon and counterbattery radar range fans, and target data. Target data includes active, inactive planned, on-call and suspect targets, and support identification of protected targets, NFAs, and RFAs.

Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS). The CSSCS provides battlefield decision support and situation awareness for planning and controlling the logistics support of combat
operations. CSSCS provides materiel and personnel status of units. It identifies logistical
capability to resupply units for subsequent combat operations.

- **Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2).** The FBCB2 provides situational
  awareness through a seamless battle command capability to leaders at brigade and below. It
  provides horizontal and vertical integration of the information generating and processing
  capabilities of individual weapons, sensors, and platforms.

- **Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS).** The EPLRS is an integrated C2
  system that provides near-real-time data communications, position and location, navigation,
  identification, and reporting information.

- **JOPES.** CA planners use this system for planning TPFDD or strategic deployment planning.

- **Global Reconnaissance Information System (GRIS).** GRIS supports the planning and
  scheduling of reconnaissance operations.

- **Evacuation System.** This system displays information about U.S. citizens located outside the
  United States.

- **Global Status of Resources and Training.** This system provides detailed data regarding the
  status and training of all DOD units’ equipment and training.

- **Joint maritime command information system.** This database offers a fused or common
  operational picture of the operational environment.

- **Theater Analysis and Replanning Graphical Execution Toolkit.** This system provides
  required access to documents, information sources, analysis tools, multimedia, and
  teleconferencing tools to ensure continuity of planning for CA forces.

- **Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).** The JWICS is used to
  obtain access to the sensitive compartmented information portion of DISN. These data
  include photographs, maps, and images. CA forces commonly use this system to query
  intelligence analysts and archives developed by the intelligence community, such as
  intelligence link (INTELINK), Special Operations Command Research, Analysis, Threat, and
  Evaluation System, PSYOP automated system, Situational Influence Assessment Model, and
  community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers.

- **Contingency Theater Automated Planning System and Air Tasking Order.** These
  systems provide CA forces visibility over planned air operations conducted at the direction of
  the CMOC.

4-39. Another system is the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), the Army XXI
communications network that will replace the Tri-Service Tactical Communications Program and
mobile subscriber equipment (from theater to battalion command post and tactical operations center).
WIN-T will provide C2 on the move to the warfighter. WIN-T—

- Is based on commercial products and technology.
- Provides wired and wireless communications to support voice, data, and video information
  exchange requirements.
- Provides seamless connectivity among ABCS and weapons platforms within the operational
  environment.
- Supports multiple security levels.
- Integrates terrestrial, airborne, and satellite-based transport systems.

4-40. Connectivity via various communication networks are maintained from the CAT level through the
Cacom level and include—

- Ultrahigh frequency (UHF) (Motorola type 1 encryption) local area voice network.
- Very high frequency (VHF) frequency modulation (FM) local area network (LAN) (within 35
  kilometers [km]) includes voice and data at 25 kilohertz (kHz) bandwidth.
- High frequency (HF) wide-area network (WAN) includes voice, data, and voice over Internet
  Protocol (VoIP) at 5-kHz bandwidth.
- Military satellite communications (SATCOM) WAN includes voice, data, and VoIP at 5-kHz
  bandwidth.
• Iridium commercial satellite telephone with type 1 encryption at 56 kilobytes per second (kbps) secure voice.
• Secure telephone equipment (STE) with type 1 encryption includes voice and data at 56 kbps.
• Dial-up to the respective command’s remote access server (RAS) WAN.
• Virtual private network (VPN) through Internet and Global Information Grid (GIG) to the respective command’s SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and non-secure internet protocol router network (NIPRNET).

4-41. Additional communication networks used from the CA company level through the CACOM level include—

• Special operations forces deployable node-light (SDN-L) WAN with L-band and soon broadband global area network SATCOM using the international maritime satellite (INMARSAT) to connect to regional SOF nodes at 128 kbps and soon 464 kbps secure voice and data communications.
• L-band satellite STE telephone using INMARSAT at 56 kbps secure voice and data communications.
• TACLAN with 100 megabytes per second (mbps) LAN and a 1.5 mbps routed WAN.

4-42. The special operations forces deployable node-medium (SDN-M) WAN is a communications capability found at the CA battalion level through the CACOM level. The SDN-M is capable of Ku-, K-, and Ka-band telecommunication to regional SOF nodes at 1.5 mbps via secure voice and data communications.

4-43. CMOCs should have the ability to plug into the local indigenous government architecture and, as required, the UN and ad hoc organizations, such as interim administrations. CMOCs must also have input into the en route mission planning and rehearsal system, which provides updated, real-time information to deploying forces. Additionally, CMOCs should have access to the GIG. GIG is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel.

4-44. At the CAT, all communications equipment is “owner operated.” CA companies through CACOM manage a unit base station and the TACLAN system with manning from the communications section of the unit. Figure 4-9, pages 4-17 and 4-18, identifies communications equipment used to support the various network connectivity requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications Systems Equipment</th>
<th>CAT</th>
<th>CA CO</th>
<th>CA BN</th>
<th>CA BDE</th>
<th>CACOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motorola handheld radio for UHF (Motorola type 1 encryption) local area voice network</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-148 and VRC-90F radios for VHF (FM)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC-150 and VRC-104 radios for HF</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC-5D for Military SATCOM</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDN-L WAN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improved SO communication assemblage includes the PRC-150, PSC-5D, and INMARSAT satellite STE telephone</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iridium satellite telephone</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>STE network includes voice and data at 56 kbps</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACLAN light with 100 mbps LAN and 1.5 mbps routed WAN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Router and KIV-7 data encryption system</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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Figure 4-9. Civil Affairs unit equipment supporting communication connectivity
Communications Systems Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>CAT</th>
<th>CA CO</th>
<th>CA BN</th>
<th>CA BDE</th>
<th>CACOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laptop computers—VPN through Internet and GIG to USACAPOC SIPRNET and NIPRNET</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laptop computers—Dial-up to USACAPOC RAS WAN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blue Force Tracking system (MTX)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDN-M WAN with Ku-, K-, and Ka-band telecommunications</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4-9. Civil Affairs unit equipment supporting communication connectivity (continued)

MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS

4-45. CA capabilities are aligned to support Army modularity, while maintaining SOF support, to execute CAO across the full range of military operations. The redesign of CA force structure standardized the organizational structure of both Active Army and USAR CA units. The documentation of the resulting tables of organization and equipment (TOEs) identified the various elements of the units with unique standard requirement codes (SRC) that allow for more efficient mobilization and deployment of forces. Although some differences in the number of unique elements documented within a particular organization exist, Figure 4-10 depicts the standard structure of CA units (battalion through CACOM).
4-46. Mobility requirements of the various types of CA units and elements are based on the types of units that they support and the supported unit mission requirements. Table 4-1 identifies the CA mobility requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Mobility (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CACOM</td>
<td>Command Section</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FX SP Cell (3 each)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CLT (2 each)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT (5 each)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA BDE</td>
<td>Command Section</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FX SP Cell</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CLT (2 each)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA BN</td>
<td>Command Section</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FX SP Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CLT</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA CO</td>
<td>Co HQ, CA Co (Tac)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CMOC, CA Co (Tac)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAT (5 each)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ESTABLISHING

4-47. Although the CMOC has a set structure, it retains the capability to expand, conduct split and mobile operations, and contract to meet the demands of the operation. It must be able to accommodate the various agencies that join or depart an operation during its different phases. The following paragraphs describe techniques for establishing the CMOC.

4-48. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC, and more than one CMOC may be established in an AO. The supported commander establishes the CMOC early in an operation for two primary reasons:

- To account for the nonmilitary threats, distractions, and interference that can adversely affect the military mission.
- To foster successful interagency coordination inherent in all operations.

4-49. A CMOC should be given a specific task and purpose, such as in a tasking order. A METT-TC analysis of this task and purpose will determine the exact structure, equipment, manning, location, and operational requirements to accomplish the mission of the CMOC.

4-50. Those teams establishing a CMOC for rapid decisive operations may be required to deploy without certain items of equipment, such as vehicles, trailers, generators, or tents, to conserve limited transportation space. These teams must be prepared to palletize mission-essential items of equipment, based on METT-TC (laptops, radios, video cameras, and other team equipment), and coordinate the rest of their equipment for follow-on transportation by air, rail, or surface ship. The team must plan and coordinate to rent or requisition transportation and billeting in the AO while its own vehicles and tents are in transit.
4-51. At every level, the CMOC must be flexible enough to expand and contract as requirements change; for example, incorporating members of military and nonmilitary organizations to meet short- or long-term projects. It must also be appropriately located, staffed, and equipped to perform the vital functions of research, planning, recording, coordinating, monitoring, and influencing CMO in a secure, and sometimes less-than-secure, austere environment.

4-52. The CMOC must be prepared to conduct echelon- and split-based operations. Doing so means operating within the security perimeter of the supported military HQ, as well as outside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ, and on the road (mobile)—often simultaneously. The parent CA unit must have redundancy in its manning, organization, and equipment to conduct echelon- and split-based operations in support of all units with which it has a planning association.

4-53. When operating in support of an operational or tactical unit, the CMOC, at a minimum, must establish its relationship with the supported unit CMO staff officer (G-9 or S-9), operations officer (G-3 or S-3), and chief information officer (G-6 or S-6), and intelligence officer (G-2 or S-2). The CMOC’s normal relationship with the—

- G-9 or S-9 is similar to that of a direct support field artillery unit with the fire support coordinator. The staff officer monitors the daily operations of the CMOC and advises the commander on CMO and the employment of CA assets. The CMOC provides the G-9 or S-9 with the status of CMO and CAO and assists in planning and posturing CMO and CAO to support future operations of the supported commander.

- G-3 or S-3 is that of a satellite office specializing in a specific aspect of the overall military operation. The CMOC keeps the G-3 or S-3 advised of how CMO and CAO are providing the desired effects in support of the military operation. The CMOC routes requests for assistance through the G-3 or S-3 for approval and ultimate tasking.

- G-6 or S-6 allows network connectivity into the supported unit and permission to VPN through the supported unit network back to CONUS with the bandwidth to meet the CMOC requirements for information management and collaboration. The G-6 or S-6 must find a location for the communications and network center with an antenna field to set up HF, SATCOM, and VHF antennas. The G-6 or S-6 requests HF, VHF, and SATCOM frequencies, channels, and cryptographic requirements for tactical and CONUS network reachback communications systems used by CA forces in the theater.

- G-2 or S-2 is that of a related activity specializing in CMO. As the commander’s nerve center for civil-military engagement, the CMOC ensures that the G-2 or S-2 is aware of the CMO situation and is in a position to best synchronize civil information and civil considerations analysis products with current and future operations.
4-54. One important consideration when establishing a CMOC is whether local, national, or international coordination mechanisms for civil-military interface already exist. If the UN, HN, or some other organization or agency already operates a facility to coordinate CMO in the AO (for example, a city or county emergency operations center during civil support operations [CSO]), it may be best to establish a liaison or augmentation cell within that facility. Such a COA legitimizes the efforts of the lead organization and facilitates the disengagement of U.S. forces during transition and redeployment from the operation.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS TERMINOLOGY

In Operation STRONG SUPPORT (post-Hurricane Mitch relief operations in Central America in 1999), a regional- or national-level “CMOC” was avoided. This was in deference to stated HN concerns about sovereignty and aversion to the CMOC concept as putting a foreign military in charge of what should be a national coordinating function. The concept for conducting civil-military interface was to work through HN emergency management centers and HN authorities as much as possible. However, mini-CMOCs (called mini-HOCs in that operation) were established at the local level to deconflict relief operations where JTFs were operating.

Notes of a U.S. CA Officer on Operations
During Operation STRONG SUPPORT, 1999

4-55. Another important item to consider early while establishing a CMOC is the creation of continuity books. The continuity books are digital. They are maintained on local systems and the Civil Information Management and Knowledge Management System at Fort Bragg. A continuity book facilitates continuity of operations during periods of potential disruption; for example, routine or emergency personnel turnover, extending and contracting the CMOC, and transition operations. Although there is no particular format for a continuity book, there are some techniques to make the book useful. These techniques are as follows:

- Arrange book chronologically with daily, weekly, and monthly calendars showing essential tasks.
- Provide enough detail (who, what, where, why, when, and how) to each task to eliminate guesswork by the replacement.
- Include journal to record actions taken and POCs for ongoing projects.
- Take photographs of projects, POCs, meeting facilities, and other items (for example, funding) pertinent to conducting CMO, and include them where appropriate in the continuity book.

LOCATION OPTIONS

4-56. The location of the CMOC depends on METT-TC. There are four options for locating a CMOC:

- Within the security perimeter of the supported military HQ.
- Outside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ.
- On the road (mobile).
- In combination of two or all three (echelon- and split-based operations).

4-57. Each option has merit depending on the situation and mission requirements. During the course of operations, the CMOC must be flexible and ready to move from one option to another based on changes in the security situation and mission requirements. Figure 4-11, page 4-22, demonstrates a possible arrangement for the CMOC inside the security perimeter of the supported HQ. Locating the CMOC here should be considered when—

- Planning and coordinating CMO are at the strategic (geographic combatant command) level.
- The security environment at the operational (JTF and corps) level permits nonmilitary individuals to enter freely or with limited inconvenience.
- The primary mission of the military force is CMO, such as during HA or disaster relief operations.
- Resources are limited and must be shared with other military units.
4-58. Because of its role as a clearinghouse for all CMO-related issues and a meeting place for nonmilitary partners and participants in an operation, the CMOC will receive much traffic. The CMOC and its associated parking area should be in a location that offers convenient access to visitors and that will not interfere with the internal operations of the supported HQ. The facility should be large enough to accommodate the many functions performed by the CMOC. If possible, the facility should include space for supported organizations to conduct business.

4-59. Figure 4-12, page 4-23, demonstrates a possible arrangement for the CMOC outside the security perimeter of the supported HQ. Locating the CMOC here should be considered when—

- The security environment at the supported military HQ restricts access to nonmilitary individuals, and access procedures offer major inconvenience to those individuals.
- Planning and coordinating CMO at the tactical (corps and below) level.
- The primary customers are the IGOs, NGOs, government officials, and the local populace.
- The CMOC is tasked to form the nucleus of a humanitarian operations center (HOC) or HA coordination center.

4-60. This CMOC location option normally results in split-based operations. Split-based operations occur when a CMOC must operate a less-secure facility outside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ while retaining a secure facility inside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ. Split-based operations often occur when the nature of the military operation absolutely prohibits or severely limits civilian access to the supported military HQ site.
4-61. The less-secure, external CMOC may be active 24 hours daily or during set business hours. If the external CMOC is active for 24-hour operations, it must be equipped to operate as an extension of the internal CMOC. (This arrangement requires some redundancy in communications and automatic data processing equipment.) If the CMOC is active only during set business hours, the internal CMOC may be required to manage administrative and logistical operations when the external CMOC is not operational.

4-62. Because of its role as a clearinghouse for all CMO-related issues and a meeting place for nonmilitary partners and participants in an operation, the external CMOC will receive much traffic by those participants, as well as visibility from local officials and the media. The CMOC should be in a location that offers convenient access to those partners and participants. The facility should be large enough to accommodate the many functions performed by the CMOC. The CMOC staff should clear interagency work and meeting areas of classified and unclassified but sensitive materials.

4-63. There are instances when nonmilitary organizations cannot participate in the activities of the CMOCs mentioned above. Such instances may occur during fluid combat operations, in nonpermissive environments, or because of political or cultural considerations. CLTs or CATs may be required to interface with those organizations.

4-64. CLTs or CATs might be operating on foot (dismounted) or from a team high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) under the control of a CMOC. These teams generally conduct assessments and pass the results to the controlling CMOC for incorporation into posthostilities plans. Assessment teams may also be task-organized CA specialists who travel on a set schedule (“circuit-rider” arrangement) to visit...
civilian organizations or agencies throughout a specified region. When detached from the main CMOC to perform such activities, these teams are conducting echelon-based operations.

**FACILITY CONSIDERATIONS**

4-65. The CMOC cannot fully depend on its supported unit HQ to provide the facilities it requires to operate efficiently and effectively. A CMOC should be self-deployable and operational using organic vehicles and equipment. The organic vehicles and equipment must be compatible with those of the unit with which the parent CA unit has a planning association, to include shipping containers or trailers, generators, tents, and so on.

4-66. CA units should consider placing their CMOCs in two large containers express or trailers—one containing the secure equipment that will remain within the security perimeter of the supported unit HQ, and one containing the nonsecure equipment for split operations outside the security perimeter of the supported unit HQ. In addition, the units should employ several HMMWVs with trailers to transport CMOC Soldiers and their personal equipment, as well as to perform as mobile CMOCs.

4-67. Depending on the environment, situation, and available existing structures, a CMOC can be established in—

- Civilian trailers or vehicles.
- A suite in an office building.
- A municipal emergency operations center.
- A separate building, such as a storefront.

4-68. Whether operating from organic facilities or civilian structures, the CMOC must contain enough space for work areas, meeting areas, parking areas, living quarters, break areas, and so on. It must provide a healthy and safe environment for the CMOC personnel (for example, proper ventilation, fire protection, weather protection, and sanitation).

4-69. Wherever and whenever the CMOC is established, it is important to identify and publicize its location to the CMOC “customers” in terms understandable to them. For example, providing a street address, building name, facility markings, commonly known landmark, or strip map is better than providing a universal transverse Mercator grid location to people who do not use military maps. CMOC personnel should provide a local telephone access number and an Internet-accessible e-mail address that the community can use to contact the CMOC.

**SECURITY AND FORCE PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS**

4-70. Because of the nature of activities that occur at the CMOC, there are many physical, personnel, computer security, and continuity-of-operations issues to consider. Before initiating operations, the CMOC security officer conducts a site and situation threat and vulnerability assessment to determine CMOC security requirements. He considers and advises the CMOC director on security and FP issues, such as—

- Defensibility (for example, fighting positions, “safe rooms,” multiple exits, or shelter).
- Communications with a quick-reaction force.
- 24-hour access control systems and procedures (restricted areas, restricted hours, parking areas, barriers, and security in depth).
- Business-hour access control systems and procedures (passes, metal detectors, or escorts).
- Security of vehicles and equipment during meetings.
- Guidance for security and FP of visitors and civilian members of the team.
- Coordination with local law enforcement for—
  - Patrons.
  - Full-time on-site security presence (gate security).
  - Periodic threat updates.
- Background checks of full-time staff members, especially local hires.
Alternate power supply or uninterrupted power supply for computers and communications equipment.

Handling of classified materials and equipment, to include emergency destruction.

4-71. The security manager may extend this assessment to areas and locations supported or frequented by the CMOC, such as HN and NGO facilities. (Appendix E provides more information on CA FP considerations.)

MAP BOARD (SITUATION BOARD)

4-72. Two standard sheets of plywood (4 feet by 8 feet) are normally sufficient for use as a map board or situation board (Figure 4-13). If space is insufficient to display two boards, maps and overlays can be posted on each side of one board—one side for the military and the other side for everyone to see. Critical information should be posted on the board to ensure all parties are receiving the same information. Figure 4-14, page 4-26, shows examples of CMO-specific graphics.

LAYOUT CONSIDERATIONS

4-73. The layout of the CMOC must be conducive to continuous, productive communications flow. As a minimum, the CMOC should have the following areas:

- Meeting area (determined by officer in charge [OIC]).
- Military work areas (operations security [OPSEC], classified).
- Map boards (graphics, overlays) and briefing boards.
- Access points (physical security, FP).
- Information management and control.

Figure 4-13. Map board
Figure 4-14. Graphics specific to civil-military operations

Map Board
Overlay Examples:
- Operations
- Logistics/main supply route
- Distribution
- Resources
- Critical infrastructure
- Protected target
- PSYOP product distribution
- Political boundaries
- Others
Chapter 5
Core Tasks

I think all our conventional leaders and commanders need to understand and work more closely with Special Operations forces—Special Forces Operational Detachments, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP teams. This marriage must occur; we’ve got to force it. We cannot succeed on the modern battlefield without cooperation among these elements.

Brigadier General Lawson W. Magruder III
United States Army
Commander, Joint Readiness Training Center
1993–1994

OVERVIEW

5-1. CA core tasks are actions CA Soldiers plan and execute that support the achievement of CMO campaign operational and theater strategic objectives. The publication of FM 3-05.40 eliminated the term “CA activities” and defined the unique actions performed by CA Soldiers in the conduct of CAO as CA core tasks.

5-2. All CA core tasks support CMO. They embrace the relationship of military forces with the civil component including IPI, IGOs, and NGOs in areas where military forces are present. CAO may also involve the application of CA expertise in areas normally the responsibility of the civilian government. CA Soldiers offer an additive and unique capability to achieve objectives. CA core tasks are those primary tasks that CA forces are fully capable of planning, supporting, executing, or transitioning through, with, or by outside actors to mitigate or defeat civil threats.

5-3. CA core tasks are actions performed or supported by CA that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of CA FX SP skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of CMO. The five CA core tasks are—

- Populace and resources control (PRC).
- Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA).
- Nation assistance (NA).
- Civil information management (CIM).
- Support to civil administration (SCA).

5-4. CA functional specialists are task-organized to meet the various strategic, operational, and tactical requirements of CAO. These functional specialists, especially at the operational and strategic levels, may be employed in general support of interagency operations, in addition to direct support of CAO. When called upon to perform specialized CAO tasks in the absence of CA functional specialists, CA generalists seek clarification, support, and guidance in their missions from CA functional specialists via reachback.

5-5. CA core tasks supporting the GCC’s missions include operations that—

- Promote U.S. policy objectives before, during, and after combat operations by influencing the civil component of the operational area.
- Reduce demands on the Army supply system by facilitating the coordination of indigenous resources and supplies, where appropriate.
• Minimize civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the civilian populace.
• Coordinate military operations with OGAs, IPI, IGOs, and NGOs.
• Exercise civil administration in occupied or liberated areas until control returns to civilian or non-U.S. military authority.
• Support civilian efforts to provide assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population. Provide direct assistance in areas where civilian operators are not present and according to internationally accepted standards and principles.
• Provide expertise in civil-sector functions normally the responsibility of civilian authorities, applied to implement U.S. policy to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civil-sector functions.

**POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL**

5-6. PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. These controls are normally a responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During times of civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and enforce PRC. For practical and security reasons, military forces employ populace control measures and resources control measures of some type and to varying degrees in military operations across the full spectrum of operations. PRC operations are executed with, and as an integral part of, military operations.

**POPULACE CONTROLS**

5-7. Populace controls provide security for the populace, mobilize human resources, deny personnel to the enemy, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of villagers. DC operations and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

**RESOURCES CONTROLS**

5-8. Resources controls regulate the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilize materiel resources, and deny materiel to the enemy. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

**CIVIL AFFAIRS POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL MISSION**

5-9. The CA role in PRC is one of support to the commander’s operations function. General CA Soldier tasks include—

- Identifying or evaluating existing HN PRC measures.
- Advising on PRC measures that would effectively support the commander’s objectives.
- Recommending command guidance on how to implement PRC measures.
- Publicizing the control measures among IPI.
- Assessing the effectiveness of the PRC measures.
- Participating in the execution of selected PRC operations and activities, as needed or directed.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the implementation of PRC measures.

5-10. CA functional specialties that participate in PRC include—

- International law.
- Public administration.
- Public safety.
- Public transportation.
- Public works and utilities.
- Civilian supply.
Core Tasks

- Public health.
- Environmental services.
- Others according to METT-TC.

Dislocated Civilian Operations

5-11. DC operations are a special category of PRC. DC operations are the most basic collective task performed by CA Soldiers. The goals of DC operations are to minimize civilian interference with military operations and to protect civilians from combat operations.

5-12. DC operations (also commonly referred to as resettlement operations) (Appendix F) pertain to those actions required to move civilians out of harm’s way or to safeguard them in the aftermath of a disaster. The disaster may be natural, as in a flood or an earthquake, or man-made, as in combat operations, social or political strife, or technological hazard emergency, such as hazardous material (HAZMAT) (for example, chemical, biological, or radiological) spills. DC operations may occur in conjunction with stability operations.

5-13. DC operations include the planning and management of DC routes, assembly areas, and camps in support of the efforts of the HN and IGOs. They also include FHA support to the affected populace. The MP corps is a key component to the successful planning and execution of DC operations. The MP corps should be involved early in the planning process.

5-14. In planning DC operations, the primary factor is transition planning for the care and transfer of responsibility for the DC population to a controlling agency. Controlling agencies (for example, UN-mandated UNHCR, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], or HN) normally care for the basic needs of DCs—food, water, shelter, sanitation, and security. Controlling agencies also must be prepared to prevent or arrest the outbreak of disease among DCs. This last point is important for the health of the populace and military forces.

Categories of Civilians

5-15. During military operations, U.S. forces must consider two distinct categories of civilians—those who remained in place and those who are dislocated. U.S. policy dictates the placement of people in one of the categories. The U.S. category may conflict with how IGOs, NGOs, and the HN refer to the people. Therefore, CA Soldiers and CMO planners must be careful in how they describe categories of civilians. The first category includes civilians who are indigenous and other local populace, including civilians from other countries. Civilians within this category may or may not need help. If they can care for themselves, they should remain in place.

5-16. DCs are civilians who have left their homes. Their movement and presence can hinder military operations. They will likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, clothing, and similar items. DCs may not be native to the area or to the country in which they reside. DC is a generic term subdivided into eight categories. Legal and political considerations define these categories. DC categories include—

- **Displaced person.** A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country (JP 1-02).
- **Refugee.** A person outside of his or her country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion (1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol).
- **Evacuee.** A civilian removed from his place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation (JP 1-02)
- ** Stateless person.** Civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed (JP 1-02)
- **War victim.** A classification created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes as a result of war. War victims may be eligible for a claim against the United States under the Foreign Claims Act.
- **Internally displaced person (IDP).** Any persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (UN definition contained in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement).

- **Returnee.** Either a refugee or an IDP who has returned voluntarily to his or her former place of residence.

- **Resettler.** Subset of IDP or refugee – civilian wishing to return somewhere other than previously owned home or land within the country or area of original displacement.

5-17. The status of individual DCs is not always clear, even to those in the international community or the UN who routinely address DC problems, as the following examples illustrate. In some situations, the link between refugee problems and internal displacement is direct and clear. In other situations, the relationship between refugees and IDPs is more complex.

### Example of Clear DC Status

When refugees and displaced persons are generated by the same causes and straddle the border, not only are the humanitarian needs similar, a solution to the refugee problem cannot usually be found without at the same time resolving the issue of internal displacement. UNHCR’s involvement in northern Iraq during the Kurdish crisis was one such example.

In many situations, effective reintegration of returnees requires assistance to be extended also to the internally displaced in the same locality or community. In Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Guatemala, it has been operationally and conceptually difficult for UNHCR to differentiate between returnees and internally displaced. In Sri Lanka, refugees returned home only to become internally displaced, prompting UNHCR to refocus its programme [sic] on internal displacement. In Ethiopia, UNHCR participated in a cross-mandate operation with other agencies to promote reintegration of returnees and also stabilise [sic] other kinds of population movements.

Sometimes refugees have sought asylum across the border in areas where there are also internally displaced. For instance, refugees from Sierra Leone and the internally displaced in Liberia were found, not only living together, but also affected in the same manner by instability in the country of asylum. Not only is it operationally difficult and morally unacceptable to distinguish between people in such a situation, assistance targeting only refugees may aggravate their insecurity.

### Example of Complex DC Status

Refugees may be a minor component of massive internal displacement. Colombia and Chechnya are two such operations in which UNHCR is involved. Tajikistan was another instance of such involvement when geography and history dictated the flight...
of some 600,000 persons to other parts of the country and only a tenth of that number to neighbouring [sic] Afghanistan. In such cases, it makes little sense to base international assistance on location alone.

Internal conflicts of a secessionist nature have uprooted people within national boundaries, which have then become international borders. For instance, in the former Yugoslavia and Timor, UNHCR decided to provide protection and assistance to the uprooted on the basis of humanitarian needs, rather than refugee status. Borders, which shift even as people move, cannot be the sole factor determining the legitimacy of international concern.

Sometimes it has been difficult to predict whether territorial disputes or ethnic violence will lead to a break-up of a state and exodus of refugees, but it has been felt that early action to protect and assist internal displacement might check the proliferation and prolongation of human suffering and promote regional stability. This was the basis of UNHCR’s response, for instance, in the Caucasus.

Internally Displaced Persons: 
The Role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, 6 March 2000

5-18. The CA supporting tasks in DC operations are of support to the commander’s operational function and to the administration of DC control measures. Generally, CA Soldier tasks include—

- Identifying or evaluating existing HN and international community DC plans and operations.
- Advising on DC control measures that would effectively support the military operation.
- Advising on how to implement DC control measures.
- Publicizing control measures among IPI.
- Assessing MOEs.
- Participating in the execution of selected DC operations and activities, as needed or directed and in coordination with the internationally mandated organizations (for example, UNHCR, OCHA, and ICRC) for their care.
- Assisting in arbitration of problems arising from implementation of DC control measures.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION

5-19. NEO refers to the authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the Department of State (DOS), DOD, or other appropriate authority. Although normally considered in connection with combat operations, NEO can also include evacuations in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster in a foreign country and when evacuation is warranted to safe havens or to the United States because of civil unrest.

5-20. CA forces will normally assist the GCC or the ambassador in the planning and management of a NEO through their CAPTs; however, for CA forces to effectively support the GCC or Country Team, these planning teams need to play a role early in the planning process. Normally this will preclude the use of USAR CA forces unless they are already forward-deployed due to the short-notice nature of most NEOs.

5-21. DOD defines two categories of noncombatant evacuees:

- U.S. citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent authority, including—
  - Civilian employees of all agencies of the USG and their dependents.
  - Military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants.
  - Dependents of members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
Chapter 5

- U.S. (and non-U.S.) citizens who may be authorized or assisted (but not necessarily ordered) by competent authority to evacuate, including—
  - Civilian employees of USG agencies and their dependents, who are residents in the country, but are willing to be evacuated.
  - Private U.S. citizens and their dependents.
  - Military personnel and their dependents, short of an ordered evacuation.
  - Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the USG and military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces, as prescribed by the DOS.

5-22. NEOs remove threatened civilians from locations in an FN or an HN to safe areas or to the United States. The DOS directs such operations. The United States uses military assets in an evacuation only when civilian resources are inadequate. The DOS may request help in conducting evacuations to—

- Protect U.S. citizens abroad.
- Minimize the number of U.S. citizens at risk.
- Minimize the number of U.S. citizens in combat areas to avoid impairing the combat effectiveness of military forces.

5-23. NEOs are a political last step because they send a signal to the world that the United States has lost faith in the ability of the foreign government to protect U.S. personnel. The DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting NEOs. The U.S. military plays only a supporting role in the implementation of a NEO. Military commanders have primary responsibility for military involvement in the operation. This involvement may include support during all phases of a NEO. Military planners must consider the terrain, weather, hydrography, designation and number of evacuees, and other factors of the area, including dissidents.

5-24. The CA supporting tasks in a NEO are of support to the commander’s operational function and to the administration of certain aspects of the NEO. Generally, CA tasks include—

- Advising the commander of the CAO aspects and implications of current and proposed NEO plans, including assisting in writing the CMO annex.
- Performing liaison with the Embassy, to include acting as a communications link with U.S. forces in the operational area.
- Conducting an initial CMO assessment of the AO to validate information and assumptions of the CMO estimate and advising the commander of CMO-related issues affecting the NEO.
- Supporting operation of evacuation sites, holding areas for non-U.S. nationals denied evacuation, and reception or processing stations.
- Assisting in the identification of U.S. citizens and other evacuees.
- Assisting in the receiving, screening, processing, briefing, and debriefing of evacuees.
- Recommending actions to the commander to minimize population interference with current and proposed military operations.
- Assisting the commander in accomplishing the mission by obtaining civil or indigenous support for the NEO.
- Assisting in safe-haven activities, as required.


**FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

5-25. FHA is programs are conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by U.S. forces is
limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided by U.S. forces supplements or complements the efforts of the HN civil authorities and IGOs that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA.

5-26. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions (JP 1-02). Examples of disasters include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, famine, disease, civil conflicts, terrorist incidents, and incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

5-27. FHA operations are inherently complex operations that require a significant amount of interagency coordination. FHA is directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at a tactical level. FHA operations require centralized coordination and control.

5-28. The USAID, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, or OFDA provides foreign disaster assistance and coordinates the USG response to disasters abroad. U.S. military participation in FHA operations can range from providing security (allowing civilian agencies to operate safely and uninhibited), to conducting assessments, to providing specific military capabilities applied in direct disaster relief roles (providing food and medical care, constructing basic sanitation facilities, repairing public facilities, constructing shelters and temporary camps, and providing helicopter and fixed-wing transport for supplies, commodities, and passengers, as demonstrated by the Indian Ocean Tsunami response in 2004–2005).

Tsunami Response

The Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster relief effort at the end of December 2004 is a good example of interagency cooperation, collaboration, and communication. As both DOD and OFDA rapidly responded to the affected disaster areas, both realized the need for close cooperation and coordination. OFDA dispatched LNOs at the tactical level to CMOCs operating in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Thailand, as well as at USPACOM. The DOD similarly embedded LNOs at OFDA’s Response Management Team (RMT) in Washington, DC. This greatly simplified the request for assistance process from IOs and NGOs, and increased the ability of both organizations to respond more effectively and quickly to those affected by the disaster.

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID

5-29. FHA key tasks require centralized coordination and control. To help achieve FHA objectives, CMO planners must ensure the nominated programs benefit a wide spectrum of the country in which the activity occurs, are self-sustaining or supportable by HN civilian or military, and are consistent with internationally accepted standards and principles (for example, the Sphere Project). FHA program development and implementation must be closely coordinated with the civilian humanitarian architecture, which could include the IGOs, NGOs, and HN assistance agencies.

5-30. FHA programs are authorized by statutory authority. United States Code (USC) authorizes DOD to conduct specific humanitarian and assistance operations, and Congress appropriates funds for DOD to carry out these missions consisting of—

- HA.
- HCA.

5-31. HA is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions, such as human pain, disease, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in damage to or loss of property.

5-32. A special condition of HCA operations is that they must fulfill valid unit training requirements. Although all HCA operations should strive to meet desired MOEs, benefit to the local populace is secondary to meeting the training requirements prescribed under law for any such operation. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to—

- Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

Note. Refer to FM 3-05.40 for a complete discussion concerning U.S. public law and the conduct of HCA and HA missions.

5-33. The conduct of FHA may require CA Soldiers to support specific operations to accomplish overall mission objectives to include—

- Disaster relief.
- DC operations.
- Technical assistance and support operations.
- Consequence management (CM).

**Disaster Relief**

5-34. Disaster relief supporting tasks are conducted across the entire range of military operations—from domestic natural disasters to the aftermath of foreign conflicts. FHA missions in the area of disaster relief include conducting technical assessments, transportation of goods and supplies, security for humanitarian infrastructure, and when deemed appropriate by civilian officials, direct efforts to mitigate the results of natural or man-made disasters.

5-35. Normally, DOD is in a supporting role during disaster relief operations. If a foreign disaster is large enough in scope for U.S. forces to be committed, it is likely that OFDA will also have one or more disaster assistance response team (DART) on the ground in the effected area. DARTs can vary in size and scope. However, U.S. forces operating in the same disaster area must coordinate with these teams. OFDA has a military liaison unit, which can assign a liaison officer (LNO) to a military unit for the disaster relief operation. It is advisable for military commanders supporting disaster relief operations to assign LNOs to OFDA. In any case, if there are no LNOs available, it is critical that U.S. forces operating in a declared disaster area work closely with any OFDA DART on the ground.

**Dislocated Civilian Support Operations**

5-36. DC support operations during FHA are specific operations that assist refugees and IDPs. The UN definition of people in these two categories is important because of the rights and privileges afforded these groups by international legal instruments, including refugee convention, human rights law, and the guiding principles on IDPs. The UN is mandated with ensuring states and parties respect the terms of those instruments and it is responsible for coordinating and implementing programs that favor the concerned populations as directed by the secretary general of the UN. These supporting operations include—

- Care (food, supplies, medical care, and security).
- Placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations). Normally, the U.S. military will not undertake this operation, except in extreme cases where lives are at stake. Such movements should always take place under the supervision of civilian authorities.
- Administration of camps, normally in support of internationally mandated IGOs (for example, UNHCR) or NGOs (for example, ICRC).

**Technical Assistance and Support Operations**

5-37. Technical assistance and support functions are generally short-term tasks such as communication restoration, relief supply management, and provision of emergency medical care, humanitarian demining, and high-priority relief supply delivery. Based upon Presidential, SecDef, and GCC guidance, the FHA force commander should establish policy regarding technical advice and assistance to the affected country,
UN, IGOs, and NGOs as soon as possible. Active Army forces primarily conduct the technical assistance and support missions, to include—

- Communication system restoration.
- Military relief supply management (to include high-priority relief supply delivery). The U.S. military may also facilitate OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs with their relief supply efforts.
- Emergency medical care.
- Support of humanitarian mine action (demining) activities by assisting in training the national mine action authority (NMAA) and conducting liaison activities with the HN infrastructure, the UN, and IGOs or NGOs.
- Assist the NMAA to establish C2 and support effective communications with subordinate organizations and HN government officials.
- Assist in integrating the NMAA into the HN and international communities.

**CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT**

5-38. CM operations mitigate the results of intentional or inadvertent release of WMD or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE). These operations involve those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. They involve measures to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by emergencies abroad. CM operations include—

- Assisting with the restoration of essential HN government services.
- Assisting with the protection of HN public health and safety.
- Assisting with the provision of emergency relief to HN government, businesses, and individuals.
- Identifying and assessing the threat posed by HAZMAT.
- Providing consultation to HN decision makers.

*Note.* FM 3-11.21, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence Management*, provides additional information concerning CM.

5-39. The CA role in FHA is one of support to the commander’s operational function and to the administration of certain aspects of the FHA operation. General CA Soldier tasks include—

- Participating in interagency assessment, planning, and synchronizing of FHA operations.
- Identifying, validating, or evaluating HN and international community resources designated for use in the FHA operation.
- Participating in the execution of selected FHA activities, as needed or directed.
- Tracking costs associated with execution of FHA.
- Performing quality control assessments of FHA activities and costs.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of FHA operations.

**NATION ASSISTANCE**

5-40. NA is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. NA operations support an HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. NA programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance (SA), foreign internal defense (FID), and Title 10 United States Code (10 USC) programs, such as MCA, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by federal agencies or IGOs. All NA activities are normally coordinated with the U.S. Ambassador through the Country Team.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE

5-41. SA is a broad program aimed at enhancing regional security in areas of the world facing internal or external threats. SA is under the supervision and general direction of the DOS. The DOD administers military portions of the program under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD[ISA]). GCCs have the responsibility for planning FID operations for their AOR; however, they interface directly with the SA process through the security assistance organization (SAO), which is located in the HN. This action is coordinated with the U.S. Chief of Mission (or Ambassador). GCCs are active in the SA process by advising the SAO and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing SA efforts in their AORs. SA support areas include equipment and training. CMO support to security assistance can include training foreign military forces in CMO and civil-military relations.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

5-42. FID is an umbrella concept that covers a broad range of activities. Its primary intent is always to help the legitimate host government address internal threats and their underlying causes. Commensurate with U.S. policy goals, the focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the HN program of internal defense and development (IDAD). FID is not restricted to times of conflict. It also can take place in the form of training exercises and other activities that show U.S. resolve to and for the region.

5-43. CA units conduct various CAO that support the internal development of an FN or HN. CA may support other military forces and nonmilitary agencies through direct or indirect support of FID, but they must coordinate with the HN and the TSOC (GCC). These operations focus on the indigenous infrastructures and population in the operational areas.

5-44. CA Soldiers supporting FID are normally assigned to the highest-level military elements supervising FID operations or to U.S. military advisory elements that train and aid FN or HN military units. CA support to FID may include—

- Reviewing U.S. SA program goals and HN IDAD goals, and planning CMO to support the HN plan.
- Planning CMO based on the three phases of insurgency described in FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations.
- Training HN military to plan, train for, and conduct NA, PRC, and other CAO appropriate to the IDAD of its country.
- Training on TTP required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency; develop indigenous individual, leader, and organizational skills; isolate insurgents from the civil population; and protect the civil population.
- Establishing and maintaining contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.
- Identifying specific CMO missions the HN military can and should conduct.

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

5-45. MCA activity consists of employing U.S. military forces in a military-to-military role of advising or training foreign military forces in MCA projects in overseas areas. The HN and the U.S. arrange these projects through an international agreement.

5-46. MCA is the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population. These projects occur at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others that contribute to economic and social development of the area. An essential feature of MCA is that the projects also serve to improve the standing of the indigenous military forces and the indigenous government with the population.

5-47. MCA must comply with U.S. fiscal laws. Expenses for consumable materials, equipment leasing, supplies, and necessary services incurred as a direct result of MCA projects may not be paid out of USG funds unless authorized under a foreign aid or SA program for which DOS funds are appropriated, or that have other authority and funding.
5-48. MCA projects are divided into two general categories—mitigating MCA projects and developmental MCA projects—as follows:

- **Mitigating MCA projects** are immediate-response, short-term projects designed to provide emergency assistance to a populace in the wake of a disaster and to reduce further damage or suffering, as in HA. The disaster could be from natural causes, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, famines, or floods, or from man-made causes, such as civil disturbances, accidents, terrorism, or war. Some examples of mitigating MCA projects are—
  - Operating an emergency medical clinic.
  - Distributing food.
  - Building temporary shelter and sanitation facilities.
  - Conducting damage clean-up operations, including decontamination of HAZMAT spills or release of WMD.

- **Developmental MCA projects** are long-term projects designed to enhance the infrastructure of a local area. They are often preventive in nature and include any activities that actually eliminate or reduce the probability of occurrence of a disaster. Developmental MCA projects require interagency cooperation and continuous support from government sources to be effective. Some examples of developmental MCA projects are—
  - Building or redesigning facilities to reflect better land-use management.
  - Building or reinforcing structures to withstand the destructive elements present in the area.
  - Building or rehabilitating water sources and sanitation facilities to eliminate or prevent the spread of disease.
  - Operating a long-term public health campaign to educate the populace on preventive health measures (a medical readiness training exercise [MEDRETE]).
  - Conducting some humanitarian demining operations.

5-49. In MCA, CA supports the commander’s operational function. CA Soldier tasks include—

- Identifying, validating, or evaluating MCA project nominations.
- Synchronizing MCA projects with other programs, both military and civilian.
- Participating in the execution of selected MCA activities, as needed or directed.
- Tracking costs associated with execution of MCA projects.
- Performing quality-control assessments of MCA activities and costs.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of MCA operations.

**SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION**

5-50. SCA is military operations that help to stabilize or continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. SCA occurs most often in operations. Some SCA is manifested in other CAO, such as PRC, FHA, and NA.

5-51. SCA consists of two distinct mission activities:

- **Civil administration in friendly territory.** GCC’s support to governments of friendly territories during peacetime, disasters, or war. Examples of support include advising friendly authorities or performing specific functions within limits of the authority and liability established by international treaties and agreements.

- **Civil administration in occupied territory.** The establishment of a temporary government, as directed by the SecDef, to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the populace of a territory which U.S. forces have taken from an enemy by force of arms until an indigenous civil government can be established.
5-52. During civil administration in occupied territory, the following terms apply:

- **Military governor.** The military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from the commander’s government or superior.

- **Military government ordinance.** An enactment on the authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control.

5-53. The CA supporting tasks in SCA vary between assistance to civil administration in friendly territory, and civil administration in occupied territory. In either case, however, the CA mission is one of support to the commander’s operational and support function with respect to the continuity of government in an FN or HN. Generally, CA Soldier tasks include—

- Identifying, validating, or evaluating FN or HN infrastructure.
- Understanding the needs of the IPI in terms of the six functional specialties.
- Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the IPI in terms of the six functional specialties.
- Performing liaison functions between military and civilian agencies.
- Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational SCA operations.
- Participating in the execution of selected SCA operations, as needed or directed.
- Performing quality control assessments of SCA operations and costs.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of SCA operations.
- Coordinating and synchronizing transition of SCA operations from military to indigenous government or international community control.

**Civil Support Operations**

5-54. CA support of full spectrum operations includes those operations conducted in support of local, state, and federal government agencies within the borders of the United States known as CSO. CSO encompass the combined emergency management authorities, policies, procedures, and resources of local, state, and national-level governments to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters of all kinds. In the aftermath of a disaster, this effort includes incorporating voluntary disaster relief organizations, the private sector, and international sources into the National Disaster Response Network (Figure 5-1, page 5-13).

5-55. One of the basic responsibilities of civil government is to support its citizens in times of disaster. This basic responsibility normally begins at the local level and elevates incrementally to the national level. Also, this responsibility means addressing the complex and constantly changing requirements associated with natural, man-made, and technological disasters:

- Saving lives.
- Protecting property.
- Meeting basic human needs.
- Restoring the disaster-affected area.
- Reducing vulnerability to future disasters.

5-56. Under the Stafford Act, Executive Orders 12148 and 12656, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) primarily coordinates federal emergency preparedness, planning, management, and disaster assistance functions. DHS also establishes federal disaster assistance policy. Under the Stafford Act, a governor may request the President to declare a major disaster or an emergency if an event is beyond the combined response capabilities of the state and affected local governments. A Presidential declaration is necessary before the authorization of direct federal assistance.

5-57. The DOD established the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in 2002 to consolidate under a single unified command the existing missions that other military organizations previously executed. The mission of the USNORTHCOM is homeland defense and civil support, specifically—
- Conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned AOR.
- As directed by the President or SecDef, providing defense support of civil authorities, including CM operations.

Figure 5-1. National disaster response network

5-58. In a major disaster or emergency as defined in the Stafford Act, the President may direct any federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to use its authorities and the resources granted to it under federal law (including personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and advisory services) in support of state and local assistance efforts. In 2005 in response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, disaster relief included significant DOD resources, including manpower, equipment, and supplies.

5-59. The CA supporting tasks in CSO are of support to the commander’s operational function. Generally, CA Soldier tasks include—

- Assessing and assisting in the restoration of essential government services.
- Assisting in the protection of public health and safety (within the limits of federal law and USC).
- Assisting in the provision of emergency relief to government, businesses, and individuals.
- Identifying and assessing the threat posed by HAZMAT (civil considerations).
- Providing consultation through the defense coordinating officer (DCO) to decision makers.
- Participating in interagency assessment, planning, and synchronization of CSO through JTF or regional TF and DCO.
- Participating in the execution of selected CSO activities, as needed or directed.
- Establishing CMOCs to provide communication links.
CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

5-60. Civil information is information developed from data with relation to ASCOPE within the civil component of the commander’s operational environment. CAO and CMO planners can fuse or process this developed information to increase DOD, interagency, IPI, IGO, and NGO situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance.

5-61. CIM is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher HQ, other USG and DOD agencies, IGOs, and NGOs to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the AO. CIM is not the sole task of the CA officer or NCO in the CIM cell. It is an essential task for all components of a CA unit and should be broadly tasked to the supported units intelligence and maneuver elements to enhance the COP and the IPB process. The enhancement of situational awareness and situational understanding for all elements in the operational environment to achieve decision superiority is the end product for CIM. Figure 5-2 shows the flow of civil information.

5-62. About ninety percent of intelligence starts as open-source information; typically the classification is due to the sources and methods of collection. The intent for CIM is to keep the vast majority of this type of information unclassified and easily shared with non-USG partners.

5-63. Civil information is generated through collection, collation, processing, analysis, production, and dissemination. The management is the fusion of the following steps and the process to benefit the supported commander:

- Collection is the literal gathering of relevant data. At first there is little, if any, quality screening on the data collection; everything related is relevant.
Core Tasks

- Collation is the ordering of the data into groupings. The tools and methods for this step are varied and most are still being developed. Available computer-based software programs can accomplish this step. Additional web tools for the cataloguing of vast amounts of data continue to emerge.
- Processing is the physical and cognitive manipulation of the separate pieces of data into information. Processing structures the collated data into a usable form for the analyst. It is often the collector of the data that collates and processes the data into information. Often the data are gathered in a processed form like a book, article, Web site, film, or previously compiled database on the subject. The analyst should provide feedback to the collection manager to improve the effectiveness of the collection.
- Analysis is the sifting of the information for patterns and indicators of past behaviors or ideas that might have some predictive value and application. The analysts and civil information manager molds the information into a knowledge product. The most difficult analyzing performed uncovers the “unknown unknowns,” as described by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Unknown unknowns are those indicators of future events that were previously obscured in the background noise (data). The analyst’s supervisor must direct the effort to those holes in the picture rather than exhaustively refining intelligence on what is known.
- Production is the packaging of civil information into forms and structures easily disseminated. The COP layers GIS derived civil information is one example. Other products of civil information analysis are—
  - Answers to various information requirements developed during MDMP.
  - PIR.
  - CCIR.
  - Other requests for information.
  - Ongoing CMO assessments, area studies, and running estimates.
- Dissemination is not producing an assessment or area study and waiting for someone to ask for it. It is actively pushing the knowledge products to consumers, some that may not even realize they need them.

5-64. The primary methods used by all CA forces to gather and utilize civil information are—
- **Civil Reconnaissance.** Civil reconnaissance is conducted by tactical and operational CATs based on the established civil information collection plan to support the higher unit’s mission. It begins prior to deployment in conjunction with the O/I and CIM cell.
- **Key Leader Engagement.** Leaders establish a network of relationships and map of other key leader relationships in the respective AO. Basic link analysis on AO-specific government, tribal and religious leaders, and other organizations is briefed prior to mission deployment.
- **Project Management.** All units begin to manage all projects spatially and analyze other units’ projects (for example, DOS, engineers, and NGOs) and the effects on the respective AO or targeted population.

5-65. The secondary methods whereby civil information is gathered include—
- Collaboration and liaison with data-producing organizations for inclusion in COP.
- Processing of assessments, SITREPs, and contact reports into the knowledge management system.
- Collection and processing of open-source reports and databases.
- Processing and analysis of OPORDs, estimates, and other information received from higher HQ (or OGAs).

5-66. The goal of CIM is to create a collaborative information environment that consists of a virtual aggregation of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructure, and processes to create and share the data, information, and knowledge needed to plan, execute, and assess CAO. It will enable CA leaders to make more informed recommendations to the supported commander. As a component of the GIG, CIM enhances CA capabilities for the explicit purpose of information and knowledge collaboration. It offers commanders and staffs the capacity to facilitate the creation of a shared situational awareness so they
can plan and operate with an enhanced unity of effort. CIM seeks to provide the right information to the
right people at the right time in an understandable and actionable format or display.

5-67. CA supporting tasks in CIM support the commander’s operational function and include—

- Conducting CR to find, analyze, and report civil information.
- Coordinating with non-CA assets to achieve a coherent reconnaissance and execution plan.
- Synchronizing the collection and consolidation of civil information.
- Developing the civil components of the COP.
- Increasing the supported commander’s environment awareness.
- Assisting in the development of the supported commander’s COP.
- Conducting interagency, IPI, IGO, and NGO coordination.
- Developing protocols for the storage, maintenance, access, and referral of civil information.

CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE

5-68. CR is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the
environment. CR focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented at
the tactical level by using ASCOPE. CA Soldiers or other forces can conduct CR, as required. Examples of
other specialties and assets that can conduct CR are engineers, medical, MP, and unmanned aircraft
systems.

5-69. The heart of collection is the daily interaction between U.S. forces and the myriad of civilians in the
supported commander’s AO, and the capture of these contacts and data points. Every Soldier who
encounters the civilian elements of an AO is a potential sensor of civil information. CAO and CMO
planners in coordination with the CMOC integrate CR into the overall supported commander’s OPLAN,
enhancing the development of the COP.

5-70. Potential sources of civil information that a coordinated CR plan considers include—

- Observations of maneuver forces supporting CATs in the conduct of offensive operations.
- Debriefings to Soldiers involved in MEDRETE, medical civic action projection, and veterinary
civic action project regarding attitudes of the local population.
- Debriefings to Soldiers involved in daily convoy operations.
- Ongoing ASCOPE assessments of the AO that identify MOE trends.
- CA interaction with IPI spheres of influence, including—
  - HN government officials.
  - Religious leaders.
  - Tribal or clan leaders.
Chapter 6

Transition Operations

It is DOD policy that...Civil affairs activities shall be undertaken to achieve an orderly and prompt transition of civilian sector responsibilities from the DOD Components to non-DOD authorities.


OVERVIEW

6-1. Transitions may occur randomly, sequentially, or simultaneously across the AO or within a theater. Ideally, each type of transition is executed according to synchronized transition plans. Depending on the situation, CAO and CMO in transition operations may be—

• Terminated.
• Transferred to follow-on forces.
• Transitioned to OGAs, IPI, or IGOs.

6-2. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, establishes that the Secretary of State (SEestate) shall coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts, involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. When the U.S. military is involved, the SECSTATE shall coordinate such efforts with the SecDef to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations. NSPD 44 further requires that the SECSTATE and SecDef will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans and will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate. The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization is tasked with the implementation of the requirements of NSPD 44. Integrated planning and effective management of USG agency operations early in an operation provide an interagency framework at the national strategic level for follow-on theater and operational level planning and creates unity of effort within an operation that is essential for mission success.

TRANSITION PLANNING

6-3. CAO and CMO planners play a major role in transition planning and, based on their expertise, may be the best group to perform this function. For these planners to accomplish the task of transition planning, they must have a clearly identifiable desired end state and transition or termination criteria for the operation. CAO and CMO planners initiate transition planning during the initial phases of operation planning to ensure adequate attention is placed on this critical area.

6-4. Areas that impact significantly on the development of a transition plan are—

• Identification of issues.
• Key events (past and present).
• Work required to accomplish the transition.
• A thorough knowledge of the organization or force taking over control of the operation.

6-5. Transition plans are normally a product of transition working groups established early in the planning process of an operation. Transition working groups usually require close ties with a CMOC to obtain updates on the current situation and the status of MOEs. They meet periodically to review, refine,
and coordinate specific details of the transition plan. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. An unclassified transition plan written in easily understood terms is particularly required when transitioning to nonmilitary organizations.

6-6. Transition of CAO and CMO fall into three categories:
- Termination of an operation or task.
- Transfer of an operation or task to follow-on CA units, other military forces, or the international community.
- Transition of an operation or task to the OGAs, IPI, or IGOs.

**TERMINATION**

6-7. The termination of an operation or task occurs for a variety of reasons. Some of these include—
- The time specified for the task has elapsed.
- Milestones or overall objectives have been reached.
- The political or security situation has deteriorated below an acceptable level.
- A loss of support or funding by the project benefactor.
- A change of mission.
- Command directive.

6-8. When terminating an activity or task, whether completed as planned or not, CA Soldiers must execute certain close-out procedures. These include—
- Closing out all open administrative actions.
- Giving or returning equipment and facilities (in equal to or better condition than received) to the appropriate authorities.
- Conducting and after-action review and writing an AAR.

6-9. Depending on METT-TC, the command climate, and other factors, CA Soldiers may consider conducting a termination ceremony. This action helps maintain good rapport with the IPI, as well as the international community, and facilitates future operations in the area. JP 3-57, Chapter III, and FM 3-05.40, Appendix A, contain sample checklists for termination planning.

**TRANSFER**

6-10. Transferring an operation or task to other forces or organizations requires detailed, coordinated, and synchronized planning. The CAO and CMO planner should consider the following items:
- Define the desired end state; for example, continuity of current operations or modification of current operations to some other format.
- Identify the organizational structure required to perform the operation or task.
- Identify and match components within the incoming organization that are the same or similar in nature to components within the unit being replaced.
- Identify equipment and facilities required to perform the operation or task, and who will provide them. Prepare the appropriate property-control documentation if transferring equipment or facilities between organizations.
- Create timelines that provide enough overlap between the outgoing and incoming organizations.
- Determine the criteria that will dictate when the incoming organization will assume control of the activity or task; for example, a target date, task standard, or level of understanding.
- Orient the incoming organization to the area, including an introduction to all the essential players of both military and civilian organizations remaining in the area.
- Orient the incoming organization to the operation or task. Include exchanging procedures, routine and recurring events, and other information critical to the conduct of the activity or task in the orientation. Demonstrate the activity or task, if possible.
Supervise the incoming organization in performing the operation or task. The outgoing organization retains control of the operation or task during this process, providing critiques and guidance, as needed.

- Transfer the operation or task according to the plan.
- Redeploy.
- Conduct an after action review and write an AAR.

Transfer in Afghanistan

The fall of Kandahar and Kabul in November of 2001 marked the collapse of the Taliban government and disintegration of its fighting forces. While the organization of the Afghan Interim Authority was taking place, JSOTF-North consolidated the stabilization effort by assigning UW to the three 5th SFG battalion commanders. The Special Operations Command and Control Elements (SOCCEs) were formed to better control operations by various Alliance warlords and to reduce bypassed pockets of Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance around Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan. A second Ranger parachute assault (Objective Bastogne) seized a remote airfield to support ARSOF attack helicopter operations. Destroying al-Qaeda leaders became a secondary mission for JSOTF-North under the new functional alignment directed by SOCCENT. That was to be the primary mission of the new JSOTF-South. The ADVON of that headquarters relocated to Kandahar Air Base when Marine Corps forces at Objective Rhino moved there. The 10th Mountain division left K2 for Bagram Air Base, south of Kabul. Just days after Hamid Karzai became interim prime minister, the Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force was established in Kabul to direct and coordinate civil and humanitarian affairs in rebuilding Afghanistan. In mid-January 2002, TF Rakkasan from the 101st Airborne Division deployed to Kandahar Airport to replace the marines…

…3rd SFG at Fort Bragg had been alerted to replace 5th SFG in the combat zone, and 19th and 20th SFG (ARNG) battalion staffs and ODAs were arriving in theater. Mobilized USAR CA and PSYOP units had been “earmarked” to replace Active Army forces in the theater…

Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan
USASOC Command Historian, 2003

TRANSITION

6-11. Ultimately, especially during SCA operations, an operation or task may be turned over to the OGAs, IPI, or IGOs. The following are examples:

- Transfer of civil authority from military to civil government (for example, replacement of U.S. military governors by German civilian high commissioners with the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, and replacement of the U.S. military government with the Japanese government).
- Establishment of indigenous police or security forces (for example, establishment of a multiethnic police force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the establishment of the Afghan National Army and the Iraqi Army).
- Privatization or return of facilities, such as public works and utilities, airports, and seaports, to civilian control (for example, Kuwait City International Airport).
- Privatization of FHA programs.
6-12. The considerations for transferring an operation or task to IPI are similar, in many respects, to transferring to follow-on forces or organizations. Items for the CAO and CMO planner to consider include the following:

- Capabilities and limitations of the elements of the on-the-ground infrastructure, such as—
  - Organization of the indigenous government (national, regional, and local).
  - Bilateral donors.
  - UN agencies.
  - IPI.
  - IGOs, especially the International Crisis Group and the ICRC.
  - NGOs, by type (assistance or advocacy).
- Desired end state; for example, continuity of current operations or modification of current operations to some other format.
- Identification of the organizational structure required to perform the operation or task.
- If within the control of the relieved organization, identification of competent, trustworthy individuals to fill positions within the relieving organizational structure.
- If necessary, procedures for demilitarizing indigenous forces and incorporating former belligerents into the private sector.
- Identification of the equipment and facilities required to perform the operation or task, and who will provide them. Preparation of the appropriate property-control documentation if transferring equipment or facilities to the relieving organization.
- Creation of timelines that provide sufficient overlap between the departing and relieving organizations.
- Criteria that will dictate when the relieving organization will assume control of the operation or task; for example, a target date, task standard, or level of understanding.
- Orientation of the relieving organization to the operation or task. Orientation includes procedures, routine and recurring events, and other information critical to the conduct of the activity or task (demonstrate the activity or task, if possible).
- Supervision of the relieving organization in performing the operation or task. The departing organization retains control of the operation or task during this process, providing critiques and guidance, as needed.
- Transfer of the task according to the plan.
- Redeployment timelines.

6-13. Transition planning must begin with the desired end state in mind. This includes the engagement of the indigenous government or regional actors early in the postcrisis and postconflict planning. This creates an atmosphere of cooperation, collaboration, and enfranchisement for the recovering or reconstituting HN. JP 3-57, Chapter III, and FM 3-05.40, Appendix A, contain sample checklists for transition planning.

CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

6-14. The continuity of operations plan is the mechanism to ensure that underway projects, coordination, reconstruction planning, and implementation receive support during and after transition. The goal of transition to follow-on organizations or IPI is a sustainable, durable structure or system. Throughout all operations, CAO and CMO planners, functional specialists, and team members maintain continuity books that will orient new personnel to their routine tasks. Ideally, an overlap period exists when mission handoff occurs between individuals and units.

6-15. A continuity book facilitates a turnover of operations between outgoing and incoming personnel that is transparent to the supported organization, agency, or populace. The book should be chronologically arranged with daily, weekly, and monthly calendars that show essential tasks with enough detail to preclude guessing by a newly assigned Soldier (including details such as who, what, where, when, why,
and how). The daily staff journal is a tool that CA Soldiers can use to build a useful continuity book. Additional items for the CA Soldier to consider ensuring continuity of operations are—

- Operational resource requirements (funding, equipment, personnel, and facilities).
- Sources of supplies and services required to maintain operations.
- Identification of interdependency and interoperability between organizations.
- Contingency plans that address threats to continuity of operations, countermeasures to mitigate those threats, and preparedness for, response to, and recovery from those threats that succeed in disrupting operations.
- Postredeployment oversight and support mechanisms for the operation (reachback POCs, periodic visits, and combatant command theater engagement programs).

**CIVIL AFFAIRS DESIRED END STATE
INDICATORS AND MEASUREMENT**

6-16. Indicators are measures for which data exists that helps quantify the achievement of a desired result. Indicators help answer the question: “How would we know a result if we achieved it?” Examples of indicators include—

- Rates of preventable disease.
- Death rates among a distressed population.
- Rates of pregnancy and drug use.
- Crime rates.

6-17. One of the products of the MDMP was CMO MOEs. CAO and CMO planners developed CMO MOEs to determine how well or poorly an operation is proceeding in achieving the CMO goals of the operation according to the commander’s mission statement and intent. CA and CMO planners developed CMO MOEs to identify effective strategies and tactics and to determine points at which to shift resources, transition to different phases, or alter or terminate the mission.

6-18. In addition to deciding MOEs, CA and CMO planners developed plans to observe and validate each MOE. These plans answered the following questions:

- Who will observe the MOE?
- When will the MOE be observed?
- How will the MOE be observed?
- Where will the observations be made?
- Who will approve and validate the achievement of the MOE?
- What actions will be taken when the MOE is satisfactorily achieved?

6-19. Some MOEs may be observed in the course of routine CMOC, or interagency, operations. The CMOC analyzes reports from CATs and various civilian agencies, records the statistics resulting from the analysis, and then provides input to the COP. In this way, MOEs, such as the sustainability of NGO or HN operations, are readily identifiable.

6-20. Observation of MOEs may be event-driven or time-driven. CA Soldiers are able to observe and measure some MOEs immediately after an event, such as the percentage of a population inoculated or the level of output of a utility after repairs. However, CA Soldiers can only observe other MOEs after a cycle of time has passed, such as harvest season (if measuring agricultural output) or a school year (if measuring academic achievement). CA Soldiers may need to observe MOEs on a routine or periodic basis to establish baselines or trends, as in crime rates or mortality rate.

6-21. Transition working groups usually require close ties with a CMOC to obtain updates on the current situation and the status of MOEs. The CAO and CMO staffs validate the MOEs. An approval authority, which may be a commander, HN authorities, organized representative of the international community, or some other entity, approves the validated MOEs. Validation and approval occur before final disposition of an event or program.
6-22. Achievement of MOEs must be tied to a disposition action. This action may be the termination of an activity or task; the transfer of an activity or task to follow-on CA units, other military forces, or the international community; or the transition of an activity or task to the OGAs, IPI, or IGOs. Satisfaction of MOEs indicates an operation is nearing completion. CA Soldiers finalize transition plans and begin executing termination or transition timelines.

6-23. If the MOEs have not been achieved, CA Soldiers must determine why. The evaluated results of an event or program may be unsuccessful because levels were set too high, the wrong activity was measured, or some other reason. CA Soldiers may determine that the MOEs have been partially achieved. In this instance, CA Soldiers should modify, not recreate, the MOEs to do the intended job. After the CAO and CMO planners recommend the modification of the operation from the original plan, the supported commander decides what to do next. Some options include—

- Continuing the operation as currently planned and reevaluating at a future date.
- Accepting the results and proceeding with transition of the operation as planned.
- Redefining the mission and developing a new plan with new MOEs.
Appendix A

Assessment Formats

The assessment is common to all CA. CA personnel obtain, analyze, and record information in advance of need. The basic assessment of an area is the CA area study that establishes baseline information relating to the civil components of the area in question. CA personnel update the information detailed in the study as required by conducting a preliminary assessment prior to the receipt of a mission. CA assessments that support other forces should supplement—not repeat—information in the basic CA area study.

INITIAL ASSESSMENT

A-1. Upon deployment to an AO, CA soldiers conduct an initial assessment of the area. This assessment updates, validates, and provides additional data to fill informational gaps within the previously assembled area study and preliminary assessment. To ensure coverage of all functional areas, an identical format is normally used to conduct the area study and the preliminary and initial assessments. Reference should be made to the sample sequence of functions shown in Figure A-1, pages A-1 through A-23.

### Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. General.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Geography.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Location and size.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Location in relation to neighboring countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Total land area (square miles or kilometers; size in relation to a U.S. state).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Physical features.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Waterways and ports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Topography.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Natural resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Road and rail nets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Climate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Seasonal abnormalities, temperature, atmospheric pressure, humidity, rainfall, and prevailing winds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Characteristics and statistics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Political geography.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Politically organized areas and regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Effectiveness of administration of political areas in relation to geographic boundaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Cities and towns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Sources of raw material.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
f. Principles or traditions that command loyal support.
g. State of industrial development.

B. History.
1. Brief history of—
   a. The development of the area.
   b. Influence exerted by major powers in development.
   c. Divisions or partitions resulting from wars and treaties.
   d. Major geographic or political factors to the current status of the area.
   e. Present form of government and previous forms of government.
   f. Extent of political control over other areas.
   g. Degree of control over the population exercised by government.
   h. Susceptibility of existing government toward major powers.
   i. Political organization of the area.

2. Brief coverage of each—
   a. International treaty to which subject area or country is signatory.
   b. Status of forces agreement.
   c. Summary pronouncement of national policy pertinent to the subject area or country.

C. People.
1. Population.
   a. Numbers.
   b. Distribution and density.
   c. Birth and death rates.
   d. Biographical sketches of prominent personalities.
      (1) Name.
      (2) Address.
      (3) Business, profession, or occupation.
      (4) Political affiliation.
      (5) Education.
      (6) Religion.

2. Culture and social structure.
   a. Culture.
      (1) History, government, and geography as they affect the cultural makeup of the people.
         (a) Events and facts considered most important.
         (b) Traditionally conducted activities, beliefs, or situations.
      (2) Heroes and leaders of groups, with reasons for special esteem.
      (3) Ethnic groups (racial, tribal, or religious) and population distribution (rural or urban with ratios of age, sex, and imported or exported labor forces).
      (4) Majority or minority groups (unique challenges or conditions).
      (5) Moral codes.
      (6) Attitudes toward age, sex, and race.
(7) Influences on personality development.
(8) Individuality.
(9) Privacy.
(10) Nature of the people’s perceptions.
(11) Clothing.
(12) Fatalism or self-determination.
(13) Values in economic philosophy (cooperation, competition, and respect for personal and private property).

b. Social structure.
(1) Status of male and female, by age.
(2) Humor, entertainment.
(3) Community participation.
(4) Exchange of gifts.
(5) Public displays of emotion.
(6) Lines of authority.
(7) Cooperation versus competition, including economics.
(8) The family.
  (a) Roles and status of family members.
  (b) Nuclear or extended.
  (c) Authority, obedience, place, and expectations of members.
  (d) Place in society.
  (e) Inheritance customs.
  (f) Entrance rites and rituals.
  (g) Markers of social change, adulthood, special activities.
(9) Dating and marriage.
  (a) Age standards.
  (b) Influence of family and peers.
  (c) Common dating practices, courtship activities.
  (d) Chaperones, group dating.
  (e) Engagement customs.
  (f) Divorce, separation, aloneness.
  (g) Sexual mores.
(10) Greetings.
  (a) Conversation and gestures on meeting.
  (b) Distinctive approaches for greetings.
  (c) Compliments given or received.
  (d) Space and time (standing, sitting, distance between people).
  (e) Farewell and leave-taking.
  (f) Use of first name versus titles.
  (g) Favorite, familiar, or pleasing phrases.
(11) Visiting practices.
   (a) Conversations.
      (i) Topics.
      (ii) Appropriate part of visit.
      (iii) Attitude, rate, pitch, and tone.
   (b) Gifts.
   (c) Compliments on possessions, family, and children.
   (d) Parties and other social events.
   (e) Business discussions.
   (f) Mannerisms, gestures, posture, eye contact, and facial expressions.

(12) Eating practices.
   (a) Table manners (before, during, and after the meal).
   (b) Average diet, meal size, and scheduling.
   (c) Specific foods reserved for special occasions or rituals.
   (d) Forbidden foods.
   (e) Social and other occasions.
   (f) Unique problems and challenges.

(13) Work and recreation.
   (a) Age, sex, status, and hierarchy.
   (b) Schedules.
   (c) Obligations, successes, or failures.
   (d) Business codes.
   (e) Bribes.
   (f) Family, cultural, and social recreation, vacation, and sports.
   (g) Individual recreation (age and sex exclusions and variations).
   (h) Distinctive arts and sciences.
   (i) Well-known artists, athletes, and others.

   c. Dos and don’ts. (Include items or areas that could embarrass or hurt
      the commander’s mission if handled improperly. Include a quick reference
      for the commander and a starting point for briefing troops. This section may
      include items previously mentioned.)

3. Languages.
   a. Map showing distribution.
   b. Minority groups.
   c. Standardization of languages.

4. Religion.
   a. Religious sects (number, key leaders, and geographic locations).
   b. Funeral and burial practices.
   c. Religious problems.
   d. Eating and dietary habits.
   e. Sexual mores, including interrelations and intermarriages with alien personnel.
   f. Written and unwritten laws of conduct and human behavior.
### D. U.S. interests.
1. U.S. military units and teams in the area and their activities.
2. U.S. Government organizations in the area and their interests.
4. Legal agreements and treaties.
5. Trade and commercial interests.

### E. FN support.
   a. Space and facilities at echelons above corps.
   b. C2 of other functional areas.
   c. Area security.
   d. Dislocated civilians.
   e. Battlefield circulation control communications.
      1. Use of communications systems.
      2. Repair of communications systems.
      3. Cable construction and repair.

2. Combat service support.
   a. Use of FN transportation and distribution systems, including highways, railways, waterways, ports (public and private).
   b. Use of FN buildings.
   c. Civilian services (laundry, bath, bakery, food, water).
   d. Depot operations and depot maintenance.
   e. Material-handling equipment.
   f. Labor.
      1. Skilled.
      3. Agricultural.
      4. Male or female.
      6. Third country (labor necessity, availability, and quantity).
      7. Screened by intelligence.
      8. Linguists and interpreters.
     10. Workday.

3. Mobility and survivability.
   a. Repair of railroads, highways, and pipelines.
   b. Obstacle construction.
   c. Contract guard services.
   d. Decontamination.
   e. Port facilities and repair.
   f. Barrier and construction materials.

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**Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format (continued)**
4. Medical.
   a. Hospitals (facilities and beds).
   b. Medical evacuation.
   c. Medical supplies and equipment.
5. FN POC for U.S. forces and procedures.

II. Public administration.
   A. General system of public administration.
      1. Political traditions.
      2. Political stability.
      4. Constitutional system.
      5. Civil rights and practices.
      6. Political factions, movements, and dynamics.
   B. Structure of national government.
      1. Executive branch.
         a. Organization.
         b. Powers.
         c. Policies.
         d. Administration.
      2. Legislative branch.
         a. Organization.
         b. Powers.
         c. Composition of membership.
         d. Pressure groups.
         a. Organization.
         b. Powers.
      4. Methods of selection of key officials.
      5. Biographical sketches of key officials.
         a. Name.
         b. Address.
         c. Position in government.
         d. Political affiliation.
         e. Education.
         f. Religion.
         g. Former business, profession, or occupation.
         h. Attitude toward the United States.
      6. Potential officials and biographical sketches.
C. Structure of government at other levels.
   1. Province or state.
   2. District.
   3. City.
   4. Relations with national government.
   5. Biographical sketches of key officials, potential officials, and other influential persons.
      a. Name.
      b. Address.
      c. Position.
      d. Political affiliation.
      e. Education.
      f. Religion.
      g. Former business, profession, or occupation.
      h. Attitude toward the United States.

D. Armed forces.
   1. Historical background.
   2. Organization, size, and mission.
      a. Defense establishment.
      b. Army.
      c. Navy.
      d. Air force.
      e. Paramilitary forces.
      f. Political control and effectiveness.
   3. General military policy.
   4. International treaties.
   5. Foreign influence.
      b. Percentage of total budget.
      c. Military pay.
   7. Quality and source of manpower.
      a. Key officers and qualifications.
      b. Recruitment.
      c. Conscription.
      d. Reserves.
      e. Training.
      f. Mobilization plans.
   8. Logistics.
   9. Weapons and equipment.
   10. Ranks, uniforms, and insignia.

Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format (continued)
11. Loyalty and morale factors.

E. Political parties.
   1. Strength and capabilities.
   2. Organization.
   4. Biographical sketches of leaders.
   5. Training.
   6. Role in international communist movement.
   7. Relation to domestic government.
   8. Internal party politics.

F. International affairs.
   1. Agencies.
   2. Foreign relations.
   3. Relations with intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

III. Cultural relations.
   A. General conditions and problems.
   B. Cultural affairs.
      1. Religions in the area.
         b. Organized.
         c. Unorganized (sects).
         d. Relations among religions and religious leaders, indigenous and missionary.
      2. Clergy.
         a. Number, location, and education of clergymen.
         b. Influence of religious leaders.
      3. Religious beliefs.
         a. Major tenets of each religion, including such concepts as—
            (1) Faith.
            (2) Impact of faith on life.
            (3) Concept of the hereafter.
            (4) Means of salvation.
            (5) Rites of cleaning and purification.
            (6) Impact of religions on value systems.
         b. Degree of religious conviction in lives of indigenous populace.
      4. Worship.
         a. Forms and significance of worship of each religion.
         b. Places of worship.
         c. Frequency of worship.
      5. Relationship between religion and motivation of indigenous people.

Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format (continued)
6. Relationship between religion and transcultural communication.

7. Socioeconomic influence of religion.
   a. Influence of religions on society.
   b. Economic influence of religions.
      (1) Religious ownership of property and other possessions.
      (2) Teachings of religions about private property.

8. Interrelation with government.
   a. Relationship of religious leaders and government officials.
   b. Role of religions and religious leaders in armed forces.
   c. Political influence of religious leaders.

   a. Location, size, and attendance.
   b. Influence.
   c. Relationship to nonsecular schools.

C. Arts, monuments, and archives.
   1. Description of conditions of the arts and monuments.
   2. Advancements over the past 10 years.
   3. Influence of outside countries.
   4. Arts.
      a. Location, type, use, and significance of the fine arts.
      b. Population attitude toward art treasures.
      c. Government policies and agencies dealing with the arts.
      d. Agencies through which arts are performed.
         (1) Private.
         (2) Government.
   5. Advancements in science.
   6. Artists’ organizations and government control.
   7. Monuments.
      a. Location of historic monuments and sites.
      b. Present significance of historic monuments and sites.
   8. Archives.
      a. Location of archives.
      b. Varieties of archives.
         (1) Public archives.
         (2) Semipublic archives.
         (3) Ecclesiastical archives.
         (4) Private or family archives.
      c. Contents or category of archives.
         (1) Historical.
         (2) Current documents.

Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format (continued)
IV. Civilian supply.
   A. General conditions and problems (such as peculiarities of climate and geography
      that might influence civilian supply).
   B. Storage, refrigeration, and processing facilities.
      1. Storage space, available and required.
         a. Food.
         b. Other supplies.
      2. Refrigeration, available and required.
         a. Food.
         b. Other supplies.
   C. Distribution channels.
      1. Food.
      2. Clothing.
      3. Essential durables.
   D. Dietary and clothing requirements and customs.
      1. Food.
         a. Available.
         b. Required.
      2. Clothing.
         a. Available.
         b. Required.
      3. Customs that might influence civilian supply.
   E. Production excesses and shortages.

V. Legal.
   A. System of laws.
      1. Civil and criminal codes.
         a. Origins.
         b. Procedures.
         c. Penalties.
      2. Political crimes.
   B. Administration of justice.
      1. Historical development.
      2. Agencies (national and local).
      3. Courts and tribunals (types of jurisdiction, including administrative tribunals).
      5. Personnel.
         a. Judiciary.
         b. Prosecutors.
         c. The bar.
d. Legal training.

e. Political controls.

VI. Public safety.

A. General conditions and problems. (The primary consideration in this area is whether the existing institutions [police, fire, and penal] may be used to carry out the combat commander’s primary mission and to provide the day-to-day control and bodily protection of the local population.)

B. Police system.

1. Organizations at all levels.
   a. Types of police forces and criminal investigative agencies.
   b. Organization.
   c. Areas of responsibility and jurisdiction.
   d. Chain of command.
   e. Names and biographical sketches of key personnel.

2. Equipment.
   a. Arms and special equipment.
   b. Modern crime-fighting equipment.
   c. Traffic-control equipment.
   d. Riot-control equipment.
   e. Police communications.
   f. Transportation.

3. Personnel.
   a. Strength.
   b. Method of selection.
      (1) Political, racial, and religious requirements.
      (2) Reliability.
      (3) Morale and state of training.
   c. Promotion basis.

4. Functions and authority.
   a. Criminal action.
   b. Civil ordinances.
   c. Disorder and disaster control.

5. Police regulations that differ from U.S. concept of law and order.
   a. General.
   b. Identification system.
   c. Restrictions on travel, gatherings, and curfews.
   d. Restrictions on ownership of firearms.

6. Miscellaneous.
   a. Other methods of enforcing law and order, such as the influence of religious leaders, family ties, and role of the military.
   b. Psychological effect on the local population.
C. Penal institutions.
   1. National and local.
      a. Prisons and jails (number, location, and capacity).
      b. Concentration camps and labor camps (number, location, and capacity).
   2. Organization.
   3. Government agency exercising control.
   4. Inmate breakdown.
      b. Criminal.
      c. Juvenile.
      d. Sex.
   5. Adequacy (sanitary and health conditions).
   6. Treatment of prisoners.
   7. Probation.
   8. Parole.

D. Fire protection.
   1. Organization (in general, the same as for the police).
   2. Equipment.
      a. Type, location, and adequacy of existing equipment and facilities.
      b. Adaptability of local military firefighting equipment.
   3. Personnel.
      a. Strength and mode of selection.
      b. Training status and efficiency.
      c. Names and political reliability of key personnel.
   4. Miscellaneous.
      a. Particular problems in certain areas, such as overcrowded cities, narrow streets, and local water pressure.
      b. Possible use of equipment in controlling riots and other public disasters.

VII. Economic development.
   A. General conditions and problems.
   B. Public finance.
      1. Organization.
         a. National level.
         b. Other levels.
         c. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
      2. Policies.
         a. Fiscal and economic policies.
         b. Special conditions and policies.
         c. Accounting systems used.

Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format (continued)
3. Monetary system.
   a. Currency.
   b. Reserves or backing of currency.
   c. Issuing authorities.
   d. Stability of currency.
   e. Controls.
   f. Exchange rates.
   g. Government authorities.
   h. Other legal instruments of exchange.
   i. Other means of exchange, such as the black market.

4. Budgetary system and current budget.
   a. Current budget.
   b. Budgetary analysis.
   c. Governing authorities and controls.
   d. Analysis of budgetary procedures.
   e. Patterns of expenditure and distribution.

5. Sources of government income.
   a. Analysis of taxation (amount of taxes collected, method of collection, and type of taxes).
   b. Formulation of tax policies.
   c. Investments.
   d. Other sources of government income.

   a. Banking institutions (facilities, location, capital, and credit policies).
   b. Investment institutions.
      (1) Stock institutions.
      (2) Controlling authorities and control exercised.
      (3) Miscellaneous investment companies.
   c. Insurance companies (number, size, and location).
   d. Specialized savings institutions.

7. Foreign exchange (balance of trade, controls, and restrictions).

8. Applicable laws and regulations.

C. Economics and commerce.

1. Description of economic system.
   a. Private enterprise.
   b. Public enterprise.
   c. Biographical sketches of key officials and business leaders.


3. Goals and programs.
   a. Short-range.
   b. Intermediate-range.
   c. Long-range.

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Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format (continued)
4. Summary of important trade agreements and extent of participation in world trade.

5. Resources.
   a. Natural.
   b. Developed.
   c. Human.
   d. Self-sufficiency, dependency, substitution.

6. Extent of development.
   a. Capabilities of infrastructure.
   b. Capabilities of industry and power.
   c. Capabilities of agriculture.
   d. Capabilities of service sector.

7. Statistics.
   a. Per capita (income, savings, consumer spending).
   b. Aggregate (gross national product, national income).
   c. Ratios (unemployment, productivity, occupations).
   d. Validity of statistics (when compiled).

8. Internal movement of goods.

   a. Type.
   b. Quantity.
   c. Market.
   d. Influence.

10. Commerce.
    a. Domestic trade.
       (1) Wholesale and retail distribution system.
       (2) Markets and fairs.
       (3) Weights and measures standards.
       (4) Cooperatives and public markets.
    b. Foreign trade.
       (1) Principal items of export and import.
       (2) Tariff system, customs, and duties.
       (3) Trade agreements.
       (4) Balance of payments.

11. Industries.
    a. Location of main industrial centers.
    b. Names of important companies.
    c. Labor (skills and distribution).
    d. Power sources and capacities.
    e. Manufacturing industries.
    f. Types (machinery, chemical, or textile).
g. Locations (province or city).

h. Processing industries (types, locations, and capacities).

12. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
   a. Government organization.
   b. Trade associations and chambers of commerce.
   c. Laws governing commerce and industry.
   d. Subsidies and monopolies.

13. Price control and rationing.
   a. Stabilization.
   b. Variation of prices.
   c. Control measures and techniques.
   d. Commodities under price control.
   e. Distribution.
      (1) Essential commodities.
      (2) Imports and exports.
      (3) Ration controls.
      (4) Production and distribution.
      (5) Effect on demands.
      (6) Types and status of markets.
   f. Control systems.
      (1) Price-control program.
      (2) Rationing program.
      (3) Raw materials.
      (4) Financial.
   g. Legislation.
      (1) Price-control legislation and items subject to price control.
      (2) Rationing legislation and items subject to rationing.

D. Labor.
   1. Organization.
      a. National level.
      b. Other levels.
      c. Key personnel with biographical sketches.
   2. Labor force.
      a. Employment data and trends.
      b. Available manpower and labor supply by special classes.
      c. Ages and distribution.
      d. Unemployment.
      e. Labor productivity.
Appendix A

3. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
   a. Government labor policy.
      (1) Labor laws and working conditions.
      (2) Role of government.
      (3) Government job placement controls.
      (4) Wages and other incentives.
   b. Labor organizations.
      (1) Organizations (type, size, location, leadership, and political influence).
      (2) Membership.
      (3) Relations with foreign or international labor organizations.
      (4) Total potential labor force (type, distribution, mobility, and ages).
   c. Social insurance.
   d. Labor disputes, including mechanisms for settling.
4. Wages and standards, including hours and working conditions.

VIII. Food and agriculture.

A. General conditions and problems.
   1. Importance of agriculture in total economy.
   2. Extent of agricultural productivity and self-sufficiency.
   3. Principal problems.
   4. Attitude of farm population.

B. Agricultural geography.
   1. Locations of principal farm areas.
   2. Types of soil.
   3. Influence of climate and topography.
   4. Types of crops.
   5. Farm to market road net.

C. Agricultural products and processing.
   1. Livestock and dairy products (types, amounts, methods of processing, refrigeration, and warehousing).
   2. Crops (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage).
   3. Poultry (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage, refrigeration).

D. Agricultural practices.
   1. Extent of mechanization.
   2. Improvement programs.
   3. Conservation programs.
   4. Pest and disease control.

E. Land-holding system and reform programs.

F. Fisheries.
   1. Commercial (number, companies, location, type of fish, type of crafts, fishing areas, methods of processing, storage, annual production).
   2. Private (policy, rules, regulations, type of fish, fishing areas).

Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format (continued)
3. Restocking program.
4. Problem areas.

**G. Forestry.**
1. Reforestation program.
2. Importance of forestry to the country.
3. Forestry services or administration.
4. Hunting (controls, laws, regulations, and types of game).
5. Products and their processing.

**H. Agencies, institutions, and programs.**
2. Private.

**I. Food products.**
1. Type.
2. Quantity.
3. Processing.
4. Location, size, and ownership of warehouses.
5. Types and quantity of food supplies stored.

**J. Applicable laws and regulations governing food and agriculture.**

**IX. Environmental management.**
A. General conditions and problems.
B. Pollution control and environmental management organizations.
C. Laws and regulations.
D. Sources of pollution.
   1. Air.
   2. Water.
E. Health hazard.
   1. Immediate and present threats.
   3. Mid-term.
   4. Long-term.

**X. Public health.**
A. Organization.
   1. National level.
   2. Other levels.
   3. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
B. General conditions and problems.

Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format (continued)
C. Agencies and institutions.
   1. Hospitals.
      a. Number.
      b. Capacity (number of beds).
      c. Location and condition of facilities.
   2. Other medical facilities.
      a. Public.
      b. Private.

D. Medical personnel.
   1. Numbers (doctors and nurses).
   2. Location.

E. Medical equipment and supplies.
   1. Surgical and dental equipment.
   2. Testing equipment.
   3. Drugs.
      a. Availability.
      b. Shortages.
   4. Other supplies.

F. Diseases.
   1. Predominant types.
   2. Control programs.

G. Environmental sanitation.
   1. Regulations governing food and drugs.
   2. Water control and supply.
   3. Disposal of sewage and waste.

H. Public welfare.
   1. Organization.
      a. National level.
      b. Other levels.
      c. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
   2. Major social problems.
      a. Juvenile delinquency.
      b. Alcohol and narcotics abuse.
      c. Unemployment.
      d. Poverty and dependency.
   3. Public assistance.
      a. Basis upon which granted.
      b. Types of relief and medical care provided.
   4. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
      a. Social insurance.
      b. Health insurance.
      c. Accident insurance.

Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format (continued)
d. Old age, disability, and survivors’ pensions.
e. Unemployment.
f. Family assistance.
g. Other.

5. Welfare services (government and private).
   a. Child welfare (adoption, maternal).
   b. Emergency and war relief.
   c. Relief and public assistance.
      (1) For mentally and physically handicapped.
      (2) For aged and indigent.

6. Institutions.
   a. Orphanages (number, location, and capacity).
   b. Homes for the aged (number, locations, and capacity).
   c. Physical therapy (number and location).

7. Programs.
   a. Recreational.
   b. Vocational.
   c. Health.
   d. Child care.

8. Welfare personnel.
   a. Professional standards.
   b. Volunteer assistance.
   c. Number available by type of organization.

   a. Financial plan (how funds are obtained).
   b. Laws and regulations.
   c. Organizational structure.


XI. Public transportation.
   A. General conditions and problems.
   B. Rail transport.
      1. Railroad by type, gauge, and miles or kilometers.
      2. Type, number, and condition of rolling stock.
      3. Location of switchyards.
      4. Major rail terminals (number, size, location, and condition).
   C. Vehicular transportation.
      1. Road (type, condition, and miles or kilometers).
      2. Street systems and condition.
      3. Vehicles and public conveyances by type, number, and ownership.
D. Water transportation.
   1. Size, location, type, use, and ownership of all floating vessels.
   2. Location of all port facilities and services.
   3. Identification of sea routes.
   4. Location and use of inland waterways.

E. Air transportation.
   1. Location, size, and use of all airfields.
   2. Number, size, use, and ownership of all aircraft.

F. Pipelines.

G. Travel.
   2. Restrictions.
   3. Regulations.
   4. Volume by geographic area of people leaving and entering.
   5. Items of general importance common to all transportation systems.
      a. Ownership.
      b. Regulatory agencies and licenses.
      c. Financial structure.
      d. Administration.
      e. Operation and revenues.
      f. Maintenance.
      g. Trade associations.
      h. Personnel and labor relations.
   6. Elements relative to each specific transport system in detail.
      a. Location and mileage.
      b. Condition.
      c. Effect of seasonal variation.
      d. Special traffic hazards and problems.

XII. Public works and utilities.

A. General conditions and problems.

B. Public works.
   1. Public buildings, including hospitals (use, size, and location).
   2. Roads and streets.
   3. Bridges.
   4. Port facilities (harbors).
   5. Airports and railroad terminals.
   7. Dams (flood control).

C. Public utilities.
   1. Power system, including nuclear reactors and power-generating plants and distribution systems.
   2. Water system (source dams, degree of pollution, filter plants, and ownership).

Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format (continued)
3. Gas works (size, location, source, and ownership).
4. Sewage-collection systems and disposal plants.
5. Radioactive waste, garbage, and refuse disposal.
6. Storm drainage systems.
7. Items of general importance to all public works and utilities.
   a. Ownership.
   b. Regulating and licensing agencies.
   c. Financial structure.
   d. Administration.
   e. Operations and revenues.
   f. Maintenance.
   g. Trade associations.
   h. Personnel and labor relations.
8. Elements relative to each specific public works or utility in detail.
   a. Locations of plants, line systems, nets, and connecting grids.
   b. Condition.
   c. New construction requirements.
   d. Available resources for construction.
   e. Priority of usage.

XIII. Public communications.
   A. General conditions and problems.
   B. Postal system.
      1. Extent and frequency of service.
         a. Metropolitan.
         b. Rural.
      2. Censorship.
      3. Private carriers.
      4. Parcel post service.
      5. Other functions.
         a. Postal savings.
         b. Money order service.
         c. Issuance of licenses.
         d. Tax information service.
   C. Telephone.
      1. Exchanges and local service.
      2. Long-line systems and connecting grids.
      3. Priority usage.
      4. Censorship.
      5. Private systems.

Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format (continued)
D. Telegraph.
   1. Exchanges and local service.
   2. Long-line systems and connecting grids.
   3. Priority usage.
   4. Censorship.
   5. Private systems.

E. Radio and television.
   1. Transmitting stations (number, type, and location).
   2. Channels, frequencies, and trunk lines.
   3. Hours of operation.
   4. Censorship.
   5. Propaganda usage.
   7. Foreign broadcasts.

F. Applicable laws governing communications systems.

XIV. Public education.

A. Organization.
   1. National level.
   2. Other levels (province, state, district).
   3. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
   4. Philosophy guiding the educational systems.

B. General conditions and problems.
   1. General development of the area’s educational system.
   2. Requirements placed upon individuals.
   3. Significant achievements in recent years.
   4. Educational level of population.

C. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
   1. Government agencies and policies.
   2. Educational systems and facilities.
      a. Administration and controls.
      b. Preschool, kindergarten, and primary schools.
      c. Secondary schools.
      d. Vocational and special schools.
      e. Higher education.
      f. Teacher education.
      g. Private schools.
      h. Adult education.
   3. Evaluation of educational system.
4. Private and public organizations.
   a. Influence and pressure groups.
   b. Youth organizations.
   c. Religious groups.

D. Influence of politics on education.

XV. Civil information.

A. General conditions, problems, and stage of development.
   1. Effect of geographic, social, economic, and political factors.
   2. Reading, listening, viewing habits.
   3. Rural-urban differences.
   4. Anticommunist appeal.
   5. International outlook.
   6. Techniques to measure impact.

B. Newspapers, periodicals, and publishing Firms.
   1. Name.
   2. Location.
   3. Ownership.
   5. Publication.
   7. Editorial policies (political persuasion).
   8. Procedures.
   9. Employees.
   10. Equipment.
   11. Sources of supply.
   12. Revenue.

C. Miscellaneous means of communications.
   1. Private printing facilities.
   2. Advertising agencies.
   3. Others.

**Figure A-1. Sample initial assessment format (continued)**

A-2. The rapid assessment is a deliberate assessment conducted within an AO when time or other constraints do not allow for a more detailed collection of information. Rapid assessments can also be directed for emergencies, single issues, or special situations, such as a such as a damage assessment incident to a claim or to determine the current conditions of a specific location. The findings of a rapid assessment may lead to refined mission statements, updates to the CA area study, a CMO annex to the base order, and reallocation of forces and resources. Figure A-2, pages A-24 through A-28, provides a sample rapid assessment format.
Rapid Assessment
Current as of: (MM/DD/YY)

I. General Information.
   A. Location name.
   B. Location (military grid reference system or latitude/longitude).
   C. Total land area (square miles, kilometers).
   D. Topography (basic type of geography, such as desert, mountainous, or forested).
   E. Climate and seasons (basic description of the local climate and seasonal breakdowns).
   F. Languages and dialects spoken.
   G. Key landmarks.
   H. Brief area history (any pertinent recent or ancient history).

II. Key persons (Brief biographies, including gender, age, family, politics, associations, demeanor, habits, and influence).
   A. Mayor.
   B. Police chief.
   C. Religious Leaders.
   D. Local military leaders.
   E. School leaders.
   F. Tribal leaders.
   G. Other leaders.
   H. IGOs/NGOs/OGAs in the area (list all entities providing assistance, including POC and type, quantity, and frequency of assistance).

III. Indigenous population.
   A. Population totals.
   B. Families.
   C. Males.
   D. Average age of males.
   E. Females.
   F. Average age of females.
   G. Children.
   H. Average age of children.
   I. Mortality.
      1. Male mortality rate.
      2. Female mortality rate.
      3. Child mortality rate.
   J. Ethnic composition (basic ethnic breakdowns by percentage).
   K. Religious makeup (basic religious breakdowns by percentage).
   L. Social structure or hierarchy.

Figure A-2. Sample rapid assessment format
M. Distribution of specific populations and groups (intermixed or split by ethnicity or religion into areas).
N. General populace demeanor (pro-, neutral, or anti-United States; pro-, neutral or anti-HN).

IV. Standard of living.
A. Food (sources, quantity, quality, average diet, reliability across the community).
B. Water (sources, quantity, quality, reliability across the community).
C. Power (sources, quantity, quality, reliability across the community).
D. Sewage (type, capacity, reliability across the community).
E. Transportation.
   1. Public.
      a. Local (basic systems used for travel within the community).
      b. Intercommunity (basic systems used for travel between communities).
   2. Private.
      a. Local (basic types used for travel within the community).
      b. Intercommunity (basic types used for travel between communities).
F. Shelter.
   1. Types of dwellings (huts, single story, multistory, high-rise).
   2. Standard construction material (wood, brick, mud, steel, block).
   3. Number of dwellings (total estimated number).
   4. Overall category (list by percentage using the structural evaluation chart below).
      a. Category 1.
      b. Category 2.
      c. Category 3.
      d. Category 4.

Figure A-2. Sample rapid assessment format (continued)
5. Heating (percent of households, type, quality, reliability).
7. Running water (percent of households, type [private well or community source], quality, reliability).
8. Sewage (percent of households, type [outhouse or flush toilet], quality, reliability).
9. Average dwelling occupancy (average occupancy of households).

G. Communications
1. Telephone (percent of households, reliability, service providers).
2. Television (percent of households, number of channels, reception, reliability, service providers).
3. Radio (percent of households, number of channels, reception, reliability, service providers).
4. Newspaper (percent of households, number of printings weekly, views, reliability).

H. Medical.
1. Facilities.
   a. Hospitals (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).
   b. Clinics (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).
   c. Dental offices (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).
   d. Veterinary offices: (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).
   e. Mortuaries: (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).
2. Professionals.
   a. Doctors (location, capability, reliability).
   b. Nurses (location, capability, reliability).
   c. Dentists (location, capability, reliability).
   d. Veterinarians (location, capability, reliability).
   e. Morticians (location, capability, reliability).
   f. Traditional (location, capability, reliability).

I. Education.
1. Basic education level.
2. Facilities.
   a. Grade schools (POCs, locations, capacity [current and future], schedule, shortfalls).
   b. High schools (POCs, locations, capacity [current and future], schedule, shortfalls).
   c. Universities (POCs, locations, capacity [current and future], schedule, shortfalls).
   d. Religious schools (POCs, locations, capacity [current and future], schedule, shortfalls).

J. Crime.
1. Rate.
2. Types (predominant types of crime in the community).
3. Areas (locations of concentrations, bad areas).
4. Figures (identified crime figures with biographical information, if available).
5. Penal institutions (type, organization, structural information, capability, current capacity, and locations).

K. Unique problems and challenges (miscellaneous information).

Figure A-2. Sample rapid assessment format (continued)
V. Economic characteristics.
   A. Type of economy (market, agrarian, industrial).
   B. Currency (all currencies and any known exchange rates).
   C. Unemployment rate (percent of eligible work force that is unemployed).
   D. Self-employed (percent of eligible work force that is self employed).
   E. Nature of self-employment (list professions if they constitute a major percentage of the self-employed)
   F. Employed (percent of eligible work force that is employed by others).
   G. Nature of employment (list professions if they constitute a major percentage of the employed).
   H. Trade/exchange with other locations (list major items, agreements, and methods for trade with other population areas).
   I. Natural resources (list all major natural resources for the community).
   J. Main crops (main staple crops of the community, even if not an agrarian economy).
   K. Livestock (main livestock types, locations, and uses).
   L. Industry type (major industries that support the community).

VI. Politics.
   A. Political system.
   B. Parties (number and density).
   C. Representatives (elected or selected).
   D. Political attitude toward the United States and HN governments.
   E. Biographies of key officials/leaders (if not covered in Section II).

VII. Emergency services.
   A. Police (organization, structure, strength, functions, equipment, enforcement methods, and locations).
   B. Fire (organization, structure, strength, functions, equipment, and locations).
   C. Rescue (organization, structure, strength, functions, equipment, and locations).
   D. Militia (organization, structure, strength, equipment; product of national military policy or separatist organizations).
   E. Unique problems and challenges.

VIII. Significant structures. (This includes any major structures not already covered.)
   A. Dams.
   B. Bridges.
   C. Water/sewage treatment plants.
   D. Water distribution facilities.
   E. Religious structures.
   F. Historic structures (any items/locations of significant value to the local populace).
   G. Cultural structures (any items/locations of significant value to the local populace, to include zoos and libraries).
   H. Power generation plants.
   I. Power distribution nodes.
J. Rail lines, yards, and switching stations.
K. Airports.
L. Port areas.
M. Government buildings.

IX. Dislocated civilians.
   A. Location (grids for all major concentrations).
   B. Quantity (numbers broken down by male/female/children).
   C. Composition.
      1. Ethnicity.
      2. Religion.
      3. Categories (by percentage, if able to be determined).
         a. Displaced person.
         b. Refugee.
         c. Evacuee.
         d. Stateless person.
         e. War victim.
         f. Internally displaced person.
         g. Returnee.
         h. Resettler.
   D. Disposition (general status of the DC population, for example, self-sufficient, receiving assistance, sick, or starving).
   E. Leadership (POCs).
   F. Unique problems and challenges with local community.

X. Observations. (General comments on traditions, customs, or taboos observed.)

Figure A-2. Sample rapid assessment format (continued)
Appendix B

Open-Source Research Techniques

Open-source research is a mission-essential task during the planning and the preparation for military operations. CAO and CMO planners use research techniques and tools to support writing of area studies and area assessments, developing CMO estimates, preparing for CR missions, and conducting CIM. In the course of research, planners use a variety of approaches to acquire information and collaborate with knowledgeable people. In some cases, open-source research requires CA personnel to develop partnerships with academic and commercial research centers to facilitate the collection and analysis of primary source data on areas or topics not found in current literature or knowledge. FMI 2-22.9, Open-Source Intelligence, contains additional information regarding open-source intelligence.

Although not the only tool, the Internet is an essential open-source research tool to acquire timely information about diverse operational environments. The Internet provides access to Web pages and databases that hold a wide range of cultural, political, military, and technological information. As depicted in Figure B-1, page B-2, and described in this appendix, personnel can use several basic techniques and procedures to accomplish Internet research of open sources.

PLAN RESEARCH

B-1. CAO and CMO planners use their understanding of the supported unit’s mission, the specific information requirements, and the Internet to plan, prepare, and execute their research. The specific information requirement helps the researcher determine what information to research and where to look for information sources. A good specific information requirement, like any well-thought-out research question, provides the objective and indicators that will provide the terminology the research uses to locate information sources and research information.

B-2. For example, if a unit is planning an FHA operation in the Sudan, the information requirement may be “Locate refugee concentrations in the Sudan.” The specific information requirements answer the questions:

- “Where are the humanitarian relief organizations operating food distribution centers in the Sudan?”
- “Where are the militia forces in the Sudan?”

B-3. The location of food and hostile paramilitary forces are two possible indicators of where refugees may or may not concentrate. Based on the mission and specific information requirements, the research objective is to locate refugee concentrations based on the position of food and militia forces in the Sudan. The indicators that provide the search terms are—

- Sudan.
- Refugee.
- Humanitarian relief.
- Food distribution.
- Water wells.

B-4. Once identified, the researcher records these search terms and uses them to identify information sources and locate information within the Internet.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Technique and Procedure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Plan Research** | • Use mission and specific information requirements to determine objective and search terms.  
• Write down all search terms.  
• Collaborate with other analysts to determine potential information sources.  
• Select the search tools and sources that will best satisfy the objective.  
• Comply with legal restrictions.  
• Determine operations and computer security measures. |
| **Conduct Search** | • Search by keywords.  
• Search in natural language. |
| **Refine Search** | • Compare the relevancy of the results to objective and indicators.  
• Compare the accuracy of the results to search parameters (keywords, phrase, date or date range, language, format, and so on).  
• Compare the results from different search engines to identify missing or incomplete information (for example, the results of one engine include news articles but another engine does not).  
• Modify the keywords.  
• Search within results.  
• Search by field.  
• Search cached and archived pages.  
• Truncate uniform resource locator (URL). |
| **Record Results** | • Record results.  
• Bookmark Web page.  
• Save content.  
• Download files.  
• Record citation.  
• Identify intellectual property. |
| **Assess Results** | • Evaluate source reliability.  
• Evaluate information accuracy. |
| **Identify Considerations** | • Searching the Internet can compromise OPSEC by leaving “footprints” on visited sites.  
• Visiting Internet sites can compromise computer security by downloading malicious software.  
• Search engines vary in how they search and how they display results.  
• Most search engines build and search only an index of Internet sites and files.  
• Search engines display results based on a relevancy formula that is subject to manipulation. |

**Figure B-1. Internet research techniques and procedures**

B-5. After determining the objective and indicators, the researcher uses an Internet browser to connect to a previously identified information source on a communications, database, or information site. If there are no previously identified sources, the researcher can connect to a communications or service site to collaborate with other analysts or use a search engine to identify information sources, respectively. Since search engines do not index the entire Internet, the communications capabilities of the Internet are important means of collaboration with authors, experts, POCs, and other people who know the information or have the information stored in off-line databases or hard copy.
LEGAL RESTRICTIONS

B-6. Information gathering must comply with Army Regulation (AR) 381-10, *U.S. Army Intelligence Activities*, concerning the collection, retention, and dissemination of information on U.S. persons. AR 381-10 provides the regulatory guidance and procedures that enable Army organizations “to carry out effectively their authorized functions while ensuring their activities that affect United States persons are carried out in a manner that protects the constitutional rights and privacy of such persons.” Other legal restrictions include compliance with international and federal laws governing the use of copyrighted, trademarked, patented, or other measures designed to preserve rights of an individual or organization. When uncertain, organizations should contact their supporting Judge Advocate General (JAG) office before publishing information containing copyrighted or similarly protected information.

INFORMATION SECURITY

B-7. The Internet is not a benign environment. The information and sites that a researcher seeks and visits can provide adversaries with indicators of military plans and operations. The interaction with Internet sites and information also provides adversaries and other malicious users with the means to track activities and attack the researcher’s workstation. The Internet researcher must be aware of these threats to take appropriate security measures to deny adversaries information about operations and protect the network from attack. Common threats to the researcher and the network include—

- **Espionage agent.** A hostile agent or malicious user uses e-mail, chat rooms, Web logs (blogs), and other communications means to subvert the Internet user, consciously or unconsciously.
- **Password hacking.** Accessing a workstation or network using a stolen password encrypted file and encryption program.
- **Viruses.** A computer virus injected into the workstation or networks either through accidental or contrived means that destroys information and disables the workstation.
- **Forged Internet Protocol address.** A forged Internet Protocol address of a trusted host used to gain connection with a workstation or network.
- **Sniffers.** A program that captures user names, passwords, and keywords.

B-8. The following are basic guidelines to prevent or limit the damage to the researcher’s mission, system, and information while using the Internet. The researcher—

- Uses the Open-Source Information System to provide a degree of anonymity while conducting Internet research.
- Adheres to organizational policies and procedures on visiting restricted or prohibited Internet sites (for example, pornographic, hate group, terrorist, or other unauthorized sites).
- Adheres to organizational procedures for downloading, scanning, installing, or opening files.
- Deletes immediately any suspicious e-mails (from both the inbox and the deleted-mail folder to permanently remove it).
- Scans e-mail attachments (particularly from unknown senders) with antivirus software before opening.
- Sets browser to reject all cookies or, as a minimum, provide a warning before downloading and installing cookies on the hard drive.
- Deletes periodically the temporary Internet files and history files.
- Backs up files regularly to reduce the amount of data lost should a virus infect the computer.
- Uses a stand-alone Internet workstation to prevent corruption of the organization’s primary LAN.

UNDERSTANDING SEARCH ENGINES

B-9. Estimates are that the Internet contains as many as 3 to 4 billion pages of information, with 7 million new pages added each day. With so many pages of seemingly random data, how does anyone find anything? Without some way to organize all this information, researchers could wander aimlessly for eons without finding what they are looking for. Fortunately for researchers, software engineers have developed tools to solve this problem. These tools are search engines.
B-10. Simply stated, a search engine is a tool that allows researchers to search text from billions of Web pages. Once the search engine discovers text matching the researcher’s query, it displays a brief description of the “hit” (a match to a text query) and a hyperlink that will take the researcher to that particular Web page. In addition to text query, some search engines have topic directories, prepared by people who spend their days surfing the net and categorizing information they find based on the topics covered. Some commercial, governmental, and NGOs employ their own people to perform this function, whereas others rely on contracting with one of several commercial companies who do this kind of work.

B-11. The researcher uses a search engine and planned search terms to locate information sources on the Internet and find information within the Internet site. Search engines allow the user to search for text and images in millions of Web pages. The different commercial and government search engines vary in what they search, how they search, and how they display results. Most search engines use programs called Web crawlers to build indexed databases. A Web crawler searches Internet sites and files and saves the results in a database. The search engine, therefore, is actually searching an indexed database not the content of the site or an online database. The search results also vary between search engines because each engine uses different Web crawlers and searches different sites. Most engines display search results in order of relevancy with a brief description and a hyperlink to the referenced Internet file or site. Understanding how search engines work, the researcher—

- Conducts an initial search using unique keywords or keyword combinations and, if possible, multiple search engines.
- Evaluates the relevance and accuracy of the search results to research objective, indicators, and search parameters. Do not rely on the relevancy formula of the search engine, particularly commercial search engines, to list the most relevant information source at the top of the list.
- Conducts follow-on searches using refined terms and methods. Refining terms includes inverting the word order, changing the case, correcting spelling, and adjusting search terms. Refining search methods includes searching within results that are similar to the desired information.

INDEX DATABASES

B-12. Search engines have a database built by a Web crawler. The Web crawler, or spider, is a different application than the search engine. The crawler is like some voracious monster with an insatiable appetite. It roams the Internet 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, searching for information. Once it finds a Web site, it then indexes and saves it in a database relevant to the search engine. Some search engines have their own spiders but others use commercial contracted spider programs to develop their databases. In addition, each spider may use a different approach to acquiring data. One spider may be programmed to research only the titles of Web pages and the first few lines of text. Other spiders research virtually the entire Web site with the exception of graphics or video files. Because search engines may use different Web crawler software with different ways to index and save data, each separate search engine may yield different results. Also, the search engine provider can supplement or alter the spider software’s index to ensure the Web site of a specific customer appears in the index. Examples of these are when a Webmaster—

- Submits information directly to the search engine company.
- Pays a “paid inclusion services” fee to have their sites in the inclusion process.
- Pays a “pay-for-placement” fee to guarantee priority in search engine placement.

RELEVANCY FORMULAS

B-13. The relevancy formula is how well the researcher’s query results match the researcher’s request. For Web pages that are commercially oriented, designing the page to achieve the highest ranking has become an art form. For some search engines, the process is simple—the higher the bid, the higher the site’s ranking. Search engines are continually changing their relevancy formulas to try to stay ahead of Web developers. Some Web designers, however, load their sites with words such as “free,” “money,” or “sex” in an attempt to influence the relevancy formula of the search engine. Other Web designers engage in practices called “spamdexing” or “spoofing” in an attempt to trick the search engine.
B-14. The significance of the relevancy formulas to the researcher is the importance of understanding that the keyword the researcher uses in the search does not necessarily yield the same results with every search engine. This becomes obvious when researchers consider that the relevancy formulas vary from search engine to search engine, and that they are in a constant state of evolution. In some formulas, the placement of the keywords yields different results if rearranged because the search engine’s relevancy formula places more emphasis on the first words in the search string. Relevancy formulas may also assume importance depending on the type of search the researcher conducts. For instance, a field search, which is limited to the Web page itself (for example, title, URL, and date) may be more critical than a full-text search.

META-SEARCH ENGINES

B-15. As search engines have evolved, some engines have become known for their ability to find specific types of information such as statistical, financial, and news more effectively then other engines. To overcome this specialization, software engineers developed the meta-search engine. The meta-search engine allows the user to query more than one search engine at a time. On the surface, this would seem to be the final answer to the search question; just query all search engines at one time. Unfortunately, it is not quite that easy. Since the meta-search engine must be designed to work with all the search engines that it queries, it must strip out each search parameter to the lowest common denominator of each search engine used. For example, if a particular search engine cannot accommodate phrases in quotation marks or a type of Boolean function, then the meta-search engine will eliminate that function from the search. The resulting search, in many instances, then becomes too broad and less useful than a well-formatted search using a search engine that the user is familiar with and that is known to be good at locating the type of information required.

CONDUCT SEARCH

B-16. Researchers should avoid the temptation to use one favorite search engine to the exclusion of others. Each search engine has its strengths and weaknesses. Organizational standards, research experience, and peer recommendations guide the selection of which search engine to use in any particular situation.

B-17. Generally, a thorough search often requires the use of more than one search engine and, even then, the information may not be complete. As a rule of thumb, if a trained researcher cannot find the information using multiple search engines and common search techniques within 30 minutes, it is possible that the information is not on the Internet, not indexed, or not in a retrievable format. At that point, the researcher must consider alternative, non-Internet information sources such as other humans, brick-and-mortar libraries, and direct observation.

SEARCH BY KEYWORD

B-18. In keyword-based searches, the researcher should consider what keywords are unique to the information being sought. The researcher needs to determine enough keywords to yield relevant results but not so many as to overwhelm the researcher with a mixture of relevant and irrelevant information. The researcher should also avoid such common words as the articles “a,” “an,” “and,” and “the,” unless those words are part of a title of a book or article. Most search engines ignore common words. For example, if looking for information about Russian and Chinese tank sales to Iraq, the researcher should not use tank as the only keyword in the search. Instead, the researcher should use additional defining words such as “Russian Chinese tank sales Iraq.”

B-19. In some search engines, Boolean and math logic operators help the researcher establish relationships between keywords that improve the search. Using the operators listed in Table B-1, page B-6, the search engine searches for Russian and tank together when the researcher places the words within parentheses; for example, “(Russian tank)”. If the researcher wants to exclude Chinese tank sales from the search result then he uses “(Russian tank) NOT (Chinese tank)” in the search. The researcher can also use a “NEAR” search when the relationship and the distance between the terms are well established. For example, if the researcher is searching news articles for incidents of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks near Ramadi, he can define his search to locate incidents of the word “IED” within five words of the word “Ramadi.” He would, for example, enter “IED NEAR/5 Ramadi” in the search field.
### Table B-1. Boolean and math logic operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Boolean</th>
<th>Math</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Must be present*</td>
<td>AND</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>chemical AND weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>chemical + weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must not be present</td>
<td>NOT</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Africa NOT Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Africa – Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May be present</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>not applicable</td>
<td>chemical OR biological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete phrase</td>
<td>“”</td>
<td>“”</td>
<td>“Chinese tank sales to Iraq”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nested</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>not applicable</td>
<td>(Shining Path)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near**</td>
<td>NEAR</td>
<td>not applicable</td>
<td>“White House” NEAR “airspace incursion”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wild cards</td>
<td>word* or *word</td>
<td>not applicable</td>
<td>gun* (gunpowder, gunsight, and so on)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop words***</td>
<td>“” “”</td>
<td>not applicable</td>
<td>““OR”” (do not ignore OR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

* In some search engines, the default is AND. In this case, you will have to use the OR operator or the equivalent option on a pull down menu.

** Some engines use ten words as the distance between NEAR words. A forward slash and a number indicate the distance between the terms.

*** Stop words are words that search engines ignore because they are too common or are reserved for a special operation. There is no uniform list, but they include words such as an, any, to, with, from, and so on. They also include the standard Boolean operators AND, NOT, NEAR, and OR.

### SEARCH IN NATURAL LANGUAGE

B-20. An alternative to using a keyword search is the natural language question format. Most of the major search engines allow this capability. The researcher obtains the best results when the question contains good keywords. One of the major downsides to this technique is the large number of results. If the researcher does not find the needed information in the first few pages, he should initiate a new search using different parameters.

### REFINE SEARCH

B-21. Normally, the first few pages of search results are the most relevant. Based on these pages, the researcher evaluates the initial and follow-on search results to determine if the results satisfy the objective or requires additional searches. During evaluation, the researcher—

- Compares the relevancy of the results to the objective and indicators.
- Compares the accuracy of the results to search parameters (keywords, phrase, date or date range, language, format, and so on).
- Compares the results from different search engines to identify missing or incomplete information (for example, the results from one search engine include news articles but another engine does not).

### MODIFY THE KEYWORD

B-22. If initial search attempts are unsatisfactory, the researcher can refine the search by changing—

- **Order.** Search engines may place a higher value or more weight on the first word or words in a multiple word or phrase search string. Changing the word order from “insurgents Iraq” to “Iraq insurgents” may yield different search results.
- **Spelling.** Search engines attempt to match the exact spelling of the words in the search string. There are search engines that do recognize alternate spellings or prompt the user to correct common misspellings. Changing the spelling of a word from the American-English “center” to
the British-English “centre” may yield different results. Changing the spelling of a transliterated name from “Al-Qaeda” to “al-Qaida,” “al-Qa'ida,” “el-Qaida,” or “al Qaeda” generates different results that may be useful, depending upon the objective of the search.

- **Case.** Search engines may or may not support case-sensitive searches. Like spelling, some engines attempt to match the word exactly as entered in the search. The researcher should use all lowercase letters for most searches. When looking for a person’s name, a geographical location, a title, or other normally capitalized words, the researcher should use a case-sensitive search engine. Changing the case of a word from “java” to “Java” changes the search result from sites about coffee to sites about a software program.

- **Variants.** Researchers use terms that are common to their language, culture, or geographic area. Using variants of the keyword such as changing “policeman” to “cop,” “bobby,” “gendarme,” “carabiniere,” “policía,” “polizei,” or other form may improve search results.

**SEARCH WITHIN RESULTS**

B-23. If the initial or follow-on search produces good but still insufficient results, the researcher can search within these results to drill down to the Web page that have a high probability of matching the search string and containing the desired information. Most of the popular search engines make this easy by displaying a phrase such as “search within these results” or “similar pages” that the researcher can select. Selecting the notice takes the researcher to Web pages with potentially relevant information.

**SEARCH BY FIELD**

B-24. In a field search, the researcher looks for the keywords within the URL as opposed to searching the entire Internet. The best time to use a field search is when the search engine returned a large number of Web pages. Although capabilities vary by search engine, some of the common field search operators are:

- **Anchor.** Searches for Web pages with a specified hyperlink.
- **Domain.** Searches for specific domains (see Figure B-2, page B-8, or visit http://www.iana.org).
- **Like.** Searches for Web pages similar or related in some way to a specified URL.
- **Link.** Searches for a specific hyperlink embedded in a Web page.
- **Text.** Searches for specific text in the body of a Web page.
- **URL.** Searches for specific text in complete Web addresses.

**SEARCH IN CACHE AND ARCHIVE**

B-25. Sometimes a search or an attempt to search with results returns a URL that matches exactly the search objective, but when the researcher tries to link to the site, the link or the site is no longer active. If the search engine captures data and the URL, the researcher can select the “cached” link to access the original data. Another technique is to search an Internet archive site such as http://www.archive.org for the content. The researcher needs to be aware that this information is historical and not subject to update by the original creators.

**TRUNCATE THE UNIFORM RESOURCE LOCATOR**

B-26. In addition to using the search engine to search within results, the researcher can also manually search within the results by truncating the URL to a Web page. The researcher works backward from the original search result to the Web page or home page containing the desired information or database by deleting the end segments of the URL at the forward slash. This technique requires a basic understanding of how Web page designers structure a Web page.
## Figure B-2. Top-level domains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Operator or Sponsor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.aero</td>
<td>Reserved for members of the air-transport industry.</td>
<td>Société Internationale de Télécommunications Aéronautiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.biz</td>
<td>Restricted to business.</td>
<td>NeuLevel, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.com</td>
<td>Unrestricted top-level domain intended for commercial content.</td>
<td>VeriSign Global Registry Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.coop</td>
<td>Reserved for cooperative associations.</td>
<td>Dot Cooperation LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.edu</td>
<td>Reserved for postsecondary institutions accredited by an agency on the U.S. Department of Education’s list of Nationally Recognized Accrediting Agencies.</td>
<td>Educause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.gov</td>
<td>Reserved exclusively for the USG.</td>
<td>U.S. General Services Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.info</td>
<td>Unrestricted top-level domain.</td>
<td>Afilias Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.int</td>
<td>Used only for registering organizations established by international treaties between governments.</td>
<td>Internet Assigned Number Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.jobs</td>
<td>Reserved for human resource managers.</td>
<td>Dot Cooperation LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.mil</td>
<td>Reserved exclusively for the U.S. military.</td>
<td>U.S. DOD Network Information Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.museum</td>
<td>Reserved for museums.</td>
<td>Museum Domain Management Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.name</td>
<td>Reserved for individuals.</td>
<td>Global Name Registry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.net</td>
<td>Originally for network infrastructures, now unrestricted.</td>
<td>VeriSign Global Registry Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.org</td>
<td>Intended for noncommercial use but open to all communities.</td>
<td>Public Interest Registry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.pro</td>
<td>Restricted to credentialed professionals and related entities.</td>
<td>RegistryPro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Country code domain names are available at [http://www.iana.org](http://www.iana.org).

**Source:** Internet Assigned Number Authority at [http://www.iana.org](http://www.iana.org)

### RECORD RESULTS

B-27. The researcher must save the search results that satisfy the research objective. Saving the results enables the researcher to locate the information later and properly cite the source of the information in intelligence reports and databases. Although printing a hard copy is an option, a soft-copy, electronic record of the search results provides a more portable and versatile record. Also, some researchers have software tools specifically designed for creating a complete record of the Web page content and metadata. Some basic techniques for saving an electronic record of the search results are—

- **Bookmark.** Bookmark the link to the Web page using the “bookmarks” or “favorites” option on the Internet browser.
- **Save content.** Save all or a portion of the Web page content by copying and pasting the information in text document or other electronic format such as a field within a database form. The naming convention for the soft-copy record should be consistent with unit electronic file management standards. As a minimum, the record should include the URL and retrieval date within the file.
- **Download files.** Download audio, image, text, video, and other files to the workstation. The naming convention for the soft-copy record should be consistent with unit electronic file management standards.
**Save Web page.** Save the Web page by using the “save as” option in the Internet browser and the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension Hypertext Markup Language (MHTML) file type, which creates a Web archive with the “.mht” extension. This creates a complete, stable record of the entire Web page. It may be necessary to include the date and time in the file name to ensure a complete citation for the information.

**Record source.** As a minimum, record the author or organization, title, publication or posting date, retrieval date, and URL of the information in a citation format that is consistent with the American Psychological Association and Modern Language Association style manuals. The following is an example of an American Psychological Association citation for an Internet document: BBC News (2005). *Sudan: A Nation Divided*. Retrieved 16 May 2005 from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/africa/2004/sudan/default.stm.

**Identify intellectual property.** Identify intellectual property that an author or an organization which has preserved rights to by copyrighting, trademarking, patenting, or other measures. Some Web pages list the points of contact and terms of use information at the bottom of the Web page. When uncertain, organizations should contact their supporting JAG office before publishing information containing copyrighted or similarly protected information.

**ASSESS RESULTS**

B-28. Deception and bias are of particular concern in open-source research. Internet information is often from a secondary source of information. Secondary sources such as government press offices, commercial news organizations, and private blog sites can intentionally or unintentionally add, delete, modify, or otherwise filter the information they make available to the public. It is very important to assess the reliability of information sources to distinguish objective, factual information from information that lacks merit, contains bias, or is part of an effort to deceive the reader.

B-29. The researcher can evaluate the reliability of the information source based on previous research results and background information about the source. Reliability ratings range from A (reliable) to F (cannot be judged) as shown in Figure B-3. If this is a new information source, the researcher rates the source as F (cannot be judged). An F rating does not necessarily mean the source is unreliable, but that the researcher has no previous experience with the source upon which to base a determination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Reliable</td>
<td>No doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of complete reliability; usually demonstrates adherence to known professional standards and verification processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Usually Reliable</td>
<td>Minor doubt about authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency; has a history of valid information most of the time; may not have a history of adherence to professionally accepted standards but generally identifies what is known about sources feeding any broadcast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Fairly Reliable</td>
<td>Doubt of authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency but has provided valid information in the past.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Not Usually Reliable</td>
<td>Significant doubt about authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency but has provided valid information in the past.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Unreliable</td>
<td>Lacking in authenticity, trustworthiness, and competency; history of invalid information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Cannot be Judged</td>
<td>No basis exists for evaluating the reliability of the source.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure B-3. Source reliability*
B-30. The researcher can also evaluate the accuracy of the recorded information based on previous reporting from that source and information from other sources. Accuracy ratings range from 1 (confirmed) to 6 (cannot be judged) as shown in Figure B-4. If this is new information, the researcher rates the content as F (cannot be judged). An F rating does not necessarily mean the document is inaccurate but that the team has no means of verifying the information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; consistent with other information on the subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Probably True</td>
<td>Not confirmed; logical in itself; consistent with other information on the subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Possibly True</td>
<td>Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; agrees with some other information on the subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Doubtfully True</td>
<td>Not confirmed; possible but not logical; no other information on the subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Improbable</td>
<td>Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicted by other information on the subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cannot be Judged</td>
<td>No basis exists for evaluating the validity of the information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure B-4. Information accuracy
Appendix C

Use of Interpreters

Most U.S. military operations are conducted on foreign soil. Consequently, there are occasions when CA Soldiers will lack the linguistic ability to communicate effectively with the local populace in the AO. Therefore, the proper use and supervision of interpreters can play a decisive role in the mission.

CIVIL AFFAIRS LINGUISTIC CAPABILITIES

C-1. Theater-oriented linguistic capabilities enhance the effectiveness of CA Soldiers. CA organizations attempt to achieve limited basic language skills aligned with their GCC’s priorities. Ideally, USAR CA units will recruit individuals with a combination of civilian technical expertise, military education, and appropriate language skills. In practice, however, adequate language skills are difficult to attain and maintain. Thus, during most operations, contracted interpreters-translators provide required language skills.

Note. Active Army Soldiers receive formal language training as a part of their overall qualification training program prior to assignment to a CA unit.

INTERPRETER SELECTION

C-2. Whenever possible, interpreters should be U.S. military personnel or at least U.S. citizens. In some operational or training settings abroad, CA Soldiers will not need to select an interpreter; the chain of command or host government will assign one. In other cases, CA Soldiers choose interpreters from a pool provided by the host government. Finally, in many operational situations, CA Soldiers use interpreters hired from the general HN population. Whatever the case, the following guidelines are critical to mission accomplishment.

C-3. Interpreters should be selected according to the following criteria:

- **Native speaker.** Interpreters should be native speakers of the socially or geographically determined dialect. Their speech, background, and mannerisms should be completely acceptable to the target audience so that their audience pays no attention to the way the interpreter talks, only to what the interpreter says.

- **Social status.** In some situations and cultures, interpreters may be limited in their effectiveness with a target audience if their social standing is considerably lower than that of the audience. This may include significant differences in military rank or membership in an ethnic or religious group. Regardless of the CA Soldier’s personal feelings on social status, he should remember the job is to accomplish the mission, not to act as an agent for social reform in a faraway land. The CA Soldier should accept local prejudices as a fact of life.

- **English fluency.** An often-overlooked consideration is how well the interpreter speaks English. As a rule, if the interpreter understands the CA Soldier and the CA Soldier understands the interpreter, then the interpreter’s command of English should be satisfactory. The CA Soldier can check that “understanding” by asking the interpreter to paraphrase, in English, something the CA Soldier said. The CA Soldier then restates the interpreter’s comments to ensure that both persons are synchronized. Also, interpreting goes both ways. The interpreter must be able to convey the information expressed by the interviewee or target audience.

- **Intellectual intelligence.** The interpreter should be quick, alert, and responsive to changing conditions and situations. He must be able to grasp complex concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence. Although education does not equate to intelligence,
Appendix C

generally speaking, the better educated the interpreter, the better he will perform due to increased exposure to diverse concepts.

- **Technical ability.** In certain situations, the CA Soldier may need an interpreter with technical training or experience in special subject areas to translate the “meaning” and the “words.” For instance, if the subject is very technical or specialized, with terms such as nuclear physics, background knowledge will be useful.

- **Reliability.** The CA Soldier should beware the potential interpreter who arrives late for the interview. Throughout the world, the concept of time varies widely. In many less-developed countries, time is relatively unimportant. The CA Soldier should make sure that the interpreter understands the military’s preoccupation with punctuality.

- **Loyalty.** If the interpreter used is a local national, it is safe to assume that his first loyalty is to the HN or subgroup, and not to the U.S. military. The security implications are clear. The CA Soldier must be very cautious in how he explains concepts to give interpreters a greater depth of understanding. Additionally, some interpreters, for political or personal reasons, may have ulterior motives or a hidden agenda when they apply for the interpreting job. If the CA Soldier detects or suspects such motives, he should tell his commander, S-2, or security manager. The CA Soldier should be aware of and monitor these motives with all interpreters.

- **Gender, age, and race.** Gender, age, and race have the potential to seriously affect the mission. One example is the status of females in Muslim society. In predominantly Muslim countries, cultural prohibitions may render a female interpreter ineffective under certain circumstances. Another example would be the Balkans, where the ethnic divisions may limit the effectiveness of an interpreter from outside the target audience’s group. Since traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, it is important to check with the in-country assets or area studies for specific taboos or favorable characteristics.

- **Compatibility.** The CA Soldier and the interpreter will work as a team. For the interpreter to be most effective, he should become a psychic extension of the CA Soldier. The target audience will be quick to recognize personality conflicts between the CA Soldier and the interpreter. These conflicts can undermine the effectiveness of the communication effort. If possible, when selecting an interpreter, the CA Soldier should look for compatible traits and strive for a harmonious working relationship.

C-4. If several qualified interpreters are available, the CA Soldier should select at least two. This practice is of particular importance if the interpreter works during long conferences or courses of instruction. The exhausting nature of these type jobs makes about four hours of active interpreting about the maximum for peak efficiency. Whatever the mission, with two or more interpreters, one can provide quality control and assistance to the active interpreter. Additionally, this technique can be useful when conducting coordination or negotiation meetings as one interpreter works in an active role and the other pays attention to the body language and side conversations of the others present. Many times, the CA Soldier will gain important side information that assists in negotiations from listening to what others are saying among themselves outside of the main discussion.

**POPULATION ANALYSIS**

C-5. Implied throughout the preceding points is the need for a careful analysis of the target population. This type of analysis goes beyond the scope of this lesson. Mature judgment, thoughtful consideration of the audience as individual human beings, and a genuine concern for their receiving accurate information will go a long way toward accomplishing the mission. The CA Soldier must remember that the individual from a farm or small village is going to have markedly different expectations than the jet-setting polo player.

**EVALUATION CRITERIA**

C-6. As mentioned, it is safe to assume that if the interpreter is not U.S. military or at least a U.S. citizen, his first loyalty will be to his country or subgroup and not to the United States. The CA Soldier must be cautious about what information he gives his interpreter. The CA Soldier must always keep in mind possible security issues. Certain tactical situations may require the use of uncleared indigenous personnel
as “field expedient” interpreters. Commanders should be aware of the increased security risk involved in using such personnel and carefully weigh the risk versus the potential gain. If uncleared interpreters are used, the CA Soldier should keep any sensitive information to a minimum. The interpreters must be honest and free from unfavorable notoriety among the local inhabitants. Their reputation or standing in the community should be such that persons of higher rank and standing will not intimidate them.

**RAPPORT ESTABLISHMENT**

C-7. The interpreter is a vital link to the target audience. Without a cooperative, supportive interpreter, the mission could be in serious jeopardy. Mutual respect and understanding is essential to effective teamwork. The CA Soldier must establish rapport early in the relationship and maintain rapport throughout the joint effort. The difficulty of establishing rapport stems most of the time from a lack of personal contact.

C-8. The CA Soldier begins the process of establishing rapport before he meets the interpreter for the first time. Most foreigners are reasonably knowledgeable about the United States. The CA Soldier should obtain some basic facts about the HN. Useful information may include population, geography, ethnic groups, political system, prominent political figures, monetary system, business, agriculture, and exports. A recent almanac or encyclopedia is a source for a good general outline. More detailed information is available in the Area Handbook for the country and current newspapers and magazines, such as *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News and World Report*.

C-9. The CA Soldier should find out about the interpreter’s background. The Soldier should show a genuine concern for the interpreter’s family, aspirations, career, education, and so on. Many cultures outside the United States place a greater emphasis on family over career, so the Soldier should start with understanding the interpreter’s home life. The CA Soldier should also research cultural traditions to find out more about the interpreter and the nation in which the Soldier will be working. Although the Soldier should gain as much information on culture as possible before entering an HN, his interpreter can be a valuable source to fill gaps. Showing interest is also a good way to build rapport.

C-10. The CA Soldier should gain the interpreter’s trust and confidence before embarking on sensitive issues, such as religion, likes, dislikes, and prejudices. The Soldier should approach these areas carefully and tactfully. Although deeply personal beliefs may be very revealing and useful in the professional relationship, the CA Soldier must gently and tactfully draw these out of his interpreter.

**ORIENTATION**

C-11. Early in the relationship with interpreters, the CA Soldiers should ensure that interpreters are briefed on their duties and responsibilities. The Soldiers should orient the interpreters as to the nature of their duties, standards of conduct expected, techniques of interview to be used, and any other requirements necessary. The orientation may include the following:

- Current tactical situation.
- Background information obtained on the source, interviewee, or target audience.
- Specific objectives for interview, meeting, or interrogation.
- Method of interpretation to be used:
  - Simultaneous—when the interpreter listens and translates at the same time.
  - Alternate—when the interpreter listens to an entire phrase, sentence, or paragraph, then translates during natural pauses.
- Conduct of the interview, lesson, or interrogation.
- Need for interpreters to avoid injecting their own personality, ideas, or questions into the interview.
- Need for interpreter to inform interviewer (CA Soldier) of inconsistencies in language used by interviewee. An example would be someone who claims to be a college professor, yet speaks like an uneducated person. During interrogations or interviews, this information will be used as part of the assessment of the information obtained from the individual.
- Physical arrangements of the site, if applicable.
- Possible need for interpreter to assist in after action reviews or assessments.
INTERPRETER TRAINING

C-12. As part of the initial training with the interpreter, the CA Soldier should tactfully convey that the instructor, interviewer, or interrogator (CA Soldier) must always direct the interview or lesson. The Soldier should put the interpreter’s role in proper perspective and stress the interpreter’s importance as a vital communication link between the Soldier and the target audience. The CA Soldier should appeal to the interpreter’s professional pride by clearly describing how the quality and quantity of the information sent and received is directly dependent upon the interpreter’s skills. Also, the CA Soldier should mention how the interpreter functions solely as a conduit between the Soldier and the subject.

C-13. The CA Soldier must be aware that some interpreters, because of cultural differences, may attempt to “save face” by purposely concealing their lack of understanding. They may attempt to translate what they think the CA Soldier said or meant without asking for a clarification or vice versa. Because this can result in misinformation and confusion and impact on credibility, the CA Soldier should let the interpreter know that, when in doubt, he should always ask for clarification. The Soldier should foster this understanding as early in the relationship as possible.

C-14. Other points for the CA Soldier to cover while orienting and training the interpreter are as follows:

- Importance of the training, interview, or interrogation.
- Specific objectives of the training, interview or interrogation, if any.
- Outline of lesson or interview questions, if applicable.
- Background information on the interviewee or target audience.
- Briefing, training, or interview schedules. It may take double or triple the amount of time needed when using an interpreter to convey the same information. For that reason, the interpreter may be helpful in scheduling enough time.
- Copy of the briefing, questions, or lesson plan, if applicable. Special attention should be given to develop language proficiency in the technical fields in which the interpreters are expected to be employed. In general, this will give the interpreter time to look up unfamiliar words or ask questions to clarify anything confusing.
- Copies of handout material, if applicable.
- General background information on subject.
- Glossary of terms, if applicable.

INTERVIEW PREPARATION

C-15. The CA Soldier selects an appropriate site for the interview. He positions and arranges the physical setup of the area. When conducting interviews with very important persons (VIPs) or individuals from different cultures, this arrangement can be significant.

C-16. The CA Soldier instructs the interpreters to mirror the Soldier’s tone and personality of speech. The Soldier instructs the interpreters not to interject their own questions or personality. He also instructs the interpreters to inform him if they notice any inconsistencies or peculiarities from sources.

INTERVIEW CONDUCT

C-17. Whether conducting an interview or presenting a lesson, the CA Soldier should avoid simultaneous translations; that is, both the Soldier and the interpreter talking at the same time. The Soldier should speak for a minute or less in a neutral, relaxed manner, directly to the individual or audience. The interpreter should watch the Soldier carefully and, during the translation, mimic the Soldier’s body language as well as interpret his verbal meaning. The CA Soldier should observe the interpreter closely to detect any inconsistencies between the interpreter’s and CA Soldier’s manners. The Soldier must be aware not to force the interpreter into literal translation by being too brief. The Soldier should present one major thought in its entirety and allow the interpreter to reconstruct it in his language and culture.

C-18. Although the interpreter will be doing some editing as a function of the interpreting process, it is imperative that he transmit the exact meaning without additions or deletions. As previously mentioned, the
CA Soldier should insist that the interpreter always ask for clarification, prior to interpreting, whenever not absolutely certain of the Soldier’s meaning. However, the Soldier should be aware that a good interpreter, especially if he is local, can be invaluable in translating subtleties and hidden meanings.

C-19. During an interview or lesson, if the audience asks questions, the interpreter should immediately relay them to the CA Soldier for an answer. The interpreter should never try to answer a question, even though he may know the correct answer. Additionally, neither the Soldier nor interpreter should correct the other in front of an interviewee or class. They should settle all differences away from the subject or audience.

C-20. Just as establishing rapport with the interpreter is vitally important, establishing rapport with interview subjects or the target audience is equally important. The CA Soldier and the interpreter should concentrate on rapport. To establish critical rapport, the CA Soldier should treat the subjects or audiences as mature, important human beings that are capable and worthy.

COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES

C-21. An important first step for the CA Soldier in communicating in a foreign language is to polish his English language skills. This is true even if the CA Soldier does not try to learn the indigenous language. The clearer the Soldier speaks in English, including diction, the easier it is for the interpreter to translate. Other factors to consider include use of profanity, slang, jargon, and colloquialisms. In many cases, translators cannot translate such expressions. Even those the translator can translate do not always retain the desired meaning. In addition, if the interpreter must translate a technical term or expression, the CA Soldier must be sure the interpreter conveys the proper meaning in the target language. The Soldier should speak in low context and simple sentences. For instance, he may want to add words usually left off such as “air” plane. This ensures the meaning will be obvious and he is not talking about the Great Plains or a wood plane.

C-22. When the Soldier is speaking extemporaneously, he must think about what he wants to say. He should break it down into logical bits. He should give it out a small piece at a time using short, simple words and sentences and low context. The interpreter can then quickly and easily translate. As a rule of thumb, the CA Soldier should never say more in one sentence than he can easily repeat word for word immediately after saying it. Each sentence should contain a complete thought without verbiage.

TRANSITIONAL PHRASES AND QUALIFIERS

C-23. These tend to confuse and waste valuable time. Examples are “for example,” “in most cases,” “maybe,” and “perhaps.” The Soldier should be cautious of using American humor. Cultural and language differences can lead to misinterpretations by foreigners. The Soldier should determine early on what the interpreter finds easiest to understand and translate meaningfully. In summary, the CA Soldier should—

- Keep the entire presentation as simple as possible.
- Use short sentences and simple words (low context).
- Avoid idiomatic English.
- Avoid flowery language.
- Avoid slang, jargon, and colloquial expressions.

C-24. Whenever possible, the Soldier should identify any cultural restrictions before interviewing, instructing, or conferring with particular foreign nationals. For instance, when is it proper to stand, sit, or cross one’s legs? Gestures, being learned behavior, vary from culture to culture. The interpreter should be able to relate a number of these cultural restrictions, which, whenever possible, the interpreter observes while working with the particular group or individual.

DOS AND DON’TS

C-25. The following are some dos and don’ts for the CA Soldier to consider while working with an interpreter. The CA Soldier should—

- Position the interpreter by his side (or even a step back). This method will keep the subject or audience from shifting their attention, or fixating on the interpreter and not on the Soldier.
Always look at and talk directly to the subject or audience; guard against the tendency to talk to the interpreter.

Speak slowly and clearly; repeat as often as necessary.

Speak to the individual or group as if they understand English. The Soldier should be enthusiastic and employ the gestures, movements, and voice intonations and inflections that he would normally use before an English-speaking group. The Soldier can convey considerable nonverbal meaning through voice and body movements. The Soldier should encourage the interpreter to mimic the same delivery.

Periodically check the interpreter’s accuracy, consistency, and clarity. Another American, fluent enough in the language, should sit in on a lesson or interview. This should ensure that the interpreter has not distorted, intentionally or unintentionally, the translation. Another way to be sure is for the Soldier to learn the target language so he can check the interpreter’s loyalty and honesty.

Check with the audience whenever he suspects misunderstandings and clarify them immediately. Using the interpreter, the Soldier should ask questions to elicit answers that will tell whether the point is clear. If it is not clear, he should rephrase the instruction differently and illustrate the point again. The Soldier should use repetition and examples whenever necessary to facilitate learning. If the class asks few questions, it may mean the instruction is “over the heads” of the audience, or the message is not clear to the audience.

Make the interpreter feel like a valuable member of the team; give the interpreter recognition commensurate with the importance of his contribution.

C-26. The CA Soldier should not—

Address the subject or audience in the third person through the interpreter. The Soldier should avoid saying “tell them I’m glad to be their instructor,” but rather should say, “I’m glad to be your instructor.” He should address the subject or audience directly.

Make side comments to the interpreter, since the interpreter is not expected to translate them. This tends to create the wrong atmosphere for communication.

Be a distraction while the interpreter is translating and the subject or audience is listening. The Soldier should not pace the floor, write on the blackboard, teeter on the lectern, drink beverages, or carry on any other distracting activity while the interpreter is actually translating.
Appendix D

Negotiation and Mediation

This appendix discusses negotiation and mediation from the perspective of mediating between former belligerents in a postconflict environment. The following guidelines are not all-inclusive or exclusive. Since mediation is the preferred method for conducting bilateral or multilateral talks, these guidelines were written mainly to facilitate mediation. However, the principles contained below should also apply in those cases where the CA Soldier is serving as a negotiator or arbitrator.

OVERVIEW

D-1. The mediation process, like the interview process, consists of three distinct phases: the preparatory phase, the meeting phase, and the postmeeting phase. Unlike the interview process, which is normally a one-time event, the three phases are repeated before each mediation event.

PREPARATORY PHASE

D-2. This phase includes determining where the mediation should take place, as well as doing research to understand what factors are involved so that a successful outcome of the mediation process will result. The following paragraphs discuss these actions.

ENVIRONMENT

D-3. When setting the environment, the mediator considers the physical meeting place and the individual or group requirements of the parties present at the mediation. The mediator should consider preferences among the representatives for a specific time or location. However, a safe, quick route equidistant for as many of the involved parties as possible should be the priority. All parties must feel secure and comfortable while at the mediation site. Shelter, water, food, light, telephone and communications assets, restrooms, paper and pens, chairs and tables, and any other requisite supplies should be readily available.

SITUATION RESEARCH

D-4. Preparation, as in any military operation, is the key to a successful mediation. The mediator must know the factual situation and the nuances that the local representatives will apply to the facts. The condition of local factories, level of education, age of the populace, amount of farming versus manufacturing, and lines of communications (roads, telephones, water, and so on) are but a part of the overall situation. Also critical are political inclination before and after the conflict, economic ties outside the country, and the ideologies of internal and external pressure groups seeking cooperation or disharmony.

D-5. The mediator must be fully aware of the resources he can exploit to reach an agreement. He must know about all possible resources, not only from the organization that he represents but also from other international, nongovernmental, or private groups operating in the theater.

D-6. The mediator should also know which requirements of the local populace he could leverage to increase pressure on the local representatives to comply with efforts to enhance stability and peace. For example, there may exist in the AO factories that are missing an easily procured part or farmland that could productively grow an alternate crop. Although this knowledge does not directly lead to an agreement, an effort by the mediator to obtain the missing part or an alternate crop source could nudge a party toward cooperation.
D-7. The local slant on the facts will vary by person, village, county, and nation. Mediators must know what each party can and will concede, and ensure that a balance is achieved.

D-8. The mediator must know as much as possible about the parties that are directly and indirectly involved in the mediation. There will be personalities and pressures from behind the scenes that can affect the willingness of the local representative to support an agreement. Mediators must know the ability of the people present at the table to effectively comply with any agreement that they sign. Frustration and distrust are hard to overcome when an unseen person derails an agreement made in good faith.

D-9. The mediator must also know if the local representative can sign an agreement and expect the support of the populace. If popular support is not forthcoming, any momentum toward stability will be lost. Finally, the mediator must know which international parties have an influence on, as well as an interest in, the topics of the mediation. The mediator should ensure that the goals of the mediation are not at odds with those of a member of the international community.

D-10. When using an interpreter, the mediator must also be mindful of the interpreter’s personal bias filter. To ensure the integrity and accuracy of interpreters, the mediator should arrange for a routine check of the interpreters. If the interpreter works directly for the mediator, the mediator arranges the check; if the interpreter is from a pool of interpreters, the mediator arranges a check with the interpreter’s supervisor. Before key meetings, the mediator should brief the interpreters to ensure the interpreters understand new or difficult ideas and explain uncommon words and their definitions.

D-11. When hiring interpreters, mediators must consider many factors. Local interpreters tend to be the most fluent and have a better command of dialects but will be more likely to have more pronounced biases, based upon their personal experiences and loyalties to particular ethnic or religious groups. American interpreters have a lower tendency to have personal biases, either for or against a party, but their command of local dialects may not equal that of a native speaker. If possible, mediators should use interpreters in tandem to ensure accuracy and reliability, and to reduce the effects of personal bias.

D-12. One of the most difficult challenges facing a mediator is ensuring that all parties are represented. In some cases, portions of the populace will be either underrepresented or not represented at all. The mediator must know the demographics of the region to integrate all potential interested parties into the process. Failure to do so will lessen overall support for stability and may actually lay the foundation for future controversy where the United States is cited as a biased entity.

MEETING PHASE

D-13. Effective communication is essential to maintain successful negotiations. This will often take place within meetings. Meetings may be informal and spontaneous or may be routine. However, CA Soldiers must carefully think out and plan the briefing.

BEFORE THE MEETING

D-14. Before any meeting, the CA Soldier conducting the meeting should accomplish the following:

- Identify the reason for members meeting face-to-face.
- Ensure members have been invited well in advance.
- Establish the objectives for the meeting.
- Ensure all participants understand the objectives.
- Circulate reports and other documentation pertinent to the discussion before the meeting so information can be read and digested.
- Prepare the physical environment beforehand (check for warmth, fresh air, light, seating arrangements, security, communications support, accessibility of the meeting location, and solitude). The CA Soldier should also—
  - Ensure appropriate visual aids (whiteboards, markers, sheets of paper, recording equipment, and overhead projectors) are in place.
  - Arrange members so they can face each other, if possible; for larger groups, he should try U-shaped rows. A leader has better control when he is centrally located.
Choose a location suitable to group size. Small rooms with too many people get stuffy and create tension. A larger room is more comfortable and encourages individual expression.

Vary meeting places, if possible, to accommodate different members.

Collect any other resources needed for the meeting.

Assemble static displays, if used.

Establish and publish an agenda.

Identify and prepare a facilitator.

Identify and prepare a recorder.

AT THE MEETING

D-15. The facilitator will—

- Make sure the meeting starts on time.
- Be knowledgeable on appropriate social customs and requirements.
- Be aware that people of different cultures may follow different time scales. If there are latecomers, welcome them, give them a moment to settle, and then tell them what the group is doing.
- Welcome members and organizations, and conduct introductions.
- Articulate ground rules that have been developed by the members:
  - Respect for other people. There will be no interrupting, no long monologues, no personal abuse, and sufficient time for everybody to express their views.
  - Confidentiality. Agreement needs to be reached on whether meeting content shall be discussed outside the meeting.
  - Responsibility. Everybody agrees to take responsibility for timekeeping, keeping to the agenda, and voicing their opinions in the meeting rather than afterward.
  - Physical comfort. Agreement needs to be reached on whether smoking is permissible or whether breaks can be negotiated.
  - Decision making. Agreement needs to be reached on how decisions are to be made—by consensus or voting. If consensus cannot be achieved, at what point will alternative decision-making methods be used and who will decide?
- Read and call for apologies.
- Establish the time frame for the meeting.
- Keep the group focused on the agenda.
- Thank everyone for attending the meeting and, if appropriate, set the time and place for the next meeting.
- Conduct a documents security check of the room or area after the meeting.

AFTER THE MEETING

D-16. During the meeting with officers, members discuss problems so improvements can be made. The facilitator will—

- Follow up on delegation decisions, ensuring all members understand and carry out their responsibilities.
- Give recognition and appreciation to excellent and timely progress.
- Put unfinished business on the agenda for the next meeting.
- Conduct a periodic evaluation of the meetings. The facilitator can analyze productivity and make necessary adjustments.
- Ensure action plans and follow-ups are confirmed.
- Ensure minutes are checked (by facilitator and recorder).
- Ensure the time frame for publication and distribution of minutes, reports, and the next agenda is arranged, as required.
**GOAL EXPLANATION**

D-17. The methods and operational aspects of an operation may be classified, but there is nothing classified about the goals of U.S. policy. Upon meeting the parties to the mediation, the mediator must be forthright and direct with what is expected between parties as it pertains to the establishment of stability and lasting peace. The mediator should present the U.S. goals to all parties to the mediation in written form and in the local language. After the local representatives have read the goals, the mediator should ask questions of them to ensure that they understand the goals and that there is no mistaken conception that the mediator is trying to further the particular interests of either the United States or a local entity.

D-18. Neither the goal of stability nor of peace should have negative connotations. When applicable, the mediator should place the mediation effort in the context of a larger framework of international or regional agreements, or a treaty signed by a higher-level local government official.

**ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROFESSIONAL INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PARTIES**

D-19. It is a challenge to balance the interpersonal relationship between the mediator and the local parties. Mediators must be accessible and open without appearing to favor one side over another. Any social meeting should be brief and based upon the professional relationship. Any appearance of being overly cordial with a party to the negotiation will erode trust. Mediators should treat all meetings as if they were in a business environment to preclude the taint of impropriety.

**FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY**

D-20. In conjunction with interpersonal relationships, mediators must show fairness and impartiality. When a mediator suggests a program or offers to assist in providing funding or support for a cooperative project that adheres to U.S. policy goals, he must equitably divide the resources to ensure that neither side profits at the expense of the other.

D-21. Similarly, the mediator must know when to allocate rewards and punishments. If one party consistently cooperates while another party constantly resists or refuses to cooperate, the mediator must simultaneously reward and punish the respective participants. In this situation, an effective way to influence behavior is to seek an increase in funding or support for programs that benefit those who cooperate, and decrease funding or support for programs that aid the uncooperative.

D-22. Mediators should exercise discretion concerning the treatment of how previously noncooperative parties once they begin to cooperate. The mediator may recommend either restoring lost funding or support or simply recommend that funding or support be permanently lost.

**PERCEPTION EQUALS REALITY**

D-23. An essential tenet in all mediation efforts in a postconflict environment is that perception is the same as reality. The basis for reality is how a person perceives recent events and not how actual facts prove the perception right or wrong. Therefore, if a party to mediation perceives he was wronged, then he was wronged. Alternatively, if the United States were perceived as taking a side, the United States has, de facto, taken a side.

D-24. It is not the impartial mediator’s place to correct false perception. In any event, he will be unable to do so in the limited amount of time he has to affect the situation. The mediator must be aware of local misperceptions and find a way to circumvent them. In a postconflict environment, an effective way to correct misperceptions is by long-term revisions made with small steps.

**SOMETHING TANGIBLE TO OFFER**

D-25. While remaining impartial, the mediator must have something tangible to offer the parties for cooperation and, therefore, something tangible to take away for failing to cooperate. Otherwise, the mediator is only an observer and cannot lead the mediation effort toward cooperation, stability, and peace. There are instances, however, where a mediator has nothing traditionally tangible to offer. Funding may be
Negotiation and Mediation

slow in coming or nonexistent. In those cases, the mediator will have to improvise and seek either nontraditional support or methods that allow military resources to assist. The mediator can always leverage the prestige of cooperating with the United States. It is unusual for local politicians to not want to appear as being able to hold their own in a U.S.-led arena.

MONEY EQUALS INFLUENCE

D-26. Money usually equals immediate influence; however, the use of cash can cause problems if not closely monitored. Mediators must not appear to be using funding for projects to force local officials into cooperating in agreements that run counter to the interests of the local populace. (Appendix G provides more information on financial management.)

D-27. The United States funds foreign aid projects expressly to influence the decisions of local officials. However, the perception that an official is a puppet of the United States will lessen his effectiveness in the community and quell popular support for U.S. policy.

REFOCUS OF THE MEDIATION EFFORT

D-28. There are situations when the mediator may have to totally refocus the mediation effort. If the participants are actively opposing U.S. policy and the mediator’s concerted efforts fail to alter that behavior, the mediator should redirect his effort. This is a very delicate and complex task. If the uncooperative representatives are able to quickly or easily replace, by domestic or international means, the same support or funding withdrawn by the U.S. representative, then the prestige and influence of the United States is adversely affected. The mediator should display his determination to seek stability and leverage his ability to curtail support for the uncooperative officials. Coordination with the various members of the IGOs operating in the area is critical.

D-29. If the mediator must redirect the mediation, he should consider different communication methods. The mediator can alter the meeting location, change which entities participate, reassess what subjects will be addressed, find a different IGO to host, allow for surrogates, or lower the level of representatives from the local communities. To succeed, the mediator must be flexible.

D-30. The mediator must consistently demonstrate that U.S. determination to achieve stability and peace is greater than the local dedication to continued conflict. He must constantly reiterate the goal of cooperation over the protests of the locals to confirm that U.S. staying power will overcome any attempt to stall progress toward peace.

MEDIATOR CONTROL

D-31. Mediators must always be in control of themselves and the members of their team and not become personally involved. This is very difficult when the mediator has knowledge of a particular participant’s inhumane acts or when a party to the mediation exhibits an aggressive attitude. No matter the circumstances, the mediator and his subordinates must maintain their composure.

D-32. Mediators must also control the outbursts of the participants. The mediator cannot tolerate belligerent acts or threats. When unacceptable behavior occurs, the mediator must stop the talks immediately to prevent escalation. The mediator should then schedule separate and private meetings with each participant to reiterate what is expected of each party.

D-33. The mediator, however, should not be emotionless. There are times when the mediator should show his disapproval, both verbally and through body language. Although the mediator should not yell or aggressively approach any participant, he should schedule a private meeting to clarify the reason for his disapproval.

OPTION TO RETREAT

D-34. Parties to mediation should always have an option to retreat. The goal of mediation is not to defeat a party but to instill cooperation toward stability and peace. There may be times when a participant cannot support a position and the mediator should tactfully allow the party a face-saving route of escape. If an
agreement is made with a party that felt trapped, that party is very unlikely to honor the agreement. It is more effective to reschedule and meet when actual progress can be made than to reach an agreement that will be discarded. All parties should be able to retreat honorably or with some form of victory.

PRIVATE MEETINGS

D-35. Private meetings have an important role in mediation efforts. They allow the mediator and each participant to know one another on a personal level, and both the mediator and the individual party can explain their particular goals. In addition, issues a party would not discuss in front of an adversary can be discussed while details and differences of opinion can be ironed out.

D-36. The mediator should be aware that too many private meetings with one party or another may give the appearance of favoritism. Main issues of the mediation should be the focus in private meetings.

D-37. An effective use of the private meeting format is mediation conducted in seclusion and without outside witnesses. Because the parties do not have the opportunity or feel the pressure to bluster or outmaneuver their adversary for the benefit of the public, these meetings can be very constructive. Once cooperation and trust are established, private meetings can quickly lead to progress.

PUBLIC MEETINGS

D-38. Public meetings are the most effective vehicle for widely demonstrating progress and support for increased trust, cooperation, stability, and peace between former warring parties. Public meetings also help establish the air of permanence and, thereby, add to the legitimacy of the effort.

D-39. Although public meetings are preferable to private meetings, the costs and inherent inefficiencies may outweigh the benefits. Coordinating public meetings can be extremely difficult. As local and international spectators attend the mediation, the physical requirements increase drastically. Security and safety issues also become more acute. The mediator must weigh concerns for security against the public display for stability and peace. Mediators must also ensure that the desire to cooperate and pursue stability and peace is genuine, and that parties will not intentionally use a public meeting to disrupt cooperation or U.S. policy.

POSTMEETING PHASE

D-40. The postmeeting phase is the implementation and follow-through required for a successful mediation. The following paragraphs discuss the necessary actions that mediators must take.

REPRESENTATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY

D-41. Once a local representative commits to and signs an agreement, he must be held accountable to the terms of the agreement. Support and funding for projects that benefit the signatories’ communities should always be directly linked to continued adherence to all agreements.

D-42. The mediator must establish a system that ensures every party will adhere to all agreements. If a signatory begins to veer away from the intent or the letter of an agreement, the mediator must be prepared to apportion punishment and clearly and directly explain the reason for the punishment.

D-43. The mediator should use all forms of local, national, and international press, as well as IGOs that monitor the area, as watchdogs. As often as possible, the mediator should publicize agreements to make them a matter of public record, which will compel the parties to comply.

ACCURATE INFORMATION DELIVERY TO ALL INTERESTED PARTIES

D-44. The press can be a tremendous asset and a tremendous burden for mediators. There are particular guidelines for interacting with the media, and the public affairs officer (PAO) within each command is tasked with announcing official information releases. The PAO is also the primary source for information on contacting members of the press.
D-45. The PAO, CA, and IO personnel must observe certain parameters when they integrate media. They have to conduct an analysis of the target audience and the method of information delivery. They must balance the significance of the event with the amount of press coverage. The size and the literacy rate of the audience are also factors. In addition, the geographic area (local, regional, national, or international audiences) has a significant impact on which media will be effective.

D-46. The CA civil information officer and local PSYOP assets should also be integrated into the delivery of information. Close coordination for timing and dissemination is critical for success. Accurately informing the public about successful agreements will broaden popular support for stability and peace while reducing the negative impact of local perceptions about the behavior of their former adversaries.

D-47. Wording and translation of information releases are critical. As one who is fully knowledgeable of the subject matter, the mediator should be closely involved in drafting all documents describing key points about the agreement. When writing information releases, the mediator should use short, direct sentences that read well if quoted. Speeches should be available in written form. Ratified agreements should be presented in as many applicable languages as possible. The mediator should ensure the accuracy of all translations. For the TV and radio media, the mediator ensures information appears in short but understandable pieces that are usable as “sound bites.” As with everything that is to be disseminated after having been translated, the mediator should ensure that appropriate personnel have vetted the translations.

D-48. Timing is critical to effectively announcing a successful mediation. The mediator coordinates with IO and PAO to ensure no events disrupt or detract from the mediator’s announcement. The mediator releases information once he has ensured the content is not diluted or edited to the point where it is ineffective. If possible, the mediator should avoid dates that involve major holidays, elections, religious holy days, historical events, or dates when a critical announcement is scheduled. The mediator should also coordinate with the other members of the international community to eliminate the possibility of conflicting announcements.

**WRITTEN RECORDS AND AGREEMENTS**

D-49. Written records of all meetings must be kept to ensure that all participants to the mediation understand important terms, conditions, and definitions within an agreement. Without written records, it is impossible to establish the accuracy of an agreement. The parties to the mediation should see that notes and records are being kept, which serves two purposes. First, it reinforces the understanding that the participants will be held to the terms of the agreement and, therefore, should not make statements without intending to honor them. Second, a written record can be forwarded to the participants for their records. This documentation boosts the professional image of the mediation, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the mediation effort.

D-50. All agreements must be written and translated. A handshake to symbolize the final acceptance of an agreement is excellent for a closing but does not substitute for a written and signed agreement. If necessary, the mediator can gather signatures on a working version of the agreement to establish documentation of an agreement. From this working version, the mediator can formalize the agreement with an official signing ceremony. The mediator should use all of these protocols to reinforce, among the local population as well as their representatives, the seriousness of the agreement and that all agreements will be monitored for compliance.

D-51. English is commonly accepted as the international language of agreements. During mediation, therefore, the English version of an agreement is the official version. If the intent or terms of an agreement are challenged, the English version must be the benchmark for all clarifications.

**MEDIATION AND TRANSITION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

D-52. The mediator should establish a routine by scheduling mediation meetings at set intervals. As the mediation progresses, he should invite key members from the international community to observe and participate. After the members of the international community become more active, the mediator may defer to them on decisions or integrate their expertise. The mediator integrates members of the international community into the process as mediators and hosts to maximize exposure and establish cooperation. If
possible, the mediator should encourage the group of participating entities to decide on a group name to encourage a sense of ownership and membership in an exclusive organization.

D-53. The mediator should transition the mediation effort, once firmly established, to the international community. The mediator can use the role of mediation leader, as well as the trust and prestige established over the term of the mediation effort, to prepare the participants for transition to the international community. Doing so will allow the international and nongovernmental institutions and organizations chartered to assist in these areas to accomplish their mandates.

D-54. Effectively transitioning the international community into the lead role in the mediation effort will help them accomplish their respective missions and may lead to future international community support of U.S. military-led mediation efforts. As U.S. military representatives establish a reputation as effective mediators, the international community should in turn become more accepting of the U.S. military’s mediation efforts and, therefore, become more enthusiastically supportive. Quicker support from the international community for U.S. military mediation efforts will then reduce the long-term requirement for U.S. force structure needed to conduct postconflict operations.

D-55. The mediator should set a timetable in coordination with the international community that will gradually transition the lead role from the CA mediator to a mediator from the international community. The CA mediator should install a member of the international community as a co-mediator, or establish a pattern for alternating the role of lead mediator from one meeting to another. The CA representative and the international community representative should be present at all meetings until final transition occurs. After coordinating with his chain of command, the mediator passes all records to the international community organization that is providing the person who is taking the position of lead mediator.

MEDIATION PROCESS AND THE MEDIATOR’S ACTIONS

D-56. Mediation in a postconflict operation follows a general pattern. Although each operation is on a different timeline and can involve additional or fewer steps, the process remains constant. In some instances, steps in the process may take place at the same time or they may take place in a different order. The mediator must remain flexible and open to change based on the idiosyncrasies of the local situation. Since CA mediators are often replaced at the six-month mark, the mediator must initiate the process as soon as possible after arrival. In addition, the mediator must have accurate records to ensure continuity when he transitions out.

D-57. Starting at establishing trust and ending at the first multilateral agreement, the average period for completing a mediation cycle is four to six months. Since the CA mediator is usually in the area for about six months, he must act quickly and decisively to develop a plan for mediation. The following paragraphs describe the general mediation process and the steps the mediator takes during the process.

Establishment of Trust (Closed Door—No Outside Observers, Participants, or Press)

D-58. The mediator conducts one-to-one meetings to establish a professional relationship between himself and each individual participant. The mediator also explains U.S. policy goals, expectations, and the rewards of cooperation, as well as the consequences of noncooperation. The mediator compiles a list of the concerns and grievances of each party. He compares the lists and decides which issues show promise of cooperation. He looks for areas where infrastructure or lines of communication intersect. These areas generate many opportunities where the needs of the parties overlap. Group meetings of increasing size and frequency are held to establish a professional relationship between the participants. Following one-to-one and group meetings, the mediator tries to establish the routine of a “social hour” for small talk and to relax the participants in the company of former adversaries.

Bilateral Mediation (Open or Closed Door—May or May Not Allow Outside Observers, Participants, or Press at the Mediator’s Discretion)

D-59. The mediator orchestrates a simple agreement over a small issue that only involves two of the local entities or villages. He concentrates on those areas where concerns or needs overlap, and works with pairs of representatives from the local communities, one representative from each of the opposing sides. The
mediator rewards the two participants with funding, support, or by coordinating assistance for their respective communities.

D-60. Throughout the entire course of the mediation, the mediator actively encourages all parties to meet outside the framework of the mediation. Details about wording or minor aspects about the terms and conditions of cooperation should take place directly between the opposing sides. The mediator should make every attempt to determine what the parties have agreed to, but the more important goal is to establish normalized communications between all local entities without the intervention of the international community or the U.S. military. The mediator meets with the representatives of adjacent entities or villages and discusses the successful cooperative efforts that are occurring in the region and the rewards that ensued.

D-61. The mediator keeps a comparative balance in the characteristics of the participants. He attempts to pair each entity with an entity from the opposition that has a similar size, infrastructure, farming or business base, and economic condition.

D-62. The mediator repeats the above steps with issues of increasing importance to establish credibility in ever-expanding realms. He makes cooperation the norm so that it becomes expected and not a surprise.

D-63. The mediator initiates bilateral talks with as many pairs of the local entities as can be effectively managed. When possible, he works different issues with each pair to establish cooperation in various areas.

D-64. As bilateral talks advance toward a multilateral setting, the mediator exploits established cooperation between any or all of the pairs of entities. He encourages parties to a successful bilateral mediation to mentor other pairs who are facing similar problems. As the process moves forward into more formalized multilateral mediation, the mediator builds teams from the pairs to establish a personal bond between the participants.

D-65. All of the above steps lay the groundwork for meetings between multiple entities. Before moving forward in the process, the mediator should ensure that there are enough successful precedents to indicate that multilateral mediation will be fruitful.

**Multilateral Mediation (Open or Closed Door—May or May Not Allow Outside Observers, Participants, or Press at the Mediator’s Discretion)**

D-66. The mediator meets with the pairs of representatives developed during the bilateral phase to determine their combined concerns and issues. Also, he determines whether they are willing to talk with other pairs of representatives to discuss larger group cooperation and concessions. The mediator explains U.S. policy goals, the rewards of cooperation, and the consequences of noncooperation.

D-67. The mediator demonstrates the rewards and advantages of cooperation by citing previous cooperative ventures and the proceeds that the cooperative parties received for their communities. He explains the goals of the mediation and what each cooperative party can expect to gain at the conclusion of an acceptable agreement. (The mediator should ensure that the international community and the military chain of command can and will sustain any support or funding that is proffered.)

D-68. The mediator asks the participants to propose a name for the group that is representative of the entire region. He refers to commonplace names for rivers, mountain ranges, or any major terrain feature that the local populace can readily recognize. The mediator should ensure the name does not have potential negative connotations, such as a major battle or the site of an atrocity.

D-69. The mediator begins the multilateral mediation with a statement of intent to cooperate. He works out the details ahead of time and has the participants sign the document, either as a group or during one-to-one meetings. A group setting is preferred.

D-70. The mediator has the international community and the military commander write congratulatory letters to the entire group of participants, and ensures that the wording is accurate and noninflammatory. The mediator submits a draft of the letter to the U.S. military commander and the representatives from the international community so that they have a common reference point from which to write their respective congratulatory letters. From this point onward, any communication from the U.S. military or the
international community is addressed to the group to reinforce the perception, among the participants, of membership in a larger organization.

D-71. The mediator develops the statement of intent to cooperate into a declaration to work as a cohesive group for rebuilding infrastructure that affects the entire region. Once again, he procures congratulatory letters from the major international community and military HQ. Each subsequent statement, declaration, or agreement should receive a letter from the appropriate international community and military leadership. The mediator matches the level of the local document with the level of the letter that the international and military communities deliver. For example, an agreement from a group whose physical boundaries are within the AO of a battalion should receive letters from the battalion commander and the leadership of the major international community organizations that conduct business in the immediate area. As the participants to the mediation outgrow AOs of the battalion or brigade, the next-higher level within the command structure, as well as the international community, should write a congratulatory letter.

Mediation by Establishing Protocol and a Schedule

D-72. The mediator follows the rules of order for a typical board of directors meeting and begins distributing minutes from the previous meetings. He sets an agenda and keeps to it. The mediator encourages direct discussions between the participants of the mediation.

D-73. The mediator initiates a plan where the participants to the mediation rotate as the president or host for the meeting. Any equitable system of rotating this role is acceptable, be it weekly, biweekly, or monthly, as long as it allows all parties an opportunity to lead the discussion. (The mediator does not relinquish control of the mediation at this time.)

Integration of the International Community into the Mediation (Open or Closed Door—May or May Not Allow Outside Observers, Participants, or Press at the Mediator’s Discretion)

D-74. This period in the cycle of the mediation is critical for establishing long-term stability and peace. The mediator identifies an organization within the international community that is directly involved with the issues of the participants and will be in the theater for an extended time. The international community organization should provide a person to act as a co-mediator or alternate with the military mediator as the head mediator. The U.S. military mediator begins to phase out of the lead role.

Agreement Resolution (Open or Closed Door—at the Mediator’s Discretion)

D-75. This period can be the least predictable in the mediation effort. If the mediator’s preparation has been effective, no external events have disrupted the willingness of the participants to cooperate, and funding from either the United States or the international community remains intact, then participants can rather quickly reach a written agreement. If anything occurs to disturb the process, the mediator may have to reinitiate the entire procedure.

D-76. After the basics of the agreement are verbally resolved, the mediator puts them on paper. The mediator can use butcher-block paper on an easel, or a similar form of displaying the points of the agreement to the entire group, to start the process of putting the ideas of the agreement on paper. The mediator formalizes the process by creating typewritten interim versions of all documents and giving everyone a copy. Participants use these documents as working drafts. The mediator makes changes and adds details, as required. Once the first part of an agreement is concluded, momentum toward cooperation is created. Then the mediator assumes the additional burden of keeping up the pressure to reach a finalized document.

Agreement Announcement to the Public (Open Door—Outside Observers, Participants, or Press Are Invited)

D-77. The mediator develops a program to announce the agreement to both the domestic and the international community. He integrates CA civil information and PSYOP assets to publicize the agreement. In concert with the PAO, the mediator releases information to the local, national, and international press. The mediator ensures that the cooperating participants are the focus of all announcements. He downplays
the role of the U.S. military mediation effort and enhances the role of the international community and the participants to set the stage for eventual transition to the international community.

D-78. The mediator allows access to signing events for print, radio, and TV to publicly document the agreement. If possible, local, national, and international press agencies should be present and given copies of the agreement in the local language and in English.

D-79. The mediator has the local participants sign the agreement followed by the official witnesses from the international community and the military. A public display of civility, such as a group handshake, is also encouraged. The witnesses should be from the organizations tasked with monitoring the agreement.

**Mediation Expansion**

D-80. Mediators should integrate efforts in one AO into the efforts of adjacent AOs. If there is no current effort underway in an adjacent AO, the mediator coordinates for expansion of the mediation effort across internal boundaries. The mediator educates key leaders in adjacent military and international community organizations on the methods that led to success.

**Agreement Monitoring**

D-81. The organizations that mediated the agreement must supervise the agreement for compliance by all parties. To ensure everyone is meeting the obligations outlined in the agreement, monitors normally listed in the agreement monitor the local participants as well as U.S. and IGOs that pledged support or funding.

**Agreement Documents**

D-82. The documents that lead up to a multilateral agreement can range from the simple to the complex. The most successful documents allow for flexibility and are direct and simple. Complex documents, especially when translated, lend themselves to multiple interpretations.

D-83. All agreements must be written and readily available to establish compliance by the parties. The mediator coordinates the forwarding of documents to all international community and military organizations in the affected area, as well as adjacent areas, to coordinate all efforts to establish cooperation.

D-84. The mediator should leverage every document produced during mediation to increase the legitimacy and institutionalization of the cooperative group. Each document should be the foundation for subsequent documents until the goal of permanently established stability and peace is accomplished.

D-85. There is no standard format for any of these documents, and the mediator must tailor each document to the individual situation. However, consistency in format is critical to establishing understanding and legitimacy as the process expands. Some of the common documents that the mediator will either draft or contribute to are—

- **Letters of intent.** The most simple of the documents involving mediation, letters of intent are short statements signed by an individual or by two or more local parties declaring that the signatories will come together with the intention of discussing cooperation. The mediator should be the official witness for these documents. Letters of intent incur no other commitment than to enter into talks. There is no commitment from the United States or international community. Letters of intent are the base document the mediator uses to bring parties to the original talks.

- **Statements supporting cooperation.** Statements supporting cooperation are the next type of document that the mediator should pursue. These documents include more detail and should incorporate an explicit commitment from the United States or the international community to support or fund projects based upon demonstrated cooperation. These documents should quickly generate an official congratulatory letter from the U.S. military, as well as the applicable international community organizations.
Appendix D

- Agreement to cooperate in support of stability and peace. A written agreement, signed by all participants, is the pinnacle of the mediation effort. These documents—
  - Delineate the categories in which the signatories intend to cooperate (for example, refugee return, infrastructure reconstruction, housing, education, agriculture, and so on).
  - State what the signatories expect from the international community and the U.S. military in return for cooperation. (These documents can be politically explosive at the local level and, therefore, mediators should seek methods to limit negative political impact upon the signatories to the agreement.)

D-86. The mediator should ensure that the document has enough detail to hold the participants responsible to the terms of the agreement. The document should be concise and not overbearing. The mediator should eliminate references to any local political group to preclude the perception of favoritism or the generation of negative publicity through association. Flexibility in how a signatory interprets an agreement should be very limited, and the body of the agreement must address each signatory’s specific concerns.

D-87. The mediator will find that issues will emerge after the agreement is signed that will hamper cooperation. As soon as possible after a signatory identifies an issue, the mediator should draft an addendum to the original agreement that eliminates the problem.

ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS

D-88. There will be circumstances when a mediator will have to draft a document to clarify a specific issue relevant to an agreement. The mediator should minimize these occasions to preclude confusion and distraction from the intent of the original document. The mediator’s task in this situation is to create a simple addendum that is concise and directly addresses a grievance or clarifies a questionable detail.

ADOPTION OF A NAME

D-89. These documents are very simple and take the form of an official resolution. As long as the mediator, supported by CMO planners, researches negative connotations associated with a name, there is little contention in adopting a name.

ADOPTION OF A SCHEDULE

D-90. When the mediator establishes a schedule, the mediator must ensure that the schedule is clear and equitable to all parties. Any agreements pertaining to exceptions to a predetermined schedule should be included to prevent confusion. Examples of common exceptions to a predetermined schedule include religious holy days, elections, state holidays, and contentious historical dates. The mediator can also incorporate prearranged meeting places and alternate meeting dates or locations into the schedule, which adds to the legitimacy of the mediation effort.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A REVOLVING LEADERSHIP PROGRAM

D-91. The mediator should write agreements about rotating the internal leadership role within the group of participants to ensure equality and that no individual party benefits exceedingly from a leadership position. The participant who is in the leadership role should not establish the group’s agenda or have the power to veto or disproportionately affect issues brought to the mediation. During the mediation process, participants may identify the need for other administrative positions such as secretary, deputy leader, and so on.

RECOGNITION OF A TRANSITION OF MEDIATORS

D-92. When the time occurs for transition to the international community from the U.S. military, the participants should be encouraged to adopt a resolution recognizing a specific international community organization as the new mediator. The CMO transition plan establishes the official date of transition and the method for contacting the new mediator. (This document should not be required when the mediator
transitions from one U.S. military representative to another since the organization that is leading the mediation has not changed.)

**Layout of a Typical Agreement**

D-93. The mediator should establish a standardized format for each type of document based upon the peculiarities of each operation. All subsequent documents in the AO should, to the extent possible, follow the format of documents written to accomplish similar goals. This leads to a formalized and predictable structure to succeeding mediation efforts. The mediator coordinates the production of enough copies of the agreement in the local language so that each signatory can receive an original document with original signatures. In addition, all participants and witnesses should sign an official English version of the agreement. For example, if there are six participants and two official witnesses, the mediator should coordinate the production and signing of nine documents to allow each participant and witness to receive an original document. Each participant and witness receives an original copy with the English version maintained as the official reference document.

D-94. The general format for an agreement includes the following:

- **Introduction.** The introduction should state the name of the group signing the agreement, the goals of the agreement, location and date of the signing, and administrative information specific to the signing.
- **Body.** The body of the agreement should include—
  - The specific areas in which the parties to the agreement will cooperate.
  - Political entities that will adhere to the agreement.
  - Specifics, as required, clarifying the terms of the agreement.
  - What the signatories to the agreement expect from the members of the international community and the USG.
- **Conclusion.** The conclusion should state that the agreement is made in an effort to support stability and peace between the communities that are parties to the agreement and reiterate the signatories’ willingness to cooperate for the benefit of their communities.
- **Signatories.** The signatories should sign immediately below the body of the agreement. The signature blocks should include a typed line long enough to accommodate a signature, the typed name of the signatory (under the line for the signature), with the signatory’s title along with the name of his community under his name. If the signatories habitually affix a seal to official documents, the document should include a blank space for an official seal to prevent distortion of the signatures.

  **Note.** The order of the signatures should not show favoritism. An effective technique is to arrange the signatures in the order in which the participants joined the mediation effort. Since the mediator took pains to maintain a balance, the signatories should be in a balanced and unbiased pattern.

- **Witnesses.** The witnesses should sign at the bottom of the document and their signature blocks should follow the pattern used for the participants. Again, the document should include a blank space for official stamps or seals.

**Maintaining the Agreement**

D-95. Until the cessation of U.S. participation in an operation, the U.S. military representative who initiates the original mediation effort is responsible for monitoring that the signatories comply with any agreements stemming from mediation. In addition, the U.S. military mediator or representative is responsible for ensuring that the members of the international community, as well as the USG, comply with the obligations they made.
CHECKING FOR COMPLIANCE

D-96. Either the mediator or a representative of the U.S. military should habitually attend the meetings that the parties to the mediation have scheduled. This attendance exhibits the continued interest of the U.S. military and allows for an insight into how the efforts to support cooperation are progressing. Continuing contact with the representatives that have to comply with any mediated agreement facilitates communications and an open environment. The mediator or his representative should always seek ways to reinforce cooperation.

D-97. The mediator or his representative should perform scheduled and unscheduled inspections into areas where the local parties have agreed to cooperate. Meetings with local leaders, who are not signatories to a mediated agreement, should include questions about support by the populace for cooperation, as well as adherence by the local community to previous agreements.

D-98. Mediators should use all available information resources, military and civilian, to monitor adherence to the terms of the agreement. The mediator should also watch for parties that circumvent the intent of the agreement. Warnings as to possible punishment for noncompliance should be timely and direct. The mediator should have leeway for recommending curtailment of support for intentional breaches of an agreement.

D-99. Conversely, mediators should reward cooperation between former adversaries in areas not covered by the terms of a mediated agreement. If possible, mediators should seek additional funding or support for initiatives outside the parameters of a previous agreement.

D-100. The mediator should apprise members of the international community of the current situation, advising members of an increase or decrease in cooperation. Doing so allows the international community to reward or punish the local entities as their behavior dictates.

MODERATING THE SIZE

D-101. When the mediator sets out to bring former warring parties together, he is always concerned with the issue of how many communities to incorporate into the mediation. Each operation will be different since no two nations have political subdivisions of the same size.

D-102. The mediator must be careful not to include too many parties in a mediation effort. Too large of a population can overburden the funding and logistical capability of the military assets and the international community than are committed to supporting cooperation. A gradual expansion of the population involved in mediation can generally be planned for and accommodated, but too many people too fast will overwhelm the theater’s logistical systems.

D-103. Each party will have issues specific to their community and, with a large group, the likelihood of competition for resources escalates. Additionally, the requirement to monitor agreements by a small force over expansive terrain is inefficient. The typical optimum size of a mediation effort is six to eight participants, depending upon the population and geography within each community. Mediation efforts larger than this tend to overcome the ability of the limited number of U.S. military personnel and should remain in the realm of the international community or the U.S. State Department.
Appendix E

Force Protection Considerations

FP is a paramount concern of all commanders. Every GCC, Army Command, ASCC, and direct reporting unit has standing FP policies that require understanding and adherence by all personnel. USASOC also prescribes FP requirements as a matter of policy for all assigned units and Soldiers. CA units, teams and elements incorporate these requirements in planning to ensure compliance and mitigate risk.

OVERVIEW

E-1. FP encompasses a range of processes—mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. These processes occur in a continuous, overlapping, and repeating sequence throughout an operation. Per the DOD-approved definition, FP does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. FP rests on the synergy of OPSEC, physical security, counterterrorism (CT), law enforcement, and personal security to protect personnel, facilities, operations, and activities from loss due to hostile action, including terrorism, criminal activity, or disaffected insiders.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

E-2. OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to—

- Identify those actions that adversary intelligence systems can observe.
- Determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
- Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

E-3. OPSEC has always been an integral part of military doctrine, but the challenge for commanders is to apply these time-tested principles to CT. FP is an integrated effort on the part of staffs of all units. Commanders of units and installations must have the mindset that CT is not just the responsibility of military law enforcement personnel.

E-4. Effective OPSEC measures minimize the “signature” of military operations, avoid set patterns, and employ deception when patterns cannot be altered. Although strategic OPSEC measures are important, the most effective methods manifest themselves at the lowest level. Terrorist activity is discouraged by—

- Varying patrol routes.
- Staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals.
- Conducting vehicle and pedestrian searches and identification checks on a set but unpredictable pattern.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

E-5. Physical security programs involve physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. Physical security measures deter, detect, and defend against threats from terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. Measures include—

- Fencing and perimeter stand-off space.
- Lighting and sensors.
Vehicle barriers.
- Blast protection.
- Intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance.
- Access control devices and systems.

E-6. Procedural measures such as security checks, inventories, and inspections augment the above-listed measures. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.

ROLE IN FORCE PROTECTION

E-7. CA Soldiers focus on FP at two distinct levels—the individual or team level and the supported force level. These levels are discussed below:

- At the individual or team level, CA Soldiers employ measures to counter threats to individual or team members from all sources while conducting CA operations. Threats to CA Soldiers include enemy direct and indirect fires; CBRNE attack; ambush; IEDs; enraged or disaffected civilians, thugs, and criminals; and theft of equipment. CA Soldiers follow command guidance and unit FP SOPs.

- At the supported force level, conducting routine CA operations can enhance protection of the supported force from threats from the civil component of the AO. Threats to the supported force include disaffected or DC populations, unfriendly political organizations, terrorist incidents, and theft of equipment.

E-8. CA Soldiers enhance FP in any operation by conducting normal CAO and CMO. This means they—

- Circulate among the populace.
- Establish rapport with ordinary citizens, key leaders, and representatives of IGOs and NGOs.
- Establish and maintain an accessible CMOC.
- Conduct continuous deliberate assessments.
- Conduct deliberate CR.
- Provide input to all-source analysis centers on conditions, attitudes, and intentions of the populace.

E-9. FP can be significantly improved with the proper mix of intelligence and information gathering. Because CIM is a core task of CAO, CA Soldiers must be sure to share their observations with the intelligence community. It is critical, however, that CA Soldiers do not misrepresent themselves as gatherers of intelligence.

FORCE PROTECTION PLANNING

E-10. FP initiatives at all levels must be coordinated closely with the appropriate security, intelligence, and investigative forces, given their knowledge of threat possibilities and appropriate responses. Effective FP planning includes input, guidance, and decisions from other interested agencies and personnel. These may include civil government and law enforcement officials and, in some cases, private security firms (as in the proprietary security offices of multinational corporations in the AO which may be more organized or better informed than local authorities). Ultimate responsibility for FP rests with the force commander, and any actions taken must be consistent with the commander’s decisions. More information is contained in DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H, DOD Antiterrorism Handbook.

E-11. Commanders plan FP operations using trained organic or attached FP specialists. CAO and CMO planners support the FP plan by integrating CAO into the plan and sharing information contained in routine CA reports. Although subordinate units and teams comply with the senior commander’s FP plan, they also augment the plan by planning at their own level to account for nuances specific to their AO and operations. For example, a CMOC operating outside the security perimeter of a supported unit may require additional FP considerations than the CMOC inside the perimeter.

E-12. CA Soldiers are most effective working in small units that interact with a wide variety of agencies—civilian and military. This interaction implies a degree of risk higher than the risks encountered by conventional forces. The risks can, however, be mitigated by a thorough analysis of the environment as it
relates to mission requirements and by strict adherence to resultant FP measures. The FP requirements of the supported command may prove to be less than optimal for the CAT mission. It may, for example, be culturally inappropriate and counterproductive for CA Soldiers in full combat attire to conduct liaison with local officials. In such cases, the senior CA officer should coordinate with the supported commander to formulate plans that lead to mission success while allowing for cultural sensitivities.

E-13. CA Soldiers planning FP operations follow basic security planning steps and principles. The following steps and principles apply whether planning at the individual or team level or the supported force level:

- Conduct a threat assessment.
- Conduct a vulnerability assessment.
- Determine appropriate countermeasures.
- Implement countermeasures.
- Evaluate effectiveness of the countermeasures.

E-14. These steps and principles also apply to CATs conducting mobile operations or operating from a fixed site. The CATs focus not only on terrorist threats, but on all threats.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

E-15. The first step in developing a FP program is to identify and characterize the potential threats to the force. Understanding the threat enables CA Soldiers to assess their vulnerability to attack and to develop effective protective and response measures. The following is an overview of the elements within a threat assessment.

THREAT IDENTIFICATION

E-16. CA Soldiers identify threats from the civil component during preliminary and deliberate assessments. Their analysis of the situation using ASCOPE yields potential threats to the force. Examples of threats for each of the ASCOPE factors are—

- Areas:
  - Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves.
  - Damaged or contaminated towns, villages, or cities.
- Structures:
  - Nuclear power plants.
  - Facilities that employ toxic chemicals in production processes.
  - Structurally unsound buildings.
- Capabilities:
  - Indigenous communications networks.
  - Propaganda mechanisms.
  - Ability to organize and mobilize.
  - Existence of legal or illegal arms among the populace.
  - Paramilitary skills found among the populace.
- Organizations:
  - Radical social, political, religious, or criminal organizations.
  - Terrorist organizations.
- People:
  - Enemy sympathizers.
  - Organized criminals.
  - Common thieves.
Appendix E

- Events:
  - Internal feuding between competing factions.
  - Political or anti-U.S. and coalition force rallies.
  - Accidental release of HAZMAT.
  - Rainy, windy, or drought seasons.
  - Outbreak of disease among the populace.

**Threat Definition**

E-17. Once the CA Soldier identifies the threat, the CA Soldier determines the negative effects of the threat on the force. For example—

- Damaged or contaminated areas pose a safety risk to Soldiers passing through those areas.
- The capability to organize and mobilize great numbers of civilians, armed with firearms, pitchforks, clubs, or stones, can overwhelm a force operating among or near the mobilized population.
- Nuclear power plants or facilities that employ toxic chemicals in production processes are vulnerable to accidents or direct terrorist attack that can harm Soldiers operating nearby.
- Criminals can steal equipment or information that for use against the force to inflict casualties.
- Political or antiforce rallies can quickly deteriorate and pose a threat to Soldiers in the area.

E-18. Terrorists operate in a clandestine mode. Therefore, the information needed to define and analyze a terrorist threat is often more difficult to acquire than information dealing with less esoteric military threats. To build a composite picture of threat conditions, police and intelligence personnel gather information from numerous sources, such as newspapers, criminal records, government records, local organizations and people, and other intelligence organizations. As outlined in DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H, DOD has identified six factors to be used in the collection and analysis of information from all sources bearing a terrorist threat:

- **Existence.** A terrorist group is present, assessed to be present, or able to gain access to a given country or locale. The analysis of information regarding the existence of a terrorist group addresses the question: Who is hostile to existing organizations and social structure?
- **Capability.** The acquired, assessed, or demonstrated level of capability to conduct terrorist attacks. An analysis of terrorist group capabilities addresses the questions: What weapons have terrorist groups used in carrying out past attacks? What infrastructure is necessary to train, equip, target, and execute attacks?
- **History.** Demonstrated terrorist activity over time. The analysis of terrorist group history addresses the questions: What have the terrorists done in the past? What is the terrorist group’s method of operations? How did they acquire the capacity they demonstrated? Where did they obtain support? What additional attacks did they mount?
- **Intentions.** Recently demonstrated anti-U.S. terrorist activity, or stated or assessed intent to conduct such activity. An analysis of terrorist group intentions addresses the questions: Why do groups engage in terrorist acts? What do they hope to achieve?
- **Targeting.** Current credible information on activity, indicative of preparations for specific terrorist operations. Targeting addresses the questions: Who is likely to be attacked, why are they likely to be attacked, and what is the basis for accepting reports that such attacks are planned?
- **Security environment.** The internal political and security considerations that impact terrorist element capability to carry out their intentions. The parameters examined within the security environment of a country include training of national law enforcement, paramilitary, and military institutions to deal with terrorist incidents and to maintain social order; quality of equipment available for law enforcement and internal security forces; and distribution of internal security forces throughout a country.
THREAT LEVEL

E-19. FP planning responds to the threat level. The threat level for an area is determined after information on the threat factors is gathered and analyzed. The greater the presence of threat factors, the higher the threat level. Five of the six factors are used together to define the threat level; the sixth, security considerations, is used separately as a modifying factor. Table E-1 depicts the relationships of the threat factors and threat levels. (Additional information is in DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H, Chapter 5.)

Table E-1. Department of Defense determination of terrorist threat level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Level</th>
<th>Threat Analysis Factors</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Existence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>a</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a – Factor must be present  
b – Factor may or may not be present

E-20. Unit commanders rely on local intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) personnel to provide warnings and indicators about specific and general threats to the installations, resources, and personnel. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) determines threat levels in the CONUS, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) determines threat levels outside CONUS for DOD installations. Commanders at all levels establish the FP conditions based on the FBI or DIA threat level and locally developed information. This information, coupled with the vulnerability assessment discussed in the following section, will influence decisions as to which FP measures are applied to installation assets.

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

E-21. A vulnerability assessment addresses the susceptibility of the force to the threats identified during the threat assessment. A vulnerability assessment applies to fixed sites and to mobile operations. The vulnerability assessment is an ongoing process that includes all three components of threat assessment. This very essential step helps to identify and prioritize the resources required to defeat the threat, providing a basis for determining CT measures that can protect personnel and assets from terrorist attacks.

E-22. A vulnerability assessment looks at the security aspects related to the force and its operations—OPSEC, physical security, CT, law enforcement, and personal security. During the vulnerability assessment, CA Soldiers identify any shortcomings in each of these areas as they apply to team or site operations. DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H contains guidelines and sample survey checklists that can be applied to a CAO and CMO vulnerability assessment.

E-23. The CA Soldiers planning FP operations evaluate the results of the vulnerability assessment against the type of threat and identified threat level to determine the appropriate level of protection. Figure E-1, page E-6, shows the steps to conduct a vulnerability assessment.

DETERMINE APPROPRIATE COUNTERMEASURES

E-24. Countermeasures are those measures taken by a unit or individual to counter a specific threat at a specific time and place. Countermeasures take many forms. They include specialized procedures, personal equipment, unit or team equipment, facilities, and training. They may require reorganization of land use, reorientation of roadways, security improvements to installation entries, and improvements to existing structures and the surrounding site area. They may also require the creation of specialized elements that are task-organized to mitigate threats, respond to threats, and recover from the aftermath of threats.
E-25. Some threats may require the identification of multiple scenarios, or alternatives, for achieving the desired goal. All alternatives should undergo a suitability analysis, which considers factors that may limit the feasibility of an action or project. Limiting factors consist of physical, resource, and political constraints, such as land area restrictions, limited availability of construction materials, and HN or civilian sensitivities. Examples of threat-specific countermeasures for CAO and CMO are in Table E-2, pages E-6 through E-8.

### Table E-2. Examples of threat-specific countermeasures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat ID</th>
<th>Threat Definition</th>
<th>Threat Level</th>
<th>Countermeasure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Areas</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal enclave</td>
<td>History of criminal violence against passers-through</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mitigation—Travel according to supported unit FP guidelines (2-man rule, 2-vehicle rule). Maintain situational awareness, weapons security, and radio contact with base unit. Identify patterns and methods of operation.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Response—Follow mission ROE. Notify base unit. Identify characteristics, personalities, and methods used by hostiles.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recovery—Return to base. Report any compromised information or equipment. Debrief. Refine policies, as necessary.</td>
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<td>Structures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chemical processes on adjacent property</td>
<td>Hazardous chemicals may spill, explode, or pollute the air</td>
<td>Low–Medium</td>
<td>Mitigation—Identify HAZMAT areas and pertinent safety precautions. Monitor HAZMAT situation. Coordinate with local and military HAZMAT managers to identify response plans and agency capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat ID</td>
<td>Threat Definition</td>
<td>Threat Level</td>
<td>Countermeasure</td>
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<td><strong>Structures (continued)</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical processes on adjacent property</td>
<td>Hazardous chemicals may spill, explode, or pollute the air</td>
<td>Low–Medium</td>
<td><strong>Response</strong>—Follow approved response plans. Report all information to base unit.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Recovery</strong>—Coordinate planning between organizations involved. Review response plans. Refine response plans, as necessary. Assist in upgrading response capabilities.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local militia or hostile community</td>
<td>Capability to organize and mobilize rapidly when provoked</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td><strong>Mitigation</strong>—Identify what provokes the community to become hostile or to mobilize the militia. Train the force in how not to provoke the community. Establish positive relationship with militia, political, law enforcement, and other leaders. Engage the populace with normal CAO. Establish a plan that includes assistance from local authorities.</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Response</strong>—Follow approved response plans. Perform as liaison between supported unit and local authorities to help diffuse the situation. Maintain awareness of personal security situation. Report all information to base unit.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Recovery</strong>—Conduct projects or other activities to reestablish or enhance a positive relationship between the force and the community. Refine response plans, as necessary.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorist organization</td>
<td>History of IED bombings against U.S. targets in region</td>
<td>Critical</td>
<td><strong>Mitigation</strong>—Engage the populace with normal CAO. Travel according to supported unit FP guidelines (two-man rule, two-vehicle rule). Maintain situational awareness, weapons security, and radio contact with base unit. Observe indicators among populace, such as excessive interest in military activities, unexplained or suspicious cancellation of civilian activities, and unusual movement of vehicles, materials, or people. Report observations to appropriate channels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat ID</td>
<td>Threat Definition</td>
<td>Threat Level</td>
<td>Countermeasure</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Organizations (continued)</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Terrorist organization | History of IED bombings against U.S. targets in region | Critical | **Response**—Take a protective posture according to unit SOP. Notify base unit. Identify characteristics, personalities, and methods used by aggressors.  
**Recovery**—Assist investigators as liaison between supported unit and local authorities. Refine SOP, as necessary. |
| **People** | | | |
| Thieves | Penetration of military facilities, vehicles, or personal space for equipment or information | Medium | **Mitigation**—Employ strict physical security, OPSEC, and personal security measures. Maintain situational awareness. Keep civilians no closer than one arm’s distance from Soldiers.  
**Response**—Review law enforcement and higher HQ reporting SOP. Review ROE regarding apprehension use of force.  
**Recovery**—Prosecute thieves according to appropriate law. Publicize incident through PSYOP and public information assets. Hold meeting with local authorities or public forum to discuss the implications of stealing equipment or information from military forces. Get commitment from local authorities to prevent future incidents. |
| **Events** | | | |
| Planned hostile demonstrations | History of violence against U.S. or coalition personnel and facilities | Medium | **Mitigation**—Engage the populace with normal CAO. Travel according to supported unit FP guidelines. Maintain situational awareness, weapons security, and radio contact with base unit. Observe indicators among populace. Report observations to appropriate channels.  
**Response**—Follow approved response plans. Perform as liaison between supported unit and local authorities to help diffuse the situation. Maintain awareness of personal security situation. Report all information to base unit.  
**Recovery**—Conduct projects or other activities to reestablish or enhance a positive relationship between the force and the community. Refine response plans, as necessary. |
E-26. CA Soldiers must remember that countermeasures are most effective when—
- Endorsed by the commander.
- Understood by all participants.
- War-gamed.
- Written into operations and contingency plans.
- Resourced.
- Exercised or rehearsed.

*Note.* Failure to achieve any of these reduces the chance a countermeasure will succeed.

**IMPLEMENT COUNTERMEASURES**

E-27. Implementation of countermeasures must occur as soon as possible after identification of a threat. The least costly, and often the most effective, protection measures are those incorporated during the planning phase. Implementing appropriate FP measures at the planning stage can preclude the need for piecemeal and costly security enhancements later.

**EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COUNTERMEASURES**

E-28. Over time, threats change as situations change. Countermeasures that may have been effective one day may no longer be effective the next day. As CA Soldiers conduct continuous assessments, they reevaluate the threat and the countermeasures arrayed against the threat. They develop new countermeasures as old ones are determined to be no longer effective. As before, CA Soldiers ensure the following concerning the new countermeasures:
- Commander endorses them.
- All participants understand them.
- They are war-gamed.
- They are written into OPLANs and CONPLANs.
- They are resourced.
- They are exercised or rehearsed.
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Appendix F

Techniques in Dislocated Civilian Operations

DC operations are a special category of PRC and the most basic collective task performed by CA Soldiers. The goals of DC operations are to minimize civilian interference with military operations and to protect civilians from combat operations. DC operations are part of the CMO plan, but because of expertise, CA operators need to be prepared to be the lead elements in DC operations. This appendix addresses techniques for meeting those goals.

OVERVIEW

F-1. People may become dislocated from their homes or villages for a variety of reasons in times of crisis. The following are some examples:

- Destructive forces (both natural and man-made) cause people from a devastated area to pursue sources of basic needs, such as food, water, shelter, security, and health care.
- Anticipation or expectancy that the government or infrastructure will not meet people’s basic needs in an impending disaster, causing voluntary or forced evacuation.
- Political or ethnic persecution force portions of a population to seek a friendlier environment.
- Enemy forces deliberately use civilians as shields, countermobility barriers, or disruptions to friendly operations.

F-2. Based on national policy directives and other political efforts, the theater commander provides directives on the care, control, and disposition of DCs. The operational force commander integrates the theater commander’s guidance with the ground tactical plan. At division and other subordinate command levels, the DC plan must—

- Allow for accomplishing the tasks assigned by the higher command echelon.
- Be within the restrictions imposed by the higher HQ.
- Guide the subordinate commands in the handling and routing of DCs.
- Ensure that all concerned parties (including the fire support coordination center and the S-3 or G-3) receive information on DC plans, routes, and areas of concentration.

F-3. DC plans support the OPLAN and require extensive coordination among operational, legal, logistics, interagency, HN, and international community planners. As a minimum, DC plans must address—

- Authorized extent of migration and evacuation.
- Minimum standards of care.
- Status and disposition of all DCs.
- Designation of routes and control measures for movement control.
- Cultural and dietary considerations.
- Designation and delegation of responsibilities.

TEMPLATING

F-4. There is no doctrinal template or rule of thumb for determining how many people of a certain area will leave their homes in response to actual or perceived threats and disasters. As illustrated above, every situation is different. Some people may be able to survive the situation in relative comfort and safety, while others may choose or be forced to leave their homes for relative comfort and safety elsewhere.
F-5. In the absence of a doctrinal template, DC planners conduct comprehensive civil IPB, using all the factors of METT-TC and ASCOPE, to analyze the DC situation. They consider the civil centers of gravity, civil decisive points, and civil lines of operation in their analysis.

F-6. DC planners use this analysis to create a series of civil situational templates (SITTEMPs). The first of the civil SITTEMPs describes civil dispositions under normal conditions and circumstances. The remaining civil SITTEMPs describe the possible COAs a populace, or portions of a populace, may take given certain criteria or stimuli. Ideally, the SITTEMPs will indicate the anticipated speed, direction, and flow pattern of DC movement (described later in this appendix).

F-7. DC templating is more of an art than a science. Planners will often need to call on knowledgeable representatives of various CA specialties to fully understand the civil environment. Examples of additional information requirements that may result from brainstorming are as follows:

- What is the status and resiliency of the civilian support infrastructure in the area?
- What is the level of preparedness for this type of situation (for example, how effective are the area’s emergency management or civil defense plans and resources)?
- Are there any political, economic, military, informational, demographic, historical, or other reasons that indicate the populace, or portions of the populace, may leave their homes?
- Are there any political, economic, military, informational, demographic, historical, or other reasons that indicate the populace, or portions of the populace, may remain in or near their homes?
- What conditions or actions might mitigate a DC problem and how can we influence the realization of those conditions or actions?

F-8. DC planning cannot occur in a vacuum. DC planners must make the DC templates available to other operational planners during problem-solving and decision-making processes. They must also coordinate with interagency, HN, and international community planners and participants as the situation and OPSEC requirements permit.

**MOVEMENT PLANNING FACTORS**

F-9. DC planners must consider several variables, or factors, when creating SITTEMPs for DC movements. These factors assume a controlled movement and apply to all DC movements regardless of type or size. Planners assume values for the variables, based on common sense, until verified by observation. For DCs moving through denied areas, planners should consider requesting unmanned aerial system support to determine actual values. DC movement planning factors include the following:

- Distance factors:
  - Dislocated civilian road space (DCRS): Used in determining time length (TL) of the DC column. DCRS consists of two parts: the space occupied by one DC alone and distance between another DC, and the sum of the distance between elements of a number of DC foot columns. (Total DCRS = road space [RS] [individual DC] + DCRS column distances).
  - DC column gap: The space between two organized DC elements following each other on the same route.
  - DC traffic density: The average number of DCs that occupy 1 km, expressed in DC/km.
  - Length of DC column: The length of roadway occupied by a column, including gaps, measured from front to rear inclusive.
  - Road gap: The distance between two DC march elements.

- Rate factors:
  - Speed: The actual rate of speed at a given moment.
  - Pace: The regulated speed of a DC column or element set by the column.
  - Rate of march: The average number of km traveled in any given period of time, including short delays or periodic halts. Expressed in kilometers per hour (km/h).
• Time factors (must be adjusted for demographic of column, health, and weather conditions):
  ■ Arrival time: The time when the head of the DC column arrives at a designated point.
  ■ Clearance time: The time when the last of a DC column passes a designated point.
  ■ Completion time: The time when the last element of a DC column passes a designated point.
  ■ Extra time allowance (EXTAL): Time added, based on assessment of situation, to the pass time.
  ■ Pass time: Actual time required for a DC column, from the first to the last element, to pass a given point.
  ■ Road clearance time: The total time a DC column requires to travel over and clear a section of road.
  ■ Time distance (TDIS): The time required to move from one point to another at a given rate of march.
  ■ Time gap: Time measured between rear and front of successive DC columns as they move past any given point.

• Formulas:
  ■ Distance = Rate x Time.
  ■ Distance/Time = Rate.
  ■ Distance/Rate = Time (or TDIS).

**Example.** Determine TDIS of a DC column moving on foot traveling 20 km at a rate of 4 km/h. TDIS = 20 km/4km/h = 5 hours.

**Note.** An EXTAL of 3 hours is added based on assessment of demographic (women, children, elderly) composition of the DC column and weather conditions. It is anticipated that the head of the DC column will arrive at completion point in approximately 8 hours.

• TL, Foot Column (Rate Formula):
  ■ 0 km/h TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0150.
  ■ 3.2 km/h TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0187.
  ■ 2.4 km/h TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0250.
  ■ 1.6 km/h TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0375.

**Note.** DC movement rate 4 km/h during day slows to 3.2 km/h at night. Cross-country DC movement rate 2.4 km/h during day slows to 1.6 km/h at night.

**Note.** Distance between DCs during day is 2 to 5 meters, 50 meters between columns. Distance between DCs during night is 1 to 3 meters, 25 meters between columns.
Appendix F

MOVEMENT GRAPH

F-10. A DC movement graph (Figure F-1) is a time-space diagram that visually depicts a DC movement from start point to completion point. It is used during the DC movement planning phase to integrate, coordinate, prevent congestion along the route of march, and deconflict route usage with the military highway regulation and traffic circulation plan. It is also used to prepare or check the DC road movement table. It shows the relative time and location of the head and tail of each DC march column at any point along the route, arrival and clearance times of DC columns at critical points, and restrictions and congestion in the network.

![Figure F-1. Dislocated civilian movement graph](image)

F-11. DC planners transfer information derived from march formulas or obtained from DC march tables directly to the graph. To complete the DC movement graph, planners must determine time-distance, arrival time, and pass time for each identified DC column based on data collected on organized DC columns.

MOVEMENT TABLE

F-12. A DC movement table is a convenient way of transmitting time schedules and other essential details of a DC move. The accompanying example (Figure F-2, page F-5) of a DC movement table is one of the formats that may be used to track the data. The following notes assist in the use of this format:

- Only the minimum number of headings should be used. Any information common to two or more movements under general data paragraphs of the DC movement annex should be included.
- Because the table may be issued to personnel concerned with control of traffic, the security aspect must be remembered. Including dates and locations may not be desirable.
- If the table is issued by itself and not as an annex to a detailed order, the table must be signed and authenticated in the normal way.
A critical point is a selected point along a route used for reference in giving instructions, coordinating for required support, and deconflicting, as required. It includes start points, collection points, and other points along a route where interference with military movement may occur or where timings are critical.

- The DC movement number (column) identifies a DC column (or element of a column) during the whole movement.
- To obtain due times for DC columns, DC planners transfer directly from the road movement graph or calculate using time-distance table and strip map.
- To obtain DC column clear times, DC planners add march unit pass time to due time.
- To complete the schedules for successive DC columns, DC planners add pass time plus graph time to due time.

**ANNEX (DC Movement Table) to OPORD # ______

**General Information:**

- a = DC Column #
- b = Date
- c = Estimated #DCs
- d = From
- e = To
- f = Route
- g = Route to SP
- h = Reference
- i = Due
- j = Clear
- k = Route to Camp
- l = Remarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>c</th>
<th>d</th>
<th>e</th>
<th>f</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Critical Points**

- a. Start Point
- b. Collection Point
- c. Assembly Areas
- d. Emergency Rest Areas
- e. Camp

![Figure F-2. Dislocated civilian movement table example](image)

**MITIGATING THE DISLOCATED CIVILIAN PROBLEM—DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CONTROL TECHNIQUES**

F-13. Once DC planners have identified the parameters of the expected DC situation, they must determine how to deal with the DC problem. Potential COAs include the following:

- Prevent or minimize dislocations.
- Bypass or ignore DCs.
- Control DC movement using various techniques.
- Use any combination of the above.
PREVENT OR MINIMIZE DISLOCATIONS

F-14. This COA involves executing populace control measures, such as a stay-put policy, curfew, and controlled evacuations. Each measure requires detailed assessment and planning, as well as coordination with and support of HN civil authorities and, at times, the international community. Public information and PSYOP assets will increase the chance of success.

STAY-PUT POLICY

F-15. A stay-put policy is, essentially, an order to citizens to stay within the confines of their homes, communities, or other defined boundaries. Successful execution of a stay-put policy requires that the citizens be provided with sufficient necessities of life (food, water, shelter, security, and health care, according to accepted international standards, such as the Sphere Project), during and after the period the policy is in effect. Mitigation measures conducted during predisaster emergency services programs (building individual and community survival shelters, stockpiling food and medicines, and conducting preparedness exercises) will enhance the willingness of citizens to abide by stay-put policies. Emergency response operations, such as the airlift of disaster relief into the populated area, may also be required.

F-16. The stay-put policy minimizes civilian interference with military operations and, just as importantly, minimizes civil collateral damage. HN authorities should enforce a stay-put policy whenever possible. When enforced by military forces, the policy requires an agreement among participating nations and the appropriate military command. This section provides guidance on what such agreements should or could contain.

GENERAL

F-17. This agreement should state that in matters concerning population movement, military commanders will always deal through and with the appropriate national commanders or authority. “Stay put” means that civil authorities will do everything in their power to stop DCs (also known as IDPs) in their own country—especially preventing them from passing from one country to another. Neighboring countries should cooperate closely to help in the implementation of this policy within common frontiers. If, for whatever reason, some movement does take place, the receiving country should do all in its power to hold DCs in appropriate areas and return them to the country from which they were displaced as soon as circumstances permit. Any such movement might gravely prejudice national, multinational, or coalition operations and the possibility of civilian survival.

F-18. In crisis and wartime, indigenous national authorities retain full responsibility for their populations, institutions, and resources unless otherwise arranged for by special agreement. Evacuations of populations in times of crisis short of war may become a necessity to ensure the population’s survivability and no less to ensure freedom of military operations. During crisis or wartime, civilian populations may start to move of their own volition and thus become DCs. Unless such movements are fully controlled by proper authorities and agencies, they may lead to chaos. National authorities shall take all possible steps—

- To prevent unauthorized population movement.
- To control and organize DCs should such movement occur.

F-19. Should refugee movements occur, commanders must cooperate with and assist national authorities in preventing such movements from interfering with military operations. National law normally dictates whether and under what conditions commands can take control of DC movements, if that is necessary for the achievement of their operational mission and for the protection and safety of the population. If commanders have such control, they will hand it back to the proper national authorities as soon as possible. All actions taken with respect to DCs must be in consonance with the applicable provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and other rules of the International Law of War—especially The Hague Land Warfare Conventions.
DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT

F-20. Commanders and national authorities must consider the overall problem of population movements against the background of the circumstances likely to prevail at the time. Panic and fear among the civilian population caused by weapon effects—including WMD—may induce large numbers of civilians to flee their homes and take to the roads. Should this happen, DCs would use all means of transport available. Unless controlled, they may—

- Interfere with military operations.
- Risk their lives.

F-21. All commanders must be aware of—

- The responsibilities of national authorities. The responsibility for all planning and implementation measures concerning population movements rests with the national authorities.
- Their own responsibilities. Commanders will—
  - Contact and assist national authorities to coordinate military planning with national planning and national implementation of measures concerning the evacuation of the civilian population and the control of refugee movements, as appropriate.
  - Assist, on request, national authorities in the implementation of the above plans, as long as they are compatible with the existing operational situation.
  - Assume control of population movements if so granted as described above.
  - Keep the appropriate national authorities advised of the development of operations.
  - Provide appropriate national authorities with information concerning the adverse effect of the refugee situation on the preparedness or operations of the military forces under their command.
  - Work with national authorities to obtain information concerning the population movement situation and associated matters, which could have adverse effects on the preparation and conduct of operations.

F-22. If the military assumes direct control of the population—is the last resort to ensure the safety of the population and the conduct of operations—the military commanders will inform higher HQ of the following:

- Period of assistance.
- Composition of military forces to be provided.
- C2 of these forces.
- Powers granted to the commanders of these forces (should be the same as those held by equivalent national authorities and must in any case ensure the security of the military forces).
- Any restrictions on the employment and conduct of military forces.
- Logistics support for the assistance of military forces where special measures are necessary.

CURFEWS

F-23. Curfews and other movement restrictions discourage unauthorized civilians from moving during certain times or into certain areas. These restrictions should be codified in a policy that is legal, practical, enforceable, and well publicized. Exceptions to the policy may be granted using a strict identification or pass system. In addition, restrictions should be enforced by a system of measures, including patrols, checkpoints, and roadblocks, or any combination thereof.

CONTROLLED EVACUATIONS

F-24. Controlled evacuations are a way of minimizing the chaos that exists when civilians will not or should not stay where they are. Forced dislocations may be appropriate to protect civilians from combat operations and impending natural disasters, such as hurricanes or volcanic eruption. They also may be appropriate to protect military operations, as in the removal of civilians from port areas or areas
Appendix F

adjacent to main supply routes to promote the efficiency of logistics operations and minimize the possibility of sabotage.

AVOIDANCE

F-25. Some military operations may dictate that DCs can or must be ignored or bypassed to ensure military success. An example is rapid offensive operations in which maintaining momentum is required. Commanders should consider the use of PSYOP leaflets or loudspeakers to instruct or bolster the morale of bypassed DCs.

F-26. The decision to bypass or ignore DCs depends on the factors of METT-TC and may require the approval of the chain of command. Bypassed or ignored DCs must eventually be controlled by some military or civilian organization in the AO. Since bypassed groups of DCs may include enemy infiltrators attempting to pass through friendly lines, the military or civilian organization must be prepared to take security and FP measures when assuming this control.

MOVEMENT CONTROL

F-27. DC movement must often be controlled to minimize interference with planned or ongoing military operations. Planners may use several techniques to control the movement of DCs. These techniques require detailed assessment and planning, as well as coordination with and support of HN civil authorities and, at times, the international community. These techniques include blocking, clearing, and collecting (Table F-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Measure</th>
<th>Effectiveness of Measure</th>
<th>Special Requirements</th>
<th>Personnel Resource Intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blocking</td>
<td>Medium–High</td>
<td>Conductive Terrain</td>
<td>Low–Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing</td>
<td>Low–Medium</td>
<td>Dedication Vehicle(s)</td>
<td>Low–Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting</td>
<td>Low–High</td>
<td>Special Training</td>
<td>High–Very High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BLOCKING

F-28. Blocking uses roadblocks, possibly supported by checkpoints, to prevent DCs from flowing onto roads or into areas essential for the conduct of military operations. Blocking involves preventing DCs from entering those areas and redirecting them to some other area, such as back to their homes or along a designated DC route. Depending on the security situation and other factors, civilians and their means of transport may or may not be searched at the blocking position.

F-29. The following questions must be considered when planning DC blocking operations:
- What are the likely timing, direction, route, rate, and flow of DCs? (This is required to mass forces when and where they are most needed.)
- Where is terrain that canalizes DCs?
- Does the ability exist to reinforce a roadblock under pressure?
- Does the flexibility exist to disengage on order?

CLEARING

F-30. Clearing directs DCs from main supply routes, alternate supply routes, and other areas of military significance to keep them from interfering with operations. Ordinary Soldiers or small, specialized teams at the small unit level clear DCs. Their sole purpose is to confront DCs, remove them from their current location, and orient them toward the location to which the commander wants them to go. In some cases, this may simply be the shoulder of the road.
F-31. Clearing is intended for fast-paced, unit-level operations. Clearing is not an effective method for large-scale DC operations. Clearing must be deliberately planned and integrated with other control techniques. Clearing is intended to push or direct DCs in specified directions, away from military operations, installations, or encampments, until they can be picked up by more organized DC operations, such as collecting.

F-32. Some of the challenges of clearing operations include the following:
   - Clearing is temporary in nature; units must continually sweep or chase new or returning DCs.
   - External support is often required to transmit the intended message in a way that the DCs will understand.
   - DCs present a continuing security concern for friendly forces (for example, potential for terrorist acts, such as car or suicide bombings).
   - Unit resources can be quickly overwhelmed if the numbers of DCs are great or the DCs need emergency assistance.

COLLECTING

F-33. Collecting provides positive control of concentrations of DCs at various holding areas to prevent them from interfering with operations and to foster care and processing. The collection plan is resource-intensive and must be coordinated and synchronized with operations, logistics, and security plans. Whenever possible, existing facilities, such as barns and warehouses, should be considered.

F-34. Collecting must also be planned and executed in collaboration with HN authorities and NGOs that specialize in public health, public safety, public communications, transportation, public works and utilities, and mass care and feeding. The main features of collecting are collection points, DC routes, assembly areas, and DC camps.

COLLECTION POINTS

F-35. These are temporary holding areas for gathering small numbers of DCs before moving onward along DC routes to assembly areas or DC camps. Units establishing DC collection points (commonly known as CIV on operational graphics) provide minimal emergency relief supplies that address only short-term (less than 1 day to 3 or 4 days) immediate needs (for example, water and trauma first aid).

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN ROUTES

F-36. DC routes are routes that offer protection to DCs. DC routes move DCs away from the main effort of military combat and logistics operations.

ASSEMBLY AREAS

F-37. Assembly areas are larger and more elaborate than collection points. They provide DCs with emergency relief, such as food, intermediate medical care, and temporary shelter. Designated personnel (military or civilians of the United States, HN, or international community) begin screening and registering DCs to identify family groups, determine points of origin and intended destinations, and other pertinent information. They also begin to segregate enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), hostile civilians, and deserters. Assembly areas are typically located in division rear areas and may host DCs for a week or longer. Authorities may decide to send DCs from assembly areas to camps, allow them to continue to their intended destination, or to return home. Assembly areas may evolve into DC camps, if required.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CAMPS

F-38. DC camps are semipermanent, carefully planned facilities. Administrators of DC camps prepare DCs for return to their homes, resettlement, repatriation, or other disposition. Host country authorities, NGOs, or IGOs normally administer DC camps. U.S. forces may temporarily administer them or assist when necessary. Designated personnel continue to detect hostile civilians who should be interned. Camp
administrators also begin examining and monitoring the DC population for disease. DCs should receive identification cards, records, food, clothing, and medical care in the camp. Camps are generally located in the division or corps communications zone or theater rear area. Figure F-3 shows a typical DC collection plan.

F-39. Ideally, HN authorities handle mass DC operations by implementing planned and rehearsed evacuation plans. When a military force assumes responsibility for planning DC operations, DC planners should consider incorporating HN assets in the planning and implementation of DC plans.

![Image of DC collection plan]

**Figure F-3. Typical dislocated civilian collection plan**

**ROUTE PLANNING**

F-40. Considerations with respect to the movement of civilians are as follows:

- **Selection of routes.** All DC movements take place on designated routes that are kept free of civilian congestion. When selecting routes for civilian movement, CA Soldiers must consider the types of transportation common to the area. They coordinate these routes with the traffic circulation plan proposed by the transportation officer and MP personnel.

- **Identification of routes.** After designating the movement routes, CA Soldiers mark them in languages and symbols the civilians, U.S. forces, and allied forces can understand. HN military and other allied military units can help mark the routes. PSYOP units can then instruct dislocated civilians to use certain routes to avoid congestion as much as possible and where to go in order to safely arrive at designated sheltering areas.

- **Control and assembly points.** After selecting and marking the movement routes, CA and HN authorities establish control and assembly points at selected key intersections. The G-9 or S-9
coordinates with the provost marshal, the movement control center, and the G-4 for the locations of these points for inclusion in the traffic circulation plan.

- **Emergency rest areas.** CA Soldiers set up emergency rest areas at congested points to provide for the immediate needs of the DCs. These needs include water, food, fuel, maintenance, and medical services.

- **Local and national agencies.** Use of local and national agencies is essential for three reasons. First, it conserves military resources. Second, civilian authorities normally have legal status and are best equipped to handle their own people. Third, the use of local personnel reduces the need for interpreters or translators.

F-41. When routing DC movements, CMO planners should consider three fundamentals and four principles that govern routing. The three fundamentals that govern routing are—

- **Balance.** The process of matching DC column characteristics with route characteristics. Balance ensures that DC traffic never routinely exceeds the most limiting features of a route. Balancing also identifies requirements for upgrading routes or ordering cautions for certain areas along the route. Route characteristics are identified during the planning process.

- **Separation.** The process of allocating road space for movements to ensure that movements do not conflict. The goal of separation is to reduce the potential for congestion.

- **Distribution.** The process of allocating as many routes as possible to reduce the potential for congestion. Distribution also promotes passive security by distributing and separating traffic.

F-42. The four principles that govern routing are as follows:

- Assign highest priority traffic to routes that provide the minimum time-distance.
- Consider sustainability of route network when assigning movements.
- Separate motor movements from pedestrian movements.
- Separate civilian traffic (vehicular or pedestrian) from military movements.

F-43. Effective routing of DCs requires a detailed understanding of the military highway regulation and traffic circulation plan. Route classification and traffic control measures currently in use by military movement control agencies are applicable during the planning and execution of DC operations. These measures include—

- Open routes.
- Supervised routes.
- Dispatch routes.
- Reserved routes.
- Prohibited routes.

F-44. OPSEC considerations are important. Planned DC routes may be an indicator for the location of the main effort in the attack or defense. By attempting to minimize interference by DCs with military operations, planners may inadvertently disclose the location of the main effort. Because opposing forces seek to discover seams and boundaries to exploit them, DC planners should not consistently move DCs along seams or unit boundaries. The example in Figure F-4, pages F-12 and F-13, discusses DC road space usage calculations.

**COMBINED DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CONTROL METHODS**

F-45. An analysis of METT-TC may indicate that several of the DC control methods may be required simultaneously or sequentially. In a port city, for example, the people in a predominantly neutral area may be ordered to stay in their neighborhoods and conform to such restrictions as curfews. Meanwhile, civilians in a hostile section of the city may be quarantined (no one may enter or leave without permission and escort), and those in the areas closest to critical port facilities and adjoining the main inland supply routes may be selectively evacuated.
1. TASK. Visualize, describe, and direct DC operations.

2. FACT. The city of An Nasiriyah is key to the Corps’ river crossing operation. The population of An Nasiriyah is approximately 400,000.

3. VISUALIZE DC FLOW. Will DCs displace north as opposing forces move north; will DCs displace south into path of friendly forces moving north; or will DCs displace east or west? Assess likelihood of DCs moving south into a fight or away from a fight. Assess percentage of total numbers of DCs that will move north, south, east, or west. Divide AOR into zones based on operational phase for ease of computation and assessment.

4. DESCRIBE. Apply concept of elasticity to determine approximate DCs. Concept of elasticity states that 50% of an urban area must be destroyed before 20% of a given population departs the area.
   a. Application of concept of elasticity. Total population of An Nasiriyah is estimated at 400,000. If 50% of An Nasiriyah is destroyed, then we can expect 20% of the population to depart the area. Additionally, concept of elasticity states that food is less elastic than housing. A food shortage will cause people to depart an area in search of food.
   b. Formula. 400,000 x 20% = 80,000 expected DCs departing the An Nasiriyah metropolitan area.
   c. Subtract percentage of total estimated number of DCs that are assessed to move north, east, west, or south. Out of 80,000 expected DCs to depart An Nasiriyah, 40% are assessed to depart with opposing forces displacing north, 20% to move east due to affiliation with coreligionists, 10% west, and 30% south to search for food.
   d. Calculations.
      - 80,000 x 40% move north = 32,000 DCs
      - 80,000 x 20% move east = 16,000 DCs
      - 80,000 x 10% move west = 8,000 DCs
      - 80,000 x 30% move south = 24,000 DCs
   e. Assessment. The 320,000 persons remaining in An Nasiriyah will be engaged with IO to support stay-put objective. Concept of elasticity suggests that the availability of food is less elastic than housing, and if food is supplied in a timely manner it will assist in keeping the population in place. Coordination for delivery of food and medical supplies forward into vicinity of An Nasiriyah supports enforcement of stay-put policy.
   f. Describe DC columns. Depict what DC columns will look like and the amount of RS the columns will utilize. Apply road usage formula in DC Model.
      1. Step 1. Determine optimum size of DC column (packet) based on control and sustainability (DC road network) considerations. Divide 24,000 by number of DCs determined to be optimum size of a DC column for control and sustainability. Example: If 2,000 DCs is optimum size then 24,000/2,000 DCs = 12 DC columns; if 1,000 DCs, then 24,000/1,000 DCs = 24 columns; if 500, then 24,000/500 DCs = 48 DC columns; if 250, then 24,000/250 DCs = 96 columns.
      2. Step 2. Determine RS usage of DC columns. Measurement is based on a 2–5 meter distance between DCs during the day and 50 meters between columns and 1–3 meter distance between DCs at night and 25 meter distance between columns.
         Example: To determine the RS requirement for 12 x DC columns of 2,000 (4 x 5,000 DCs) during the day, multiply:
         - 4 x DC columns x 2 meters = 8 meters wide.

Figure F-4. Example of dislocated civilian road space usage calculations
(b) Divide 2,000 DCs by 4 (column of four): $2,000/4 = 500$ DCs per file x 2 meters separation between DCs = 1,000 meters for one DC column.
(c) DC column of 2,000 DCs is approximately 8 meters wide and 1,000 meters long.
(d) Multiply DC column length x number of columns: $1,000$ meters x 12 = 12,000 meters long, divided by 1,000 meters = 12 km.
(e) Add 50 meters between columns during day moves: 12 columns x 50 meters = 600 meters.
(f) Total RS requirement of all DC columns = 12.6 km.
(3) Step 3. Determine TDIS rates of DC columns. Example: To determine TDIS rates, divide the distance between stops by the rate of march of the DC column in km/h. DC column movement rate is 4 km/h during the day.
(a) The TDIS of a DC column moving on foot traveling 20 km at a rate of 4 km/h = 20 km/4 = 5 hours. Add EXTAL if assessment of demographic (women, children, elderly, medical condition) composition of DC column and weather conditions warrant.
(b) Compute DC moves for all columns for total DC operations timeline.
(c) Multiply 5 hours x 12 DC columns = 60 hours or 7.5 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 5 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 3 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.
(d) Multiply 5 hours x 24 DC columns = 120 hours or 15 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 10 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 7 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.
(e) Multiply 5 hours x 48 DC columns = 240 hours or 30 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 20 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 13 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.
(f) Multiply 5 hours x 96 DC columns = 480 hours or 60 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 40 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 27 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

5. DIRECT. Based on the various DC operation timelines above, coordinate and direct DC movements on established DC route network IAW routing fundamentals. Apply combination of blocking, redirecting, clearing, or collecting DCs, as appropriate. Coordinate, integrate, and regulate DC operations with IO, movement control, medical command, MP, rear operations center (ROC), and G-2. Coordinate and integrate NGOs, as required.

Figure F-4. Example of dislocated civilian road space usage calculations (continued)

**TASK FORCE CONTROL**

F-46. One technique for controlling DCs in a tactical AO is to organize organic forces into a TF specifically tailored for this mission, known generically as TF DC control. This TF has four imperatives:
- Implement an integrated system of control.
- Help provide life saving and life sustaining care, such as oral rehydration therapy (ORT) and water.
- Help process civilians to determine their identity and status and to collect military and civil-military information.
- Transition control operations in an orderly manner.

F-47. Generic TF DC control is a combined arms force revolving around general purpose (GP) teams of Infantry with MP, PSYOP specialists, and CA specialists or CA-trained personnel. GP teams control civilians by the basic techniques of blocking, clearing, and collecting described earlier.
F-48. The basic action element for blocking and collecting is the same—a GP block and collect team of one Infantry squad with organic armored vehicle (if mechanized), one MP team with organic vehicle, one tactical Psychological Operations team (TPT), and one tactical CAT or several CA-trained personnel. The basic action element for clearing is the GP clearing team, consisting of one MP team with organic vehicle and one TPT. TF DC Control may modify one or more GP teams based on the civil-military situation and its tasks, the terrain, and the assets available (for example, using an MP squad instead of an MP team as a basic building block of all GP teams or augmenting the teams with combat engineers).

F-49. Generic TF DC control also has five special purpose teams, each designed to accomplish particular missions requiring special training or equipment. Figure F-5, page F-15, depicts the basic equipment the various teams should have to perform their tasks. The five teams are as follows:

- **Negotiation team.** The primary purpose of the negotiation team is to assist in intense negotiations that have a potential for creation or expansion of unrest or may result in highly adverse public perceptions beyond the battlefield. Negotiations include meetings with civil leaders, but not hostage incidents—hostage rescue and similar means of resolving a hostage situation are beyond the scope of generic TF DC control. Instead, one goal of negotiation is to contain the incident or issue. By containing the incident or issue, the incident does not adversely or unduly influence the populace. The second goal of negotiation is to resolve the incident or issue peacefully, if possible, so that civilian lives are not unduly jeopardized and the incident does not become a focus of the local or international news media.

- **Special reaction team (sniper).** The primary purpose of the special reaction team (sniper) is to neutralize special threats effectively and safely as they arise in blocking, clearing, and collecting operations. Another purpose is to support the apprehension of troublemakers and ringleaders by a team assigned to snatch them from a crowd. However, apprehending a suspect in other circumstances is beyond the scope of generic TF DC control.

- **Special reaction team (armored vehicles).** The primary purposes of the special reaction team (armored vehicles) are to conduct show-of-force operations (especially at road blocks), protect TF elements and any civilians in their charge, and assist the TF, as needed, to include the execution of snatch apprehensions in crowds.

- **Medical care team.** The primary purposes of the medical care team are to respond quickly to civilian mass casualties (MASCAL) to begin triage and coordinate further MASCAL response with the surgeon from the parent unit and medical operations center, or the equivalent, and to provide medical care above the level of emergency first aid, as needed by the TF.

- **CI team.** The primary purpose of the CI team is to exploit the potential for military and civil-military information from civilians encountered by the TF. CI agents are often fluent in the primary language of the AO or come with a translator, and the TF always needs a few translators. Moreover, there is a synergy to be gained when CI and CA work together. CA, CI, and PSYOP form a strong triad within TF DC control and for the parent JTF.

**PLANNING DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CONTROL MEASURES**

F-50. The senior commander in the AO provides guidance pertaining to the designation of DC control measures. Typically, this guidance provides for bottom-up or top-down planning.

**BOTTOM-UP PLANNING**

F-51. In bottom-up planning, each subordinate unit commander selects routes for movement of DCs and tentative DC collection points within his designated unit boundaries. His staff sends this information up to the next level commander for consolidation into his DC plan. The senior commander’s staff deconflicts duplication and sends the approved plan back to subordinate commanders for implementation.
Techniques in Dislocated Civilian Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>GP Block/Collect Team</th>
<th>GP Clear Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vehicles</strong></td>
<td>MP vehicle and Infantry or Combat Engineer vehicle, supplemented by vehicles obtained through foreign nation support.</td>
<td>MP vehicle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Materials</strong></td>
<td>Pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum [OC]) with ultraviolet identification dye for marking individuals and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion.</td>
<td>Pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum [OC]) with ultraviolet identification dye for marking individuals and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CS riot-control agent (RCA) with means of mass dispersion, such as M-203.</td>
<td>CS riot-control agent (RCA) with means of mass dispersion, such as M-203.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flashbangs, riot batons, riot gear, and other crowd-control equipment.</td>
<td>Flashbangs, riot batons, riot gear, and other crowd-control equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flex-cuffs or cable ties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Care Materials</strong></td>
<td>Water/cups for thirst and RCA flushing.</td>
<td>Water/cups for thirst and RCA flushing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ORT mixes/ingredients.</td>
<td>ORT mixes/ingredients.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency medical kits.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian rations (emergency only).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Security</strong></td>
<td>Lethal weapons (organic).</td>
<td>Lethal weapons (organic).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Magic wand metal detector.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undercarriage inspection device.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barrier Materials</strong></td>
<td>Concertina wire and gloves.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>Loudspeaker with approved, tape-recorded messages.</td>
<td>Loudspeaker with approved, tape-recorded messages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure F-5. Basic equipment of general purpose teams

TOP-DOWN PLANNING

F-52. The senior commander may designate and assign specific routes and collection points to subordinate units for implementation based on METT-TC. This action does not preclude the subordinate commander from adding to the plan as he sees fit. The subordinate commander’s staff forwards additional control measures to the senior commander to allow the senior commander’s staff to refine his plan.

F-53. Whatever the planning method, commanders responsible for implementing DC control measures ensure the measures are known to all participants and, as applicable, are fully resourced for their intended purpose. Commanders also ensure those Soldiers and civilians who man DC collection points, areas, and camps are trained and rehearsed to perform their duties. Figure F-6, pages F-16 through F-19, provides a sample DC plan format.
Reference: Map, series (number), (name), sheet (number and name), edition _____, (scale).

a. Status of forces agreements in effect.

b. CA agreements in effect.

c. Other OPLANs or intelligence summaries.

Time zone used throughout the order: _____.

Task Organization: This paragraph should show any specially organized units or elements required for the execution of DC operations (for example: liaison teams or contact teams).

1. SITUATION:

a. GENERAL: This should include an overall description of the DC situation with a brief description of primary causes of the problem.

b. ENEMY: This should include an analysis of any enemy actions or capabilities as they affect the DC situation. Examples:

   (1) Enemy has chemical or nuclear capability and decontamination units have been seen in a certain area.

   (2) Enemy infiltrators have been discovered in adjacent areas posing as DCs.

c. FRIENDLY: This will, hopefully, be an extensive paragraph describing the location, current operations, and capabilities of any friendly unit or civil organization that is supporting or could support DC operations. Examples:

   (1) HN:

       (a) Police have control of all roads in area.

       (b) Civil defense organization is currently functioning to full capability and has total control in towns of _____.

       (c) Local hospitals include:

           1. _____ with 180 beds at vicinity (vic).

           2. _____ with 300 beds at vic _____.

           3. _____ with 100 beds at vic _____.

           A shortage of Betadine is expected.

   (2) U.S. nonmilitary:

       (a) Peace Corps headquartered at vic _____ has stored blankets and clothing for 5,000 personnel.

       (b) American Red Cross has capability to assist with medical supplies and food.

Figure F-6. Sample dislocated civilian plan format
(3) U.S. military:

(a) DC camp operation is corps rear area at vic _____. CA BN is currently expanding to second camp at vic _____.

(b) CA CO operating additional assembly area at vic _____ for processing before transporting to civilian-run camps.

(c) Transportation BN providing transportation from division assembly to civilian DC camps.

d. ASSUMPTIONS: This should include any pertinent assumptions made during the estimate of the situation. Examples:

(1) Expected number of DCs.

(2) Expected locations and directions of movements.

(3) Expected problem areas.

(4) Expected degree of military support required:
   (a) Medical.
   (b) Subsistence.
   (c) Transportation.

(5) Will local government be viable entity?

(6) Will CA agreements remain in effect?

(7) Will there be a language communication gap?

(8) What will the attitude of civilians be toward the U.S. efforts?

2. MISSION: This should state the objectives of the specific DC plan. Examples (one or more of the following):

a. Reduce interference with military operations.

b. Relieve destitute conditions of DCs encountered in battle area.

c. Evacuate an area pursuant to military operations.

d. Control disease or health problems.

e. Be prepared to assume control of or establish more extensive DC operations in the absence of civilian participants, such as DC camps.
3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of operations. A general statement of intent of how the plan will be accomplished. A description of the DC flow should include collection points, routes (primary and alternate), assembly areas and, if necessary, DC camps. Hopefully, the involvement of military personnel will be minimal. If, however, any major subordinate units have missions that are key to the plan, they should be included.

(Subordinate unit paragraph)

These paragraphs should include assigned or be-prepared missions enumerated for each subordinate unit. Included below are some examples of missions that could be considered for assignment to subordinate units.

b. 1st BDE: Establish collection points at vic _____.

c. 2d BDE: Operate checkpoints at road junction vic _____.

d. 3d BDE: Welfare action at collection points (water, food, medical aid).

e. Medical BN:

(1) Provide two medical teams to collocate with CATs at the assembly area vic _____.
(2) Be prepared to provide additional medical support, on order.

f. Supply and transportation BN:

(1) Be prepared to provide one truck squad to transport DCs.
(2) Be prepared to provide 5,000 meals a day, on order, assembly area at vic _____.

g. MP:

(1) Maintain free-flow of traffic along main supply route.
(2) Establish liaison through CA unit with civil police.

h. Signal BN: Provide wire from the assembly area at vic _____ to CMOC at vic _____.

i. CA:

(1) Supervise DC operations under G-9.
(2) Maintain liaison with civilian DC operations.

j. PSYOP: Assist CA units with printing, publishing, and language expertise.

k. Engineers:

(1) Clear obstacles on DC routes.
(2) Transport and purify water.

l. Chaplain.
Techniques in Dislocated Civilian Operations

m. Coordinating instructions: This should include any specific reports or procedures not covered in the various SOPs. Examples:

(1) Displaced persons from _____ should be routed to _____ MI detachment for questioning.

(2) Persons identified as city officials of _____ should be treated as VIPs and provided transportation to the CMOC as soon as possible.

(3) Traffic control: Coordinate all traffic along main supply route on traffic control net.

(4) Cultural DOs and DON'Ts: These can be identified from area studies concerning the specific area.

(5) EPW handling instructions: (treatment).

(6) Disarming of civilians.

(7) Possessions allowed to be transported.

(8) Use of DCs as labor.

(9) Where is CA authority retained? (Division or delegated down to BDE?)

4. SERVICE SUPPORT: This section should include a summary of resources that have been identified as necessary and assigned. Also, if any resources have been identified as critical or short, they should be mentioned.

   a. Supply: Distribution of captured enemy supplies (food, medical).

   b. Transportation: Required vehicles.

   c. Medical: Medical considerations for wounded DCs.

5. COMMAND and SIGNAL:

   a. Command:

      (Examples):

      (1) CMOC locations—grid _____.

      (2) POCs for various agencies, police departments, and civilian officials.

      (3) POCs for major subordinate HQ.

   b. Signal:

      (Examples):

      (1) Route marking—primary route for DC movement is marked by red triangles; alternate route is marked by yellow circles.

      (2) Radio nets—DC control net is G-9 alternate net. Net control station is G-9 CMOC.

Figure F-6. Sample dislocated civilian plan format (continued)
COMMUNICATION

F-54. Persuading people to comply with the terms of a DC plan is often a difficult endeavor. HN public information programs and PSYOP assets may assist by providing mass media broadcasts, loudspeakers with prerecorded messages, signs (with culturally correct graphics), and leaflets.

F-55. The following messages, prerecorded in the dominant language of the AO, are useful for controlling civilians in tactical situations:

- **Standard roadblock recording:**
  - This is a roadblock.
  - For your safety, you will not be allowed to pass this point.
  - Return to your homes.
- **Standard clearing recording:**
  - Stay off the road.
  - Get out of this area.
  - If you do not comply, you will be detained or arrested.
  - Return to your homes.
- **Standard recording for a DC collection point:**
  - This is a civilian collection point.
  - You will not be harmed.
  - Everyone will be searched. Vehicles will be searched and parked. Some belongings may be taken from you temporarily for everyone’s safety.
  - Water and emergency medical care will be provided to you after you have been searched.
  - If we take any of your belongings, you will receive a receipt. If any of your belongings for which you have a receipt are not returned to you, you will be compensated for them.

F-56. The recordings should also be printed in English and the predominant language of the AO on 3 x 5 cards which can be used to “point and talk” by number. A well-prepared DC control site will have the same words in the same order on a large sign.

F-57. There are 10 words or phrases that every Soldier should be able to say in the dominant language of the AO. “Put down your weapon” and other phrases are also important, but “hands up” is a simpler way to express surrender, control, and related concepts. The 10 words or phrases are—

- Go.
- Stop.
- Hands up.
- Right.
- Left.
- Stand.
- Sit.
- Yes.
- No.
- Water.

TECHNIQUES FOR DISLOCATED CIVILIAN COLLECTION POINTS

F-58. A technique for designating hasty sites to control noncombatants and other groups is the quadrant method. By this method, each quadrant of a crossroads may be designated for a likely group or purpose, as depicted in Figure F-7, page F-21. In this example, West is designated as a hasty collection point (civilian); Northeast is designated as a hasty EPW or detainee site; Southeast is designated as a hasty casualty collection point (CCP); and Southwest as a multipurpose quadrant for maintenance, supplies, and other purposes.
F-59. Each control point is located 50 to 100 meters from the roads to keep the groups sufficiently separated. This distance improves the safety and security of each group, minimizes manpower requirements, and reduces potential for terrorism by keeping people a reasonable distance from passing troops. Prior training and rudimentary supplies, including water cans or water bottles and large quantities of chemical lights, facilitate the day and night operation of a hasty DC collection point.

F-60. Upon activation of a hasty DC collection point, designated personnel transform the site into a deliberate DC collection point. The following are five key tasks that must be accomplished at a deliberate DC collection point:

- Security (1).
- Processing (2).
- HA (3).
- Disposition (4).
- Handoff (5).

F-61. Figure F-8, page F-22, shows these key tasks. The numbers following the key tasks listed above are keyed to the numbers in Figure F-8. The following paragraphs discuss the key tasks in detail.

**Local Security**

F-62. The collection point should be located so that DCs will not suffer any greater exposure to the effects of combat than would exist for them away from the collection point. Local security should be established to protect the occupants, persons operating the collection point, and friendly troops adjacent to or passing by the collection point. Guards should be posted at the entrance and exit of the collection point and given special orders, as required.
PHYSICAL SECURITY WITHIN THE COLLECTION POINT, TO INCLUDE VEHICLE SEARCH AND DISLOCATED CIVILIAN SEARCH

F-63. This task requires setting up special purpose areas within the collection point and following certain procedures. CA Soldiers—

- Ensure that all private automobiles, public conveyances, and the like (including livestock and carts) are parked outside or on the fringes of the collection point in the vehicle search area until they have been searched, and make all passengers dismount.
- Direct passengers to the DC search area.
- Make the driver remain with the vehicle until it is searched. Designated personnel search the vehicle. If an undercarriage observation device is available, it is used. When the search is over, the driver and the searchers together move the vehicle, livestock, or cart to the vehicle hold area.

F-64. Many vehicles will contain household goods, suitcases, and other items. These vehicles should be searched for bombs and other dangerous items if the vehicle holding area is within 50 meters of the people holding area. Searching for contraband is not standard procedure, but it may be mandatory under the OPORD or by special orders. Searchers inform the driver that once the vehicle is searched, it will be secured and placed off limits so that no DC will be allowed to retrieve any of the items in the vehicle. Searchers communicate as described above. Searchers treat livestock as vehicles, and treat pets as livestock.
if this does not create more problems than it avoids. A searcher then escorts the driver to the DC search area. Designated personnel—

- Search DCs and their belongings for prohibited items.
- Vary search methods. A quick pat-down is used for some people. A more invasive search is done for others. If a handheld metal detector is available, its use will expedite the searches. Any property taken under the searcher’s control is tagged and a copy given to the owner. A field property control card should be used, and an explanation card should be issued, as necessary.
- Always use trained personnel to perform searches. If possible, females search females, infants, and little boys. If a female searcher is not at the collection point but can arrive there in a reasonable time, these searches are deferred until she arrives. The unsearched people are set aside until then so that they do not pose a clear and present potential danger to others. If a female searcher cannot be obtained, a trained male searcher should do the search using the back-of-the-hand technique if its use is not contrary to orders and special security concerns require a search.
- Always use a searcher (unarmed) and an overwatcher (armed). They must be trained in these skills and to work together.

**DISLOCATED CIVILIAN PROCESSING AND PROPERTY CONTROL**

F-65. This part of operating a deliberate DC collection point may be deferred for a while, but full waiver is not advisable as a general practice. DC processing consists of two stages. All persons go through stage one. Stage two may be deferred or delayed, may be reserved for certain people, or may not take place at all.

**Stage One Processing**

F-66. This is the quick screen to identify EPWs and others (civilian internees and detainees) that must be segregated immediately from everyone else. This processing may be done without a translator. Searchers should beware of irregulars and infiltrators trying to pass as civilians. Upon discovery, all EPWs, civilian internees, and detainees are placed in the short-term detainee holding area. Normally, anyone who is causing a problem at the collection point is detained. Although civilian internees and detainees should be further segregated from EPWs, rarely is the time or resources available to do this.

F-67. Consistent with orders, searchers take control of all items that may cause harm to the team, friendly forces passing the collection point, or the DCs. In addition, searchers confiscate and tag all items that noncombatants are not permitted to have according to U.S. or HN policy.

F-68. If available, a field property control card is affixed to the vehicle or animal. The field property control card contains, at a minimum, the following information: the DC collection point number, the date, the seized item quantity, the seized item description, and a signature block for the collection point OIC or NCOIC. A copy is given to the driver.

**Stage Two Processing**

F-69. This stage is intended to help more finely categorize DCs (for example, determining if anyone is a U.S. citizen), to reunite families within the collection point, to identify persons of influence, and to obtain information (from equipment, weapons, papers, and discussions) that may have intelligence value. This processing is done when the time and resources are available—it is not a high priority. A translator is almost always required.

**LIMITED SERVICES (FOOD, WATER, SHELTER, AND SANITATION)**

F-70. Services at a DC collection point may range from immediate care (attention to life-threatening conditions) to ancillary care (including food), depending on need and resources. However, only water and immediate medical care are mandatory, and only to the extent they are emergency services provided consistent with the legal and moral obligations of the commander. Services are not provided to a DC until
after he has undergone the quick-screen stage of processing, except for emergency care needed to prevent loss of life (death imminent). CA Soldiers should—

- Treat life-threatening emergencies, such as first aid for traumatic injuries and ORT for dehydrated infants.
- Provide water as a preventive measure if an adequate supply is available for this purpose.
- Allow occupants to relieve themselves. CA Soldiers should provide one place for males and one for females and basic equipment (such as shovels and latrine expedient) to permit and encourage the occupants themselves to prepare rudimentary sanitation facilities (slit trenches). Occupants must be supervised.
- Give out food only to occupants who have been at the collection point 24 hours or more. Food handed out more generously can become a “pull factor.” Also, CA Soldiers should be aware that certain MRE items may be forbidden or inappropriate by religion or culture, or may be so rich that they cause immediate sickness to malnourished people. (Yellow-packaged international humanitarian rations are safe.)
- Provide other services consistent with the commander’s legal, moral, and mission-specific obligations and requirements.

F-71. The following historical example, which discusses sanitation, originates from notes of a CA Soldier who served in Operation DESERT STORM.

### Lesson Learned During Operation DESERT STORM

When disposing of waste, the burning procedure used in Vietnam would not work because the Moslem population has the habit of cleaning themselves with water. Therefore, instead of waste, there was a high level of water or waste liquid. This material would not burn. Consequently, the recommended procedure was to have a deep hole where the waste could be disposed of and allowed to dry out. Once dry, the waste was usually burned or buried.

### RESOLUTION OR DISPOSITION OF EACH DISLOCATED CIVILIAN

F-72. Once a DC collection point is operational, there are four possible outcomes for the collection point operators:

- Retain control of the collection point, recognizing that moral obligations to DCs at the collection point increase with time.
- Close down the collection point by releasing the DCs from it, if warranted by the tactical situation and other factors.
- Arrange for movement of the DCs to another holding area, such as a civilian assembly area.
- Hand off collection point operations to other operators (such as a support unit or the HN), which is the most likely outcome for infantry units on the move.

### DISLOCATED CIVILIAN COLLECTION POINT HANDOFF

F-73. As a unit moves out of an area, it must be prepared to hand off (transition) any active DC collection point to follow-on forces. Ideally, these forces will include trained CA operators; however, they may not. In either case, the outgoing unit must be prepared to fully brief the follow-on forces on the operation of the collection point.

### Briefing

F-74. The DC collection point OIC or NCOIC should personally brief the OIC or NCOIC of follow-on forces. He should note the date-time group of the handoff; the name, rank, and position of the person to
whom the handoff was made; and a summary of the information provided. The transition briefing should cover—

- EPWs.
- U.S., allied, and coalition soldiers.
- Civilian internees and detainees.
- Civilians who are U.S. citizens or contractors.
- Civilians who may be useful as centers of influence.
- The tactical situation and intelligence (or unprocessed information) as they concern threats to the DC collection point.
- Medical emergencies.
- Controlled property.
- Any special, additional information peculiar to the DC collection point.

**Controlled Property**

F-75. Units have several disposition options for controlled property. Depending on the property category, units may retain control of it, return it to the persons from which it was taken, do a combination of all three, or hand it over to other forces or agencies (such as local law enforcement or follow-on forces taking control of the DC collection point). Unit commanders act according to their moral and legal obligations, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each option.

**Transferring Control**

F-76. To transfer control of this property, units must fill out a property control register listing all the items controlled and have an official of the follow-on forces sign for the items and a copy of the register itself by using DA Form 3161 (Request for Issue or Turn-In).

**Retaining Control**

F-77. If units take the property with them (it must be taken if no one will sign for it and return is not an option), they should give the owner an official receipt (such as DA Form 3161), explain the unit’s intention for the property, and explain the owner’s rights and procedure requirements for compensation. This reiteration of rights reassures the owners and helps ensure a smooth handoff.

**Evacuation Planning**

F-78. Evacuation creates serious problems and should only be a last resort. U.S. doctrine states that only a division or higher commander can order an evacuation. When the commander decides to evacuate a community, CA planners must make detailed plans to prevent uncontrolled groups from disrupting the movement of military units and supplies. Considerations in mass evacuation planning include—

- **Transportation.** CA planners plan for the maximum use of civilian transportation.
- **Security.** CA Soldiers assist the G-2 in security screening and documentation of evacuees. Since the civilians are being removed from the area where they can best take care of themselves, the military provides security for them after evacuation. The military also provides for the security of all civilian property left behind, including farm animals, pets, and other possessions.
- **Documentation.** In some circumstances, evacuees may need identification documents showing, as a minimum, the name and locality from which they were evacuated. As a control technique, CA Soldiers may prepare a manifest that lists evacuees for movement.
- **Briefing.** Before movement, the movement control officer briefs evacuees. The briefer uses leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other means available. This briefing explains the details of the move, such as restrictions on personal belongings, organization for movement, and movement schedules.
- **Rations.** For a movement lasting no more than 2 days, supply personnel issue rations to each evacuee at the time of departure or at designated points en route.
Health care. The public health team makes maximum use of civilian medical personnel, equipment, and supplies to care for the health and physical well-being of the evacuees. Military medical personnel, equipment, and supplies can be used as supplements, if necessary. The public health team or surgeon’s staff takes proper steps before the movement to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

Return. Evacuation plans also provide for the evacuees’ eventual return and criteria for determining the duration of their absence.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CAMP CONSIDERATIONS

F-79. To successfully operate a camp, CA Soldiers must consider many items. The following paragraphs discuss these considerations.

FACILITIES

F-80. When large groups of civilians must be quartered for a temporary period (less than 6 months) or on a semipermanent basis (more than 6 months), CA units establish camps. HN personnel usually direct the administration and operation of a camp. CA units provide technical advice, support, and assistance, depending on the requirements. They may also furnish additional detachments and functional teams or specialists to resolve public health, public welfare, or public safety problems at any particular camp. Minimum considerations include—

- Camp control, construction, administration, screening, medical care, and sanitation.
- Security.
- Supply.
- Transportation.
- Information dissemination.
- Liaison with other agencies.

CAMP CONTROL

F-81. Control of the people is the key to successful camp operations. To meet U.S. obligations under international law, CA Soldiers ensure the efficient and effective administration of camps. Camp control also includes measures to reduce waste and to avoid duplication of effort. CA Soldiers must quickly and fairly establish and maintain discipline when administering DC camps. They must publish and enforce camp rules of conduct. Camp administrators are the single point of contact, coordinating all internal camp matters and external matters with organizations or agencies. Camp rules should be brief and kept to a minimum.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CAMP LOCATION AND CONSTRUCTION

F-82. The most manageable number of people in a camp is 5,000. This number helps enforce control measures. It also lets CA Soldiers efficiently administer the camp and its population. The location of the camp is extremely important. Engineer support and military construction materials are necessary when camps are in areas where local facilities are unavailable—for example, hotels, schools, halls, theaters, vacant warehouses, unused factories, or workers’ camps. CA Soldiers must avoid those sites near vital communication centers, large military installations, or other potential military targets. The location of the camp also depends on the availability of food, water, power, and waste disposal. Additional considerations include the susceptibility of the area to natural or man-made disasters (for example, flooding, pollution, and fire) and the use of camp personnel as a source of local labor support.

F-83. The physical layout of the camp is important. The main principle is to subdivide the camp into sections or separate compounds to ease administration and camp tension. Each section can serve as an administrative subunit for transacting camp business. The major sections normally include camp HQ, hospital, mess, and sleeping areas. The sleeping areas must be further subdivided into separate areas for unaccompanied children, unattached females, families, and unattached males. CA Soldiers must also consider cultural and religious practices and make every effort to keep families together.
F-84. CA Soldiers must also consider the type of construction. Specific types of construction necessary to satisfy the needs of the particular DC operation vary according to the—

- Local climate.
- Anticipated permanency of the camp.
- Number of camps to be constructed.
- Availability of local materials.
- Extent of available military resources and assistance.

F-85. Whenever possible, the DCs or local agencies or government employees should construct the camp. Local sources provide materials whenever possible IAW legal limitations. The supporting command’s logistics and transportation assets are used to acquire and transport required resources to build or modify existing facilities for DC operations. The supporting command also furnishes medical, dining, and other supporting assets to establish DC camps.

ADMINISTRATION OF DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CAMPS

F-86. Because of the large numbers of DCs for whom control and care must be provided, using HN civilians as cadre for the camp administration is preferred. DCs should become involved in the administration of the camp. Past military experience in DC operations shows that about 6 percent of the total number of DCs should be employed on a full-time basis. If possible, CA Soldiers organize and train the cadre before the camp opens. Whenever possible, civilians should come from public and private welfare organizations and be under military supervision. Other concerns are problems that might stem from the state of mind of the DCs. The difficulties they have experienced may affect their acceptance of authority. They may have little initiative or may be uncooperative because of an uncertain future. They may be angry because of their losses, or they may resort to looting and general lawlessness because of their destitution. The camp administrator can minimize difficulties through careful administration and by—

- Maintaining different national and cultural groups in separate camps or sections of a camp.
- Keeping families together while separating unaccompanied males, females, and children under the age of 18 (or abiding by the laws of the HN as to when a child becomes an adult).
- Furnishing necessary information on the status and future of DCs.
- Allowing DCs to speak freely to camp officials.
- Involving the DCs in camp administration, work, and recreation.
- Establishing contact quickly with agencies for aid and family reunification.

SCREENING

F-87. Screening is necessary to prevent infiltration of camps by insurgents, enemy agents, or escaping members of the hostile armed forces. Although intelligence or other types of units may screen DCs at first, friendly and reliable local civilians under the supervision of CA Soldiers can perform this function. They must carefully apply administrative controls to prevent infiltration and preclude alienation of people who are sympathetic to U.S. objectives. The insertion or the development of reliable informants is important in all but the most temporary camps. The screening process also identifies skilled technicians and professional specialists to help in camp administration—for example, policemen, schoolteachers, doctors, dentists, nurses, lawyers, mechanics, carpenters, and cooks.

MEDICAL CARE AND SANITATION

F-88. The need for medical care and sanitation intensifies in camp environments because of the temporary nature of the facilities and the lack of sanitation by the people. Enforcement and education measures are necessary to ensure that the camp population complies with basic sanitation measures.

SUPPLY

F-89. The camp supply officer or CA civilian supply specialist must coordinate in advance for food, water, clothing, fuel, portable shelter, and medical supplies. CA supply personnel must make sure U.S. medical personnel inspect all food and water, particularly civilian and captured stocks. USAID and SA officers can be helpful in U.S. efforts to provide aid to the country. IGOs and NGOs may also be useful. Support from
U.S. military stocks should only be considered as a last resort, however, and CA supply Soldiers should not rely upon that support.

SECURITY

F-90. The camp security officer, supervised by the public safety team, provides camp security and enforces law, order, and discipline. Sources for security officers include local police forces, HN paramilitary or military forces, and U.S. military forces. Another potential source may be the camp population itself. Police personnel within the population could supplement security teams or constitute a special camp police force, if necessary. Internal and external patrols are necessary; however, security for a DC facility should not give the impression that the facility is a prison.

TRANSPORTATION

F-91. The efficient administration of a DC camp requires adequate transportation assets. The camp movement officer or CA transportation specialist determines the types and numbers of vehicles required and makes provisions to have them on hand. He uses civilian or captured enemy vehicles whenever possible.

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

F-92. In the administration of any type of camp, dissemination of instructions and information to the camp population is vital. Communications may be in the form of notices on bulletin boards, posters, public address systems, loudspeakers, camp meetings and assemblies, or a camp radio station. An example of barracks rules is shown in Figure F-9, page F-29. CA civil information teams and area PSYOP units may be able to help.

LIAISON

F-93. Liaison involves coordination with all interested agencies. USG and military authorities, allied LNOs, and representatives of local governments and international agencies may help in relief and assistance operations.

DISPOSITION

F-94. The final step in DC operations involves the ultimate disposition of the DCs, although this consideration must occur early in the planning phase. The most desired disposition is to return them to their homes. Allowing DCs to return to their homes as quickly as tactical considerations permit lessens the burden for support on the military and the civilian economy. It also lessens the danger of diseases common among people in confined areas. When DCs return to their homes, they can help restore their towns and can better contribute to their own support. If DCs cannot return to their homes, they may resettle elsewhere in their country or in a country that accepts them. Guidance on the disposition of DCs must come from higher authority, under coordination with U.S. forces, national authorities, and international agencies.

ORAL REHYDRATION THERAPY

F-95. Death from dehydration (extreme loss of fluids), especially of infants, the elderly, and the sick or injured, is a constant threat. People tend to experience extreme loss of fluids from diarrhea, bleeding, and hot weather. CA Soldiers must be aware of this threat and be prepared to respond to it effectively, especially when operating a DC collection point.

F-96. Soldiers operating a DC collection point must be especially aware of—

- Infants.
- Nursing mothers.
- Very thin people with sallow eyes.
- Persons who are heavily bandaged.
- Persons on litters.
- The elderly.
**Barracks Rules**

1. **Do not move from assigned barracks without permission.** *Note: Area teams assign individuals to the designated barracks. Only the U.S. center’s administrative staff can change barracks assignments. Occupants desiring to change barracks must request permission from the area office.*

2. **Maintain the sanitary and physical condition of the barracks.** *Note: Barracks chiefs organize occupants to perform these tasks.*

3. **Empty and wash trash cans daily.** *Note: Put the trash into the trash receptacles (dumpsters) in the barracks area.*

4. **Do not bring food or cooking utensils into the barracks. Do not take food from the mess halls (other than baby food and fruit).**

5. **Do not have weapons of any kind in the barracks and in the surrounding camp.**

6. **Do not have pets in the camp.**

7. **Observe barracks lights-out time of 2300. Barracks indoor lights will be turned out at 2300 each night. Do not use TV or radio after 2300.**

8. **Do not allow children to play on the fire escape.** *Note: This practice is very dangerous.*

9. **Watch children carefully and do not allow them to wander out of the residence areas.**

10. **Do not throw diapers and sanitary napkins into the toilets. Place these items into trash cans.**

11. **Do not allow children to chase or play with wild animals, as these animals may bite and carry diseases.**

12. **Obtain necessary barracks supplies from the barracks chief.**

13. **Do not smoke, use electrical appliances for heating or cooking, or have open fires in the barracks.**

*Note: These barracks rules are similar to the ones used in August 1975 at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. They also parallel the rules posted in support of Panama’s Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY.*
Appendix F

F-97. People suffering from dehydration require more than just water. Soldiers should consider the following information when providing oral rehydration:

- **World Health Organization ORT formula:**
  - 1 quart water.
  - 3.5 grams of sodium chloride (table salt).
  - 2.5 grams of sodium bicarbonate (baking soda).
  - 1.5 grams of potassium chloride (lite salt).
  - 20 grams of sugar.

- **U.S. military field expedients for ORT:**
  - MRE salt pack = 4 grams of table salt.
  - MRE beverage base pack = 32 grams of sugar.
  - MRE cocoa pack = 1.4 grams of potassium.

- Water is most important, next is salt, then potassium, then sugar. Additional considerations include the following:
  - Water and salt alone may be used in a pinch.
  - In extreme cases, do not “load up” the patient with fluids, especially if the water is cold; the patient could vomit and lose even more fluid. Small amounts of room temperature water should be given frequently.
  - Babies will want to suck (not drink) the formula. Ice chips or a wet, porous rag should be used.
  - Dehydration causes the blood pressure to be low. The patient should get in the shade with feet up, if possible.
  - Pedia-Lite is a brand-name ready-mix ORT formula for infants.
Appendix G
Financial, Contract, and Project Management

Money is a weapon system... J-5, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (Airborne) Afghanistan, 2004

Furthermore, knowledge of contracting and scope of work is critical for all CA forces. CMO activities are heavily reliant on the timely, targeted, and efficient application of funds, particularly CERP [Commander’s Emergency Response Program] funds. Training in contracting, negotiations, and scope of work would add significantly to the success of U.S. forces in CMO environments.

A structure to manage civil reconstruction projects within any size task force is necessary to ensure a unity of effort and optimal impact on the overall CMO plan. Given the importance of CMO in stability and support operations, division and brigade commanders have developed tactics, techniques, and procedures to direct the focus of their staffs to address CMO.

Initial Impressions Report No. 04-13 Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 2004

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report described money as more than just currency—it is a reality of asymmetric warfare or irregular warfare. Money represents influence and power and its use should be considered an action on par with attack, defend, seize, or destroy. CA Soldiers traditionally use money during FHA or MCA. The money allows CA Soldiers to conduct CAO in support of the CMO objectives. But as the Center for Army Lessons Learned bulletin illustrates, CA Soldiers require skills and knowledge in the use of money to create effects within the supported commander’s operational environment.

OVERVIEW

G-1. The ability to commit, obligate, and disburse funds is based on specific authority to do so. This appendix will not cover all the possible uses of money by the CA Soldier; rather the intent is to familiarize CA Soldiers with—

- Sources of funding.
- Funds execution authority.
- Terms, procedures, and forms used for acquisition and procurement.
- Roles of the various acquisition and procurement actors, to include—
  - Contracting officers (KOs).
  - Field ordering officer (FOO) and project purchase officer (PPO).
  - Class A or paying agent (PA).
  - Project manager.
  - Vendor or contractor.
  - Other agencies.
- Techniques for the management of money, contracts, and projects.
Importance of Understanding Funding From Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

Civil systems require money to operate. Obviously, money creates action in the civilian sector and the importance of this can be underlined by experience in Iraq with CERP and other funding sources. The CA units should enhance the combatant commander's capability to mass money on high-value targets, interdict local problems, and bolster the legitimacy of local leaders by executing projects aligned to Iraqi priorities of work. When the Division or BCT commander sees he will be receiving a CA unit, he should immediately understand that he would be receiving the financial management capability to manage and execute projects and programs according to civilian standards. The capability to effectively contract, account for funds, and execute projects is according to civilian standards, not military standards, is essential. This is important to set the conditions for the military to disengage and transition to civilian operations more quickly. CA units should come with the skills and information management equipment to facilitate better-managed effects with money.

AAR, 425th Civil Affairs Battalion with 1st Armored Division
21 December 2004

SOURCES OF FUNDING

G-2. The CA Soldier has access to a number of programs and organizations with funds available to finance many of the projects or needs identified by various CA assessments and the supported commander’s CMO objectives. Funding may originate from within DOD, DOS, or OGAs as appropriated by Congress through the enactment of public law. Even though the following discussion relates to funding provided by USG sources, CA Soldiers should consider funding opportunities available by integrating IGO and NGO resources into the execution of the CMO plan.

TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE APPROPRIATIONS

G-3. Appropriations to DOD fund programs identified in sections of 10 USC that provide the authority to commanders to conduct humanitarian operations. This authority includes—

- Section 401, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 401), which establishes the HCA program under which small-scale rudimentary humanitarian projects may be performed. Such activities, by law, must promote the security interests of the United States, the country in which the activities are carried out, and the operational readiness skills of participating U.S. forces. If a given project is executed through the HCA program, U.S. military forces must provide the labor. Army operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts fund the building materials and other incremental costs incurred for projects performed under Section 401 authority.
- HCA activities, which are defined in 10 USC 401 as—
  - Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas of a country.
  - Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
  - Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
  - Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
- 10 USC 401(c)(2), which authorizes the military commander to fund minimal HCA opportunities that often arise during the course of an exercise or operation in a foreign country. The unit’s O&M funds, commonly referred to as the operational fund, fund minimal HCA opportunities. Minimal HCA opportunities are referred to as de minimis HCA. Only HCA amounting to “minimal expenditures” may be provided. DODD 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, provides guidance in determining what “minimal” means. De minimis HCA activities must be one of the four activities statutorily allowed...
as an HCA activity. Additionally, all of the other restrictions for the conduct of HCA mentioned above apply to de minimis HCA.

- Section 2557, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2557), which provides the authority to make available for humanitarian relief purposes, through the State Department, any nonlethal excess supplies of DOD. The identified excess property inventory normally transfers to USAID, as agent for the DOS, for distribution to the target nation.

- Section 2561, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2561), which provides the authority for DOD to carry out broader, more extensive, HA projects. Projects which use contractors, include the purchase of end items other than those used in connection with 10 USC 401 HCA activities, or involve the provision of training or technical assistance for humanitarian purposes are carried out under this authority. This authority can also be used to provide the transportation of humanitarian and relief supplies using DOD assets or resources.

- Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA), which is a DOD account to which Congress appropriates funds. OHDACA funds are generally used to pay for operations and activities that are authorized by 10 USC 2561, HA, and demining under 10 USC 401. Even though the law specifically lists HCA and disaster relief as appropriate uses for the fund, the actual practice is that OHDACA funds are used to pay for activities authorized by 10 USC 2561.

**SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS**

G-4. In some cases, the Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for humanitarian relief and related activities for a specific operation. An example is the CERP. The coalition provisional authority in Iraq developed CERP to enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their AO. The program is now in use in Afghanistan. The rules governing the use of such funds are based on the Congressional restrictions in the legislation and are tailored to the needs of the particular operation.

G-5. Further guidance is available from the servicing judge advocate and from the current year’s Operational Law Handbook, published by the Center for Law and Military Operations of the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. The CERP program is discussed in detail later in this appendix.

**FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TERMINOLOGY**

G-6. The procedures required to execute appropriated funds consist of—

- **Commitment**: The act of certifying and recording, by an authorized official, a programmed expenditure of funds for the costs associated with the purchase or reimbursement of products and services. An authorized commitment certifies that funds are available and provides the purchasing authority with the accounting data necessary to obligate the government for payment.

- **Obligation**: Acts that legally bind the USG to make payments. Funds may be obligated only for the purposes for which they were appropriated and only to satisfy the bona fide needs of the fiscal year for which the appropriations are valid for obligation.

- **Disbursement**: The payment of funds to satisfy a legal obligation of the USG.

- **Reconcilability**: The process of accounting for the expenditure of funds by means of documenting the commitment, obligation, receipt, and payment for supplied goods and services.

**AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE DOD FUNDS**

G-7. Commanders have the authority to execute appropriated funds. Commanders are directly involved in the oversight of the process. This level of involvement ensures compliance with established financial management policies and procedures to prevent fraud, waste, and mismanagement of authorized funds. A commander’s authority includes the ability to appoint subordinates to positions of responsibility specifically to manage and execute funds.
G-8. KOs, uniformed and civilian, are professionally trained to negotiate and legally obligate the USG by means of contracts and purchase agreements. The amount of money a particular KO is authorized to obligate is usually based on the KO’s formal training, experience, and duty position. A KO’s obligation authority is prescribed in a personal warrant that describes the types of contracts and funding limitations of the KO’s authority.

G-9. Commander-appointed positions to assist in the financial management of the unit’s funds include the—
- **FOO.** The role of the unit FOO is to assist in the local purchase of supplies and equipment. The FOO is trained to legally obligate the USG in accordance with acquisition policies and regulations. The limitations of a FOO’s obligation authority are detailed in the appointment orders that assign the duty. An appointed FOO cannot perform the duties of a Class A agent or PA.
- **Class A Agent or PA.** Agents are appointed to perform specific disbursement duties. PAs are appointed to support the local procurement process. Class A agents are appointed to provide support to individuals. Agents cannot perform both duties. The limitations of agents’ authority are detailed in the appointment orders that assign the duty. An appointed agent cannot perform the duties of a FOO.

G-10. Dependent on the level of command, a commander’s staff may include a financial management officer, who is responsible for the commitment, obligation, and reconciliation of unit funds. This officer normally would provide staff oversight of the unit’s FOOS and PAs. The total amount of funds available for execution by a commander and the maximum value of a single transaction are normally dependent on the level of command. For example, a brigade commander may be authorized a total of $200,000 in CERP funds per quarter and given authority to approve projects valued at a maximum of $10,000; whereas, a battalion commander may only be authorized half those amounts.

**OBLIGATING THE GOVERNMENT**

G-11. As a general rule, only KOs have the authority to legally bind the government and enter into, administer, or terminate contracts. A limited exception allows nonprocurement personnel to execute purchases within specified amounts. These individuals and the limits of their authority must be specified in writing.

G-12. Any government employee who makes an agreement to purchase goods and services without the authority to do so creates an unauthorized commitment. Unauthorized commitments can result in disciplinary action against the responsible individual if the act was intentional and done to circumvent regulatory and statutory requirements. An unauthorized commitment may also expose the responsible individual to financial liability to the contractor if a contracting office is unable to ratify, that is, approve retroactively, that purchase.

G-13. Ratification is the retroactive adoption of an unauthorized act. By ratifying the act, the government becomes financially liable for the act. Ratification, however, is not automatic. The following circumstances must have existed at the time of the unauthorized commitment in order for the KO to ratify it:
- The government was provided and has accepted supplies or services, or the government has otherwise obtained a benefit resulting from performance.
- The ratifying official has the authority to enter into a contractual commitment.
- The resulting contract would otherwise have been proper if made by an appropriate KO.
- The KO reviewing the unauthorized commitment determines the price to be fair and reasonable.
- The KO recommends payment, and legal counsel concurs in the recommendation.
- Funds are available and were available at the time of the unauthorized commitment.
- The ratification is in accordance with any other limitations prescribed under agency procedures.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

G-14. Documenting the commitment, obligation, disbursement, and reconciliation of funds at the unit level requires maintaining a number of financial documents that provide an audit trail detailing the execution of funds. Basic documentation that CA Soldiers should be familiar with include—

- Department of Defense Form (DD Form) 448 (Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request), also called MIPR, which financial management officials use to transfer funds between military agencies. A properly executed MIPR (Figure G-1, page G-6) allocates funds by specific accounting classifications. The MIPR is the receiving agency’s authority to commit and obligate funds against requirements specified in the document.
- DA Form 3953 (Purchase Request and Commitment), which is used by primarily by financial management officials to track the commitment and obligation of funds.
- Standard Form (SF) 44 (U.S. Government Purchase Order Invoice Voucher) (Figure G-2, page G-7), which FOOs use for ordering and verifying receipt of goods and services by the government. It is completed by the PA to verify the receipt of payment by the vendor.
- SF 1034 (Public Voucher for Purchases and Services Other Than Personal), which is used to authorize payment of a vendor invoice.
- DD Form 1081 (Statement of Agent Officer’s Account) (Figure G-3, page G-8), which the PA and the disbursing officer of a finance office use to reconcile the funds entrusted to the PA for disbursement.
- DD Form 250 (Materiel Inspection and Receiving Report) (Figure G-4, page G-9), which a responsible authority such as a contracting office representative (COR), project officer, or project manager uses to document the receipt of goods, contract deliverables, or services. Completion of the DD 250 is normally necessary to authorize payment to a vendor.

G-15. The total amount of all the audit trail documents may equal but not exceed the entry on the MIPR tracking document. Audit trail documents validate the expenditures from the MIPR allocations (Figure G-5, page G-10).

COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM

G-16. The CERP provides local commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan means to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements that can be implemented quickly and immediately impact the local populace. Commanders establish procedures that ensure compliance with established policies and procedures to prevent fraud, waste, and mismanagement of CERP funds. Commanders establish proper management and fiscal controls to account for these funds by direct involvement in the expenditure approval process and oversight of the unit’s overall program.

G-17. CERP expenditures and programs normally focus on labor-intensive and urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects. Rapid implementation of projects enforces a positive perception within the local economy by providing employment opportunities to the local populace. CERP projects normally focus on—

- Reconstruction projects after combat operations to rapidly improve conditions.
- Emergency repairs of critical facilities.
- Critical infrastructure shortfalls that can be rapidly resolved.
- Reducing the risk of injury to the local populace.
- Procurement of critical equipment to replace lost, stolen, and nonrepairable items or to establish critical community-essential services.
- Projects to stimulate the local economy by providing employment opportunities to the populace.
## MILITARY INTERDEPARTMENTAL PURCHASE REQUEST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>QTY</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ESTIMATED UNIT PRICE</th>
<th>ESTIMATED TOTAL PRICE</th>
</tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure G-1. Sample DD Form 448 (Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request)**
Figure G-2. Sample SF 44 (U.S. Government Purchase Order Invoice Voucher)
## Appendix G

### Figure G-3. Sample DD Form 1081 (Statement of Agent Officer’s Account)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATEMENT OF AGENT OFFICER’S ACCOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISBURSING OFFICER’S NAME, ADDRESS, DISBURSING STATION SYMBOL NO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon A. Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC, FT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Finance BN (Q0301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TRANSACTIONS AFFECTING AGENT OFFICER’S ACCOUNT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSACTIONS</th>
<th>INCREASE (Amount in $)</th>
<th>BEGINNING BALANCE (Amount in $)</th>
<th>DECREASE (Amount in $)</th>
<th>ENDING BALANCE (Amount in $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BALANCE FORWARD</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. U.S. DOLLARS</td>
<td>37,500.00</td>
<td>2,500.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FOREIGN CURRENCY</td>
<td>12,500.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MILITARY PAYMENT CERTIFICATES</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. COLLECTIONS</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. DEPOSITS</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. TREASURY CHECKS</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. MILITARY PAYMENT ORDERS</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. OTHER (specify)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PAID VOUCHERS</td>
<td>47,500.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. INCORRECT VOUCHERS RETURNED</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. TOTAL FUNDS IN HANDS OF AGENT OFFICER</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### STATEMENTS

**ON ADVANCE:** I HAVE INTRUSTED FUNDS AND/OR OTHER ITEMS AS INDICATED IN THIS STATEMENT TO THE ABOVE NAMED AS MY AGENT OFFICER.

**ON RETURN:** I HAVE RECEIVED FUNDS AND/OR OTHER ITEMS AS INDICATED ON THIS STATEMENT FROM THE ABOVE NAMED AGENT OFFICER.

**ON ADVANCE:** I, AS AGENT OFFICER, HAVE ASSUMED NECUNARY RESPONSIBILITY THEREFOR. I WILL NOTIFY THE DISBURSING OFFICER IMMEDIATELY UPON DISCOVERY OF ANY LOSS OR SHORTAGE, AND I HAVE RECEIVED AND UNDERSTAND WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING MY DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS AN AGENT OFFICER.

**ON RETURN:** THE ABOVE STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT IS CORRECT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SIGNATURE OF DISBURSING OFFICER</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SIGNATURE OF AGENT OFFICER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 May 05</td>
<td>Gordon A. Dollar</td>
<td>01 May 05</td>
<td>John B. Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May 05</td>
<td>Gordon A. Dollar</td>
<td>31 May 05</td>
<td>John B. Smith</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DD Form 1081, MAY 75 (EG) PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.
## MATERIAL INSPECTION AND RECEIVING REPORT

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 50 minutes per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Department of Defense, Executive Services and Communications Directorate (0704-0248). Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR COMPLETED FORM TO THE ABOVE ORGANIZATION. SEND THIS FORM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN THE DFARS, APPENDIX F-401.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SF-44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15 Apr 06</td>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>C1650</td>
<td>15 Apr 06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>HHCC 52nd ID</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 9. PRIME CONTRACTOR
- Code: Hakim Hassan LTD
  - Baghdad, Iraq

### 10. ADMINISTERED BY
- Code: James W. Brown
  - MAJ, CA
  - CMOC, 52nd ID

### 11. SHIPPED FROM (if other than 9): CODE
- Code: Same as 9

### 12. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY
- Code: John B. Smith
  - MAJ, CA
  - Pay Agent, CMOC, 52nd ID

### 13. SHIPPED TO
- Code: HHCC, 52nd ID
  - ATTN: Supply
  - Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq

### 14. MARKED FOR
- Code: SSG Weber

### 15. STOCK/PART NO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>UNIT PRICE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Copy paper (8-1/2” x 11”), White Bond</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Case</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>250.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Misc. Office supplies per attached order form</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lot</td>
<td>150.00</td>
<td>150.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 21. CONTRACT QUALITY ASSURANCE
- a. ORIGIN
  - Acceptance of listed items has been made by me or under my supervision and they conform to contract, except as noted herein or on supporting documents.

### 22. RECEIVER'S USE
- Quantities shown in column 17 were received in apparent good condition except as noted.

- Date Received: 15 Apr 06
- Signature of Authorized Government Representative: William G. Weber
- Title: SSG, Supply NCO, HHCC 52nd ID
- Mailing Address: HHCC, 52nd ID, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq
- Commercial Telephone Number: 7001234567

### 23. CONTRACTOR USE ONLY

---

**Figure G-4. Sample DD Form 250 (Material Inspection and Receiving Report)**
G-18. Examples of permissible expenditures include, but are not limited to—

- Water generation and distribution infrastructure.
- Sanitation infrastructure repair.
- Civic or cultural facilities.
- Agriculture, to include irrigation systems.
- Electric power generation and distribution.
- Health care.
- Education.
- Telecommunication systems.
- Labor for civic cleaning.
- Purchase and repair of civil government vehicles.
- Food production and distribution.
- Projects in furtherance of economic, financial, and civil management improvements.
- Transportation infrastructure.
- Initiatives which further restore the rule of law and effective governance.

G-19. Congressional restrictions placed on appropriated CERP funding state that funds will not be used for—

- Benefiting coalition forces, either directly or indirectly.
- Entertaining the local population.
- Funding any type of weapons buy-back or rewards programs.
- Removing unexploded ordnance.
- Purchasing firearms or ammunition to equip police.
- Paying salaries or pensions to the civil work force.
- Augmenting available unit non-CERP and O&M funds, to include de minimis HCA.
- Providing support to individuals or businesses unless they were damaged by coalition forces.
COMMON CERP MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

G-20. A commander’s responsibility for the execution of CERP necessitates the establishment of proper management and fiscal controls to ensure accountability of appropriated funds. While not totally inclusive, the following discussion identifies a number of policies and procedures typically instituted to provide program oversight.

G-21. Units down to the battalion or squadron level nominate and train a dedicated primary and alternate PA PPO to help the commander execute the CERP program. An O-6 commander normally executes memorandum format appointment orders of PAs and PPOs. The term “project purchase officer” differentiates officers responsible for CERP projects from those involved with projects funded by other O&M accounts.

G-22. PPOs must also be trained and appointed on orders as a FOO by a warranted KO. PPOs execute CERP payment according to established FOO and PA procedures. PPOs must maintain a file copy of their appointment orders for both appointments. PPOs conduct operations following the same established policy and procedures as a FOO and are prohibited from commingling CERP and other appropriated funds on any project. Reconciliation of CERP and other appropriated fund projects must clearly define each as separate expenditures.

G-23. The following is an example of spending thresholds and policy guidance regarding the execution of CERP funds. Limitation of commitment authority may frequently change and is normally defined upon receipt of funds by the supported commander. Brigade commanders normally have authorization to periodically draw a maximum of $200,000 of CERP funding. Local funding restrictions usually set a single project limit of $200,000. Individual projects that may exceed $200,000 must be coordinated through the next higher HQ (division) G-8 or comptroller. A brigade commander’s approval authority for any particular project is limited to a maximum value of $10,000. The next higher HQ must approve in advance projects valued at over $10,000. PPOs are authorized to make purchases and to pay for projects up to $10,000 with the SF 44 for this program only. A separate purchase request and commitment form (DA Form 3953) is required for each project exceeding a value of $10,000. Projects exceeding $100,000 require a warranted contacting officer’s signature.

G-24. Projects whose expenses are estimated in excess of $10,000 normally require additional procedures. For these projects, brigade commanders—

- Inform the next higher HQ in advance.
- Obtain three separate bids for the project.
- Identify an individual to manage the project.
- Document PPO’s efforts to verify costs are reasonable.

G-25. Units may use CERP to repair collateral damage caused by combat operations that are not otherwise compensable due to combat exclusions. Payments for battle damage cannot be identified as claims. However, commander’s have the discretion to use CERP funds to repair individual homes and businesses. These repairs must not be made as compensation, or in an attempt to make that individual whole.

G-26. Unit CERP may be used to make condolence payments not to exceed $2,500 for death, serious injury, or property damage caused by coalition or anti-HN forces. Payments are meant to express sympathy and provide humanitarian relief and are not an acknowledgement of fault or responsibility. These are not salacious payments (money paid for death or damage when USG admits fault). When commanders use CERP funds for condolence payments, no acknowledgement of any moral or legal responsibility for someone’s death, injury, or damaged property is offered.

G-27. Staff Judge Advocates and financial management officers provide detailed guidance to their commanders on the implementation and management of this program within their commands. Reporting requirements of the program vary, but normally commanders report expenditures every 48 hours to the next-higher HQ.
PROJECT PURCHASE OFFICER AND PAYING AGENT PROCEDURES

G-28. PPOs may request additional CERP funds, but must first clear all SF 44s with the unit comptroller and provide copies to the next-higher HQ G-8. Each SF 44 must have the vendor’s invoice or bill attached. The vendor’s invoice or bill may be written in Arabic or English. Each SF 44 must be completed, to include a detailed description of supplies or services received. The unit comptroller reviews each DD Form 1081 and SF 44 with vendor invoices for completeness. The unit comptroller then provides a clearance letter stating “The following SF 44s are cleared, contractually sufficient, and within the scope of the appointed authority.”

G-29. Project files must be kept on each CERP project and submitted to the next-higher HQ on a periodic basis. Failure to maintain and submit adequate project files may jeopardize future CERP funding. At a minimum, project files must include the following:

- PA appointment letter.
- PPO appointment letter.
- DD Forms 1081.
- Three bids for any contract over $10,000. If three bids are not obtained, the commander must provide a written justification detailing the reasons why obtaining the necessary bids was not possible.
- Commander’s clearance letter.
- Copies of SF 44s. SF 1034, DD Form 250, or a properly executed contract may be submitted in lieu of an SF 44.

PROJECT AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

G-30. CA Soldiers routinely manage humanitarian, MCA, and reconstruction projects. Experience gained during the conduct of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM has shown that projects that assist in legitimizing local government, stimulating the local economy, and improving basic quality of life of the populace have a dramatic impact on the success of stability operations. Whether the project is valued at a few hundred dollars or involves significant contracting valued in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, the basic management practices of planning and initiation, execution, and closeout remain the same.

INITIATION AND PLANNING

G-31. The initiation and planning phase begins by identification of a need or requirement that when clearly defined meets the criteria for funding and execution. A site visit or deliberate assessment may trigger the requirement. Figure G-6, page G-13, depicts the initiation and planning phase.

G-32. During the conduct of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, a number of reconstruction projects were identified as “Standardized Scope Projects,” such as refurbishing public education facilities, local medical clinics and public utility generation and distribution systems. These types of projects meet the requirements for funding under CERP and are easily adaptable to a predefined project scope. Projects not meeting this initial screening requirement must be clearly defined in terms of scope, cost, and impact and meet the approval criteria of the command.

G-33. The statement of work (SOW) or statement of objectives, which is a detailed narrative statement, defines the scope of a project. The statement provides prospective contractors the information required to prepare a competitive bid for the proposed project. Statements must be as detailed as possible to protect the government and the contractor. At a minimum, statements normally include—

- A description of the project upon completion.
- Material specifications.
- Key contractor manpower requirements to ensure successful completion.
- Government-furnished items and materials.
- Contractor-furnished items and materials.
- The government’s project manager.
- The government’s KO and COR, if required.
- Overall project timelines.
- Penalties for failure to meet project requirements and specifications, if any.

G-34. The acceptance of contractor bid documents and the selection of a contractor moves the project into the execution phase. Depending on the value of the proposed project, management may remain within the unit or be moved to another managing agency.

![Flowchart](image-url)

**Figure G-6. Project initiation and planning phase**
EXECUTION PHASE

G-35. The execution phase begins with the formal funding of the project by an approval authority, proceeds through contract negotiation and the signing of a work agreement or contract by the government’s and contractor’s representative with authority. The completed agreement includes, as a minimum, the following—

- SOW.
- Contractor’s proposal.
- Details of contractor payment. For larger projects (over $10,000) progress payments are normal when the contractor completes a significant project milestone. Agreements should refrain from “up-front” lump-sum payments.
- Definition of satisfactory contractor performance.
- Process for corrective action.
- Name of the government’s authority to modify the original agreement.

G-36. The execution phase concludes with acceptance of the completed project by competent authority. Figure G-7 depicts the execution phase.
G-37. The authority to add to, delete from, or modify an original project agreement rests solely with the government’s signatory to the agreement, whether it is a FOO, PPO, or warranted KO. A project manager, COR, or other government employee involved with the project does not have the authority to direct a change to the agreement that results in additional cost to the government without a formal modification. A directed change by an individual without authority, and acted on by the contractor, results in an unauthorized commitment.

G-38. The role of the project manager or COR is to act as the government’s acceptance authority for the work or products delivered during the course of the project. The project manager conducts inspections of the contractor’s work, materials, and products supplied to satisfy the specifications stated in the contract. Once satisfied the vendor has met the requirements, the project manager completes DD Form 250 or other prescribed completion document to initiate payment to the contractor. Contractor payment cannot be accomplished without the completion of a receiving report.

G-39. Project managers provide periodic status reports to their HQ for overall tracking of funds expenditure and project completion. The following is an article from the March-April 2005 edition of Artillery Magazine and illustrates how the CMO staff section of the 3-82 Field Artillery applied sound project management techniques while conducting CMO in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

*Note:* The Department of the Army has since changed the naming convention of the CMO staff section from G/S-5 to G/S-9.
This system organizes the unit’s CMO and makes it possible for one unit to conduct scores of simultaneous projects without confusion. The system consists of a filing box or cabinet of whatever size is available. The project manager enters files by project tracking numbers in numerical sequence with one hanging file for each project. Some projects have multiple contractors or phases, so there may be several file folders in the same hanging file with alphanumeric tracking numbers (i.e., 21a, 21b, 21c, etc.). The S-5 NCO should check the files daily to ensure that documents generated or received for each project are filed quickly and accurately.

Normally, each project file contains a statement of work (SOW) with a request for proposal (RFP), price estimates or bills of quantities from contractors, digital photos, a contractor selection memo, the funding request document, the project contract, in-progress inspection reports and pay receipts.

Each project begins with a SOW that clearly describes what the contractor must perform during the project. The RFP includes the SOW and provides detailed instructions and requirements to contractors who wish to compete in an open bid for the job, such as timelines, pricing limitations, and an estimate submission deadline.

Any element of the BN can prepare an SOW and RFP. Usually, however, the S-5 obtains RFPS from the battery commanders and CAT, who initiate and supervise the reconstruction projects as part of their ongoing CMO.

After receiving estimates from local contractors, the S-5 and commanders compare them based on the unit’s contractor selection criteria in an open free bid. Some factors of contractor selection include price competitiveness, source of labor pool, ability to meet timeline requirements, etc.

Similar to a course of action (COA) decision matrix used by staffs during the MDMP, the contractor selection memo explains why the unit selects a particular contractor. After the project funding is approved (CERP projects usually are approved by BDE commanders or higher), the project manager writes the contract by combining the RFP, the contractor’s estimate, SOW, and timeline requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index No</th>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Civil-Military Task</th>
<th>Project and Location</th>
<th>Fund Source</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Contractor and Phone No</th>
<th>Balance Remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>Mansur</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Mansur Basketball Court</td>
<td>Battalion CERP</td>
<td>$17,450</td>
<td>HSB</td>
<td>100% complete. Contract signed 16 Sep. Final payment made 7 Nov.</td>
<td>Need to schedule opening ceremony</td>
<td>Hakim Hasson 7901576980</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index No</th>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Civil-Military Task</th>
<th>Project and Location</th>
<th>Fund Source</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Contractor and Phone No</th>
<th>Balance Remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>270</td>
<td>Haleen</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Hatteen Fire Station</td>
<td>Battalion CERP</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>C Btry</td>
<td>5% complete. Contract signed 4 Nov.</td>
<td>First payment arranged: $6,000</td>
<td>Emad Chalabi 7901510480</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310</td>
<td>3-82 AOR</td>
<td>Trash</td>
<td>Mansur Fall Cleanup</td>
<td>Brigade CERP</td>
<td>$34,000</td>
<td>S-5</td>
<td>50% complete. Contract signed 28 Oct.</td>
<td>First payment arranged: $15,000</td>
<td>Faid Israel 7901227940</td>
<td>$34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169</td>
<td>Yarmuk</td>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>Karkh Medical Center Rehabilitation</td>
<td>Division CERP</td>
<td>$290,080</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>50% complete. Contract signed 23 Sep. Second payment made 7 Nov.</td>
<td>Final payment arranged: $60,000</td>
<td>Bayat Group 7901435590</td>
<td>$60,080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: AOR - Area of Responsibility
Bty - Battery
CERP - Commander’s Emergency Response Program
HSB - Headquarters Service Battery
IIG - Iraqi Interim Government
**Project Supervision.** After the contract is signed and while the project is in progress, BN Soldiers supervise the work. Digital photos are critical requirement for every stage of the process.

Units must ensure that the S-5 and battery commanders have access to digital cameras so that proper records exist for each project. Project photos should be labeled clearly and kept on file with the S-5.

The S-5 issues notices of deficiency to contractors when inspecting units or members of the local neighborhood councils discover substandard work or conduct. These also should be in the appropriate project files.

Receipts are critical in keeping track of money paid incrementally for work already completed (that is, 20 percent, 40 percent, and 60 percent). Units should never pay in advance for work not yet performed and never make final payment until the contractor corrects all deficiencies.

**Contractor Meetings.** These meetings are to evaluate the projects’ progress, issue deficiency notices, pay contractors, notify contractors of new RFPs, and collect estimates from last weeks’ RFPs. With more than 50 local contractors all seeking work at each meeting, it can be a nightmare. Yet, with planning and preparation, the event can be relatively painless.

The S-5 NCO contacts the local contractors and provides them a secure, accessible location and predictable time for a weekly meeting. He coordinates with the BDE paying agent for the meeting time and location.

Using the Project Tracker, the project manager prepares the pay receipts and deficiency notices for each current project the evening before the meeting. Numbered cards or tickets keep contractors in queue in the order in which they arrive while they wait to speak with the S-5 and the BDE paying agent. The S-5 NCO allows contractors into a private room to speak with the S-5 one at a time. The S-5 works with each contractor, depending on his contract activities or actions related to RFPs. These meetings often are a good source of atmospherics assessments and intelligence.

Once the meeting is complete, the S-5 NCO immediately sorts the new estimates by project and checks and returns all files to the filing cabinet. The S-5 updates the Project Tracker to distribute to and update commanders on the week’s progress.

Some recommended supplies for project managers include a laptop computer, filing cabinet, digital camera, copier, printer, scanner, and portable USB disk drives. For examples of products 3-82 FA used to conduct project management that were later adopted as the 1st Cavalry Division standard, please refer to the “Civil Military Operations” folder on the 1st Cavalry Division secure knowledge-sharing network at http://www.1cd.army.smil.mil.

During their 10-month tour in central Baghdad, the Red Dragons used this simple system to manage overlapping projects and multiply CMO effectiveness in support of a stable and prosperous Iraq.

SSG Thomas J. Kelly III
S-5 NCO, 3-82 FA
1st Cavalry Div, Baghdad

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**CLOSEOUT**

G-40. Projects initiated at the unit follow formal closeout procedures that determine either the completion of the project, transfer of the project to another management entity, retraction of the project from the bid process, or rejection of the project from further consideration. Figure G-8, page G-18, shows the steps taken during the closeout phase.
G-41. Project closeout procedures include completing the project management file, which consists of contractor status reports, receiving reports, construction drawings, and like documentation as well as the financial management documentation that reconciles the funds expenditures. Key to the maintenance of a project file is to provide a complete audit trail (Figure G-5, page G-10) of the project from initiation to transfer to civil authority.
# Glossary

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>after-action report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCS</td>
<td>Army Battle Command System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD3E</td>
<td>assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, and evaluate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADVON</td>
<td>advanced echelon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFATDS</td>
<td>Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARSOF</td>
<td>Army special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAS</td>
<td>All-Source Analysis System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAS-RWS</td>
<td>All-Source Analysis System-Remote Work Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service component command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD(IS)A</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATCCS</td>
<td>Army Tactical Command and Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>brigade combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDE</td>
<td>brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>blog</td>
<td>Web log</td>
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<td>battalion</td>
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<td>Btry</td>
<td>battery</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CACOM</td>
<td>Civil Affairs command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Civil Affairs operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>crisis-action planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>Civil Affairs planning team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Civil Affairs team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>casualty collection point</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIG</td>
<td>civil information grid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIM</td>
<td>civil information management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civ</td>
<td>civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ-9</td>
<td>combined-joint civil-military operations staff section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLT</td>
<td>civil liaison team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>consequence management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>center of gravity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commo</td>
<td>communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>contracting office representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>concept plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>civil reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil support operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSCS</td>
<td>Combat Service Support Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>disaster assistance response team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>dislocated civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCAA</td>
<td>dislocated civilian assembly area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC/km</td>
<td>dislocated civilians per kilometer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCO</td>
<td>defense coordinating officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCRS</td>
<td>dislocated civilian road space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET</td>
<td>detainee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISN</td>
<td>Defense Information Systems Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>div</td>
<td>division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>echelons above corps</td>
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<td>ELINT</td>
<td>electronic intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e-mail</td>
<td>electronic mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLRS</td>
<td>Enhanced Position Location Reporting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPW</td>
<td>enemy prisoner of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERA</td>
<td>emergency rest area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>est</td>
<td>estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXTAL</td>
<td>extra time allowance</td>
</tr>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBCB2</td>
<td>Force XXI Command Brigade and Below</td>
</tr>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual; frequency modulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMI</td>
<td>field manual (interim)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>foreign nation</td>
</tr>
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<td>FOO</td>
<td>field ordering officer</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection</td>
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<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>fragmentary order</td>
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<td>FUNCPLAN</td>
<td>functional plan</td>
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<td>FX SP</td>
<td>functional specialty</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-1</td>
<td>Deputy/Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>Deputy/Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>Deputy/Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>Deputy/Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics</td>
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<td>G-5</td>
<td>Deputy/Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans</td>
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<td>G-7</td>
<td>Deputy/Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Operations</td>
</tr>
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<td>Deputy/Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil-Military Operations</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCCS</td>
<td>Global Command and Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCCS-A</td>
<td>Global Command and Control System-Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIG</td>
<td>Global Information Grid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>geographic information system</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>general purpose</td>
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<td>GRIS</td>
<td>Global Reconnaissance Information System</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>HAZMAT</td>
<td>hazardous material</td>
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<td>HCA</td>
<td>humanitarian and civic assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>HF</td>
<td>high frequency</td>
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<td>HHC</td>
<td>headquarters and headquarters company</td>
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<td>HMMWV</td>
<td>high mobility multiwheeled vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>HOC</td>
<td>humanitarian operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSB</td>
<td>headquarters service battery</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAW</td>
<td>in accordance with</td>
</tr>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>identification</td>
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<td>IDAD</td>
<td>internal defense and development</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIG</td>
<td>Iraqi Interim Government</td>
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<td>IMINT</td>
<td>imagery intelligence</td>
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<td>INMARSAT</td>
<td>International maritime satellite</td>
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<td>INTELINK</td>
<td>intelligence link</td>
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<td>INTSUM</td>
<td>intelligence summary</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
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<td>IPB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the battlefield</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>indigenous populations and institutions</td>
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<td>ISOCA</td>
<td>integrated special operations communications assemblage</td>
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<td>J-9</td>
<td>joint civil-military operations staff section</td>
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<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFLCC</td>
<td>joint force land component commander</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>joint special operations task force</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>JWICS</td>
<td>Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System</td>
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<tr>
<td>kbps</td>
<td>kilobytes per second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kHz</td>
<td>kilohertz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>km</td>
<td>kilometers</td>
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<tr>
<td>km/h</td>
<td>kilometers per hour</td>
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<tr>
<td>KO</td>
<td>contracting officer</td>
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<td>LAN</td>
<td>local area network</td>
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<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>logistics</td>
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<td>logistics release point</td>
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<td>MASCAL</td>
<td>mass casualties</td>
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<td>mbps</td>
<td>megabytes per second</td>
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<td>military civic action</td>
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<td>maintenance collection point</td>
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<td>MCS</td>
<td>maneuver control system</td>
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<td>MDMP</td>
<td>military decision making process</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDRETE</td>
<td>medical readiness training exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>military intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPR</td>
<td>military interdepartmental purchase request</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>military police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>meal, ready to eat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTX</td>
<td>mini-transmitter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>nation assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOIC</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer in charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFA</td>
<td>no-fire area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIPRNET</td>
<td>non-secure internet protocol router network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLT</td>
<td>not later than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMAA</td>
<td>national mine action authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJ</td>
<td>objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>(Special Forces) operational detachment-A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA</td>
<td>other government agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHDACA</td>
<td>Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/I</td>
<td>operations and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>officer in charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFI</td>
<td>Operation IRAQI FREEDOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>operation and maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
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<tr>
<td>ops</td>
<td>operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORT</td>
<td>oral rehydration therapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSINT</td>
<td>open-source intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>paying agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>public affairs office; public affairs officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>point of contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLMIL</td>
<td>political-military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPO</td>
<td>project purchase officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Short Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>populace and resources control</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>portable satellite communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAS</td>
<td>remote access server</td>
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<td>RCA</td>
<td>riot-control agent</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFA</td>
<td>restrictive fire area</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFP</td>
<td>request for proposal</td>
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<td>ROC</td>
<td>rear operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>rocket-propelled grenade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>road space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>intelligence staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>operations staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-5</td>
<td>plans staff officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-6</td>
<td>signal officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-9</td>
<td>civil-military operations officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>security assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>security assistance organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SATCOM</td>
<td>satellite communications</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>support to civil administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDN-L</td>
<td>special operations forces deployable node-light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDN-M</td>
<td>special operations forces deployable node-medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFG</td>
<td>Special Forces group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>signals intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITREP</td>
<td>situation report</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITTEMP</td>
<td>situational template</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>special operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCCE</td>
<td>special operations command and control element</td>
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<td>SOCCENT</td>
<td>Special Operations Component, United States Central Command</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standing operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOW</td>
<td>statement of work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>standard requirement code</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>stability, security, transition, and reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STE</td>
<td>secure telephone equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tac</td>
<td>tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACLAN</td>
<td>tactical local area network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDIS</td>
<td>time distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL</td>
<td>time length</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>tactical operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>table of organization and equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
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<td>TPT</td>
<td>tactical Psychological Operations team</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSCP</td>
<td>theater security cooperation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>theater special operations command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>ultrahigh frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td>uniform resource locator</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USACAPOC</td>
<td>United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command</td>
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<td>USAJFKSWCS</td>
<td>United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>United States Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBIED</td>
<td>vehicleborne improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>very high frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vic</td>
<td>vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIP</td>
<td>very important person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VoIP</td>
<td>voice over Internet Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPN</td>
<td>virtual private network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRC</td>
<td>vehicle radio communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAN</td>
<td>wide-area network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIN</td>
<td>Warfighter Information Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWW</td>
<td>World Wide Web</td>
</tr>
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</table>
area assessment
The commander’s prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (JP 1-02)

centers of gravity
The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 1-02)
civil administration
An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 1-02)

Civil Affairs
Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also known as CA. (JP 3-57)

Civil Affairs operations
Those military activities planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by Civil Affairs forces through, with, or by the indigenous population and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or other governmental agencies to modify behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of civil-military operations or other U.S. objectives. Also known as CAO.

civil information
Information developed from data with relation to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organization, people, and events, within the civil component of the commander’s environment that can be fused or processed to increase Department of Defense/interagency/intergovernmental organization/nongovernmental organization/indigenous population and institution situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance.

civil information grid
A tool that provides the capability to coordinate, collaborate, and communicate to develop the civil components of the common operational picture. The civil information grid increases the situational understanding for the supported commander by vertically and horizontally integrating the technical lines of communication. Also known as CIG.

civil information management
Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other U.S. Government/Department of Defense agencies, and international and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of both the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also known as CIM.

civil liaison team
A team that provides limited civil-military interface capability as a spoke for the exchange of information among indigenous populations and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other government agencies, and that has limited capability to link resources to prioritized requirements. Also known as CLT.
civil-military operations
The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 3-57)

civil-military operations center
A standing capability formed by all Civil Affairs units from the company level to the Civil Affairs command levels that serves as the primary coordination interface for the United States Armed Forces among indigenous populations and institutions, humanitarian organizations, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational military forces, and other civilian agencies of the United States Government. Also called CMOC.

civil reconnaissance
Targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation that focus on the civil aspects of the environment, specifically areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). Also known as CR.

consequence management
Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (JP 3-0)

displaced person
A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. (JP 1-02)

effect
1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 3-0)

evacuee
A civilian removed from his place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02)

force protection
Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance
Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (JP 3-0)
host nation
A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance
Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also known as HCA. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian assistance
Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also called HA. (JP 3-57)

indigenous populations and institutions
A generic term used to describe the civilian construct of an area of operations to include its population (legal citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians), governmental, tribal, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called IPI.

insurgency
An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

interagency
United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 3-08)

intergovernmental organization
An organization created by a formal agreement (for example, a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (JP 3-08)

internal defense and development
The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also known as IDAD. (JP 1-02)

internally displaced person
Any person who has left their residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country. Also known as IDP. (JP 1-02)

knowledge management
Techniques and procedures that encompass the processes and databases to integrate and synchronize the command and staff activity to generate supporting information and directives such as the effects tasking order, and operational reports. Also known as KM.

link
The behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between the nodes.
measure of effectiveness
A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also known as MOE. (JP 1-02)

military civic action
The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.). Also known as MCA. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organization
A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 3-08)

reachback
The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 1-02) The concept of connecting back to home station’s infrastructure through communications systems.

refugee
A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return. (JP 1-02)

resettler
Subset of internally displaced person or refugee—civilian wishing to return somewhere other than previously owned home or land within the country or area of original displacement.

response management team
United States Agency for International Development/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance support cell in Washington, DC, that manages response activities and coordinates interagency cooperation during foreign disasters when a disaster assistance response team is deployed to the field. Also known as RMT.

returnee
Either a refugee or an internally displaced person who has returned voluntarily to his or her former place of residence.

security assistance
Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also known as SA. (JP 1-02)

security assistance organization
All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. Also known as SAO. (JP 1-02)

Sphere Project
A program based on two core beliefs: first, that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of calamity and conflict, and second, that those affected by disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance.
**stateless person**
Civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed. (JP 1-02)

**support to civil administration**
Assistance given by U.S. armed forces to friendly or neutral foreign civilian governments or government agencies. Also known as SCA.

**system**
A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 1-02)

**terrorism**
The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

**war victim**
A classification created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes as a result of war.
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Index

A
95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 1-2
Army Tactical Command and Control System, 4-15
ASCOPE, 1-4, 2-3, 2-7, 3-3 through 3-5, 3-8, 3-20, 3-25, 3-26, 5-15, 5-17, E-3, F-2
assembly areas, F-10
assessment, 2-3, A-1
deliberate, 2-4, 2-5, 3-4, 3-21, A-23, G-13
initial, 2-5, 2-6, 3-24, A-1 through A-23
preliminary, 2-3, 2-4, 2-6, 3-4, A-1
rapid, iv, 2-5, 2-6, A-23 through A-28
B
blocking, F-9
C
Civil Affairs planning team, 1-2, 1-6, 3-18, 4-20
civil areas, 1-4, 3-25
civil information grid, 3-20
civil information management, 1-2, 2-4, 2-6 through 2-8, 3-20, 4-5 through 4-7, 5-1, 5-15 through 5-17, B-1, E-2
civil liaison team, 1-2, 4-7, 4-8, 4-20
civil organizations, 3-26
civil reconnaissance, 2-8, 4-6, 4-8, 5-16, 5-17, B-1, E-2
civil structures, 3-26
civil support operations, 5-13
civil-military operations center, 4-1
establishing, 4-20
facility considerations, 4-25
function, 4-2
layout, 4-26
location, 4-22
organization, 4-3
overview, 4-1
security, 4-26
Class A agents, G-4
clearing, F-9
closeout, G-19
CMO estimate, 3-4, 3-5, 3-7, 3-8, 3-12, 3-15, 3-18, 5-7
collection point, iv, F-23 through F-28, F-32
combatant commander, 1-2, 1-3, 1-7, 2-4, 3-1
Commander's Emergency Response Program, G-1 through G-5, G-11 through G-14, G-17, G-18
communication techniques, C-5
communications requirements, 4-14
communications section, 4-14, 4-18
consequence management, 5-8, through 5-10, 5-14
continuity of operations, 6-4
contracting officers, G-1, G-4
tested tasks, 1-3, 2-8, 4-2, 5-1
countermeasures, E-6, E-10
course of action, 3-13
analysis, 3-13
approval, 3-15
comparison, 3-15
development, 3-13
curfews, F-8
D
disaster relief, 4-23, 5-7 through 5-9, 5-13, 5-14, F-7, G-3
dislocated civilian, i, 1-5, 2-7, 2-8, 3-8, 3-19, 3-25, 5-2 through 5-5, 5-8, 5-9, A-28, E-2, F-1 through F-32
camp considerations, F-29
medical care, F-31
processing, F-26
E
economic stability section, 4-12
evacuation planning, F-28
F
field ordering officer, G-1, G-4, G-12, G-16
force protection, 3-2, 4-26, E-1 through E-3, E-5, E-6, E-8 through E-10, F-9
planning, E-2
foreign humanitarian assistance, 2-7, 2-8, 3-18, 3-19, 5-1, 5-3, 5-7 through 5-10, 5-12, 6-4, B-1, G-1
foreign internal defense, 5-10, 5-11
functional areas, iii, 1-4, 3-4, 4-8, A-1, A-5
functional specialty, 1-2 through 1-4, 3-17, 4-3, 4-5, 4-8, 4-14, 4-20, 5-1
G
G-1, iii, iv, 3-18, 4-14, G-5, G-7
G-2, iv, 3-18, 4-5, 4-6, 4-21, 4-22, F-15, F-28, G-5, G-8
G-3, iv, 3-19, 4-5, 4-21, F-1, G-5, G-9
G-4, iv, 3-19, 4-14, F-11, G-5, G-10
G-7, iv, 3-19, G-5, G-16
G-9, iv, 3-18, 4-3, 4-7, 4-21, F-11, F-21, F-22, G-5
geographical combatant commander, 1-6, 1-7, 3-1, 3-16, 3-17, 5-1, 5-6, 5-9, 5-11, 5-12, C-1, E-1
Global Command and Control System-Army, 4-15
Global Reconnaissance Information System, 4-17
governance section, 4-9
infrastructure section, 4-11
INMARSAT, 4-18, 4-19
interpreter
interview, C-4
preparation, C-4
selection, C-1
training, C-4
interpreters, C-1
joint operations planning, 3-3
Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan, 3-16
Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communications System,
4-17
JOPES, 3-2, 3-4, 3-16, 4-17
measures of effectiveness, 1-4,
2-7 through 2-9, 3-19
through 3-25, 5-5, 5-8, 6-2,
6-5, 6-6
measures of performance, 1-4,
2-7, 2-9, 3-19, 3-20, 3-24,
3-25
mediation, 4-2, D-1, D-2, D-4
through D-15
meeting, D-2
military civic action, 2-8, 5-10,
5-11, 5-12, G-1, G-13
military decision making
process, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 3-12,
3-15, 3-18, 3-25, 5-16, 6-5,
G-18
mission planning, 3-12
mobility requirements, 4-19
movement control, F-9
movement graph, F-4
movement planning factors,
F-2
movement table, F-5
nation assistance, 2-7, 2-8, 5-1,
5-10, 5-11, 5-12
National Security Presidential
Directive 44, 6-1
negotiation, C-2, D-1, D-4,
F-16, G-15
noncombatant evacuation
operations, 5-6, 5-7
operations and intelligence
section, 4-5
operations security, 4-26, B-2,
E-1, E-5, E-8, F-2
oral rehydration therapy, F-32
orders production, 3-15
paying agent, G-1, G-4, G-5,
G-12, G-13
physical security, E-1, E-2
planning, F-17
bottom-up, F-17
top-down, F-18
planning products, 3-27
populace and resources
control, 2-7, 2-8, 3-18, 3-19,
3-25, 4-18, 4-19, 5-1 through
5-3, 5-11, 5-12, F-1
population analysis, C-2
project purchase officers, G-12,
G-13
public education and
information section, 4-13
public health and welfare
section, 4-10
rapport establishment, C-3
research, B-1
techniques, iv, 3-7, B-1, B-2
route planning, F-11
rule of law section, 4-9
search engine, B-3 through B-8
security assistance, 5-10, 5-11,
F-31
Stafford Act, 5-13, 5-14
statement of work, G-14, G-15,
G-18
stay-put policy, F-7
strategic planning, 3-16
support to civil administration,
2-7, 2-8, 5-1, 5-12, 5-13, 6-3
sustainment section, 4-14
TF DC control, F-16
threat
assessment, E-3
definition, E-4
identification, E-3
level, E-5
transition, i, ii, 2-1, 2-2, 2-9,
3-23, 6-1 through 6-4, 6-6,
D-8, D-13, F-16
overview, 6-1
planning, 6-1
termination, 6-2
transfer, 6-2
USAID, 2-4, 5-7, 5-8, F-31,
G-3, G-17
vulnerability assessment, E-5
Warfighter Information
Network-Tactical, 4-17
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